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Paul Mendes-Flohr
Introduction: Dialogue as a
Trans-Disciplinary Concept
In a moment of disarming candor, Buber explained to a friend who was seeking
to promote his appointment to the faculty of the Hebrew University: “Ich bin kein
Universitätsmensch” – I am not a university person.¹ By this confession, written
just before he left Germany for Eretz Yisrael in March 1938, Buber meant that he
did not fit into – nor did he care to fit into the disciplinary classifications of the
university. His appointment to the faculty to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
was delayed by many years, primarily because those advocating his appoint-
ment– such as Gershom Scholem and even the president of the fledgling univer-
sity, Judah Leon Magnes – could not convince their colleagues that Buber was
indeed a Universtätsmensch.
Was Buber a philosopher? To be sure, he wrote extensively on philosophical
themes, but his mode of exposition did not quite conform to the accepted disqui-
sitional protocol of academic publications. Was he a scholar of comparative re-
ligion (Religionswissenschaft), which he taught as a Honorarprofessor or adjunct
professor at the University of Frankfurt? Was he a biblical scholar? After all he
translated (initially with Franz Rosenzweig) the Hebrew Scriptures into German,
wrote innumerable essays and (by 1938) no less than four major books on bib-
lical subjects? Was he a scholar of Hasidism and mysticism? Or perhaps he
was an art historian, having also written about art? He was of course all
these, yet not quite any. He lacked a clear disciplinary profile. Finally, after
ten years of negotiations a compromise was reached and he was granted a pro-
fessorship in social philosophy, which soon evolved into the founding chair of
the Hebrew University’s department of sociology.² Although Buber had studied
sociology and social philosophy with the likes of Georg Simmel and Wilhelm
Dilthey, and edited a highly acclaimed series of forty monographs in social psy-
chology, Die Gesellschaft, one would hardly regard him in the strict sense a so-
ciologist.
 Buber to S. H. Bergmann, letter dated 16 April 1936. Buber, Briefwechsel aus sieben Jahr-
zehnten, ed. Grete Schaeder (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Scheidner, 1973), vol 2: 589.
 On the complex trajectory of Buber’s academic career, see my article “Buber’s Rhetoric,” in:
Martin Buber: A Contemporary Perspective, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr
(Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities/Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 2002), 1–24.
In a word, he was a polymath of exceptional learning, a fact to which his
friend Franz Rosenzweig attested in a letter explaining why he had invited
Buber to join the faculty of the Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus in Frankfurt am Main:
I would not have invited him … had I not been utterly convinced from the very first mo-
ment of his absolute genuineness, to be exact, the integrity that has slowly taken hold of
him. … I do not know of anyone else who is as honest as he is with respect to spiritual
and intellectual matters, and as dependable in human affairs. I do not readily employ
superlatives…. [Yet I must acknowledge that] Buber is for me an imposing savant (Ge-
lehrter). I am not easily impressed by knowledge, because I myself have some. … But
in comparison to Buber’s learning, I regard myself a dwarf (Gegen Bubers Gelehrsamkeit
aber emfinde ich mich als einen Zwerg.). In the course of my conversations with him, every
time I seek to say something new, I encounter a commanding erudition – without a trace
of pretentiousness – not only in German and foreign literature ‘about,’ but also in the
primary writings of individuals whose names I hardly know. That I am also impressed
by his Judaic and Hebrew knowledge says less, although in recent years I have developed
a certain sense and learned to distinguish between a ‘little’ and a ‘great’ [knowledge in
Jewish matters]. There are areas of Judaica in which he is certainly in the strictest sense of
the term an expert (Fachmann).³
Buber’s reading was not only voracious but catholic, covering encyclopedic in-
terests in the human and social sciences, the arts and literature. The enormous
breadth of his intellectual universe is also registered in the catalogue of his
personal library of over 40,000 volumes and from the thematic scope of his
writings. Buber’s interdisciplinary horizons are also reflected in the critical ed-
ition of his writings that are currently in preparation initially under the joint
sponsorship of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, and since 2009
with Heinrich Heine University of Düsseldorf, and The Israel Academy of Sci-
ences and the Humanities, will comprise some 21 volumes, some containing










 Rosenzweig to Eugen Meyer, letter dated 23 January 1923, in Rosenzweig. Der Mensch und sein







Social and Cultural Theory
Theories of Translation
Theater and Literature
Art Criticism and Art History
Indeed, Buber’s interests were trans-disciplinary.What ultimately characterizes
his work in these multifarious fields is the principle of dialogue, which he em-
ployed as a comprehensive hermeneutic method.
As an interpretive method, dialogue has two distinct but ultimately conver-
gent vectors. The first is directed to the subject of one’s “investigation”: one is
to listen to the voice of the other and to suspend all pre-determined categories
and concepts that one may have of the other; dialogue is, first and foremost,
the art of unmediated listening. In a sense Buber’s principle of dialogue ex-
tends Isaac Newton’s maxim: Hypotheses non fingo: I feign no hypotheses. Dia-
logue is, of course, more than a method ensuring maximum objectivity; dia-
logue has manifest cognitive and thus existential significance. By listening
to the Other attentively, by allowing the voice of the Other to penetrate, so
to speak, one’s very being, to allow the words of the Other – articulated acous-
tically and viscerally – to question one’s pre-established positions fortified by
professional, emotional, intellectual and ideological commitments, one must
perforce be open to the possibility of being challenged by that voice. As
Eugen Rosenstock-Heussy put it: Respondo etsi mutabor, I respond, although
I will be changed; “I respond, even though I may change in the process!” Gen-
uine dialogue thus entails a risk, the ‘danger’ that by truly listening to the other
– be the other an individual, a text, a work of art – that one might, indeed, be
changed, transformed cognitively and existentially.
On a more prosaic but no less significant level, Buber envisioned dialogue
as a scholarly conversation conducted between various disciplinary perspec-
tives. In his study of the origins of the biblical conception of Messianism, Kö-
nigtum Gottes, he not only drew upon the canon of biblical scholarship, dem-
onstrating a mastery of textual skills finely honed by exhaustive philological
analysis (grounded in a nuanced knowledge of ancient Near Eastern languag-
es), but also upon archaeology, history, and sociology. Incidentally, in this
monumental study, Buber was in particular beholden to the work of Max
Weber, whom he knew personally and whom he effusively extolled in the pref-
Introduction: Dialogue as a Trans-Disciplinary Concept 3
ace of the volume as “a most extraordinary person” (ein außenordentlicher
Mensch).⁴
And it is Weber who comes to mind when adjudging Buber’s transdisciplina-
ry disposition. In his memorable lecture of 1918 Science as Vocation (Wissen-
schaft als Beruf) Weber bemoaned the imperious, but given the inherent logic
of modern science a necessary drive to disciplinary specialization:
In our time, the internal situation [of scholarship is] conditioned by the fact that [it] has
entered a phase of specialization previously unknown and that this will forever remain
the case. Not only externally, but also inwardly, matters stand at a point where the individ-
ual can acquire the sure consciousness of achieving something truly perfect in the field of
science only if he is a strict specialist. All work that overlaps neighboring fields … is bur-
dened with the resigned realization that at best one provides the specialist with useful
questions upon which he would not so easily hit from his specialized point of view. …
Only by strict specialization can the scientific worker (Wissenschaftler) become fully con-
scious… that he has achieved something that will endure. A really definitive and good ac-
complishment is today always a specialized accomplishment.⁵
And whoever lacks this “passionate devotion,” as Weber put it, to specialized re-
search – “without this strange intoxication, ridiculed by every outsider” – “you
have no calling for science and you should do something else.”⁶
Nearly seventy years after Weber penned this plea for a sober resignation to
“the fate of our times”⁷ that knowledge must be pursued by way of often radical-
ly divergent disciplinary paths and with the circumscribed tools of the specialist,
Jürgen Habermas questioned whether specialization has not gone too far. With
respect to the social sciences, he lamented that they are each locked into a “re-
strictive line of inquiry” creating a condition of “mutual incomprehension,” such
that the adherents of different methodological approaches “scarcely have any-
thing to say to one another.”⁸ Such scholarly autism, Habermas suggested, pre-
vails in the humanities as well. Far more distressing, in Habermas’s view, is the
resulting isolation of the academic inquiry from the “life-world,” the real life of
human beings to which he believes science should ultimately serve.
Two alternative responses to stem the centrifugal tendencies to disciplinary
fragmentation have emerged in the last decades, which have witnessed an ever-
 Buber, Königtum Gottes (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1932)
 Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in: From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed.
by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), 134 f.
 Ibid., 135.
 Ibid., 155.
 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press,
1989), vol. 2: 375.
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increasing attention to inter-disciplinary scholarship. The first has been a call to
put a halt to the fragmentation of knowledge due to what is perceived as inordi-
nate specialization by development of an epistemological synthesis, yielding it is
hoped a comprehensive unified theory of knowledge. Wary of the theoretical
monism implied by such a synthesis, other scholars have called for what Charles
Camic and Hans Joas have recently described as a “dialogical turn.” ⁹
Focusing on the social sciences, Camic and Joas observe that:
Rather than decry the multiplicity of theories, methods, and research findings and then
seek their integration in a unifying framework, the characteristic of this response is that
it welcomes the presence of a plurality of orientations and approaches as an opportunity
for productive intellectual dialogue. ¹⁰
The intention of dialogue – Camic and Joas underscore – is not a strategy to pro-
mote some ultimate synthesis, but simply to foster cross-disciplinary conversa-
tion. “Dialogue among different intellectual perspectives is a paramount objec-
tive in its own right.” Further, they remark, “in contrast to programs for
synthesis that would minimize intellectual differences, or pluralist alternatives
that would neglect their productive interplay, the dialogical approach is” –
and here Camic and Joas cite one of the leading proponents of the dialogical
turn in the social sciences, David N. Levine – “one that connects different
parts of the community [of scholars], while fully respecting what appear to be
irreducible differences.”¹¹ Levine, incidentally, is explicitly indebted to Buber
and his teaching that dialogue takes place in an ontological space – das Zwi-
schenmenschliche – that arises between one human being and another when
they meet as two independent, utterly autonomous subjects, a meeting Buber
more poetically called eine Ich-Du Beziehung, an I-Thou relation.
Weber had perhaps also such a dialogue in mind when he parenthetically
noted in the citation we brought from his lecture “Science as a Vocation” that
the specialist may turn to other disciplines in order to garner “useful questions
upon which he would not so easily hit from his own specialized point of view.”¹²
To be sure, Weber acknowledged this form of inter-disciplinary dialogue in less
buoyant terms than Camic and Joas; nor would he of course endorse Buber’s on-
 The Dialogical Turn: New Roles for Sociology in the Postdisciplinary Age, eds. Charles Camic
and Hans Joas, (Landham, Maryland: Rowman and Littefield, 2003).
 Ibid., 5
 Ibid., 9 f. The citation is from Levine, Visions of the Sociological Tradition (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1995), 297.
 Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 134 f.
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tological presuppositions.What he would regard as crucial is the urgent need for
a trans-disciplinary conversation.
In support of the dialogical turn we may also conscript Goethe. In contrast to
romanticism, which he defined as an illness, the great poet celebrated classicism
as sanity. The early romantic poet and philosopher Novalis, it is said unwittingly
provided the key to a fuller understanding of Goethe’s judgment by his assertion
that the essence of romanticism is to transform a single event or individual fact
into an absolute and general explanatory principle. In contrast, classicism, ac-
cording to Goethe, while recognizing several principles as fundamentally inde-
pendent of one another, although closely interconnected and organically related.
Only by virtue of their organic interrelatedness are these disparate principles ca-
pable of creating and forming humanity’s spiritual world.¹³ Buber shared this
conviction that our spiritual universe is comprised of a multitude of ontically in-
dependent and irreducible voices, which are to be brought into harmony though
dialogue, a conversation that unfolds in the ontological space of das Zwischen-
menschliche – in dem Treffpunkt des Zwischenmenschlichen.
The objective of this volume is to explore the reception of Buber’s philoso-
phy of dialogue in some of the disciplines that fell within the purview of his
own writings: Anthropology, Hasidism, Inter-Faith Encounter, Psychology, and
Conflict Resolution, especially as it bears upon the seemingly intractable Isra-
eli-Palestinian conflict that so profoundly exercised Buber.
The transdisciplinary perspective that this volume seeks to promote is in-
spired by a statement that Buber gave towards the end of life in response to a
request that he summarize his life’s work in one succinct thesis. His reply
was: “Ich habe keine Lehre, aber ich führe ein Gespräch” – I have no doctrine,
but I conduct a conversation. It is this conversation we wish to continue in
this symposium. And if I may add a Buberian sentiment, we will exchange
ideas and listen to one another, “risking” the danger that we might change
our opinions along the way.
 Cf. Dimitri Gawronsky, “Ernst Cassirer: His Life and Work”, in The Philosophy of Ernst Cas-
sirer, ed., P. A. Schlipp (La Salle, IL, 1973), 34f.
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Jürgen Habermas*
A Philosophy of Dialogue
On 24 November 1938, Martin Buber, who had emigrated to Palestine just eight
months before, wrote to his friend and son-in-law Ludwig Strauss: “To judge
by a necessarily vague message from Frankfurt, all of our possessions in Hep-
penheim seem to have been destroyed.”¹ The Kristallnacht pogroms undoubtedly
mark a deep caesura in Buber’s long and incomparably productive career. The
next twenty-seven active years at the Hebrew University certainly give weight
to the second part of his adult life. But Buber, at 60, was already a world-re-
nowned figure when he reached this safe harbour. At the time, he could already
look back on a full life in the German-speaking world, devoted from the start to
the Jewish cause. This circumstance may explain the honourable but far from ob-
vious invitation extended to me, a German colleague, to deliver the inaugural
lecture in this newly established series. For this, I would like to express my grat-
itude to the members of the Israel Academy.²
Historical representations of Jewish culture in the German Empire and in the
Weimar Republic depict Martin Buber not only as a leading figure in the Zionist
movement but more specifically as the authoritative spokesman of a Jewish cul-
tural renaissance that enjoyed the support of a younger generation.³ The Jung
Judah movement, which took shape around 1900 within the orbit of the other
youth and reform movements, understood this awakening as the birth of a mod-
ern Jewish national culture. Buber made himself its spokesperson when he de-
livered his first programmatic speech at the Fifth Zionist Congress in Basel in
1901. Following his publications on the hasidic Stories of Rabbi Nachman of
Bratslav and The Legend of the Baal Shem Tov, the wider public also regarded
him as the spiritual leader of so-called cultural Zionism. In 1916, Buber realized
his long-cherished plan of publishing a monthly Jewish periodical. Der Jude pro-
* Originally delivered in May 2012 as the inaugural lecture of the annual Martin Buber Lecture of
the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem, and published in the Proceedings of
the Academy,VIII/6 (2013). Published here with the kind permission of Professor Habermas and
the Israel Academy.
 Tuvia Rübner and Dafna Mach, eds., Briefwechsel Martin Buber – Ludwig Strauß (Frankfurt
a.M: Luchterhand, 1990), 229.
 The present text has much benefited from the careful editing of Deborah Greniman of the Aca-
demy’s Publications Department. Prof. Paul Mendes-Flohr kindly read the edited text and made
some important corrections.
 Martin Brenner, Jüdische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000), 32ff.
vided the intellectually ambitious platform that brought together such diverse
writers as Franz Kafka, Arnold Zweig, Gustav Landauer and Eduard Bernstein.
Buber’s friendship with Franz Rosenzweig acquired major importance. In
1920, after returning from the war with his book The Star of Redemption, Rose-
nzweig opened the Jüdisches Lehrhaus in Frankfurt, which was destined to be-
come a model for similar institutions throughout the republic.With his program
of ‘New Learning’, Rosenzweig channelled the impulses of the contemporary
adult education movement in a direction that could not fail to be congenial to
Buber. As he announced in his opening address, Rosenzweig supported ‘a learn-
ing in reverse order. A learning that no longer starts from the Torah and leads
into life, but the other way round: from life, from a world that knows nothing
about the Law, or pretends to know nothing, back to the Torah. This is the
sign of the time’.⁴ Rosenzweig secured Buber as a permanent lecturer in the
Lehrhaus and his closest collaborator. The famous Bible translation based on
the leitmotifs discernible in the original Hebrew was also a product of their co-
operation.
In retrospect, the list of lecturers at the Lehrhaus is made up almost exclu-
sively of famous names – including, among others, Leo Baeck, Siegfried Kraca-
uer, Leo Strauss, Erich Fromm, Gershom Scholem, S. Y. Agnon, Ernst Simon and
Leo Löwenthal. If we read today in Michael Brenner’s historical study⁵ that Mar-
tin Buber was the ‘most prominent teacher’ in this circle and ‘the most famous
German-Jewish thinker of the Weimar period’, we needn’t scratch our heads over
a letter written in his support by the dean of the University of Frankfurt’s phil-
osophical faculty. When Walter F. Otto applied to the Education Ministry in
1930 to transform the lectureship that Buber had occupied since 1924 into a sal-
aried honorary professorship, he could confine himself to the laconic statement
that there was nobody more suitable than Buber, “who is so well known that one
can dispense with a detailed description of his achievements.”⁶ Buber resigned
from this chair in 1933, immediately after Hitler’s accession to power, without
waiting for the purge that would strip the University of Frankfurt of one third
of its faculty.
In 1953, a couple of years before I began my academic career at this same
university in the role of Theodor Adorno’s assistant, I encountered Martin
Buber on a single occasion (though only in the midst of a huge audience of stu-
 Franz Rosenzweig, ‘Upon Opening the Jüdisches Lehrhaus’, in idem, On Jewish Learning, ed.
Nahum Norbert Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1955), 98.
 Brenner, Jüdische Kultur (above, note 3), 90, 96.
 Notker Hammerstein, Die Geschichte der Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main
(Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1989), vol. 1: 120.
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dents). Buber had returned to Germany for the first time after the war and the
Holocaust. Time and again my wife and I have recalled that memorable evening
in Lecture Hall no. 10 at the University of Bonn – less so the content of the lec-
ture than the moment of Buber’s appearance, when the clamour in the overflow-
ing auditorium suddenly fell still. The entire audience rose to its feet in awe as
Federal President Theodor Heuss, as if to underscore the extraordinary nature
of the visit, solemnly escorted the comparatively small figure of the white-haired,
bearded old man, the sage from Israel, down the long passage leading from the
row of windows to the podium. Seen through the lens of memory, the entire eve-
ning becomes focused on this single dignified moment.
What I did not understand at the time was that this scene also embodied an
essential idea in Buber’s philosophy: the power of the performative, which over-
shadows the content of what is said. I must confess that today my reflections on
the public role played by Buber in the early years of the Federal Republic are
tinged with a certain ambivalence. In those years he featured centrally in Jew-
ish–Christian encounters, which happened to link up with his earlier and similar
initiatives in the Weimar era. These encounters certainly were not devoid of seri-
ous substance, and they will have fostered a critical attitude on the part of many.
However, they also fit into the then-pervasive intellectual climate, which re-
sponded to a muddled need for an inward-looking and a-political assimilation
of the “recent past” – a genre to which Adorno attached the label “jargon of au-
thenticity.” In post-war Germany, Martin Buber, the reconciliatory religious inter-
locutor, was the antipode of the implacable Gershom Scholem, who opened our
eyes during the 1960s to the obverse side of such casual invocations of the so-
called German–Jewish symbiosis.
Ladies and gentlemen, you have not invited me here to speak on the reli-
gious author and wise man, the Zionist and popular educator Martin Buber.
Buber was a philosopher as well, and as such, toward the end of his life, he
rightly became the twelfth laureate in the pantheon of those honoured by inclu-
sion in the distinguished Living Philosophers series, following, among others,
John Dewey, Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, Ernst Cassirer, Karl Jas-
pers and Rudolf Carnap. In that framework, some of the best minds in the dis-
cipline engaged in the discussion of his work.⁷ At its centre was and still is
the I–Thou relationship around which Buber’s philosophical thought crystal-
lized. I will address his thought, firstly, by situating this philosophical idea in
 Paul Arthur Schilpp and Maurice Friedman, eds., The Philosophy of Martin Buber (La Salle, IL:
Open Court, 1967). Among the participants in this volume of critical evaluations of Buber’s phi-
losophy were Gabriel Marcel, Charles Harthorne, Emmanuel Levinas, Emil Brunner, Max Brod,
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Jacob Taubes, C. F. von Weizsäcker, Helmut Kuhn and Walter Kaufmann.
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the history of philosophy. I would then like, secondly, to explain the systematic
import of this foundational idea by hinting at the implications that can be drawn
from Buber’s approach, independently of his own interests. I will conclude,
thirdly, with the characteristic philosophical achievements of religious authors
as translators from one domain into another. In Martin Buber’s case, the human-
ist grounding of his Zionism can be understood in terms of the translation of par-
ticular religious intuitions into generalizing philosophical concepts.
(1) Buber wrote his dissertation on Nicholas of Cusa and Jakob Böhme. Aside
from his love of Hasidism,⁸ which had arisen partly in response to the emergence
of the Frankist sects inspired by Sabbatai Zvi, the question arises of whether
Buber already then had some inkling of the astounding affinity between the im-
agery invoked by Böhme and that limned by the doctrines of Jewish mysticism –
an affinity to which Scholem would later draw attention with an anecdote about
the visit of the Swabian Pietist F. C. Oetinger to the kabbalist Koppel Hecht in the
Frankfurt ghetto.⁹ Buber himself describes his breakthrough to the major philo-
sophical insight that would shape the remainder of his work in the manner of a
conversion extending over the years of the First World War. Whereas up to that
point he had interpreted his religious experience in mystical terms, as withdraw-
al into an extraordinary dimension, he henceforth rejected the loss of self into
unification with an all-encompassing divinity. The place of this absorbing and
dissolving contact was now taken by a dialogical relationship to God that is
as it were normalized, though it is not levelled down. Contrary to the speechless
mystical experience, this relationship between the individual and God as a sec-
ond person is mediated by words.
In his old age Buber described his repudiation of mysticism in stark words:
Since then I have given up the ‘religious’ which is nothing but the exception, the extraction,
exaltation or ecstasy …. The mystery is no longer disclosed, it … has made its dwelling here
where everything happens as it happens. I know no fullness but each mortal hour’s fullness
of claim and responsibility. Though far from being equal to it, I know that in the claim I am
claimed and may respond in responsibility … If that is religion then it is simply all that is
lived in its possibility of dialogue.¹⁰
These words summarize the inspiration underlying the reflections on which
Buber had been working since 1917 and which he published in 1923 under the
 On Buber’s interest in Hasidism see Hans-Joachim Werner, Martin Buber (Frankfurt a/M–New
York: Campus, 1994), 146ff.
 Gershom G. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken, 1995), 238.
 Martin Buber, ‘Autobiographical Fragments’, in Schilpp and Friedman, The Philosophy of
Martin Buber (above, note 7), 26.
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title Ich und Du (I and Thou). His later writings are footnotes to this major work.
The interpersonal relationship with God as the “eternal Thou” structures the lin-
guistic network of relations in which every person always already finds himself
or herself as the interlocutor of other persons: “to be man means to be the being
that is over against other human beings and god.”¹¹
As can be read off from the system of personal pronouns, however, the sit-
uation of human beings in the world is conditioned by the fact that this ‘being
over against’ must be differentiated into two different attitudes, depending on
whether those who are ‘over against’ one are other persons or other objects.
The interpersonal relationship between a first and a second person, between
an ‘I’ and a ‘Thou,’ is different in kind from the objectifying relationship between
a third person and an object, between an ‘I’ and an ‘It’. Any interpersonal rela-
tionship calls for the reciprocal interpenetration of the perspectives that those
involved direct to each other, such that each participant is capable of adopting
the perspective of the other. It is part of the dialogical relationship that the per-
son addressed can assume the role of the speaker, just as, in turn, the speaker
can assume that of the addressee. In contrast with this symmetry, the observer’s
gaze is fixed asymmetrically upon an object – which cannot return the gaze of
the observer.
In relation to this difference between the I–Thou and the I–It relationship,
Buber provides compelling phenomenological descriptions. He discovers a cor-
responding difference between the roles of the respective subjects who say ‘I.’
In the one relationship, the ‘I’ features as an actor, in the other as an observer.
An actor ‘enters into’ an interpersonal relationship and ‘performs’ this relation-
ship, usually by means of a speech act. This performative aspect of speech is dif-
ferent from the content and the object of communication; that is, we must distin-
guish the performative aspect of the conversation from its content. Because those
involved do not spy or eavesdrop upon one another as objects, but rather open
themselves up for one another, they encounter each other in the social forum de-
limited by dialogue and, as contemporaries, become narratively involved in each
other’s stories. They can both occupy the same place in social space and histor-
ical time only when they encounter each other as second persons in this per-
formative attitude. Moreover, an encounter assumes the form of making the
other present in his or her entirety. This ‘making the other present’ as a person
forms the compass within which the perception of the other is selectively focused
on the features that are essential to the individual person herself, rather than
 Ibid., 35.
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shifting at will from one detail to the next, as in the case of the observation of an
object.
Buber describes in somewhat flowery terms this priority of the performative
in the encounter: “The primary word I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole
being. The primary word I–It can never be spoken with the whole being.”¹² To be
sure, the observer also acts, insofar as he has to ‘adopt’ an objectifying attitude
toward the object; but, in actu, the performative aspect completely disappears for
him behind the object itself, the theme of his perception or judgment. Intentione
recta, the observer disregards his own situation; by attending to something in the
world as if it were ‘from nowhere’, he abstracts himself from his own anchoring
in social space and lived historical time. This first move of juxtaposing actor and
observer is too simple, however. Even acting subjects often have shielded egos;
they, too, can screen themselves off and treat their interlocutors not as second
persons but as objects – not as partners in dialogue, but instrumentally, like a
doctor operating on the body of a patient, or strategically, like a clever bank
manager palming off loans upon his customers.
From the perspective of cultural criticism, these monological modes of ac-
tion can even become the dominant mode of interaction in society as a whole.
Against the background of his overall sceptical attitude toward the progressive
expansion of the social domains of strategic and purposive-rational action in
the course of social modernization,¹³ Buber’s practical interest focused narrowly
on a couple of outstanding face-to-face relationships such as friendship or love.
Even within the set of communicative actions, these samples of intimacy consti-
tute only a marginal segment, but they are emblematic of what Buber calls ‘dia-
logical being’. What stands out in this ideal type of unprotected encounter, in
which the participants are ‘turned toward each other’ in authentic togetherness,
are those performative aspects that are otherwise hidden by the thematic or con-
tent aspects of conversations and interactions.
Buber shares this attention to the performative with other versions of con-
temporary existential philosophy, which try as well to uncover, beneath the
‘what’ of the supposed ‘essence’ of human beings, the buried mode and modal-
ity of this life, the ‘how’ of its being-in-the-world –which oscillates in turn be-
tween authentic and inauthentic being. For the distinguishing feature of
human life is that it is up to the individual to lead it, and this effort can fail. Phe-
nomenology, historicism and pragmatism share this interest in the performative
 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans., Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Continuum, 1957), 11.
 Ibid., 56: “But in times of sickness it comes about that the world of It, no longer penetrated
and fructified by the inflowing world of Thou as by living streams but separated and stagnant, a
gigantic ghost of the fens, overpowers man.”
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character of life as it is lived. In this respect all modern philosophers are heirs of
the Young Hegelians, who initiated the de-transcendentalization and deflation of
reason – what Marx had called the ‘decomposition’ of Hegel’s absolute spirit.
This philosophical movement situates reason itself in social space and historical
time. It takes as its goal the embodiment of reason in the human organism and in
social practice – that is, in the cooperative ways in which communicatively so-
cialized subjects cope with the contingencies and conflicts of their environment.
Buber was as alert to this Young Hegelian heritage as he was to the affinity of his
thinking with contemporary existential philosophy. He engaged with Feuerbach,
Marx and Kierkegaard as intensively as with Jaspers, Heidegger and Sartre.What
sets him apart within this extended family, however, is the attention he paid to
the communicative constitution of human existence, which he describes, follow-
ing Wilhelm von Humboldt and Ludwig Feuerbach, in terms of a philosophy of
dialogue.¹⁴
(2) The point of departure is the phenomenon of being spoken to: ‘Life
means being addressed’¹⁵ such that the one must ‘confront’ the other, and this
in a twofold sense. The person addressed must allow himself to be confronted
by the other, by being open to an I–Thou relationship; and he must take a stance
on what this other says to him, in the simplest case with a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No.’ In being
willing to be called to account by another person and to be answerable to her,
the individual addressed exposes herself to the non-objectifiable presence of
the other person and recognizes her as a non-representable source of autono-
mous claims. At the same time, she subjects herself to the semantic and discur-
sive commitments imposed by language and dialogue. By the same token, the
reciprocity of the reversal of roles between addressee and speaker lends the dia-
logical relationship an egalitarian character. The willingness to accept the dia-
logical obligations imposed by the other is bound up with a pattern of attitudes
that is as egalitarian as it is individualist. However, Buber is not painting an iren-
ic picture. Exactly in the most intimate relationship, the other must be taken se-
riously in her individuated nature and be recognized in her radical otherness.¹⁶
In the need to balance these two contradictory expectations – Buber speaks of
 On Humboldt, see Martin Buber, Zwiesprache, in idem, Das dialogische Prinzip (Heidelberg:
Lambert Schneider, 1979), 178; on Feuerbach, see Buber, Das Problem des Menschen (Gütersloh:
Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1982), 58 ff. On the stimuli that Buber received from his contempora-
ries, see especially Michael Theunissen, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Hei-
degger, Sartre, and Buber,trans., by Christopher Macann (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), §46.
 Buber, Zwiesprache (above, note 14), 153.
 Martin Buber, Die Frage an den Einzelnen, in idem, Das dialogische Prinzip (above, note 14),
233; on this issue, see Werner, Martin Buber (above, note 8), 48 ff.
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“expansion into its own being and turning to connection”¹⁷ – he identifies the
source of the unease generally lurking in this kind of communicative socializa-
tion.
To be sure, the religious author radicalizes the philosophy of dialogue into
the ‘true conversation’ in which the finger of God is at work; but the inquiry
of the philosopher also offers interesting points of contact for the deflated
post-metaphysical mode of analysis. In the years since Buber set out this idea,
the relevant discourses have branched out in different directions. Let me begin
with the most important and highly controversial question: What is more funda-
mental, self-consciousness and the epistemic relationship of the self with itself,
or the communicative relationship with the other in dialogue? Which of the two
can claim priority over the other – monological self-relation or dialogical mu-
tuality? In his 1964 postdoctoral dissertation, Michael Theunissen positioned
Buber’s philosophy of dialogue as an alternative approach to Husserl’s deriva-
tion of the lifeworld from the constitutive acts of the transcendental subject.¹⁸
I may refer in this context – and not merely by way of local interest – to the ques-
tion Nathan Rotenstreich once posed to Buber: “whether reflection itself is but
an extraction from the primacy of mutuality or whether mutuality presupposes
reflection.”¹⁹
In classic mentalist terms, Rotenstreich defends the primacy of reflection
against the interpersonal relation. According to the mentalist argument, realiz-
ing a relation between a first and a second person presupposes that the subject
who is capable of using the word ‘I’ has already differentiated himself from an-
other subject; and this act of differentiation presupposes in turn an antecedent
epistemic relationship to self, because a subject cannot distance himself from
other subjects without first having perceived and identified himself as a sub-
ject.²⁰ The fraught tenor of Buber’s detailed response to his Jerusalem colleague
shows that this controversy turns on a deep-seated paradigm dispute. Are
human beings basically cognitive subjects who first relate to themselves reflex-
ively in the same objectifying attitude as that in which they relate to something
 I and Thou (above, note 12), 87.
 Theunissen, The Other (above, note 14), 291.
 Nathan Rotenstreich, “The Right and the Limitations of Martin Buber’s Dialogical Thought,”
in: Schilpp and Friedman, The Philosophy of Martin Buber (above, note 7), 124 f.
 Ibid., pp. 125 f.: “If we do not grant the status of consciousness of one’s own self we are fac-
ing the riddle how could a human being realize that it is he as a human being who maintains
relations to things and to living beings and is not just submerged but amounts to a twofold at-
titude of detachment (i.e., in the I–It-relation) and attachment (in the I-Thou-relation) … How is
it possible to be both detached and attached without the consciousness of oneself as a constit-
utive feature of the whole situation?”
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in the objective world? In that case, what sets them apart from all other living
beings is self-consciousness. Or does one subject first become aware of himself
as a subject in communication with the other? In that case, it is not self-con-
sciousness but language and the corresponding form of communicative sociali-
zation that is the distinguishing feature of human existence.
Buber conceives of human beings not primarily as subjects of cognition but
rather as practical beings who have to enter into interpersonal relationships in
order to cope, through cooperation, with the contingencies of the objective
world. In his view, human beings are distinguished, too, by their ability to dis-
tance themselves from themselves – but not in the manner of self-objectification:
“It is incorrect to see in the fact of primal distance a reflecting position of a spec-
tator.”²¹ The feature that sets human beings apart from animals is not self-reflec-
tion in the sense of turning a reiterated subject–object or I–It relationship upon
oneself. Our lives are instead performed in the triadic communicative relation-
ship between a first and a second person while communicating about objects
in the world.²² The phenomenon of self-consciousness is derived from dialogue:
‘The person becomes conscious of himself as sharing in being, as co-existing’.²³
In advance of any explicit self-reflection, the subject is caught up in an interper-
sonal relationship and first becomes aware of herself performatively by adopting
the perspective of the other towards herself: “The I that (first) emerges is aware
of itself, but without reflecting on itself so as to become an object.”²⁴
Buber has a rather special justification for the priority of the dialogical rela-
tionship over self-consciousness: the a priori of prayer. Buber accords the rela-
tionship with the ‘eternal Thou’ a constitutive status. And because the encounter
with the original word of God structures all possible conversations within the
world, Buber can assert: “Nothing helps me so much to understand man and
his existence as does speech.”²⁵ Note: ‘speech,’ and not language as such!
Like Rosenzweig, Buber participates in his own way in the linguistic turn of
twentieth-century philosophy.²⁶ Understandably enough, he has no interest in
a semantics which, in Richard Rorty’s words, is merely a continuation of seven-
teenth-century epistemology by language-analytical means. Wittgenstein’s turn
 Martin Buber, ‘Replies to my Critics’, in Schilpp and Friedman, The Philosophy of Martin
Buber (above, note 7), 695.
 Karl-Otto Apel, ‘Die Logos-Auszeichnung der menschlichen Sprache’, in idem, Paradigmen
der Ersten Philosophie (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011).
 Buber, I and Thou (above, note 12), 52.
 Ibid.
 Buber, ‘Replies to my Critics’ (above, note 21), 696.
 On this see Apel, Paradigmen der Ersten Philosophie (above, note 22), Part I.
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to the use of language was more congenial to Buber’s view. At any rate, he had
the important and correct intuition that without the dialogically created ‘be-
tween’ of an intersubjectively shared background, we cannot achieve objectivity
of experience or judgment – and the converse is true as well.
With his analysis of the twofold perspective of the I–Thou/I–It relation,
Buber directs attention to the interpenetration of two equally fundamental rela-
tionships: the intersubjective relationship between addressee and speaker
(which is constitutive for communication), on the one hand, and the intentional
and objectifying relation to something in the world (about which both commu-
nicate), on the other. The mutual perspective operating between I and Thou
makes the sharing of intentions towards objects in the world possible, while in-
dividual perceptions of something in the world acquire their objectivity only by
the fact that they are shared between different subjects. This complex relation-
ship is reflected in the competent use of the system of personal pronouns and
of the associated referential terms. The very knowledge of competent speakers
about how to use personal pronouns and deictic expressions, which forms the
pragmatic frame for any possible communication, depends upon the systematic
interpenetration of I–Thou and I–It relations.
Allow me to mention in passing an empirical confirmation of this philosoph-
ical proposition that is very close to Buber’s fundamental insight. In psycholog-
ical experiments on language development, Michael Tomasello has demonstrat-
ed the relevance of the triadic relationship for interactions with children at the
prelinguistic stage.²⁷ Children of around twelve months follow the pointing ges-
tures of caregivers (or point with their own fingers) in order to draw the attention
of the other person to certain things and to share their perceptions with them. At
the horizontal level, mother and child also grasp each other’s intentions through
the direction of gaze, so that an I–Thou relation – i.e., a social perspective – aris-
es which enables them to direct their attention to the same object in the vertical
I–It direction. By means of the pointing gesture – soon also in combination with
mimicry – children acquire knowledge shared intersubjectively with the mother
of the jointly identified and perceived object, and on this basis the gesture then
ultimately acquires its conventional meaning.
(3) Martin Buber did not pursue further the obvious path of developing his
dialogical-philosophical approach in terms of a philosophy of language.²⁸ Na-
than Rotenstreich already criticized him, not entirely without justification, for fo-
 Michael Tomasello, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2000); idem, Origins of Human Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
 See Jürgen Habermas, Philosophische Texte (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 2009), II: Rationali-
täts- und Sprachtheorie.
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cusing on the performative aspect of the I–Thou relationship, on the ‘how’ of the
‘making-present’ of the other person, while neglecting the cognitive aspect of the
I–It relation, that is, the representation of a state of affairs and the corresponding
truth claims. Buber’s well-taken critique of the fixation of the major philosoph-
ical traditions on the cognitive grasp of beings, on the self-reflection of the know-
ing subject and the representative function of language, often slides too quickly
into cultural criticism. In lumping all objectifying stances toward the world to-
gether with the objectivistic tendencies of the age, he throws the baby out
with the bathwater by exposing them all to blanket suspicion. On the other
hand, there is a trivial reason why Buber did not exhaust the theoretical potential
of his own approach: his overriding interest in issues of ethical-existential self-
understanding. The weak normativity that is already inherent in the pragmatics
of linguistic communication as such is eclipsed by the strong ethical normativity
of binding oughts and authentic life projects.
Buber the philosopher cannot be detached from the religious author. He be-
longs to the small set of distinguished religious authors with philosophical am-
bitions reaching from Kierkegaard, Josiah Royce and William James, through the
young Ernst Bloch,Walter Benjamin and Emmanuel Levinas, up to contempora-
ries such as Jacques Derrida. These thinkers continued under the changed con-
ditions of modernity a labour of translation that could take place in an incon-
spicuous, osmotic way as long as Greek metaphysics was administered and
developed under the auspices of the theologians of the Abrahamic religions
after the closure of the Academy. Once this fragile symbiosis was dissolved by
nominalism, the subversive and regenerative force of an assimilation of religious
semantics by the rational discourse of philosophy could unfold only in the broad
daylight of advancing secularization.
The philosophers now had to ‘out’ themselves as religious authors, as it
were, if they wanted to salvage untapped semantic contents from the well articu-
lated wealth of the great axial religions by their translation into generally acces-
sible philosophical concepts and discourses. Conversely, a pluralistic public has
something to learn from these authors precisely because, in a manner of speak-
ing, they pass religious intuitions through a philosophical sieve and thereby strip
them of the specificity and exclusivity lent them by their original religious com-
munities. This role of the religious author in modern times may also explain the
position that Martin Buber assumed in the political public arena. His disagree-
ment with Herzl is well known. For Buber, the Zionist project was more than
just a political undertaking whose aim was first the state’s foundation and
later its self-assertion as a sovereign Jewish state. But not every interpretation
of cultural Zionism was incompatible with such a project; in some readings, cul-
tural Zionism was meant to complement national power politics. Buber per-
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ceived the remaining difference from the perspective of a religious author who
wanted to ground the project of a Jewish national culture in the concepts of a
philosopher. He was interested in a justification of Zionism issuing not only
from an ethno-national perspective – a justification grounded in normative
terms and in arguments intended to convince everybody.
Buber thought that it was necessary to justify the Zionist idea in humanist
terms. That would be unsurprising from a Kantian point of view. But Buber
was no more a Kantian or a Neokantian than Gershom Scholem, Ernst Simon
or Hugo Bergmann. This generation of German-Jewish intellectuals took their in-
spiration, in the spirit of a contemporary philosophy of life, from Herder’s early
romantic discovery of the nation, of language and of culture, rather than from
the tradition of the Enlightenment proper. On the one hand, from their perspec-
tive, the meagre rational substance left of religion after Kant, Cohen and the sci-
ence of Judaism was too little; more interesting, for them, was the mystical un-
derside of religion or the dark side revealed by Bachofen. On the other, they had
forgotten neither the household deities who presided over their parental homes
– Spinoza and Lessing, Mendelssohn and Kant, Goethe and Heine – nor the na-
tionalism behind the everyday discrimination to which they had been exposed in
their European homelands. The moral sensitivity with which this generation of
Zionists reflected on and analyzed the so-called Arab problem from the very be-
ginning, around 1900, to the end of their days, testifies to the rather cosmopol-
itan and individualist perspective from which they wished their national project
to be understood.²⁹
It is true that Buber, the existential philosopher, did not have an adequate
sociological-conceptual frame at his disposal. He treats ‘the social,’ too, against
the backdrop of an ideal-type embodying – as the counterpart of the authentic I–
Thou relationship – an “essential We.”³⁰ Yet outlines of a political theory are dis-
cernible. In 1936, while still in Germany, Buber subjected Carl Schmitt’s friend-
foe idea to a devastating critique. He recognizes that these categories arise “at
times when the political community is threatened”, but “not at times when it
is assured of its survival.” Therefore, according to Buber, the friend-foe relation
is not fit to serve as the “principle of the political.” He sees this instead “in the
striving (of a political community) toward the order proper to it”. But communal
life, founded in language and culture, still has priority over Hegel’s Not- und Ver-
standesstaat, the institutions of the modern state: “The person belongs to the
community into which he was born or in which he lands, whether he wants to
 Buber, Die Frage an den Einzelnen (above, note 16), 254 f.
 Idem, Das Problem des Menschen (above, note 14), 116.
18 Jürgen Habermas
make something of this or not.”³¹ Nor is there any necessary correlation between
the grown nation and a coextensive state consciously constituted by its citizens.
Buber was not a liberal nationalist. It is well known that Buber at times could
well conceive of a bi-national state for Israel.³²
But whether nation or state, the normative justification of all social and po-
litical forms of coexistence ultimately depends on the authentic and considered
positions of their individual members.What is right or wrong in a political sense
is also founded in the ‘interpersonal space’ of dialogue. Each individual must
conscientiously bear a responsibility of which s/he cannot be relieved by the
group. This individualism finds expression in the remarkable statement that
true belonging to the community “includes the experience of the limits of this
belonging,” an experience, however, “that escapes definitive formulation.”³³
This humanist vision could not easily be reconciled with the political reali-
ties, of course; and after the founding of the state, the goal of a single state that
would unite citizens of Jewish and Arab nationality on an equal footing had in
any case lost its fundamentum in re. The political humanism of these German-
Jewish outsiders, notwithstanding their influence within the educational system,
is a closed chapter. Does this conclusion also hold for the philosophical stimulus
that once informed this high-minded program? To be sure, Buber’s spirit lives on
in the weak discourse of academia under different assumptions and in a differ-
ent theoretical context (I am thinking, for example, of Chaim Gans’ book on the
‘morality of the Jewish state’).³⁴ We must acknowledge without sentimentality
that traditions come to an end; only in exceptional situations can they be recov-
ered with a ‘tiger’s leap into the past’, and even then only in a new interpretation
and with different practical consequences.With his image of a tiger’s leap, what
 Idem, Die Frage an den Einzelnen (above, note 16), 241.
 Steven Aschheim has described the position of the intellectuals united in Brit Shalom and
later in Ichud: ‘This, then, was a nationalism that was guided essentially by inner cultural stand-
ards and conceptions of morality rather than considerations of power and singular group inter-
est. Its exponents were united – as many saw it, in hopelessly naïve fashion – by their opposi-
tion to Herzl’s brand of “political” Zionism both because they had distaste for his strategy of
alliances with external and imperial powers and because they did not hold the political
realm or “statehood” to be an ultimate value: their main goal was the spiritual and humanist
revival of Judaism and the creation of a moral community or commonwealth in which this mis-
sion could be authentically realized. To be sure, it is not always easy to separate the more gen-
eral German and “cosmopolitan” ingredients from the recovered, specifically Jewish and reli-
gious dimensions of their vision.’” Aschheim, Beyond the Border: The German-Jewish Legacy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 16.
 Buber, Die Frage an den Einzelnen (above, note 16), p. 241.
 Chaim Gans, A Just Zionism, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008.
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Walter Benjamin had in mind was seizing hold “of a memory such as it flashes
up at a moment of danger.”³⁵ Perhaps this beautiful and endangered country,
which is overflowing with history, has too many memories.
We, too, in our comparatively comfortable Europe, have manoeuvred our-
selves into a dead end. Everyone knows that the European Union has to found
itself anew. But there are no signs of this occurring, anywhere.
 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in idem, Illuminations (English
transl. by Harry Zohn), New York: Schocken, 1968, VI and XIV.
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Julia Matveev
From Martin Buber’s I and Thou to Mikhail
Bakhtin’s Concept of ‘Polyphony’
Bakhtinian scholars and Buber’s commentators tend to treat the relation be-
tween Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin differently. The former, with very few
exceptions, introduce Bakhtin’s dialogism either as developed independently
of Buber or as incompatible with his teaching of the ‘I–Thou’ relationship. The
possibility of talking about Buber’s influence on Bakhtin is mostly avoided or de-
nied because of the absence of explicit references to Buber in Bakhtin’s writings.
The latter, stressing striking conceptual similarities between both thinkers, nei-
ther exclude nor asseverate Buber’s possible impact on Bakhtin. The problem of
influence remains open. It is precisely this unresolved problem that has inspired
the present paper, devoted to an investigation of Buber’s influence on Bakhtin’s
concept of dialogue, on which his book Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art elaborated.
This investigation is divided into two parts. The first part reconstructs the history
of the origin and rise of Bakhtin’s study of Dostoevsky and posits the question of
the influence of Buber’s classic work I and Thou on Bakhtin’s thought. In the sec-
ond part a number of significant parallels between Buber’s and Bakhtin’s con-
cepts of artistic creativity as one of the forms of dialogue will be analyzed.
I
Bakhtin’s first major work entitled Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo (Problems
of Dostoevsky’s Art), renamed Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics in the second,
considerably revised and enlarged edition in 1963, appeared in Leningrad in
1929. Not only was this a significant contribution to Dostoevsky studies, but
also it was Bakhtin’s first and foremost philosophical project in which his
great concept of dialogism (“polyphony”) was initially announced to the world.
Our knowledge of Bakhtin’s biography up to 1929 and hence of the period he
had been at work on his 1929 book on Dostoevsky is very sketchy. From Bakhtin’s
correspondence with Matvey Kagan,¹ we know that he began working on his
study of Dostoevsky at least from 1921. In a letter to Kagan dated January 18,
1922, he writes, “I am now writing a work on Dostoevsky, which I hope to finish
 Matvey Isaevich Kagan (1889–1937), philosopher and Bakhtin’s closest friend.
very soon….”² According to the Petrograd newspaper Zhizn iskusstva (The Life of
Art), seven months later, in August 22–28, 1922, a monograph by Bakhtin on
Dostoevsky was finished and being prepared for publication. However, this
book was first printed only seven years later, in 1929. Caryl Emerson, the most
knowledgeable Bakhtinian scholar in the United States, the author of several
highly regarded books on Bakhtin and the translator of Bakhtin’s work, claims
in the editor’s preface to the second English edition of Problems of Dostoevsky’s
Poetics (1984): “This 1922 manuscript has not survived, so we do not know its
relationship to the 1929 published text.”³ Also, Tzvetan Todorov, another re-
nowned Bakhtinian scholar working in France and the author of the monograph
Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle, has claimed: “In 1929 he [Bakhtin] pub-
lished a book: The Problems of Dostoevsky’s Work; it is known that an early ver-
sion, probably quite different from the published one, had been completed as
early as 1922.”⁴
Exactly when Bakhtin wrote his Dostoevsky book of 1929 is not clear, even
today. There is no evidence that “this 1922 manuscript,” which Bakhtin had
been working on at least from 1921, was sent to press. Neither draft pages nor
a final copy of this manuscript are known to be extant; what remains of it are
the letter from Bakhtin to Kagan, the newspaper notice in which the Dostoevsky
book was announced in August 1922 as forthcoming—both cited above—and
myths about its disappearance.
According to the testimony of Samson Broitman, who knew Bakhtin person-
ally, Bakhtin claimed that the book was written four or five years prior to its pub-
lication,⁵ that is, in 1924 or 1925, thereby making it clear that the 1922 manuscript
had indeed not been finished. Moreover, in his text published in 1929, Bakhtin
refers to critical literature mostly published (in Russia and Germany, and in
both languages) during the period from 1922 to 1925. The text also includes ref-
erences to the books published in 1926⁶ and 1928.⁷ These references are actually
 Quoted in K. Nevelskaja, pseud., ed. M. M. Bakhtin & M. I. Kagan (po materialam semeinogo
arkhiva – Materials from a Family Archive), Pamjat no. 4 (Paris: YMCA Press, 1981), 263.
 See Caryl Emerson, trans. and ed., editor’s preface to Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoev-
sky’s Poetics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxxix.
 Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle in Theory and History of Literature,
vol. 13 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1998), 4.
 S. N. Broitman, Dve besedy s M. M. Bakhtinym (Two Conversations with M. M. Bakhtin) in S. N.
Broitman and N. Gorbanov, eds., Khronotop (Dagestan: Dagestanskii gosudarstvenyi universitet,
1990), 112.
 Max Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (1926).
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not just corrections made in an earlier Dostoevsky text, which was completed at
the end of 1922 as announced in The Life of Art (but for unknown reasons failed
to appear) and only revised seven years later for the book’s final publication.
Rather, they are proofs that the 1929 publication is the result of reworking and
rewriting the same book which, although published in 1929, was started in
1921. Moreover, reworking of the Dostoevsky book was a task that occupied
Bakhtin again thirty years later in 1961–62.⁸ It would be, therefore, not wrong
to assume that Bakhtin wrote his study of Dostoevsky’s novels in stages. Thus,
the process of writing can be described as follows: he abandons his first 1922 ver-
sion, but then, rewrites it in 1924–25, and not once, but over and over again,
never really finishing this work, even in 1929.
It is important to note at this point that the references in the 1929 version
show that the period between 1922 and 1925 was most intensive and extraordi-
narily productive for Bakhtin. It is precisely during that time frame that Bakhtin
read the great majority of the books and articles in different disciplines that af-
fected his work on Dostoevsky. The following works, quoted by Bakhtin to which
he gave great attention in his study of Dostoevsky, should be mentioned here
first of all: S. A. Askoldov, Religiosno-eticheskoe znachenie Dostoevskogo (Reli-
gious-ethical Meaning of Dostoevsky), 1922; Otto Kaus, Dostoevski und sein
Schicksal ⁹ (Dostoevsky and His Fate), 1923; B. M. Engelgardt, Ideologiecheskij
roman Dostoevskogo (Dostoevsky’s Ideological Novel), 1924; V. Komarovich,
Roman Dostoevskogo “Podrostok” kak khudozestvennoe edinstvo (Dostoevsky’s
Novel The Adolescent as an Artistic Unity), 1924; L. P. Grossman, Put’ Dostoevsko-
go (Dostoevsky’s Path), 1924; and Poetika Dostoevskogo (Dostoevsky’s Poetics),
1925. Bakhtin’s polemic with these scholars occupies the central place in his dis-
cussion of the key theoretical and methodological problems of critical literature
on Dostoevsky.
Needless to say, that along with the explicit polemic with scholars quoted by
Bakhtin there is a hidden polemic with other philosophers not mentioned in his
study of Dostoevsky. The philosophical significance of German–Jewish thought
for Bakhtin, in general, and the influence of Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer
on his philosophy, in particular, were already widely discussed by many Bakhti-
 F. M. Dostoevsky, Pisma [Letters] (Moscow: Leningrad, 1928), vol. 1; and G. Simmel, Gete
[Goethe] (Moscow: Izd. Gosudarstvennoj academii khudozestvennykh nauk, 1928). Russian
translation.
 M. M. Bakhtin, “Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book,” in Problems of Dostoevsky’s
Poetics, ed. C. Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 283–302.
 Bakhtin quotes Kaus in German.
From Martin Buber’s I and Thou to Mikhail Bakhtin’s Concept of ‘Polyphony’ 23
nian scholars.¹⁰ Brian Poole’s archival work¹¹ has uncovered notebooks in which
Bakhtin made copious notes from Cassirer’s work. Pool has argued that several
pages of Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His World (1965) are lifted word-for-word from
Cassirer’s The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (1927), with-
out reference to the original. Furthermore, according to Pool, the ethics descri-
bed in Bakhtin’s work Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity (written between
1920 and 1927) are mostly derived from a source Bakhtin does not even mention,
namely, the phenomenology of Max Scheler, whose text The Essence and Forms
of Sympathymerited a 58-page synopsis in a notebook of Bakhtin’s from 1926.¹² It
is, therefore, not surprising that Bakhtin does not mention Buber in his Dostoev-
sky book.¹³ But if, as Broitman testifies, the book was written in 1925, or at least
no earlier than 1924, that is, a year or two after the appearance of Buber’s phil-
osophical essay Ich und Du (I and Thou), 1922–23, could Bakhtin not have been
familiar with Buber’s work, which – precisely at this time—lay at the very core of
 See Caryl Emerson, The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin (Princeton NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1997), 230–231. On the influence of the Marburg school on Bakhtin’s aesthetics,
see Brian Pool, Nazad k Kaganu [Back to Kagan] in Dialog-Karnaval-Khronotop, ed. N. A. Pankov
(Vitebsk, 1995), no. 1, 38–48.
 Brian Pool, “Bakhtin and Cassirer: The Philosophical Origins of Bakhtin’s Carnival Messian-
ism,” South Atlantic Quarterly 97, 3/4 (Summer/Fall 1998): 537–578.
 Brian Pool, “From Phenomenology to Dialogue: Max Scheler’s Phenomenological Tradition
and Mikhail Bakhtin’s Development from ‘Toward a Philosophy of the Act’ to His Study of Dos-
toevsky,” in Ken Hirschkop and David Shepherd, eds., Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, 2nd edition
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 109–135.
 To the list of German philosophers, whose concepts Bakhtin borrowed without acknowledg-
ing his sources, we can add, though only hypothetically, Jacob Boehme. It seems to be more than
a pure coincidence that Bakhtin’s central notion of ‘polyphony,’ by which he means “a plurality
of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, […] with equal rights and each with
its own world, [which are] combine[d] but not merged in the unity of some spiritual event”
(Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 6, 13), resonates with Jacob Boehme’s conception
of the Spirit as a divine, polyphonically tuned organ, in which every voice and every pipe, in
piping out its own tone, echoed the eternal Word (Boehme deals with this theme in chapter
14 of his De signatura rerum (The Signature of All Things), 1635. And although Bakhtin insists
that the term “polyphony” is only a musical term, “a simple metaphor” (22), and he never, as
we will see, really displayed any familiarity with specific theological sources, we know from
his lectures on Kant given in the mid-1920s that he was familiar with German Christian mysti-
cism (See K. G. Isupova, ed., M. M. Bakhtin: Pro et contra. vol. I, St. Petersburg: Izdatelstvo rus-
skogo christianskogo gumanitarnogo instituta, 2001, 73–74, lecture 6, Nov. 16, 1924) and there-
fore his notion of ‘polyphony’ might be of a more religious character than has been recognized
in any of the literature on Bakhtin.
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his interest? Hardly likely. Some Bakhtinian scholars¹⁴ as well as Buber’s com-
mentators, such as Maurice Friedman¹⁵ and Steven Kepnes,¹⁶ stress striking ter-
minological and conceptual similarities between Buber’s ‘I–Thou’ teaching and
Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism introduced in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art. The
most explicit example is the correlation between Buber’s concept of “the eternal
Thou” and Bakhtin’s concept of “the third party.” Friedman points this out as
“the most surprising resemblance”¹⁷ between Buber and Bakhtin. The point is
that, like Buber, Bakhtin does not reduce the dialogical ‘I–Thou’ relationship
to the relation between men alone. For him the saying of “Thou” takes place
 Nina Perlina, “Bakhtin and Buber: Problems of Dialogic Imagination,” Studies of Twentieth
Century Russian Literature 9:1 (1984): 13–28. Perlina argues that Bakhtin has an affinity with
Buber. She writes that Bakhtin and Buber “belonged to the same cultural epoch” (26) and prob-
ably arrived at their conclusions simultaneously through their common fascination with Cohen’s
philosophy and their interest in Goethe, Christ, and Socrates (22). However, as Maurice Friedman
stresses, “like most other Bakhtin critics she has very little understanding of Buber.” See Maurice
S. Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, 4th ed., revised and expanded (London and
New York: Routledge, 2002), 354. Among the papers devoted to Bakhtin and Buber, see also
A. B. Demidov, “Osnovopolozenija filosofii komunikazii I dialoga” (The Foundations of a Philos-
ophy of Communication and Dialogue) in Dialog-Karnaval-Khronotop, vol. 4, ed. N. A. Pankov
(Vitebsk 1992), 5–35. Demidov places Bakhtin’s concept of the ‘I–Thou’ relationship in the larger
European context. Of special interest for him are the ‘I–Thou’ categories elaborated by Karl Jas-
pers, Martin Buber, and Semyon Frank. For Caryl Emerson’s remarks on the Bakhtin–Buber de-
bates in the late 1990s, see in her publication The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin, 225–
227. See also E. A. Kurnosikova, Problema Ya-Ty v zerkale refleksii (The I–Thou Relationship
through Mirror Reflection) in Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin v Saranske: Ocherk zizni I dejatelnosti
(Bakhtin in Saransk: A Sketch of His Life and Work), ed. G. B. Karpunov, et al. (Saransk: Izda-
telstvo Saratovskogo universiteta, 1989), 170– 172.
 Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, Appendix B, Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakh-
tin: The Dialogue of Voices and the Word That Is Spoken, 353–366. Speaking of Buber’s influence
on Bakhtin, Friedman points to the fact that Bakhtin himself said in an interview, “But Buber is
a philosopher. And I am very much indebted to him, in particular for the idea of dialogue. Of
course, this is obvious to anyone who reads Buber.” Ibid., 353. Friedman quotes these passages
from Josef Frank in “The Voices of Mikhail Bakhtin,” The New York Review of Books (October 23,
1986), 56. Frank, however, had cited Maiia Kaganskaia’s essay “Shutovskoi khorovod,” Sintaksis
12 (1984): 141. Friedman is obviously not familiar with Kaganskaia’s literary essay,which is a mix-
ture of fact and fantasy. In this essay Kaganskaia also writes: “Recently I have met Bakhtin on
the Champs-Elysées; he was wrapped in a white toga with an epitaph written in Latin. He stood
at the border between the Renaissance and the Middle Ages.” Ibid., 144 In the light of this vi-
gnette, the source appears not to be credible.
 Steven Kepnes, The Text as Thou: Martin Buber’s Dialogical Hermeneutics and Narrative The-
ology (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 63–71.
 Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, 357.
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in man’s relation with the world, that is, with “the world order, nature,”¹⁸ the
world of physical objects and different objective phenomena, and this includes
the saying of “Thou” to God. In his analysis of Dostoevsky’s characters, he writes
that for them “to conceive of an object means to address it;” the Dostoevskian
hero “does not acknowledge an object without addressing it,” “does not think
about phenomena, he speaks with them,”¹⁹ he thinks and talks about the
world and its order, “as if he were talking not about the world but with the
world.”²⁰ The world, to which one addresses oneself dialogically, becomes a
“Thou” for the speaker; he reacts to it, he sees himself “personally insulted
by the world order, personally humiliated by its blind necessity” and “casts
an energetic reproach at the world order, even at the mechanical necessity of na-
ture.”²¹ “But while speaking […] with the world,” Bakhtin says, the hero “simul-
taneously addresses a third party as well: he squints his eyes to the side, toward
the listener, the witness, the judge,”²² he speaks “to God as the guilty party re-
sponsible for the world order.”²³ And this “third,” Friedman claims,²⁴ is an ap-
plication of Buber’s concept of the “eternal Thou,” according to which “in
each Thou we address the eternal Thou.”²⁵
Moreover, Bakhtin makes use of such characteristic Buberian terminology
and concepts as ‘meeting/encounter’,²⁶ ‘three spheres in which the world of re-
lation arises’,²⁷ ‘affirmation of the being addressed’ (transformed by Bakhtin into






 Friedmann asserts, however, that the Bakhtinian scholar Michael Holquist has previously ar-
rived at the conclusion that “if there is something like a God concept in Bakhtin, it is surely the
superaddressee” (third party). See Friedmann, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, 358. See also
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, eds., M. M. Bakhtin: Speech Genres and Other Late Essays
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), Slavic series, no. 8, xviii.
 Martin Buber, I and Thou, 2nd edition, trans. R. Gregor Smith, (New York: Scribner/T.& T.
Clark, 1958), 22.
 The German word Begegnung used by Buber means both “meeting” and “encounter.” Ac-
cordingly, in English editions of Buber’s work this term appears in both variants in the transla-
tion. In Bakhtin’s study of Dostoevsky, we find also both variants: vstrecha [meeting] and stol-
knovenie [encounter].
 In investigating the dialogic life of the Dostoevskian hero and his ‘I–Thou’ attitude to the
world and himself, Bakhtin describes three spheres of relation (akin to Buber’s three spheres
in which the world of relation arises: man’s life with nature, with other men, and his life
with ‘spiritual beings;’ see Buber, I and Thou, 21–25): (1) “the world order, nature,” (2) the
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his own characteristic terminology of ‘dialogical addressivity’), ‘making the
other present’ or ‘seeing the other from within’ (which Bakhtin variously called
‘seeing the man in man’ [italics in original], ‘the intimate contact with someone
else’s discourse about the own self and the world’, and ‘penetrating in someone
else’s deepest “I”‘). Furthermore, he shares certain emphases, for example, the
radical distinction which he, like Buber, makes between ‘dialogue’ and ‘dialec-
tic’, as well as between the ‘dialogical relationship’ and the ‘subject–object rela-
tion’. In view of the chronological precedence of Buber’s work I and Thou with
regard to Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky book, it is by no means implausible that Bakh-
tin’s use of some of Buber’s key concepts suggests Buber’s direct impact on
Bakhtin’s development as dialogical thinker. Besides, the fact that Bakhtin
was introduced to Buber’s work is indisputable. Bakhtin’s other work Forms of
Time and Chronotope in the Novel (1937–38) is the striking evidence of this state-
ment:
[…] the motif of meeting is one of the most universal motifs, not only in literature (it is dif-
ficult to find a work where this motif is completely absent) but also in other areas of culture
and in various spheres of public and everyday life. In the scientific and technical realm
where purely conceptual thinking predominates, there are no motifs as such, but the con-
cept of contact is equivalent in some degree to the motif of meeting. In mythological and
religious realms the motif of meeting plays a leading role, of course: in sacred legends and
Holy Writ (both in Christian works such as the Gospels and in Buddhist writings) and in
religious rituals. The motif of meeting is combined with other motifs, for example that of
apparition (“epiphany”) in the religious realm. In those areas of philosophy that are not
strictly scientific, the motif of meeting can be of considerable importance (in Schelling,
for example, or in Max Scheler and particularly in Martin Buber).²⁸
However, it is hard to explain why after having read Buber and mentioning him
in his work of the late 1930s, Bakhtin insists on the originality of his idea of di-
alogism, writing in 1961: “After my Dostoevsky book, but independently of it, the
ideas of polyphony, dialogue, unfinalizability, etc., were widely developed.”²⁹
But it seems highly likely that the reason for the absence of Buber’s name in
Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky book—in both versions, its earliest publication in 1929
and the 1963 second edition—was purely political.
sphere of human relationships, in which the relation “of I with another and with others takes
place,” and (3) “the sphere of ideas (but not of ideas only)”, see Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoev-
sky’s Poetics, 236, 280, and 32, respectively.
 M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1981), 98–99.
 Bakhtin, Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book, 285.
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Sergei Averintzev, who met Bakhtin in the 1970s, claims that the lack of ref-
erences to Buber’s work and the absence of his name in Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky
study does not point to the fact that Bakhtin was not influenced by Buber al-
ready in the 1920s. “As I first met Bakhtin,” Averintzev says, “I asked him directly
[…] why he did not refer to Buber. ‘You know how it was in the 1920s’ was his
reluctant answer. Although the term anti-Zionism has been invented by us
later.”³⁰ On the basis of Averintzev’s testimony, we can not only posit the influ-
ence of Buber on Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism, but also understand the reason
why Bakhtin could not refer to Buber at that time.
In Russia of the early 1920s, Buber was quite well known as both a Zionist
and religious thinker, but most likely primarily as the former rather than the lat-
ter. His speech given at the Fifth Zionist Congress on Jewish art as well as his
Three Speeches on Judaism were translated into Russian and published in Jewish
journals³¹ as well as in books.³² (The Three Speeches on Judaism were translated
in 1919 by I. B. Rumer,³³ a cousin of the poet Ossip Mandelstam.) It is clear that
both dimensions of Buber’s philosophy made it impossible for Bakhtin to men-
tion Buber’s name in the Dostoevsky book.
The years 1922– 1929 were a time of what was called “proletarianization” in
all areas of cultural life. The campaign to proletarianize Soviet culture (known
also as the anti-religious campaign, which began in 1922 and reached its peak
in 1928) aimed at eliminating religion from Russian culture in order to form a
new, atheistic Communist culture. The Bolshevik ideology sought the wholesale
rejection of religion, which in the words of Karl Marx was “the opiate of the
masses.” Nadezhda Mandelstam, the wife, and later widow, of Ossip Madelstam,
recalls in her memoirs Hope Against Hope (1970) that in the middle twenties
“even such hackneyed expressions as ‘thank god’ were regarded as a concession
to religion,” not to mention that any reference to God was something that no-
 Quoted in Mikhail Gasparov, “Iz razgovorov S. S. Averintzeva” [From Conversations with S. S.
Averintzev] in Sapisi I vypiski [Notes and Extracts] (Мoskwa: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie,
2008), 110. It is crucial to note here that Averintzev, who with Sergei Bocharov, has edited Bakh-
tin’s writings: M. M. Bakhtin, Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva [The Aesthetics of Verbal Creation],
eds., S. S. Averintzeva and S. Bocharov (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1979), also notes in his commenta-
ries to this publication that Bakhtin had greatly admired Buber (389).
 His speech at the Fifth Zionist Congress was published in the weekly newspaper Budusch-
nost (Future or Futurity) in 1902.
 M. Buber, Evreiskoe iskusstvo: Referat, chitannyi na V Sionistskom kongresse [The speech at
the Fifth Zionist Congress on Jewish Art] (Charkov, 1902).
 M. Buber, Obnovlenie evreistva: Perevod s nemezkogo (Renewal of Judaism: Translation from
German), trans. I. B. Rumera (Moscow: Safrut, 1919).
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body “officially could afford to do.”³⁴ This campaign against religion as such was
accompanied by intensified assaults not only on the Russian Orthodox Church
and all Christian religious organizations, groups, and circles, but also on Jewish
religious institutions. During the years 1922– 1929 not only churches, Christian
theological institutes, and religious associations among the intelligentsia were
closed down, but also synagogues and traditional institutions of Jewish educa-
tion, such as the yeshiva and the cheder. Religious propaganda in general was
prohibited and it became forbidden to even print religious books and Jewish cal-
endars. The authorities clamped down on expressions of Jewish nationalism, be
they expressions of the Jewish religion or Zionism. Zionist activities and Zionist
publications were considered to be anti-Soviet activity and counter-revolutionary
agitation against Soviet Russia. During these years there were mass arrests of
Zionists, accused of having close ties with foreign countries united against the
Soviet government. In fact, for almost the same reasons—foreign connections
and opposition to the Soviet regime—many leading religious thinkers, Christian
and Jewish (such as Nikolai Berdjaev, Lev Schestov, Fedor Stepun, and Lev Kar-
savin, to name only a few) were arrested and expelled from Russia, not to men-
tion scholars who committed themselves to the Christian religion rather than to
Marxism. The stated purpose of these arrests was to purge public and academic
institutions of those who were considered enemies of the people.
Bakhtin himself was arrested around January 7, 1929 (other sources say on
December 24, 1928), as a minor figure in the Voskresenie,³⁵ an intellectual “un-
derground” religious–philosophical group with which Bakhtin was associated in
the 1920s. The subject of most burning concern for the majority of the Voskrese-
nie group, which included two Protestants, two Roman Catholics who were for-
merly Russian Orthodox, and several Jews, was the German philosophy of reli-
gion. For instance, in 1926, writing to Kagan, Lev Pumpiansky (a philosopher
and literary scholar, one of the leading representatives of the so-called Bakhtin
Circle and a prominent member of the Voskresenie group, arrested in 1928) de-
scribed the meetings of the Voskresenie circle thus: “All these years, and espe-
cially this one, we have kept busy dealing with theology. The circle of our closest
friends remains the same: Yudina [the pianist], Bakhtin, Tubiansky [the Indic
scholar] and myself.”³⁶ In 1928–1929 several members of his circle were arrested.
Bakhtin was condemned to five years incarceration in the concentration camp at
Solovki; for health reasons, however, his sentence was commuted to exile in Ka-
 Nadezhda Mandelstam, Hope Against Hope, trans. from the Russian by Max Hayward, The
Modern Library: New York 1990, 90.
 The group’s name, Voskresenie, means both “Sunday” and “resurrection.”
 Quoted in Nevelskaja, M. M. Bakhtin I M. I. Kagan, 266.
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zakhstan. The publication of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art coincided with its au-
thor’s arrest and exile in May 1929.
In those years of the growing restrictions on religious activities and public
discussions of theological questions, references to religious discourse and reli-
gious philosophy of all belief systems had to be deleted from scholarly texts.
For example, we know that several references to religious discourse were deleted
from an early version of another of Bakhtin’s texts, Author and Hero in Aesthetic
Activity, from roughly the same period.³⁷ The omission of any mention of Buber, a
German-Jewish religious philosopher and a Zionist, in Bakhtin’s 1929 book on
Dostoevsky is, hence, also not surprising.
But by the late 1930s the official position on Zionism in the USSR began to
change to a more favorable one. It is precisely at this time that Buber’s name ap-
peared first in Bakhtin’s work. By the early 1960s Soviet anti-Zionism, merged
with Soviet anti-Semitism, started again and intensified after the 1967 Six Day
War.³⁸ And again at precisely this time, any acknowledgment of Buber’s work
is absent in Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky book of 1963.³⁹
II
The purpose of the present paper is not only to elucidate why Buber’s work is not
acknowledged in Bakhtin’s study of Dostoevsky, but also, more importantly, to
show how Bakhtin applied Buber’s ideas from I and Thou to the fields of literary
criticism and scholarship. A characteristic example is Bakhtin’s concept of artis-
tic creativity, which plays a major part in his analysis of Dostoevsky’s “non-ob-
jectified” and “non-monological,” that is, “dialogical” and “polyphonical,”
mode of “artistic visualization” (Bakhtin’s terms) and representation of the
world, and which can be regarded as the application of Buber’s model of the
‘I–Thou’ relationship of man with spiritual entities (geistige Wesenheiten or as
R. Gregor Smith translates it, “spiritual beings”⁴⁰) that illustrates this relation-
 See Averintzev‘s and Bocharov‘s commentaries to this text: M.Bakhtin, Avtor i geroi (Author
and Hero), ed. S. G.Bocharov (St. Petersburg: Izdatelstvo “Azbuka” 2000), 322–25.
 Also known as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
 It is important to note that in the 1970s many of Buber’s works were withdrawn from the pub-
lic libraries in the USSR and moved to special departments of restricted access. See in Kratkaja
ebreiskaja enziklopedia (Short Jewish Encyclopedia) (Jerusalem: Carmel, 1982), vol. 1, col. 552–
554. At that time references to government-suppressed literature could lead to arrest. Not sur-
prisingly, we do not find in Bakhtin’s work any reference to Buber in the 1970s, as well.
 Buber, I and Thou, 22.
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ship from the realm of art. The investigation of the similarities between Bakhtin
and Buber proceeds in two steps. In the first, we will consider section eleven in I
and Thou in which Buber explicates his view of human spiritual creative activity
and which is an essential part of his teaching of the ‘I–Thou’ relationship. The
second step analyzes Bakhtin’s exposition of this activity—drawn into discussion
of Dostoevsky’s dialogic feeling for the world⁴¹ and “his artistic perception of the
world”⁴² in the categories of coexistence and interaction – all this, in Bakhtin’s
own words, “prepared the soil in which Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel was to
grow”⁴³ and is apparent, as he shows us, in the way a fictional character is rep-
resented in Dostoevsky as well as in the very principle of novelistic construction
created by Dostoevsky, that is, in “the unity of a polyphonic novel.”⁴⁴ Also be-
longing to this analysis is a consideration of Bakhtin’s critical remarks on the tra-
ditional methods used at that time for interpreting of Dostoevsky’s work. This
last step, we would stress, examines Bakhtin’s view of the process of creation
in close connection with Buber’s understanding of the creative act (considered
in the first step). In Buber’s terms this is a relational event that takes place be-
tween two separate existing beings—an artist and a sensed form (Gestalt)—and
becomes present to us through the mediation of those fields of symbolic commu-
nication, such as literature, sculpture, and music. Finally, it should be men-
tioned here that having said that Bakhtin was introduced to Buber’s work I
and Thou already in the 1920s, we shall present Bakhtin’s study of Dostoevsky
following the original 1929 edition of his Dostoevsky book. Thus, the expansions
included by Bakhtin in his second 1963 edition will be not examined here.⁴⁵
 The present paper does not deal with the question of whether Bakhtin, constructing an
image of Dostoevsky as the creator of the polyphonic novel, presents in his book an objective
view of Dostoevsky’s aesthetics or not. For an in-depth treatment of this question, see Katerina
Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University
Press, 1984), 276; Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky: The Stir of Liberation, 1860– 1865 (Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1986), 346; Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin:
The Creation of a Prosaics (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 231; and René Wellek,“-
Bakhtin’s View of Dostoevsky: ‘Polyphony’ and ‘Carnivalesque,’” Dostoevsky Studies I (1980):
31–9.
 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 29.
 Ibid., 31.
 Ibid., 16.
 Since the first Russian edition of Bakhtin’s Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art (1929) does not exist
in English, all references to this book will be cited according to the second English edition of
Bakhtin’s revisited version of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1963) and to Appendix I of
that edition, where we find the passages from the original edition of the Dostoevsky book
(M. M. Bakhtin, Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo, Leningrad: Priboi 1929). However, all quo-
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Now we will consider section eleven in Buber’s essay I and Thou more close-
ly, attempting to highlight the unique aspects of his dialogic aesthetics, which
left distinct traces in Bakhtin’s concept of artistic creativity. At the basis of Bub-
er’s aesthetic position lies the conviction that the work of art is neither an im-
pression of objectivity nor an expression of subjectivity. Rather, it is the witness
of the ‘I–Thou’ relationship between the artist or “onlooker” as Buber calls him
(in Smith’s translation, the “beholder”⁴⁶) and the Gestalt which arises out of the
stream of perception, proves to be something unique and meaningful and calls
on the artist to perform a creative act:
This is the eternal source of art: a man is faced by a form [Gestalt], which desires to be made
through him into a work. This form is no offspring of his soul, but is an appearance [Er-
scheinung⁴⁷] which steps up to it and demands of it the effective power. The man is con-
cerned with an act of his being. If he carries it through, if he speaks the primary word
out of his being to the form which appears, then the effective power streams out, and
the work arises.⁴⁸
As Buber explains to us in the following paragraphs, this form which the artist
meets outside as well as within the soul does not spring from his own imagina-
tion and also does not originate in his past experience or, in Buber’s own formu-
lation, it is not “an image” of his “fancy” (ein Gebild der Einbildung) nor “a thing
among the ‘inner’ things,”⁴⁹ familiar and known, already experienced, and
placed in the ordered scheme of things. On the contrary, such a form rises to
meet his senses “through grace”⁵⁰ in the present moment of intense perception,
revealing itself as something unexpected, exclusive, not on a par with other
things in “the world which is experienced.”⁵¹ And though the visualization of
form is an ability that is already present in the perception of the artist, the
form does not arise out of him and therefore out of detached subjectivity, but
out of life. That is, it emerges into view (the German term Erscheinung may loose-
ly be called “emergence-into-view”) in the real intercourse of the artist with his
tations from the second English edition will be corrected and brought in conformity with the
1929 Russian edition.
 Buber, I and Thou, 25.
 In R. Gregor Smith’s translation, this term has been translated into English as ‘appearance,’
but it may also be translated as ‘apparition’ (or ‘epiphany’). Interestingly, precisely this theolog-
ical term has been used by Bakhtin in his comments—quoted above—on the motif of meeting in
Buber‘s work. See Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, 98–99.





surrounding reality. This means consequently that art, according to Buber, can-
not be understood as autonomous of reality, as something existing only as a con-
tent of one’s single experience or imagination. At the same time, Buber’s point is
not that art making its discoveries in the outside world deals with real actual ob-
jects (Gegenstände). What the artist is faced with is not plain reality, but the Ge-
stalt, which may be termed ‘vision’ that lacks a concrete image and is thus a “vi-
sion without image.”⁵² One “can neither experience nor describe the form,” says
Buber, “if a test is made of its objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] the form is certain-
ly not ‘there’” but “the relation in which [one] stand[s] to it is real.”⁵³ In his con-
cept of human creative activity, Buber ascribes enormous importance to what
takes place between the artist and the form in the reality of that relation. This
relation, to his mind, plays an infinitely greater part in aesthetic experience
than has been hitherto thought.
In order to explain this part of Buber’s concept of the human relation to cre-
ative work, it becomes necessary to characterize his central concept of I and
Thou with greater precision. The basic premise of Buber’s exposition of the life
of dialogue is that there is no ‘I’ in itself; ‘I’ exists only either in the relation
‘I–Thou’ (Ich–Du–Beziehung) or ‘I–It’ (Ich–Es–Verhältnis). These two combina-
tions—‘I–Thou’ and ‘I–It’—are two primary principles or two “primary
words,”⁵⁴ as Buber terms them, governing man’s attitude to his own self and
to the world in which he lives. This “twofoldness” runs through every human ac-
tivity. But whatever we do, Buber says, the ‘I’ that speaks the primary word ‘I–
Thou’ sees the world in a different way than the ‘I’ of ‘I–It’ and, to be sure, the ‘I’
can pass from the realm of ‘Thou’ to the realm of ‘It’ and back again, thus chang-
ing its ‘I–It’ relation to the ‘I–Thou’ relationship.
 In his 1956 essay What Is Common to All [Dem Gemeinschaftlichen folgen] published in the
Neue Rundschau Buber, speaking of the English novelist Aldous Huxley, describes this act thus:
“In fact, the artist is removed from the common seeing in his decisive moments and raised into
his special formative seeing; but in just these moments he is determined through and through, to
his perception itself, by the drive to originate, by the command to form. Huxley understands this
manner of seeing everything in brilliant coloration and penetrating objectivity not only as ‘how
one should see’, but also as ‘how things are in reality’. What does that mean concretely? What
we call reality always appears only in our personal contact with things which remain unper-
ceived by us in their own being; and there exists personal contact which, freer, more direct
than the ordinary, represents things with greater force, freshness, and depth.” Martin Buber,
What Is Common to All, in: Judith Buber Agassi (ed.), Martin Buber on Psychology and Psycho-
therapy: Essays, Letters, and Dialogue, Syracuse University Press 1999, 102.
 Buber, I and Thou, 25.
 Ibid., 19.
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The man entering into the ‘I–It’ or subject–object relation views the world as
‘It’ (Es–Welt), that is, the world of indifferent and neutral objects, standing be-
fore him, external to him, and existing in and for themselves. And “the primary
connection of man with the world of It,” Buber writes, “is comprised in experi-
encing [italics in original]”.⁵⁵ In order to “‘find [his] bearings’ in the world”⁵⁶ sur-
rounding him, man’s desire is to experience it. More precisely, this means to ob-
serve the world, to approach it from various points of view, to study it in parts, to
analyze it objectively, and then to connect the “objective products” of human
spirit together into “manifold systems of laws”⁵⁷—“the law of life,” “the law of
the soul,” “the social law,” or “the cultural law.”⁵⁸ In that relation, the ‘I’ de-
clares itself to be “the experiencing I,”⁵⁹ that is, the bearer of knowledge, and
the world round about to be the object that “permits itself to be experienced.”⁶⁰
Taking up of this attitude to the world, the man speaks “the word of separation”
through which “the barrier between subject and object has been set up.”⁶¹
In I and Thou, Buber considers another attitude to the world—the ‘I–Thou’
relationship—which does not involve objectification, as the combination of ‘I–
It’ does. The ‘I’ of ‘I–Thou’, standing, as it were, face to face with the world, tran-
scends objectification. “When Thou is spoken,” writes Buber, the man “has no
thing for his object [Gegenstand],”⁶² but is concerned throughout with how his
being relates to the world that surrounds him. Here, the man sees the world
not as the sum total of things to be experienced, but as the wholeness and
unity of being, which “is opened to him in happenings, […] affects him,”⁶³ fills
his life, touches him, “stirs in the depth” of his soul, and “gives itself”⁶⁴ to
him. Correspondingly, “the I of the primary word I–Thou makes its appearance
as person”⁶⁵ who rises above the neutral attitude to the world and takes up








 Buber says that “when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. […] When Thou is spoken, the






himself as sharing in being, as co-existing”⁶⁶ and thus affirms that reality as “a
being [which] neither merely belongs to him nor merely lies outside him.”⁶⁷ In
this case, the man desires with his whole being—and in Buber “the primary
word I–Thou can be spoken only with the whole being”⁶⁸—“the full sharing in
being”⁶⁹ and the more direct “contact with the Thou”⁷⁰ (die Berührung des Du)
rather than the information about its essence. And if this act is performed by
man as “the [italics in original] act of [his] being”⁷¹ in relation to the ‘Thou’, if
it is an act of “affirmation of the being addressed”⁷² and of “response of man
to his Thou,”⁷³ and if there is a “mutual giving,” saying ‘Thou’ to what meets
him, the man gives himself to it, in turn, it says ‘Thou’ to him and gives itself
to him,⁷⁴ in this case, that act can be the source of creative inspiration and
also the source of spirit.⁷⁵ For in this case, man’s attitude to the world is lifted
to a higher spiritual plane of being, though “it does not help to sustain [him]
in life, it only helps [him] to glimpse eternity.”⁷⁶ By this Buber means eternal val-
ues, a true order of being, independent of time and socio-historical changes,
“the eternal Thou,” and “divine meaning in the life of the world,”⁷⁷ to be sure,
not the meaning of “‘another life’, but that of this life of ours, not one of a
world ‘yonder’ but that of this world of ours.”⁷⁸ Such an attitude to the world
is associated in Buber’s I and Thou with the dialogical life.
This view on the relationship of man to the world forms the foundation of
Buber’s concept of human relations with ‘spiritual beings’ in the realm of art.
The latter is also “twofold.” But Buber believes that only the ‘I’ of ‘I–Thou’
 Ibid., 68.
 Ibid., 67.







 What Buber means by “spirit” is not “intellect.” Ibid., 37. “Spirit in its human manifesta-
tion,” he argues, “is a response of man to his Thou.” Ibid., 48. “Spirit” he writes, “is not like
the blood that circulates in you, but like the air in which you breathe. Man lives in the spirit,
if he is able to respond to his Thou. He is able to, if he enters into relation with his whole
being. Only by virtue of his power to enter into relation is he able to live in the spirit.”
Ibid.,49. On the meeting between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ as the source of ‘action’ and ‘creative inspira-
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can have a true relationship with the form, for that form is not an object but a
‘Thou’ which is “disclosed to the artist as he looks at what is over against
him.”⁷⁹ Objectification destroys it, making it into an ‘It’. “If [the artist] [does]
not serve it aright,” writes Buber, if he “turn[s] aside and relax[es] in the
world of It,” “it is broken.”⁸⁰ Thus, to get access to the form, it is for him ‘to
step into direct contact with it’ through activity. And this activity does not by
any means imply a merely ‘objective’ observation of the form apart from any per-
sonal relation to it or neutral description of the general qualities of the form and
integration of parts in a synthetic or an analytic way into an artificial totality
(what is usually meant by ‘synthesis’). Quite to the contrary, a genuine ‘I–
Thou’ relationship of the artist to the form consists in affirming its existing
wholeness, its unity, its “exclusiveness,”⁸¹ its true ‘otherness’, and its independ-
ence from any external standard or rule prescribed by formal laws of artistic can-
ons as well as from the artist’s own stylistic preferences. This relationship “in-
cludes a sacrifice and a risk;” these are two conditions for seeing and
“bodying forth”⁸² the form as a ‘Thou’:
This is the sacrifice: the endless possibility that is offered up on the altar of the form. For
everything which just this moment in play ran through the perspective must be obliterated;
nothing of that may penetrate the work. The exclusiveness of what is facing it demands that
it be so. That is the risk: the primary word can only be spoken with the whole being. He who
gives himself to it may withhold nothing of himself.⁸³
According to the above paragraph, the first condition is the affirmation of the
form as existing being, as something which is really active of itself, something
more than a passive object of the artist’s experience but with rights equal to
those of the artist. This condition means also the confirmation that the form
can dictate the mode of expression, thus “the endless possibility” to express it
‘otherwise’ must be sacrificed “on the altar of the form.” The second condition
implies ‘mutual giving’, the openness of the artist, as a partner, to his vis-à-vis
(Gegenüber), the wholeness of the form vis-à-vis man’s wholeness, for they pre-
suppose one another, but also “the directness” of the relationship between the
two—“no system of ideas, no foreknowledge, and no fancy,” Buber adds in








characterize the true ‘I–Thou’ relationship as distinct from the ‘I–It’ relation.
And it hardly needs to be emphasized that only the former, in Buber’s view, al-
lows the artist an intimate glimpse into the depths of what is presented to him.
What the form presents, then, or, more precisely, opens up to the artist is a portal
into “the heaven of Thou,” “the cradle of the Real Life,”⁸⁵ and also into “the star-
ry heaven of the spirit.”⁸⁶ “And yet I behold it [i.e., the form],” Buber continues
in the first person discourse, “splendid in the radiance of what confronts me […]
I behold it […] as that which exists in the present. […] It affects me, as I affect
it.”⁸⁷ It follows a process of interaction between forces going from the form to
the man and from the man to the form, a process in which the effect of ‘I’ on
the form is as creative as that of the form on ‘I’ and which is thus by its nature
the dialogical relationship. The aim of creative work, as set in the final passages
of section eleven, is to “draw forth” that which is disclosed to the artist, to “body
it forth,” to give it aesthetic “shape,” and finally to “lead the form across”—in
and through his work—“into the world of It,”⁸⁸ where it becomes a thing, “an
object among objects […] fixed in its size and its limits.”⁸⁹ But, Buber insists,
even after becoming a thing, the work of art is always ready to become someone
else’s ‘Thou’ or, more exactly, it can be re-encountered by someone else as his
‘Thou’, for “from time to time,” he writes, “it can face the receptive beholder
in its whole embodied form.”⁹⁰
This last quotation is of significant importance for understanding Buber’s
concept of art, which, as could be argued, frees the experience of art from its
basis in the external, material existence of the artwork. As Buber contends in
the previous section, the work of art, which was produced by an ‘I–Thou’ rela-
tionship and becomes present to us by way of language or sound, is not just
“the verse made up of words” nor “the melody made up of notes” but “a
unity” (Einheit), a lived unity of the life of dialogue, a unity which indeed can
be “scattered into these many pieces,”⁹¹ but if we do this, it ceases to be that
which it actually is, and we are left only with a thing among things, able to
be experienced and described as a sum of qualities. But, for Buber, the work
of art cannot be left as a thing. The mystery of mutual action, the creative burn-
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effects of art on man cannot be described in this way at all. To properly interpret
the work, the interpreter must take the attitude of a “receptive beholder.” That is
to say, he does not simply experience a work of art nor does he concern himself
in the first place with partial qualities and isolated ‘contents’ or formal laws of
technique and style, limiting his relationship to art to the subject–object rela-
tion. Rather, he finds himself ‘bodily confronted’ by the work as a ‘Thou’ that
stands over against him, fully present in the unity of the whole, and breeding
the response in him.⁹²
At this point it remains to be seen how Bakhtin makes use of Buber’s con-
cept of the ‘I–Thou’ relationship with geistige Wesenheiten. First of all, Bakhtin’s
interpretation of the wholeness and unity of Dostoevsky’s work proves to be a
significant confirmation of Buber’s attitude toward the work of art as ‘Thou’
that requires the affirmation of its ‘otherness’ as well as its wholeness and
unity, which is more than a framework of the material arranged by the author
in his work and not just the matter of the sum total of formal devices.
Bakhtin’s monograph, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art, opens with the clarifica-
tion that the present book offers a different view of Dostoevsky’s work than any
of the earlier and still popular approaches to Dostoevsky—socio-historical, ideo-
logical, and psychological—and suggests studying the Dostoevskian novel as
“genuine polyphony.”⁹³ This type of novel, Bakhtin argues, is an entire “uni-
verse”⁹⁴ unto itself, i.e., it “does not fit any of the preconceived frameworks or
historico-literary schemes that we usually apply to various species of the Euro-
pean novel,”⁹⁵ but it is comprehensible as a “wholeness”⁹⁶ and “an organic
unity”⁹⁷ in its own right. To be sure, Bakhtin emphasizes that the latter does
not lend itself “to an ordinary pragmatic interpretation at the level of the
plot”⁹⁸ or to “a monologic understanding of the unity of style,”⁹⁹ that is, it cannot
be understood just in terms of generic and compositional features of the novel
and is different in principle from a “mechanical”¹⁰⁰ or technical unity of fixed
elements in the author’s design. Moreover, Bakhtin refuses to accept “the ulti-
 See also Kepnes’ interpretation of Buber’s dialogic aesthetics. Kepnes’ work focuses on the
problem of the interpretation of the work of art and the response to the text as ‘Thou’. Kepnes,
The Text as Thou, 23–26.









mate whole”¹⁰¹ of Dostoevsky’s work as a result of “the author’s synthesis” or of
“the unified, dialectically evolving spirit, understood in Hegelian terms,”¹⁰² i.e.,
“the spirit of the author himself, objectified in the whole of the artistic world he
had created.”¹⁰³ For, as he understands it, this is the unity of a dialogically per-
ceived and understood world, that is, “a higher unity, a unity, so to speak, of the
second order, the unity of a polyphonic novel”¹⁰⁴ which has to do with “Dosto-
evsky’s artistic vision”¹⁰⁵ and “his artistic perception of the world,”¹⁰⁶ whereas
the novel itself is merely a material embodiment of it.
Furthermore, in Bakhtin’s critique of “the methodological helplessness”¹⁰⁷
of the critical literature on Dostoevsky, unable “to understand the profound or-
ganic cohesion, consistency and wholeness of Dostoevsky’s poetics,”¹⁰⁸ we find
the striking parallel with Buber’s understanding of the ‘I–It’ relation to art which
involves objectification as well as direct application of scientific–objectified
methods of analysis¹⁰⁹ and therefore blocks avenues to the understanding of art-
work as ‘Thou’.
All of the Dostoevskian scholars, Bakhtin claims, were faced throughout
with separate problems in particular spheres of Dostoevsky’s work and none
of them with all its complexity. As a result, Dostoevsky’s work has been studied
as “some sort of conglomerate of disparate materials,”¹¹⁰ to be considered from
different points of view. Critics either devoted themselves to an investigation of
the ideological content in Dostoevsky’s novels, “seeking above all purely philo-
sophical postulates and insights” expressed “in the pronouncements of Dostoev-
sky (or more precisely of his characters),”¹¹¹ or “took Dostoevsky’s world as the
ordinary world of the socio-psychological European novel”¹¹² that gives us in-
sight into the psychic and mental life of man, and, according to this, investigated
the consciousness of Dostoevsky’s heroes, to be sure, chiefly the psychological
content of their consciousnesses. However, the object of Bakhtin’s most vehe-









 See Buber’s discussion of knowledge in Buber, I and Thou, p. 50.
 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 8.
 Ibid., 276.
 Ibid., 9.
From Martin Buber’s I and Thou to Mikhail Bakhtin’s Concept of ‘Polyphony’ 39
first and foremost the consistent “objectification”¹¹³ and “monologization”¹¹⁴ of
the world represented in Dostoevsky. As Bakhtin’s outline of the peculiar feature
of the critical literature on Dostoevsky demonstrates, these are two basic atti-
tudes of critical thought to Dostoevsky’s work, typical as well for the narrowly
ideological treatment of his work as for the purely psychological approach.
The former considers the Dostoevskian novel as “a philosophical monologue”¹¹⁵
with divided roles, that is, as a mere play of the intellect¹¹⁶ concerned with the
arrangement and rearrangement of the ideas and “philosophical stances, each
defended by one or another character,”¹¹⁷ turned into objects through which
the author manages to issue his speech. The naïve realism of the latter—that
fell into a dependence upon the so-called ‘sciences of man’, psychology and psy-
chopathology—“swims in too shallow waters.”¹¹⁸ Here, Bakhtin argues, Dostoev-
sky’s work and the world he created in it, regarded as “the objectified world”¹¹⁹
of the old and traditional European novel, has been reduced to the study of a
fragmentary part of that world—of “psyches” of the heroes, “psyches perceived
as things”¹²⁰ among other things in the “world corresponding to a single and
unified authorial consciousness,”¹²¹ to be sure, such things that have minds
and act by psychological laws. The fact that we have to engage here with
quite different objects, says Bakhtin, presented “after all, in the language of
art, and specifically in the language of a particular variety of novel,”¹²² and
not with “a materialized psychic reality,”¹²³ has been simply ignored.
Both approaches, Bakhtin summarizes, are equally incapable of visualizing
“a dialogicality of the ultimate whole”¹²⁴ (Buber would say that they do “not
know the dimension of the Thou”¹²⁵) that permeate all of Dostoevsky’s works,
in which nothing and nobody becomes “an object for the other”—“and this con-




 Speaking of the philosophical plane in the Dostoevskian novel, Bakhtin notes that it is not









 Buber, I and Thou, 71.
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a detached “all-encompassing”¹²⁶ observer. In clarifying this point, Bakhtin in-
sists that both approaches simply replace the wholeness and unity of Dostoev-
sky’s work by a totalization of the whole, perceived either as a so-called ‘objec-
tive’ description of the external, empirical world, or as a ‘subjective’ romantic
realism, or as a “philosophy in the form of a novel.”¹²⁷ This is why, says Bakhtin,
“all the major monographs on Dostoevsky […] contribute so little toward under-
standing”¹²⁸ what he formulates as “Dostoevsky’s fundamental task.”¹²⁹ This
task comprises “destroying the established forms of the fundamentally monolog-
ic (homophonic) European novel” [italics in original] and “constructing a poly-
phonic world,”¹³⁰ i.e., a polyphonic space in which there is no objectification
and which is neither objective nor subjective but is pure activity and intense dia-
logic interaction of “independent and unmerged consciousnesses”¹³¹ and “pure
voices”¹³² joined together in the unity of some spiritual event. This insight, as
must already be evident, demonstrates also that for Bakhtin as for Buber to
gain access to the original Thou-ness of the work of art means to understand
it properly.
Now, attention must be drawn to Bakhtin’s definition of the Dostoevskian
novel as a novel in which dialogue is real, present, and performed,which sounds
like Buber’s definition of the work of art as the witness of the life lived in the
dialogue. Here, it needs to be said that, in Bakhtin’s understanding, the poly-
phonic novel created by Dostoevsky is not a report of the dialogical life of
other people observed from without or a vision of the imagination or a philo-
sophical theory that Dostoevsky’s work represents or exemplifies. That would
be “possible in a novel of the purely monologic type as well, and is in fact
often found in that sort of novel,”¹³³ as Bakhtin tells us. He emphasizes that pol-
yphony is not so much the content or the theme as the immanent structure of the
Dostoevskian novel which displays a living interaction and fully realized dialogic
contact of the writer’s ‘I’ with another and with others. According to Bakhtin’s
interpretation, the attitude of the author to his hero is that of ‘I–Thou’. Dostoev-
sky, he writes, does not see his hero as a “voiceless object of the author’s








From Martin Buber’s I and Thou to Mikhail Bakhtin’s Concept of ‘Polyphony’ 41
words”¹³⁴ or “a created thing;”¹³⁵ he does not construe an “objectified image of
the hero”¹³⁶ or use his hero as “merely material”¹³⁷ or “an explanatory func-
tion”¹³⁸ in his work. Rather the hero is for him a free and autonomous subject,
a fully valid ‘thou’—“thou art,”¹³⁹—and he makes him present in his wholeness,
that is, portrays him as “a carrier of a fully valid word”¹⁴⁰ on himself and the
world and is interested in him as a personality “with equal rights and […]
with its own world.”¹⁴¹ Moreover, the author appears not in the aspect of an ex-
ternal authority over the hero, superior to him, but the author’s discourse is, as it
were, “dialogically addressed [italics in original] to him,” as if to another person,
so that “the author speaks not about a character, but with him [italics in origi-
nal].”¹⁴² In Bakhtin’s view, such a dialogic relationship between the author
and his characters as performed in the work of art is not invented. It is rather
a representation of what Dostoevsky found and discovered in reality itself and
what continues to be repeated in the work of art. In this regard, when Bakhtin
calls Dostoevsky the innovator “in the realm of the novel as an artistic
form”¹⁴³ and “the creator of the polyphonic novel”¹⁴⁴ and “polyphonic
world,”¹⁴⁵ he does not mean that Dostoevsky as an artist created a world of
his own, which is not deduced from, or generated by, anything and is, as it
were, produced by the author out of himself, and hence “in essence […] [is] fab-
ricated from beginning to end.”¹⁴⁶ Rather, he means by this something quite sim-
ilar to Buber’s formula regarding the task which confronts the artist who “is
faced by a form which desires to be made through him into a work” and is con-
cerned with realization—“to produce is to draw forth, to invent is to find, to
shape is to discover. In bodying forth I disclose.”¹⁴⁷
More significant parallels with Buber’s view on human creative activity or,
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still to be found in Bakhtin’s discussion of “Dostoevsky’s creative vision,”¹⁴⁸
which we will be examining in some detail below. Particularly illustrative is
the notion of “vision” in itself. In Bakhtin’s study of Dostoevsky this notion,
like Buber’s notion of Gestalt in I and Thou, is bound up with the process of ar-
tistic creation. Moreover, similar to Buber, Bakhtin associates this notion with
the source and the origin of the work of art. Following Buber’s claim that the Ge-
stalt is not “the offspring of the [artist’s] soul” or “a thing among the ‘inner’
things” reflected and expressed in his work, Bakhtin argues that “the soil in
which Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel was to grow” is neither Dostoevsky’s
“worldview in the ordinary sense of the world”¹⁴⁹ nor his own thoughts, evalua-
tions, and points of view¹⁵⁰ transformed into artistic images of his novels. Rather,
it is his artistic vision of the “now,” in the present, and is a result of the interac-
tion between the author and the world around him and a discovery of something
outside of him, something which is expressed as yet by no one and calls to be
made into a work of art, something which is both new and eternal but at the
same time something that refers to the world of men, in which people’s lives
and interrelations between human beings unfold. Such a “vision,” according
to Bakhtin, implies the artist’s “extraordinary capacity” and “gift”¹⁵¹ to “pene-
trate”¹⁵² into the deepest and most intense layers of life,¹⁵³ to see beyond the ob-
servable material of reality and superficial forms of life, to see “the world in
terms of interaction and coexistence,”¹⁵⁴ to conceive all its contents and forces
as coexisting simultaneously among people, on different planes, in the external
objective social world¹⁵⁵ and in “the depths of the human soul,”¹⁵⁶ and “to guess
at their interrelationships in the cross-section of a single moment.”¹⁵⁷ In describ-
ing Dostoevsky’s artistic vision of the dialogic nature of the human world, Bakh-
tin also emphasizes that this vision—although it does reflect “the objective com-




 Bakhtin quotes Vyacheslav Ivanov who defined “Dostoevsky’s realism as a realism based
not on cognition (objectified cognition), but on ‘penetration,’” and, indeed, the former affirms
this definition. However, in Bakhtin’s opinion, Ivanov “did not show how this principle […] be-
comes the principle behind Dostoevsky’s artistic visualization of the world, the principle behind






From Martin Buber’s I and Thou to Mikhail Bakhtin’s Concept of ‘Polyphony’ 43
plexity […] and multi-voicedness of Dostoevsky’s epoch”¹⁵⁸—is different from
that which is concerned with concrete social order or certain problems connect-
ed with human inner life or human relationships in one specific limited epoch.
Like Buber, he characterizes this vision in terms of ‘opening up a portal into eter-
nity’ (to paraphrase Buber’s words¹⁵⁹). Dostoevsky’s artistic vision, he says, rises
above time; it is “the triumph over time” and “overcoming time in time;”¹⁶⁰ it is
directed upon the essential in life and valid “for any epoch and under any ideol-
ogy;”¹⁶¹ it is addressed to the eternal,¹⁶² to a different order of existence inde-
pendent of “all concrete social forms (the forms of family, social or economic
class, life’s stories),”¹⁶³ that is, to “the abstract sphere of pure relationship,
one person to another,”¹⁶⁴ to oneself, and to the whole world¹⁶⁵ and inevitably
leads up to the relation between man and God.¹⁶⁶ Thus Bakhtin stresses that
“if we were to seek an image toward which this whole world [i.e., Dostoevsky’s
polyphonic world] gravitates, an image in the spirit of Dostoevsky’s own world-
view, then it would be the church as a communion of unmerged souls, where sin-
ners and righteous men come together.”¹⁶⁷ “But even the image of the church,”
Bakhtin insists, “remains only an image, explaining nothing of the structure of
the novel itself.”¹⁶⁸ Like Buber, he believes that “artistic vision” is not an “image”





 In Bakhtin’s own words, only things which are “essential” are incorporated into Dostoev-
sky’s world; “such things can be carried over into eternity. […] That which has meaning only as
‘earlier’ or ‘later’, which is sufficient only unto its own moment, which is valid only as past, or as
future, or as present in relation to past or future, is for him [i.e., for Dostoevsky] nonessential
and is not incorporated into his world.” Ibid., 29.
 Ibid., 264, 278, and 280.
 Ibid., 265.
 Ibid., 237.
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God and the Exiled Author (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Anton Simons, “The
Author’s Silence: Transcendence and Representation in Mikhail Bakhtin” in Flight of the Gods:
Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Theology, eds. Ilse N. Bulhof and Laurens Ten Kate
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 353–374.
 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 26–27.
 Ibid., 27.
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after being embodied in a work of art may open up, affording a glimpse of new
sides of human life.
Moreover, for Bakhtin as for Buber the creative act does not mean a mere
mirroring of what is revealed to the artist into the artwork. This act presupposes
sacrifice. And although Bakhtin does not use this term, he posits nevertheless
that the creation of “a polyphonic world,” which permits only certain artistic
means for revealing and representing itself, implies the act of offering the will
to domination and authoritarian control for the sake of “the artistic will of poly-
phony.”¹⁶⁹ The latter, he explains, is “a will to combine many wills, a will to the
event” that strives for “a unity of a higher order than in homophony,”¹⁷⁰ therefore
“the monologism of an artistic world,”¹⁷¹ dominated by the author’s authoritar-
ian voice, must be destroyed. This is apparent, as Bakhtin shows us, in the very
principle of novelistic construction created by Dostoevsky.
Thus Bakhtin writes that “the affirmation of someone else’s consciousness—
as an autonomous subject and not as an object—is the ethico-religious postulate
determining the content [italics in original] of the [Dostoevskian] novel.”¹⁷² But
this ethico-religious principle governing Dostoevsky’s worldview “does not in it-
self create a new form or a new type of novelistic construction.”¹⁷³ In saying this,
Bakhtin tends to link the creation of the polyphonic novel to aesthetic, artistic
activity rather than to ethical activity, to be sure, for him, the former presupposes
the latter. Therefore, he insists that the unity of Dostoevsky’s world – “a genuine
polyphony,” in which “a combination of several individual wills takes place” and
“the boundaries of the individual will” and “a single voice” are in principle ex-
ceeded—cannot under any condition be reduced “to the empty unity of an indi-
vidual act of will.”¹⁷⁴ That is why, to his mind, Dostoevsky shifts “the domi-
nant”¹⁷⁵ or “the center of gravity”¹⁷⁶ in this new kind of unity from “a
 Ibid., 21.
 Ibid.
 Ibid., 57. Thus Bakhtin writes that “Dostoevsky’s major heroes are, by the very nature of his
creative design, not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own directly sig-
nifying discourse. [italics in original] In no way, then, can a character’s discourse be exhausted
by the usual functions of characterization and plot development, nor does it serve as a vehicle
for the author’s own ideological position (as with Byron, for instance). The consciousness of a
character is given as someone else’s [italics in original] consciousness, another consciousness,
yet at the same time it is not turned into an object, is not closed, does not become a simple ob-
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monological sermon,”¹⁷⁷ from “a monologically formulated authorial world-
view,”¹⁷⁸ and from “a realization of one’s own private personality” to an “inter-
nally dialogic approach”¹⁷⁹ to the characters created by him, none of which be-
comes an integral and unified voice or merges with the voice of the author
himself, that is, serves “as a mouthpiece for the author’s voice,”¹⁸⁰ but each
“sounds, as it were, alongside the author’s word and in a special way combines
both with it and with the full and equally valid voices of other characters.”¹⁸¹
“The very distribution of voices and their interaction,” Bakhtin emphatically
stresses, “is what matters to Dostoevsky,”¹⁸² and what he, as the artist, is con-
cerned with is not the expression of a sole and single writer’s ‘I’¹⁸³ but the “fun-
damental task” which he set for himself ¹⁸⁴ and which, as Bakhtin defines it, is
“the realization of the polyphonic project,”¹⁸⁵ that is, the transformation of his
special polyphonic artistic vision—which cannot be subject to artistic assimila-
tion from the “monologic position”¹⁸⁶—into an “artistically organized coexistence
and interaction of spiritual diversity.”¹⁸⁷
With this, we conclude our survey of the similarities between Bakhtin’s and
Buber’s views on artistic creation, although we are far from having exhausted the
subject. We have only touched upon several basic principles of their aesthetic
position, which should by now be apparent and which have underlain our thesis
– advanced from the very beginning of the present paper – on Buber‘s influence
on Bakhtin. This survey clearly reveals the importance of Buber’s ‘I–Thou’ phi-
losophy for literary studies in general and for understanding of Bakhtin’s con-
cept of polyphony in particular. Buber’s ideas expressed in I and Thou shed addi-
tional light on the problem which was central to Bakhtin, namely, the problem of
how to understand a literary text as both the product of a single author and the





 Ibid., 5, see also 51.
 Ibid., 7.
 Ibid., 279.
 Ibid. In chap. 5, sect. iii, The Hero’s Discourse and Narrative Discourse in Dostoevsky, Bakh-
tin also speaks of weakening authorial discourse as connected with Dostoevsky’s artistic task to
break down the monologic canon.
 Ibid., 65.
 Ibid., 204.
 Ibid., 18; see also 78.
 Ibid., 31.
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phenomenon of a text whose multivoicedness contradicts the reigning notions of
authorship.




The Debate on Zionism between
Hermann Cohen and Martin Buber
In 1915, shortly after the outbreak of the First World War in Europe, Hermann
Cohen published a pamphlet expressing nationalistic convictions in favor of
the German war effort, in which he at the same time underlined the Jewish his-
torical contribution to German culture and politics. On the basis of his reflections
in this pamphlet, entitled Deutschtum und Judentum, Cohen argued for the legiti-
macy of a specifically Jewish minority as an essential component of the German
national identity. Following the appearance of this pamphlet, Cohen published
an article entitled “Religion und Zionismus. Ein Wort an meine Kommilitonen
jüdischen Glaubens” (Religion and Zionism. A Word Addressed to Fellow Mem-
bers of the Jewish Faith) in which he sharply criticized fellow Jewish Germans
who, instead of devoting their efforts to the promotion of German cultural ideals
and political goals in a time of war, were concerned above all with the creation of
a separate Jewish political entity. Cohen’s writings on this theme were a source of
passionate commentary in this period among broad segments of the German in-
telligentsia. They provided the occasion for a famous debate Cohen engaged in
with the young Martin Buber who, in direct response to Cohen’s critique of Zion-
ism, articulated an influential argument in favor of the creation of a Jewish
“homeland.”¹ Buber presented this plea in the article “Völker, Staaten und
Zion. Brief an Hermann Cohen”, (Peoples, Nations and Zion. A Letter to Her-
mann Cohen), which appeared in the journal Der Jude, in July 1916. In response
to this critique Cohen published a further article entitled “Antwort auf das offene
Schreiben des Herrn Dr. Martin Buber an Hermann Cohen” (An Answer to the
Public Writing of Dr. Martin Buber addressed to Hermann Cohen). Buber then an-
swered this response with the article, published in the September 1916 issue of
 In the early decades of the Zionist movement the so-called Endziel (ultimate objective) was
deliberately ill-defined and thus debated. The reference to a “homeland” (Heimstätte) served to
maintain the ambiguity. It was only with the rise of Hitler to power and the intensification of
anti-Semitism that the movement decisively defined its objective to be the founding of a sov-
ereign political state. Buber was affiliated with those Zionists who even at this juncture rejected
this envisioned Endziel. On the debates within the Zionist movement regarding its ultimate
political objective, see Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1961), ch.1.
Der Jude: “Der Staat und die Menschheit. Bemerkungen zu Hermann Cohens
Antwort” (The State and Humanity. Remarks on Hermann Cohen’s Response).
It would reach beyond the framework of this brief essay to provide a detailed
reexamination of the arguments advanced by Hermann Cohen and Martin Buber
for and against the creation of a Jewish homeland, which have aroused great in-
terest in recent years. I will focus, rather, on the specifically political dimension
of the debate. In highlighting the political ramifications of their pleas for and
against the creation of a Jewish State, Cohen and Buber each articulated what
seem to me to be paradoxical attitudes toward politics, expressing from diver-
gent perspectives the complexity of Jewish political theology in the period of
the First World War.
I will begin by examining what I take to be paradoxical in Hermann Cohen’s
political opposition to Zionism and then, in a brief analysis of the critique direct-
ed against him by Martin Buber, argue that Buber’s political interpretation of Ju-
daism led him to embrace a position which was no less paradoxical than that of
his opponent. As I will suggest, the paradoxes which their respective political po-
sitions involve reflect both the specific problem of Jewish political existence dur-
ing this period of the Great War that subsequent decades have done little to at-
tenuate, and the more general difficulty, which is hardly limited to theories
elaborated by Jewish thinkers, of reconciling theology and politics in 20th cen-
tury conceptions of the State.
I
The paradoxical character of Hermann Cohen’s attitude towards Jewish political
existence comes to light in his pamphlet Deutschtum und Judentum, which takes
to task any attempt on the part of German Jews to establish a State beyond Ger-
man borders. Cohen’s argument draws upon what he takes to be a profound kin-
ship between Germanity and Judaism based on a historical relation reaching
back to the bible and to Greek antiquity. This kinship derives from what was
for him central to both Jewish and German Christian culture: their “idealism”.
According to this argument idealism led Jewish thinkers, beginning with Philo
of Alexandria, to seek a common ground between the Old Testament and
Plato as a basis for ethical truth, and this quest similarly inspired seminal Ger-
man thinkers of the late middle ages and the Renaissance, such as Nicholas of
Cusa. In a later period and in a somewhat different perspective, Cohen identified
idealism with the German Reformation in its emphasis on spirituality and on the
role of individual conscience in the quest for justification (Rechtfertigung) before
God alone, independent of worldly influences. For Cohen, the central place that
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medieval thinkers such as Maimonides accorded to the transcendence of one
God as the creator of the world, in opposition to all forms of polytheism and pan-
theism which identify God with an immanent nature, had anticipated the Ger-
man Reformation; it was as such the “emblem of Protestantism in medieval Ju-
daism.”² A deep affinity became manifest in the idealist emphasis that both
German Jews and German Protestants placed on individual judgment, as on
the intellect and the pursuit of learning. It was confirmed by the importance
both groups attributed to ethical action freely chosen in light of rational deliber-
ation that Kant’s philosophy subsequently brought to fruition. In both Jewish
and German Protestant contexts idealism found further expression in the liturgi-
cal role they each accorded to music. Cohen at the same time downplayed what
had long been taken to be the radical distinction between Judaism and German
Protestantism: the Jewish insistence on the role of Halakha or law and of works,
as opposed to the Protestant belief in justification by faith. Following Grotius, as
Cohen pointed out, the Protestant tradition revived the doctrine of natural law
which acknowledged an explicit source in Mosaic law. And here Cohen drew
support for his interpretation from the works of the great 19th century Aristote-
lian scholar, Adolf Trendelenburg, who in his book on natural law had written
that:”Perhaps no legislation, not even that of Rome, has done so much as the
Mosaic law to propagate the feeling for law among the cultivated nations.’“³
The full political ramifications of Cohen’s broad historical sketch come to
light in his interpretation of the affinity between German Protestantism and Ju-
daism that crystallized during the centuries following the Protestant Reforma-
tion. He underlined above all the role of German humanism that found its clas-
sical expression in Herder’s Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität. This work, for
Cohen, expressing the religious conviction that mankind moves forward toward
an ever higher expression of its humanity, brought to fulfillment Enlightenment
hope, most eloquently voiced by Lessing, concerning the future development of
human culture. Herder’s philosophical formulation of this hope was of para-
mount importance for later generations, and its insight was more profound
than that of his great Jewish contemporary Moses Mendelssohn who, in his
book Jerusalem, abandoned any prospect of general advancement for humanity.
Herder’s efforts showed here a profound affinity with an earlier Jewish tradition
of messianism, and it was important for Cohen in this perspective that Herder
 “Wahrzeichen des Protestantismus im mittelalterlichen Judentum”, Hermann Cohen, Deutsch-
tum und Judentum (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1915), 11.
 “Vielleicht hat keine Gesetzgebung, selbst nicht die römische, solche Verdienste um das Ge-
fühl des Rechts unter den Kulturvölkern, als die mosaische.” Ibid., 12– 13. Unless otherwise in-
dicated, all translations are my own.
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developed his insight in his reflection on ancient Judaism and on the Old Testa-
ment in his work Über den Geist der ebräischen Poesie. Here we discover the
deepest source of the kinship between “Deutschtum” and “Judentum”, for
Cohen, during the early period of the First World War:
At this high point, everyone should once again feel the inner community between German-
ity and Judaism. For the concept of humanity originated in the messianism of the prophets
of Israel. And, even aside from Herder, there is no doubt that the biblical spirit had a most
profound impact on German humanism. Messianism, however, is the foundation of Juda-
ism; it is its crown and its root. It constitutes the creative and dynamic basis of monothe-
ism, as Herder had already stressed: ‘As Jehovah was unique, the creator of the world: so
was He also the God of all humans, of all races’. And messianism is its supreme result. Ad-
mittedly it was linked from the beginning to national politics and to national religiosity.⁴
Whereas Jewish thinkers such as Mendelssohn no longer comprehended original
Jewish Messianic conceptions, German Protestants such as Herder revived them
and thereby provided an essential impulse to the later development of Judaism
in Germany and in Europe as a whole. In the contemporary context of the First
World War, Cohen underlined the mission of German Christians and Jews alike to
promote the rebirth of a new sense of ethical purpose leading beyond the limits
of nationalistic perspectives oriented in terms of narrow material interests. This
requires the creation of a confederation of nations which would alone be capable
of ensuring lasting peace. Cohen speculated that this future confederation would
permit different nationalities and religions to co-exist in peace in the framework
of modern nation-states, and it would enable different nation-states to remain at
peace with each other; this is the inner truth of the idealism of both German Jews
and Christians (especially Protestants), issuing from a common source in Biblical
religiosity and Greek philosophy, and it is the ultimate goal of the messianic
ideal. Far from requiring the assimilation of the Jews, the messianic ideal calls
for the ongoing existence of Judaism, which continues to provide a unique con-
tribution to German cultural and political life as a whole. In the future, the es-
 “An diesem Hauptpunkte sollte nun wiederum jedermann die innere Gemeinschaft zwischen
Deutschtum und Judentum fühlen. Denn der Begriff der Menschheit hat seinen Ursprung im
Messianismus der israelitischen Propheten. Und es dürfte, auch abgesehen von Herder, ausser
Zweifel stehen, dass der biblische Geist auch im deutschen Humanismus als tiefste Ursache ge-
wirkt hat. Der Messianismus aber ist der Grundpfeiler des Judentums; er ist seine Krone und
seine Wurzel. Er bildet das schöpferische Grundmotiv des Monotheismus, das Herder schon her-
vorhebt: ‚War Jehova der Einzige, der Schöpfer der Welt: so war er auch der Gott aller Menschen,
aller Geschlechter‘. Und er ist seine höchste Konsequenz. Freilich war er von Anfang an mit der
nationalen Politik, wie mit der nationalen Religiosität verbunden.” Ibid., 28.
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sential purpose of Jewish monotheism would be to serve as an indispensable
bulwark for ethical culture.⁵
As interpreted by Cohen in Deutschtum und Judentum, messianism was not
simply a biblical image, nor was it limited to the sphere of religious faith. Well
beyond the domain of pure religion, it engaged the political authority of the
State which, in its capacity to dominate and harmonize the discord that arises
from religious and ethnic (“racial”) differences, no longer rests on an arbitrary
exercise of power, but on an ethical conviction and a moral purpose that
come to fruition in the process of historical development. Cohen’s philosophy
as a whole provides a curious mix of messianic prophetism and philosophy of
history derived from German idealism, especially of the Kantian variety.
This brings us to the central point: a tradition of German Protestants reach-
ing in the modern period from Johann Kaspar Lavater to Paul de Lagarde, and up
to Cohen’s contemporary, the economist Gustav Schmoller, took Jews in Germany
to task who had maintained their distinctive religious identity. And the question
had often arisen concerning why the Jews, if they sought to become Germans,
should let their religion stand as a barrier between them and the vast majority
of their Christian co-citizens? Why did they not adopt the Christian religion as
a means of assimilating and erasing the last differences separating the Jewish
minority from German Christians? In subsequent years, of course, the accent
placed on insurmountable racial distinctions would render such questions whol-
ly irrelevant, but they remained important in the period of the First World War.
Cohen attempted to provide a convincing answer to these questions on the
basis both of arguments in favor of Jewish existence in Germany and against
Zionist pleas for the separation of Germans and Jews through the creation of a
Jewish State in Palestine. Cohen’s reasoning on this matter was expounded
above all in his 1916 article “Religion und Zionismus” and in his response in
the same year to Martin Buber’s rebuke of this article; in these writings he ela-
borated on the arguments presented in Deutschtum und Judentum in favor of the
continued existence of Judaism as a separate religion in the German nation state.
In the space of this short essay I will not attempt to reconstruct the whole gamut
of Cohen’s objections to Zionism, but I will focus on the curious mix he concoct-
ed between messianism and politics. Here the argument concerning history as
the arena of development of the political authority of the State, inspired by mes-
sianic ethical principles, provided the basis for what he termed “political reli-
 “Der Monotheismus des Judentums ist das unerschütterliche Bollwerk für alle Zukunft der sit-
tlichen Kultur.” Ibid., 40.
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giosity” (politische Religiosität),⁶ in terms of which he presented his objection
against the establishment of a separate homeland for all Jews.
According to Cohen’s interpretation, the Jews had forfeited any particular po-
litical vocation following the destruction of the second temple during Roman an-
tiquity. Although the Jews never subsequently created a political society, they
were able to maintain themselves as a religious group, in spite of their dispersal
among the nations. Without the support of a Jewish State, the Jews were thus
able to maintain their distinctive religious identity throughout the centuries.
The continuity in this identity indicated to Cohen that Jewish religiosity, and
above all the messianic ideal it sustained, does not correspond to a particularly
Jewish political structure but, on the contrary, can only be perverted by attempts
– such as those of the Zionists – to impose such a structure upon it. If the Jews
are indeed God’s chosen people, they are not chosen to be representatives of a
particular State but, as mediators between God and all of humanity, of the mes-
sianic ideal itself. In his initial critique of Zionism, “Religion und Zionismus”,
Cohen wrote in this respect: “He who reserves the fundamental teachings of Ju-
daism for the Jewish people denies the unique God of messianic humanity. We
recognize the election of Israel only as the historical mediation in view of the Di-
vine election of humanity.”⁷ It is for this reason, according to Cohen, that Zionist
attempts to bind Jewish religiosity to a political principle forsake Judaism in its
very essence. Zionism harks back to an ancient period of political autonomy of
the Jewish people which it seeks to re-enact. The prophets, however, look for-
ward to the messianic destiny of all humanity and therefore, following the de-
struction of the second temple, they can only sanction the Jewish diaspora in
view of the future redemption of mankind as a whole.
Here we apprehend a curious paradox that runs throughout Cohen’s argu-
ment. He stated in Deutschtum und Judentum, and reiterated in his critique of
Zionism, that the Jews were not the unique representatives of the messianic prin-
ciple, for they shared this with German Protestants. In this vein, Cohen went to
the point, in his response to Buber’s protest against his initial critique of Zion-
ism, of rephrasing this idea in the strongest of terms: “Therefore do I love in
the unity that the German Spirit manifests in its science as in its State the Prov-
 “Antwort auf das offene Schreiben des Herrn Dr. Martin Buber an Hermann Cohen.” Jüdische
Schriften, vol. 2 (Berlin: Schetschke u. Sohn, 1924), 336.
 “Und wer das Judentum in seiner Grundlehre grundsätzlich für das jüdische Volk reserviert
hält, der verleugnet den einzigen Gott der messianischen Menschheit. Die Erwählung Israels er-
kennen wir nur als die geschichtliche Vermittlung für die göttliche Erwählung der Menschheit
an.” Hermann Cohen, “Religion und Zionismus.” Jüdische Schriften, vol. 2: 32.
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idential path toward attainment of the messianic goal.”⁸ This statement, howev-
er, brings to light a curious paradox in Cohen’s interpretation as a whole: if Ger-
man Christians are capable of representing the messianic ideal, what possible
argument could be advanced in favor of the survival of Jewish religiosity in Ger-
many? To my mind, Cohen presented no satisfactory answer to this question, nei-
ther in Deutschtum und Judentum, nor in his pronouncements against Zionism,
nor in his 1917 rebuttal of the arguments of Gustav Schmoller, who explicitly
raised doubts concerning the claims of Jews to equal rights in Germany given
their refusal to abandon religious separatism.⁹
This question intensely preoccupied Cohen in the years before his death in
1918. His last posthumously published work, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quel-
len des Judentums, was nonetheless not able, any more than his earlier writings,
to provide a satisfactory answer to it. In this final work, he elaborated his reflec-
tion on the essentially political character of Jewish messianism which he con-
trasted with the otherworldliness of Platonism that he qualified as utopian
and eschatological. Jewish messianism in this final work was now also contrast-
ed with Christian messianism which, in its insistence on otherworldliness, as-
sumed an essentially eschatological form.¹⁰ Messianism, in contradistinction
to eschatology, seeks to realize its ethical purpose in the real political world.
But this insistence on the political character of messianism only highlights the
profoundly paradoxical character of the notion of “political religiosity” that he
applied to the Jewish faith: if, indeed, as Cohen reiterated in Religion der Ver-
nunft, messianism finds its source in Old Testament prophecy and if the Jews
are direct bearers of a messianic ethical mission, then we are led to the conclu-
sion that a people which, over the centuries, has been deprived of any particular
form of political existence has been chosen to fulfill humanity’s eminently polit-
ical task. It is ultimately this paradox that comes to light in the idea of a provi-
dentially guided unfolding of the historical process which is propelled by the po-
litical messianism of the Jewish people.
 “Darum liebe ich in der Einheit, die der deutsche Geist in seiner Wissenschaft und seinem
Staat darstellt, den Weg der Vorsehung zur Erreichung des messianischen Ziels.” Hermann
Cohen, “Antwort auf das offene Schreiben des Herrn Dr. Martin Buber an Hermann Cohen.” Jü-
dische Schriften, vol. 2: 340.
 Hermann Cohen, “Betrachtungen über Schmollers Angriff.” Jüdische Schriften, vol. 2: 381–397.
 Hermann Cohen, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums.Eine jüdische Religion-
sphilosophie (Wiesbaden: Fourier, 1978), 357–392.
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II
Buber’s early political ideas concerning Zionism came to expression most nota-
bly in his attitude toward one of the principle theoretical sources of this move-
ment, the cultural Zionism of Achad Haam. In an article published in Hebrew in
1902, “The Renaissance of the Spirit,” Achad Haam considered that the move-
ment toward emancipation and assimilation of the Jews since the period of
the eighteenth century Enlightenment or “Haskalah” had led to a loss of Jewish
identity and Jewish cultural vitality. This weakening of Judaism could only be
counteracted through the creation of a Jewish State in which a return to the He-
brew language and a fortification of the principles of Jewish learning would lead
to a general revival of Jewish culture.¹¹ Buber adopted a similar line of argument,
which at the same time aimed to surmount what he took to be Achad Haam’s
narrow culturalism and intellectualism. Buber’s assessment of Achad Haam’s
work in the discourse “Die Erneurerung des Judentums” (The Renewal of Juda-
ism), the third of his early Reden über das Judentum (Addresses on Judaism) pub-
lished in 1911, was at once admirative and critical of this early theory of cultural
Zionism, which Buber sought to enrich in light of popular religious themes in-
spired by the Chassidic movement and through an intensified focus on messian-
ism. In “The Renewal of Judaism,” Buber referred to messianism as “Judaism’s
most deeply original idea.”¹² The brand of messianism Buber advocated, as he
reiterated in the critique of Cohen he presented in the article “Peoples, States,
and Zion,” initially published in 1916, went hand in hand with the bringing to
an end of the Jewish diaspora through the creation of a Jewish homeland.
This Zionist messianism found an important source in the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry writings of Moses Hess, which he evoked in his critique of Hermann Cohen:
“We lack the country through which to fulfill the historic ideal of our people;
this ideal is none other than the rule of God on this earth, the messianic time
that all of our prophets announced.”¹³ And here Buber presented a cogent cri-
tique of the messianic principles articulated by Hermann Cohen: “Judaism
may well be taken up in messianic humanity, to be melted into it; we do not,
 Achad-Haam, “Die Renaissance des Geistes” (1902), Am Scheidewege, vol. 2, tr. Israel Fried-
länder (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1913), 115.
 “[…] die am tiefsten originale Idee des Judentums”, Martin Buber, “Die Erneuerung des Ju-
dentums.” Reden über das Judentum (Berlin: Schocken, 1932), 58.
 “Uns fehlt das Land, um das historische Ideal unseres Volkes zu verwirklichen, welches kein
anderes Ideal ist als die Herrschaft Gottes auf Erden, die messianische Zeit, die von allen unse-
ren Propheten verkündet worden ist.” Martin Buber, “Völker, Staaten und Zion. Brief an Her-
mann Cohen.” Die Jüdische Bewegung (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1920), 43.
56 Jeffrey Andrew Barash
however, consider that the Jewish people must disappear among contemporary
humanity so that a messianic humanity might arise.”¹⁴ Buber’s affirmation of
Zionism, however, raises the immediate question concerning the specifically po-
litical principles which the foundation of the Jewish homeland might involve.
Buber’s writings, however, remained vague on this point and Cohen, in his re-
sponse to Buber’s critique, clearly identified this weakness in his adversary’s po-
sition. Cohen brought to light, indeed, the wholly paradoxical character of Bub-
er’s variety of political messianism, lying in his attempt to combine it with
Zionism and thus with national particularism.
In his answer to Cohen’s critique of Zionism, Buber retorted that the Zionist
goal of establishing a national homeland for the Jews could hardly be limited in
its significance to the particular national existence of the Jews; it was at the same
time “supranational” (übernational) in scope. “We want Palestine not ‘for the
Jews,’” as he wrote, “we want it for humanity, since we want it for the fulfillment
of Judaism.”¹⁵ In his remarks on Buber’s response, Cohen did not fail to point out
the highly problematic character of this mixture of Jewish universalism with the
politics of Zionism, which focused on the national existence of the Jews alone.
Cohen did not hesitate to voice the suspicion that the claim to universalism of
the political principles of Zionism was in reality no more than a means of pro-
moting the sheer quest for power typical of particular nations.
In his later article “Der Staat und die Menschheit. Bemerkungen zu Hermann
Cohens Antwort” (The State and Humanity. Remarks on Hermann Cohen’s re-
sponse), Buber addressed this crucial point. He stated that his brand of Zionism
sought to avoid precisely the empty quest for power so typical of all forms of na-
tionalism: “I have heard and seen,” he wrote, “too many of the results of the
empty need for power.” But, without further addressing this problem, he simply
reiterated his initial statement: “We want Palestine not ‘for the Jews,’ we want it
for humanity, since we want it for the fulfillment of Judaism.” At this point Buber
added a further remark which, in view of his previous pronouncements, is at
once puzzling and problematic: “In the work of the new humanity, toward
which we aim, the specific violence of Judaism cannot be avoided – the violence
that was once the strongest impulse for humanity toward the true life.”¹⁶ In his
 “In der messianischen Menschheit mag das Judentum dereinst aufgehen, mit ihr verschmel-
zen; nicht aber vermögen wir einzusehen, dass das jüdische Volk in der heutigen Menschheit
untergehen müsse, damit die messianische erstehe.” Ibid.
 “Wir wollen Palästina nicht ‚für die Juden‘: wir wollen es für die Menschheit, denn wir wol-
len es für die Verwirklichung des Judentums.” Ibid., 44.
 “Ich habe von den Werken des leeren Machtbedürfnisses zu viel gesehen und gehört”; “Am
Werk der neuen Menschheit, das wir meinen, kann die spezifische Gewalt des Judentums nicht
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critical remarks on Cohen’s political position, Buber did not clarify the precise
sense of this “specific violence” of Judaism nor did he define the political
form that the Jewish “homeland” was to assume. We learn only that this home-
land was to be made independent of the preoccupations of nations (Getriebe der
Völker) and of “external politics” (der äusseren Politik enthoben) so that it might
marshal “all forces toward the inner elaboration and thereby the fulfillment of
Judaism.”¹⁷
Buber’s reaction against contemporary expressions of nationalism is under-
standable in view of the catastrophic results of the politics of national interest
that were being pursued in the First World War. But his idea of a homeland
founded on the quest for spiritual goals and emancipated from the normal polit-
entbehrt werden – die Gewalt, die einst dem Menschen den stärksten Antrieb zum wahrhaften
Leben gab.” Martin Buber, “Der Staat und die Menschheit. Bemerkungen zu Hermann Cohens
Antwort”, Die Jüdische Bewegung, p. 61. On Buber’s critique of Cohen see Paul Mendes-Flohr,
From Mysticism to Dialogue. Martin Buber’s Transformation of German Social Thought (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1989), 109– 110.
 “[…] alle Kräfte um den inneren Ausbau und damit um die Verwirklichung des Judentums.”
“Der Staat und die Menschheit,” 61. Less than two years later, Stefan Zweig, in an undated letter
presumably written in late 1917 or early 1918, expressed his reservations concerning Buber’s con-
cept of a Jewish State in Palestine. “Since I am most clearly resolved”, he wrote, “the more the
dream threatens to become a reality, the dangerous dream of a Jewish State with canons, flags,
orders, to prefer the painful idea of the diaspora, the Jewish fate more than the Jewish well-
being. (“Denn ich bin ganz klar entschlossen, je mehr sich im Realen der Traum zu verwirkli-
chen droht, der gefährliche Traum eines Judenstaates mit Kanonen, Flaggen, Orden, gerade
die schmerzliche Idee der Diaspora zu lieber, das jüdische Schicksal mehr als das jüdische Woh-
lergehn.”) In his answer to Zweig dated February 4th 1918, Buber responded as follows: “For
today, only this – that I know nothing of a ‘Jewish State with canons, flags, and orders’, not
even in the form of a dream. What will happen depends upon those who make it happen,
and precisely for this reason must those like me, who think in terms of humanity and of man-
kind, also determine what develops, here, where in these times the creation of a new community
depends on human action. I do not conceive as valid your historical conclusions regarding the
new people, which is to be engendered from old stock. If Jewish Palestine will prove to be the
end of a movement, that was only spiritual in content, then it will be the beginning of a move-
ment that will bring the Spirit to fulfillment.” (“Heute nur dies, dass mir von einem ‘Judenstaat
mit Kanonen, Flaggen, Orden’ nichts bekannt ist, auch nicht in der Form eines Traums.Was wer-
den wird, hängt von denen ab, die es schaffen, und gerade deshalb müssen die wie ich mens-
chlich und menscheitlich Gesinnten bestimmend mittun, hier, wo es wieder einmal in den Zeiten
in die Hand von Menschen gelegt ist, eine Gemeinschaft aufzubauen. Ihre geschichtlichen
Schlussfolgerungen kann ich für das neue Volk, das hier aus altem Blute werden soll, nicht gel-
ten lassen.Wenn ein jüdisches Palästina das Ende einer Bewegung sein wird, die nur im Geisti-
gen bestand, so wird es der Anfang einer Bewegung sein, die den Geist verwirklichen will”),
Martin Buber, Briefwechsel aus sieben Jahrzehnten (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider,
1972), vol. 1: 524–26.
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ical preoccupations that the existence of a state entails is nonetheless highly par-
adoxical. Indeed, Buber’s early political messianism savored of paradox, albeit
for reasons that were radically opposed to the messianic “political religiosity”
championed by his adversary, Hermann Cohen. Nonetheless, in spite of their im-
placable hostility to each other’s positions, Cohen and Buber shared one com-
mon conviction standing at the heart of the paradox that – for opposite reasons
– characterizes their respective standpoints: each believed that the political
goals advocated by the Jewish people necessarily involved the redemption of
all humanity – either because the Jews, while destined to remain stateless,
were at the same time the wellspring of universal political aims, or because,
in their quest for a particular state, their politics necessarily engaged a spiritual
universality. In the last analysis, these two divergent concepts of politics were
each fatefully tied to the ideal of political messianism, stemming from the con-
viction that the pursuit of political aims essentially fulfills a sacred mission. If
this ideal was hardly limited to Jewish political thought, nor to the troubled pe-
riod in which Cohen and Buber wrote, their opposing political positions paradox-
ically converged in an unquestioned willingness to interpret political principles
in light of theology.
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Samuel Hayim Brody
Is Theopolitics an Antipolitics?
Martin Buber, Anarchism, and the Idea of the Political
We have come to recognize that the political is the total, and as a result we know that any
decision about whether something is unpolitical is always a political decision...
– Carl Schmitt, “Preface to the Second Edition” of Political Theology (1934)
Here is the serpent in the fullness of its power!
– Martin Buber, “Letter to Gandhi” (1939)
Introduction: The Shape of the Theopolitical
Problem
“Antipolitics,” writes Michael Walzer, “is a kind of politics.”¹ This puzzling state-
ment occurs in Walzer’s recent discussion of the Bible, which he calls “a political
book,” but one that has “no political theory” in it; its writers are “engaged with
politics” but are “not very interested in politics,” although he admits that “writ-
ers who are uninterested in politics nonetheless have a lot to say that is politi-
cally interesting.” Walzer has always been a clear writer, and if this series of
statements seems convoluted, this may be due to the subject matter itself.
Close examination of the relationship of religion and politics has a way of calling
into question our very understanding of the nature of both “religion” and “pol-
itics” as distinct and separate spheres that can each be described according to its
own special set of characteristics. This, of course, is an inconvenient state of af-
fairs for university departments like Political Science and Religion, which would
like to assume that the objects of their study do in fact exist.
This essay excavates and explicates the potential contribution of Martin
Buber to the contemporary resurgence of interest in the borders between religion
and politics, through an examination of the category “theopolitics” in Buber’s
mature work, particularly Königtum Gottes (1932), as well as his later biblical
writings.² Interest in Buber, both during and after his lifetime, has centered on
 Michael Walzer, In God’s Shadow: Politics in the Hebrew Bible (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2012), xiii.
 The essay is part of a larger project on Buber’s theopolitics. That project addresses many top-
ics beyond what space allows here, including the historical context of theopolitics in Weimar
Germany and its manifestation in a unique form of Zionism. What follows, however, will
his introduction of Hasidism to Western audiences, as well as his “philosophy of
dialogue” as represented by Ich und Du (1923). During the vogue of “religious ex-
istentialism” in the 1950s and 60s Buber was a best-seller; the waning of this
trend dimmed his star somewhat, and he settled into his current position: an im-
portant figure in Jewish ethics, who is still read in Protestant seminaries and lib-
eral rabbinical schools as an exemplar of modern Jewish thought outside the
strictures of halakha.³ Few scholars have focused on Buber’s political thought,
and those who do often complain about their lack of company. Robert Weltsch,
for example, writes: “To many it may appear that Martin Buber is not a political
scientist. He is regarded as a religious thinker and as a social philosopher, not as
a man of politics. Such a classification, however, would be a fallacy.”⁴ Twenty
years later, Steven Schwarzschild remarks that little has changed:
Much has been written about virtually all the vast and diverse aspects of the life and works
of Martin Buber. His political philosophy and activities are a striking exception to this state
of affairs, although socio-political matters were clearly of fundamental importance to him…
In at least some instances this exception is made tendentiously: Buber’s reputation is to be
used for institutional and political self-advancement, but the nature of his political thought
and programme would resist such purposes.⁵
Whether for the reason Weltsch suggests, that scholars simply do not see Buber
as a political writer, or for the more insidious reason proposed by Schwarzschild,
that they find the topic dangerous, it remains the case two more decades later
that there is no definitive treatment of Buber’s politics.⁶
focus primarily on the theoretical tenets of theopolitics as it relates to other discourses that ex-
amine the border between religion and politics.
 One could further speculate on the reception of Buber’s “successors” as apples of the schol-
arly eye in the 1970s and 80s: Scholem’s seemingly hard-headed and scientific interpretation of
Jewish mysticism displaced Buber’s “romantic” vision of Hasidism, while Levinas’s ontology of
alterity came into fashion for those who were attracted to the “philosophy of dialogue.” Levi-
nas’s popularity, sometimes mediated through the prism of Jacques Derrida, in turn contributed
to the “staying power” of Heidegger and Rosenzweig, both acknowledged influences on Levinas,
as the discourse of “existentialism” faded into that of “postmodernism.”
 Robert Weltsch, “Buber’s Political Philosophy,” The Philosophy of Martin Buber, The Library of
Living Philosophers Volume XII, eds. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Maurice Friedman (La Salle, IL:
Open Court Press, 1967), 435–449.
 Steven Schwarzschild, “A Critique of Martin Buber’s Political Philosophy: An Affectionate Reap-
praisal,” The Pursuit of the Ideal: Jewish Writings of Steven Schwarzschild, ed. Menachem Kellner (Al-
bany: SUNY Press, 1990), 185–207. Originally published as “A Critique of M. Buber’s Political Philos-
ophy—An Affectionate Reappraisal,” Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook XXXI, 1986, 355–388.
 Some scholars deny that he has a politics at all: “…[T]he two poles of Jewish life that would
hold [Buber’s] primary interest [were] the cultural and the spiritual. With the exception of his
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Weltsch is right that scholars and the general public alike have simply been
more interested in other aspects of Buber’s work. But surely it is not that Buber
just happens to be seen as a non-political writer, but that something about his
work actively encourages the formation of such a perception. Politics seems to
be consistently subordinated to other elements in his thought, lacking the proper
independent treatment it receives in writers we recognize as belonging to the po-
litical theory canon. The latter insight has been articulated most explicitly by
those who treat Buber as a philosopher. Even when Buber is recognized as hav-
ing a politics, and even when this politics is investigated with respect, it is char-
acterized as an adjunct to his philosophy: the political utopia Buber sought is
related to his existential meditations on the I-Thou relation.⁷ This stance
makes eminent sense if we take ontology (or ethics) to be first philosophy,
and read the philosophy of dialogue as Buber’s ontology (or ethics). From the
dialogical perspective, Utopia is that configuration of society with the fewest
possible obstacles to the fundamental human desire for a community based
on recognition and mutual concern. Social structures that discourage such re-
gard, and demand subservience to laws of instrumentality, such as the state
and the market, obstruct I-Thou encounters, although they may still take place
under these conditions. Such social structures would be transformed in utopia,
and would constitute a direct connection between Buber’s philosophy and his
politics. Bernard Susser sums up this approach: “[F]ederalism as Buber under-
stands it is the principle of dialogue writ large and socialized.”⁸
Thus, it would seem that one could achieve a more political reading of Buber
simply by bracketing philosophy and attempting to isolate a political doctrine.
However, significant disciplinary tendencies still militate in the direction of clas-
sifying Buber as “really” an ethicist or “really” a theologian. Foremost among
these is the idea that if politics is to be treated as a subject in its own right,
later efforts on behalf of Brit Shalom, a group committed to the reconciliation of Zionism and
Arab nationalism, Buber was not particularly interested in politics and so did not himself pro-
duce a body of literature on the topic, although he wrote occasionally on political matters.” Gilya
Gerda Schmidt, Martin Buber’s Formative Years: From German Culture to Jewish Renewal, 1897–
1909 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1995), 118. Schmidt excludes Brit Shalom from
her judgement that Buber is non-political, but Howard M. Sachar, whom she cites, includes
them within this judgement: “The Brit Shalom was an ideological, not a political, group.” Sa-
char, A History of Israel, From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Knopf, 1986), 180.
 Paul Mendes-Flohr, “The Desert Within and Social Renewal—Martin Buber’s Vision of Uto-
pia,” New Perspectives on Martin Buber, ed. Michael Zank (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006),
219–230, 220.
 Bernard Susser, “The Anarcho-Federalism of Martin Buber,” Publius 9.4 (Autumn 1979), 103–
116, 104.
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then one must focus above all on the special rules or laws that are inherent to
politics as a distinct sphere of life, what Max Weber called its Eigengesetzlichkeit
or autonomy. The idea that politics is a craft demanding special knowledge is as
old as Plato’s inquiry into the areté or excellence of the statesman. But the idea
of the autonomy of politics, the claim that politics issues its own laws to itself,
may be much younger.⁹ When Machiavelli is cited as the founder of modern po-
litical science, it is usually because he is said to have emancipated politics from
its subordination to ethics or religion, enabling it to be studied as an autono-
mous realm. Political theorists may then be defined as those who follow in Ma-
chiavelli’s footsteps, placing the recognition of the autonomy of politics at the
foundation of their work.
There is a logical slippage here, however. Merely to acknowledge that poli-
tics is a craft, like shipbuilding or medicine, demanding a particular talent or ex-
cellence, is not yet to declare it autonomous, because it is not yet to say what the
telos or purpose of politics is. The areté of a knife is to cut, and the areté of a ship
is to sail; each possesses its areté to the extent to which it succeeds in fulfilling
these purposes. One must posit a purpose for politics, then, in order to define
“the areté of the statesman.” Both Plato and Aristotle, in different ways, do sub-
ordinate politics to a telos, namely the Good. With Machiavelli, however, the
move that allows his laser-like focus on political technique is precisely the refus-
al to articulate any telos for politics beyond the desire of the prince to “maintain
his state,” that is, to continue being a prince.¹⁰ In line with what Weber called the
rationalization of every sphere of human life, this isolation of the technique of
politics can then be maintained as the sine qua non for the existence of political
science as a scholarly discipline. This claim, in turn, serves as the foundation for
many shades of political “realism,” including Weber’s own distinction between a
politics founded in an ethics of responsibility, which pays political science its
due, and one rooted in an ethics of conviction, which allows comprehensive con-
ceptions of the good to determine political action. The latter politics is vulnera-
ble to criticism in the terms used by Walzer, as “antipolitics,” since by refusing to
 As we will see, Buber’s view is that the autonomy of the political is at least as old as the Is-
raelite monarchy.
 Here I prescind from the debates swirling around how the Machiavelli of The Prince does or
does not differ from the Machiavelli of the Discourses; whether one or both should really be per-
ceived as republican or even radically democratic, rather than in the service of tyranny, etc. The
point is not what the real Machiavelli, whose true doctrines had to be uncovered by revisionist
scholarship, said, but what the Machiavelli who “founded modern political science” said. See
Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, eds., Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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stipulate that the purpose of politics is to maintain the state, it refuses to allow
politics its autonomous existence. The plea for objectivity that inaugurates polit-
ical science, namely the demand that we describe the world as it is, and not as
we think it ought to be, ends up smuggling ontology and ethics through the back
door as it first tells us how the world really is, and then demands that we recog-
nize this state of affairs in order to be responsible.
Weber, as the preeminent social scientist of his day, sets the terms of the dis-
cussion for much Weimar political thought. Maturity in politics for Weber is de-
fined by the ability to recognize and endure the irreconcilable clashes of value
between ethics and religion, on the one hand, and politics on the other. Mean-
while, the rationalization of every sphere of life attendant to modernity encour-
ages the growth of bureaucracy, which in turn endangers “the political” itself,
defined in a Nietzschean manner as Herrschaft [authority/domination] of one
person or group of people over another. These basic claims serve as the nodal
point around which numerous “symmetrical counter-concepts” form concerning
the question of the autonomy of politics.¹¹ Here I will seek to define Buber’s the-
opolitics as one such counter-concept, and to place it into dialogue with another,
the “political theology” associated with Carl Schmitt. Following Christoph
Schmidt, I argue that theopolitics functions as a radical inversion of political the-
ology: Buber uses “theopolitics” only to define the proper relationship of the re-
ligious to the political, while “political theology” describes what theopolitics be-
comes if it betrays its proper task.¹² Theopolitics concerns itself with the same
Weberian problems as does political theology—from secularization and technic-
ity to representation and charisma—and thinks through them with a highly sim-
ilar vocabulary, but it comes to diametrically opposite conclusions on one point
 Heinrich Meier speaks of the “conceptual symmetry” between Carl Schmitt’s political theol-
ogy and Leo Strauss’s political philosophy; “Preface to the American Edition” of The Lesson of
Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction between Political Theology and Political Philosophy,
Expanded Edition, trans. Marcus Brainard and Robert Berman (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2011), xv. The phrase recalls Reinhart Koselleck’s use of the term “symmetrical counter-
concepts” in his description of Schmitt’s Friend-Foe dichotomy, “a description of oneself or of
one’s Foe that is open to simultaneous use by both sides.” Futures Past: On the Semantics of His-
torical Time (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 197.
 Schmidt, “Die theopolitische Stunde. Martin Bubers Begriff der Theopolitik, seine prophet-
ischen Ursprünge, seine Aktualität und Bedeutung für die Definition Zionistischer Politik,” Die
theopolitische Stunde: Zwölf Perspektiven auf das eschatologische Problem der Moderne (Mün-
chen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009), 205–225. See my translation of a revised version of this
essay, “The Theopolitical Hour: Martin Buber’s Concept of Theopolitics, its Prophetic Origins,
and its Relevance and Significance for the Definition of Zionist Politics,” in Jacques Picard et
al., eds., Thinking Jewish Modernity (forthcoming).
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after another. Both question the continuing intellectual validity of the liberal
border between religion and politics, but to radically opposed ends: if political
theology deploys the power of the divine in the service of the authoritarian
state, theopolitics denies any possibility whatsoever of legitimizing institutional
human power. If political theology borders on the fascistic, theopolitics is its an-
archistic antipode.¹³ But a closer look at the scene laid out by Weber must pre-
cede consideration of Schmitt and Buber.
A ‘Bourgeois’ Politician: Secularism, Polytheism,
and Anarchism in Max Weber
Wolfgang Mommsen argues for a connection between Weber’s political doctrines
and his conception of scholarship. Both date to Weber’s early studies of the increas-
ing population of Polish migrant agricultural workers in the East Elbian region, as
demonstrated by his 1895 inaugural address at the University of Freiburg.Weber ar-
gued against protectionist policies that would artificially freeze German agriculture
at its current point of development; neither did he favor allowing the high rate of
Polish immigration to continue, despite the fact that the Junker landlords benefited
economically from employing lower-paid Poles. Weber’s primary concern was the
German character of the national economy, and to that end he supported state sub-
sidization of German small farmers in East Elbia, even if this ran afoul of the Junkers
and the march of capitalism. “Ostensibly pure scientific value systems of whatever
variety always appeared to stand in the way of such a consciously national econom-
ic policy,” according to Mommsen. “Therefore Weber strove to refute the very exis-
tence of scientifically-valid normative categories. At the outset, his program for a
value-free science rested largely on an effort to establish the ideal of the national
 Vincent W. Lloyd has helpfully delineated three senses in which the term “political theology”
is used in recent discussions: 1) a narrow sense, in which it refers to claims made by Schmitt
concerning the role of religious concepts in political theory; 2) an extremely broad sense, in
which the phrase is interchangeable with almost any form of the conjunction “religion and pol-
itics”; 3) a “sectarian” sense, in which it refers to a branch of theology (usually Christian) that
deals with political matters. Vincent W. Lloyd, “Introduction” to Race and Political Theology, ed.
Vincent W. Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 1–21. I deal with political theology
in the first, narrow sense, since the context in which it emerged and had its original reception is
relevant to my discussion. My portrayal of it as fascistic and in the service of legitimation may be
contested as a historical reading of Schmitt; it is, however, merely intended to convey Buber’s
own conception of where theopolitics stood.
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state as the sole indisputable standard.”¹⁴ Mommsen’s “therefore,” controversial
among contemporary adherents of Weber’s sociology, may be too strong. Nonethe-
less, he demonstrates a connection between Weber’s understandings of power and
of scholarship that others have since broadened and deepened.¹⁵ Weber himself
once put it this way:
Politics is a tough business, and those who take responsibility for seizing the spokes of the
wheel of political development in the fatherland must have strong nerves and should not
be too sentimental to practice secular politics. Those who wish to involve themselves in sec-
ular politics must above all be without illusions and…recognize the fundamental reality of an
ineluctable eternal war on earth of men against men.¹⁶
This eternal war, according to Weber, is what social science, including the sci-
ence of politics, must acknowledge from the very beginning if it is to maintain
its status as a science. And this science, in turn, is the necessary basis of “sec-
ular politics.” As Leo Strauss would later comment: “Conflict was for Weber an
unambiguous thing, but peace was not: peace is phony, but war is real.”¹⁷ This
view of conflict as fundamental naturally extends to the realm of values. Reason
is incapable of judging between irreconcilably different value-systems—some
scholars, drawing on Weber’s own image of incommensurable values as warring
gods demanding allegiance, have called this his “polytheism.”¹⁸ The metaphor of
cosmic warfare may clue us in that Weber will not opt for the Anglo-American
liberal response to what John Rawls much more mundanely calls “the fact of rea-
sonable pluralism,” namely that the public sphere should avoid making deci-
sions about ultimate values. For Weber, this is simply impossible; political deci-
sions always refer to values and are ultimately non-rational. This is one more
reason that they cannot be based upon an objective social science, and this is
also why the increasing bureaucratization of politics, the attempt to make it
function according to set regular laws, endangers the ability of politics to pre-
serve a space for individual decision at the highest level.¹⁹
 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, 1890– 1920, trans. Michael S. Stein-
berg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 40.
 Cf. e.g., Sheldon S. Wolin, “Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory,”
Political Theory 9 (1981), 401–23.
 Ibid., 41 (emphasis).
 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 65.
 David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, “Introduction: Max Weber’s Calling to Knowledge and Ac-
tion,” in The Vocation Lectures, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), xlvii-
xlviii.
 “…if you choose this particular standpoint, you will be serving this particular god and will
give offense to every other god…As long as life is left to itself and is understood in its own terms,
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Weber defined himself on many occasions as a representative member of his
class, a “bourgeois” politician. This meant, on the one hand, that he lacked sym-
pathy for the claims of the dying aristocratic landowner class, which was strug-
gling during the Wilhelmine period to hold on to its oligarchic privileges; on the
other hand, he cast a skeptical eye on the quest of the organized working class to
seize power, whether through political means or direct economic actions such as
strikes.With respect to the latter group, he argued forcefully that Marxism could
have validity either as a diagnostic scholarly apparatus submitting falsifiable
claims to social science in an attempt to increase understanding of modern cap-
italist societies, or as a purely ethically-derived call to overthrow an unjust social
order, but never both. Since the majority of the organized working class in Ger-
many operated through the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD), which was
officially committed to an “orthodox” formulation of Marxist doctrine, this
meant that there were few socialist activists who framed their work in a manner
acceptable to Weber; when he came across them, however, he treated them with
great respect and even befriended them. Such figures, including the sociologist
Robert Michels and the playwright Ernst Toller, were most often closer to anar-
chist syndicalism or Tolstoyan thought than to Marxism, as the anarchist tradi-
tion lacked the Marxist aversion to depicting the struggle for socialism as volun-
tarist and dependent on the workers’ own actions, rather than as an inevitable
consequence of the march of the forces of history.
Despite his friendly personal relationship to figures such as Michels and
Toller, however, Weber considered the anarchist quest for a society free from
domination as the very paradigm of utopianism in politics. In fact, Mommsen
argues,Weber based his famous description of the “ethics of conviction” on Mi-
chels.²⁰ Weber took for granted that the anarchist society was both impossible
and undesirable (because it would eliminate Herrschaft, a primary source of
human excellence, leading to a bleak world of Nietzschean “last men”), but he
admitted that this was a value-judgment and that he could not dismiss it on
the basis of reason. Rather, he shifted the grounds of disagreement onto the
question of the ethics of practice, depicting an anarchist committed to revolution
no matter what the short-term consequences of revolutionary actions might be,
it knows only that the conflict between these gods is never-ending…Which of the warring gods
shall we serve?” Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in The Vocation Lectures, 26–7. Strauss points
out here that this is a recipe for literal pandemonium, in the full sense implied by its Greek ety-
mology; Natural Right and History, 45.
 Mommsen, “Roberto Michels and Max Weber: Moral Conviction versus the Politics of Re-
sponsibility,” in Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1989), 88.
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in contrast to a responsible politician concerned primarily with taking responsi-
bility for such short-term consequences. This contrast reaches its sharpest point
when it touches the question of violence, for it is at this point that it reaches
what Weber considered the very borders of politics itself:
In the last analysis the modern state can only be defined sociologically in terms of a spe-
cific means [Mittel] which is peculiar to the state, as it is to all other political associations,
namely physical violence [Gewaltsamkeit]. ‘Every state is founded on force [Gewalt]’, as
Trotsky once said at Brest-Litovsk. That is indeed correct. If there existed only social forma-
tions in which violence was unknown as a means, then the concept of the ‘state’ would
have disappeared; then that condition would have arisen which one would define, in
this particular sense of the word, as ‘anarchy’.²¹
For Weber, the state is the only locus of the political today. The political is defined by
the deployment of the means of violence by associated groups of people; the state
concentrates the “legitimate” use of such violence in one association in particular,
which then claims a monopoly of this means. Here Weber’s “polytheism” manifests
in the form of a contrast between secularism and the ethics of conviction: “Anyone
who makes a pact with the means of violence, for whatever purpose—and every pol-
itician does this…is becoming involved, I repeat,with the diabolical powers that lurk
in all violence.”²² To attempt to create a society consisting only of formations “in
which violence was unknown as a means” would be to attempt “anarchy.” This,
of course, is what many in Weber’s original audience of student radicals had
been attempting to do—for Weber, they were seeking a kingdom “not of this
world.”²³ It is this specific goal, I argue, and the way in which many in Munich
in 1919 sought to achieve it, that links Martin Buber and Carl Schmitt to central
themes of Weberian thought. Both were concerned not just with the surface-level
question of whether the Bavarian Revolution would have good or bad consequen-
ces, but with the challenge posed by anarchism and non-violence to the very exis-
tence and coherence of the “political sphere.” Schmitt tried to solve the problem by
 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in Political Writings, ed. Peter Lassman
and Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 310.
 Ibid., 364–5.
 The ‘Politik als Beruf’ lecture was delivered to the Freiestudentische Bund of the University
of Munich. Weber resisted giving the lecture at first, until the convener, rector Immanuel Birn-
baum, threatened to have Kurt Eisner give it instead; even then, he urged that Birnbaum replace
him with Friedrich Naumann, founder of the German Democratic Party, a “representative Ger-
man politician.” See Strong, “Introduction,” xxxv.
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assimilating the kingdom of God to Weber’s political; Buber by proclaiming that
“there is no political outside the theopolitical.”²⁴
The Charis above Every Law: Anarchy,
Legitimacy, and Theology in Buber and Schmitt
Both Buber and Schmitt were present in Munich during the revolution of late
1918–1919, between the end of the World War and the dawn of the Weimar Repub-
lic. Schmitt was working in the censorship office of the regional martial law ad-
ministration at the time, while Buber came to lecture and to visit his best friend
of twenty years, the anarchist Gustav Landauer, an important figure among the
revolutionaries.²⁵ For both Buber and Schmitt, the vision of the anarchists
would become a seminal influence—a resource for the former, a bête noire for
the latter—which each would articulate within the field of Weberian political con-
cerns. Schmitt’s Politische Theologie (1922) had its origins in a festschrift for Weber,
while Buber’s theopolitics, first fully articulated in Kingship of God, admits its
debts not just to Weber’s Economy and Society, with its famous sociology of dom-
ination, but also to his magisterial representation of Israelite life in Ancient Juda-
ism. The relationship between anarchism and the kingdom, or kingship, of God,
stands behind each thinker’s grappling with the nature of representation, the
role of charisma in authority, the state of emergency, the nature of secularization,
the ethics of political decision-making, and the political significance of rationali-
zation and technicity in modernity. But whereas Weber argued that one had to
choose either secular politics/polytheism or the otherworldly anarchist kingdom
of God, Schmitt and Buber rejected this choice in opposite ways: for Schmitt, a se-
cularized theology was at work behind and for the legitimation of politics and
domination, while for Buber, the kingship of God was itself this-worldly, embrac-
ing and encompassing secular politics even at its most anarchistic.
 “…denn es gibt keine politische Sphäre außer der theopolitischen.” Martin Buber, Königtum
Gottes (originally published 1932, now available in Martin Buber Werkausgabe Band 15: Schrif-
ten zum Messianismus, ed. Samuel Hayim Brody [Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2015],
174). Kingship of God, trans. Richard Scheimann (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1967), 136.
 Gopal Balakrishnan writes that Schmitt “experienced at first hand the tension and insecurity
generated by the political polarization of the city when his office was broken into by a band of
revolutionaries, and an officer at a nearby table was shot.” The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of
Carl Schmitt (New York: Verso, 2000), 20.
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Although Schmitt does not explicitly deal with Buber, and Buber rarely deals
with Schmitt, they fit into each other’s respective worldviews as perfect foils.²⁶
From Buber’s point of view, Schmitt epitomizes the excesses of modern power-pol-
itics; from Schmitt’s point of view, Buber would at first appear to epitomize an
anti-political tendency to remove personal strife from society and to transform pol-
itics and government into administration by eliminating domination.²⁷ Leo Strauss
once noted that for Schmitt, “the ultimate quarrel occurs not between bellicosity
and pacifism (or nationalism and internationalism) but between the “authoritarian
and anarchistic theories.”²⁸ I argue that if this is so, and if Schmitt takes up the
authoritarian position, Martin Buber might just be the contemporary of Schmitt’s
who most radically assumes the anarchist position.
Schmitt, who may have attended Weber’s public lectures in Munich at the
time, also came to place violence at the center of his concept of the political.
This is stated most famously in the “friend-enemy” criterion of Concept of the Po-
litical (1932), but can be seen already in his first major work, Political Romanti-
cism (1919), which, while ostensibly concerned with the correct understanding
of an eighteenth-century phenomenon, can easily be seen as an oblique re-
sponse to his contemporary circumstances.²⁹ Schmitt argues that political ro-
 Buber’s references to Schmitt begin with “The Question to the Single One” of 1936, originally a
lecture in November 1933, his only explicit reference; Between Man and Man (New York: Routledge,
2002), 46–97. He also criticizes Schmitt, without referring to him by name, in “The Validity and Lim-
itation of the Political Principle” (1953), referring to “teachers of the law…who, obedient to this trait
of the times, defined the concept of the political so that everything disposed itself within it according
to the criterion ‘friend-enemy,’ in which the concept of enemy includes ‘the possibility of physical
killing.’ The practice of states has conveniently followed their advice.” In Pointing the Way, ed.
and trans. Maurice Friedman (New York: Schocken Books, 1957), 216.
 Whether Schmitt read Buber is not known. Ludwig Feuchtwanger sent Schmitt a lengthy re-
view of Kingship of God he had written anonymously; Schmitt’s reply implies that he read
Feuchtwanger’s essay carefully (“Über Martin Buber kann ich nicht mitsprechen, doch habe
ich Ihre Kritik aufmerksam und mit Nutzen gelesen.”), Carl Schmitt / Ludwig Feuchtwanger: Brief-
wechsel 1918– 1935, ed. Rolf Rieß (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007), 377–379, 381–382. I thank
Thomas Meyer for directing me to this source. It was Buber who, as part of the series of mono-
graphs he edited, Die Gesellschaft, first published Franz Oppenheimer’s Der Staat, which
Schmitt singles out for condemnation in 1932 as “the best example” of “the polarity of state
and society” which has as its aim “the destruction of the state.” The Concept of the Political, Ex-
panded Edition, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 76.
 Leo Strauss, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political,” trans. J. Harvey Lomax, in
Concept of the Political, 113. Strauss is quoting Schmitt himself in the latter part of this sentence:
“I have pointed out several times that the antagonism between the so-called authoritarian and
anarchist theories can be traced to these formulas,” Concept of the Political, 60.
 Originally published as Carl Schmitt-Dorotic, Politische Romantik (München: Duncker &
Humblot, 1919). Second, expanded edition: Carl Schmitt, Politische Romantik (München: Dunck-
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manticism is found on both the left and the right; it occurs wherever one seeks to
avoid a final political decision, since romanticism aesthetically prefers to leave
all options open and not to confine reality within the limits of the single outcome
that attends any decision: “In commonplace reality, the romantics could not play
the role of the ego who creates the world. They preferred the state of eternal be-
coming and possibilities that are never consummated to the confines of concrete
reality. This is because only one of the numerous possibilities is ever realized.”³⁰
The roots of this position are found in Malebranche and his philosophy of occa-
sionalism,which treats God as the only true agent in the world; everything else is
simply an occasion for God’s action. By centering all order in God in this way,
Malebranche reduced the agency of human action; political romanticism inherits
this outlook, and therefore it is always “at the disposal of energies that are un-
romantic, and the sublime elevation above definition and decision is trans-
formed into a subservient attendance upon alien power and alien decision.”³¹
We can hear an echo here of Machiavelli’s warning that the good prince will
come to ruin among so many who are not good; Schmitt, however, has shifted
the terrain from the unwillingness to take violent action to decision itself—for
the political romantic, Schmitt claims, decision itself is violence and therefore
must be avoided. This is the origin of the preference for “eternal discussion,”
which will soon become a theme of Schmitt’s critiques of liberal parliamentari-
anism.³²
Schmitt was anxious to sever the perceived link between romanticism and
Roman Catholicism, and in Roman Catholicism and Political Form (1923) he
went on to argue that not only was the Church not romantic, it was in fact poised
to become the last remaining home of true political “form” on Earth.³³ Marxist
socialism, anarchist syndicalism, and American capitalism all line up on the
side of the increasing de-politicization of the world that comes with increased
rationalization of industry. “There must no longer be political problems, only or-




 Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parliamentarismus (München: Duncker
& Humblot, 1923); cf. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
 Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form (Hellerau: Jakob Hegner Verlag, 1923);
second, revised edition München: Theatiner-Verlag, 1925. Cf. Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Po-
litical Form, trans. G. L. Ulmen (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).
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ganizational-technical and economic-sociological tasks.”³⁴ If these ideologies
continue to spread, only the Roman church will preserve Weberian Herrschaft
against the onslaught of modern bureaucracy. True representation empowers
one person to act in the name of another—to act freely, without needing to
check back with the represented to re-confirm authority, in the manner of the
workers’ and peasants’ councils of the revolution. The Pope, as the Vicar of
Christ, is infallible and sovereign; his decisions carry weight because of his rep-
resentative function, and therefore do not depend on the personal charisma of
the holder of the office.
This interest in the ability of true representation to maintain the personality
of decision even beyond the charismatic stage of authority is repeated again in
Schmitt’s famous claim in Political Theology: “Sovereign is he who decides the
state of exception.”³⁵ Schmitt was keenly aware of the potential of religious
faith to undermine such personal human sovereignty, however, and in his
later years wrote of the need to “de-anarchize Christianity”:
The most important sentence of Hobbes remains: Jesus is the Christ. The power of such a
sentence also works even if it is pushed to the margins of a conceptual system of an intel-
lectual structure, even if it is apparently pushed outside the conceptual circle. This depor-
tation is analogous to the domestication of Christ undertaken by Dostoevsky’s Grand In-
quisitor. Hobbes expresses and grounds scientifically what Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor
does: to render harmless Christ’s impact on the social-political realm; to de-anarchize
Christianity while still leaving it with a certain legitimizing effect and in any case not to
renounce it. A clever tactician renounces nothing unless it is totally useless. Christianity
was not yet spent. We can thus ask ourselves: to whom is the Grand Inquisitor closer,
the Roman church or Thomas Hobbes’s sovereign? Reformation and Counter-Reformation
revealed themselves as related in direction. Name me your enemy, and I will tell you
who you are. Hobbes and the Roman church: the enemy is our own question as form.³⁶
 Ibid., 65. Schmitt holds that “American financiers, industrial technicians, Marxist socialists,
and anarchic-syndicalist revolutionaries unite” on this point, with the result that “The modern
state seems to have actually become what Max Weber envisioned: a huge industrial plant.”
 Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George
Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1.
 Carl Schmitt, Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947– 1951, ed. Eberhard Freiherr von
Medern (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), 243. Cited in the combined translations of Raphael
Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews: The “Jewish Question,” The Holocaust, and German Legal Theo-
ry, trans. Joel Golb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 85–86, and Tracy B. Strong,
“Carl Schmitt and Thomas Hobbes: Myth and Politics,” in Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State
Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans. George D. Schwab
and Erna Hilfstein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), xxiv.Weber had also mentioned
the Grand Inquisitor in “Politics as a Vocation,” as a cogent analysis of the problems attending
an ethics of conviction; see “Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 14.
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The claim here is that despite its ostensible reference to the Church in Dostoevsky’s
text, the Grand Inquisitor more closely resembles the modern state itself, as repre-
sented by Hobbes’ Leviathan. Schmitt does Machiavelli one better here: lip service
to the minimalist formula that “Jesus is the Christ” is sufficient to claim absolute
divine authority for human sovereignty and to short-cut apocalyptic attempts to
de-legitimize the state by means of theology. Furthermore, as Tracy Strong has
pointed out, “the leviathan (as mortal God, hence as Christ/Messiah) holds back
the kingdom of God on this earth or at least makes no move to bring it about.
This is why this is political theology and not theological politics.”³⁷ In one of his
more overtly antisemitic moods, Schmitt claims that it was Spinoza, the first “liberal
Jew,” who undid the great serpent and “mortal god” Leviathan by denying it the
right to the formula “Jesus is the Christ” in the name of religious freedom.³⁸
Unlike the aristocratic reactionaries with whom he associated during the
Weimar era, Schmitt presented himself as highly preoccupied with political le-
gitimacy per se and not merely with the legitimacy of the new liberal-democratic
Republic. For political theorists concerned with legitimacy, anarchism often
plays a role analogous to that played by skepticism for philosophers concerned
with the ultimate grounding of truth claims: it is like a boogeyman, lying in wait,
suggesting by its very existence the possibility of the necessary failure of all proj-
ects of legitimation. Schmitt’s student turned critic, Waldemar Gurian, sees
Schmitt as always seeking a “highest instance of decision” that would bring
an end to his “despair at an anarchy identified behind all its facades.”³⁹ Indeed,
Schmitt pays far more attention to anarchist thought than many of his contem-
poraries. Like Weber, he respects the anarchists’ clear-cut opposition to his line
of thinking, in a way that liberals do not. He describes the conflict between the
optimistic anthropology he ascribes to anarchism and the pessimistic anthropol-
ogy of the Counter-Revolution as “the clearest antithesis in the entire history of
political ideas.”⁴⁰ Schmitt’s words about his hero Donoso Cortés could just as
easily be applied to him: “[He] was contemptuous of the liberals while he re-
 “Carl Schmitt and Thomas Hobbes,” xxv.
 Schmitt, Leviathan, 57. This claim called forth a vigorous response from Leo Strauss, who in-
sisted upon the wholly secular nature of the Hobbesian serpent-state, seeing Hobbes and Spino-
za not as rivals but as collaborators in the construction of the modern secular polity. See Miguel
Vatter, “Strauss and Schmitt as Readers of Hobbes and Spinoza: On the Relation between Polit-
ical Theology and Liberalism,” New Centennial Review, 2004, 4(3): 161–214.
 Paul Müller [Waldemar Gurian], “Entscheidung und Ordnung: Zu den Schriften von Carl
Schmitt,” Schweizerische Rundschau: Monatsschrift für Geistesleben und Kultur 34 (1939): 566–
76, 567–68. Cited in Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews, 92–3.
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 55.
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spected atheist-anarchist socialism as his deadly foe and endowed it with a dia-
bolical stature.”⁴¹
However, there is a strange duality to Schmitt’s view of anarchism. On the
one hand, he sees anarchism as atheistic and dependent upon a radically opti-
mistic view of human nature as essentially good. He links it intimately to the pro-
gressive secularization and rationalization of modernity and to the correspond-
ing increase of technicity. In this sense, anarchism is aligned with liberalism and
Marxism, the other secularizing and depoliticizing forces descended from the
American and French revolutions. On the other hand, Schmitt’s rhetorical pre-
sentation of anarchism emphasizes its radicalism; the bloodlessness of the tech-
nical society is balanced out by the “Scythian fury” of Bakunin, “the greatest an-
archist of the nineteenth century,” who “had to become in theory the theologian
of the anti-theological and in practice the dictator of an anti-dictatorship.”⁴² In
this sense, anarchists would be the very incarnation of the political, which
Schmitt defines as “the most intense and extreme antagonism, [which] becomes
that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of
the friend-enemy grouping.”⁴³ Anarchists embody a fascinating paradox for
Schmitt: by declaring war against the political, they instantiate the political.⁴⁴
As Strauss recognized, Schmitt does not see the anarchist ideal as utopian
and admits that he does not know whether it can be realized. Rather, he simply
abhors it. In it he recognizes a powerful enemy.⁴⁵
Throughout his near-obsession with anarchism, Schmitt always figures it as
atheistic and as committed to an irrevocably optimistic anthropology. Martin
Buber’s theopolitics, however, arguably represents a form of anarchism that
lacks these qualities. Moreover, it shares Schmitt’s concerns about the inhuman-
ity of technicity and places equivalent emphasis on the necessity of decision. In
Kingship of God, Moses, and The Prophetic Faith, as well as in a number of short-
er essays and occasional writings on Zionism, Buber provides a detailed account
of a “direct theocracy,” what we might call an anarcho-theocracy, a theopolitical
 Ibid., 63. It is open to question whether Schmitt shares the position of Cortés in this section
of Political Theology. I would argue that he does, despite ostensibly distancing himself.
 Ibid., 50, 66. The use of this epithet for Bakunin is one hint that Schmitt does identify with
Cortés,who also warned in an oxymoronic fashion about the dangers of “dictatorship of the dag-
gers,” meaning anarchists.
 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 29. Thus, according to this definition, one cannot really be
coherently anti-political, since the stronger one’s enmity to politics, the more political one is.
 Sorel is relevant here. See “Irrationalist Theories of the Direct Use of Force,” The Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 65–76.
 Strauss, “Notes on Concept of the Political,” 113.
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situation in which the “dangerousness” of man figures centrally.⁴⁶ If there is one
passage that condenses most of Buber’s theopolitical thesis into a single state-
ment, it is the beginning of Chapter Eight of Kingship of God:
The covenant at Sinai signifies, according to its positive content, that the wandering tribes
accept JHWH ‘for ever and ever’ as their King. According to its negative content it signifies
that no man is to be called king of the sons of Israel. ‘You shall be for Me a kingly domain’,
‘there was then in Jeshurun a King’; this is exclusive proclamation also with respect to a
secular lordship: JHWH does not want, like the other kingly gods, to be sovereign and guar-
antor of a human monarch. He wants Himself to be the Leader and the Prince. The man to
whom he addresses His will in order that he carry it out is not only to have his power in this
connection alone; he can also exert no power beyond his limited task. Above all, since he
rules not as a person acting in his own right, but as ‘emissary’ [Entbotener], he cannot
transmit power. The real counterpart of direct theocracy is the hereditary kingship…There
is in pre-kingly Israel no externality of ruler-ship; for there is no political sphere except
the theo-political, and all sons of Israel are directly related (kohanim in the original
sense) to JHWH, Who chooses and rejects, gives an order and withdraws it.⁴⁷
In this single passage, we see diametrically opposite positions from each of
Schmitt’s mentioned so far: God is literally ruler, and not merely deployed by
human authority as a legitimating metaphor; authority inheres in charisma,
and does not outlast it in the form of any institutional office; representation is
direct, rather than indirect. Schmitt had opposed the direct-democratic tendency
that he saw informing all the forces descending from the French Revolution, in
which representation is really no more than delegation, a task being handed out
to a representative to be performed. This, however, is exactly the role of Buber’s
charismatic leader, who is given a task by God and retreats into the background
once he carries it out. In this Buber was perhaps inspired by his friend Gustav
Landauer, and the instance of the Bavarian Council Republic (the Auftrag is
given to the Volksbeauftragter).
 The term “theo-political” makes its first appearance in Kingship of God in connection with a
discussion of the J and E “sources” or redactional trends; Buber holds that the texts designated
as J material originate among early circles of courtly compilers, “resolutely attentive to religious
tradition, but in the treatment of contemporary or recent history prone to a profane-political ten-
dency [profane-politischen Tendenz],” Kingship of God, 17. The E materials, on the other hand,
originate among the circle of the neviim, the prophets. These stand in contrast to the J circle,
as they are “independent of the court, supported by the people, less gifted in narration, but in-
spired in message, experiencing and portraying history as a theo-political occurrence [die Ge-
schichte als ein theopolitisches Geschehen], contending for the interpenetration of religion and
politics against every principle of partition which would place them in opposition.” Ibid.
 Kingship of God, 136 (emphasis in original).
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Buber distinguishes between the “pre-state” [vorstaatliche] and the post-mo-
narchical conceptions of divine kingship. Prior to the institution of a human
monarchy, the divine melekh demands of His subjects total, unconditional devo-
tion, of which the ritual symbol is sacrifice.With the founding of the monarchy,
however, the divine demand is compromised by those of the human monarch,
from tithes to service in war, and the result is a kind of secularization, a separa-
tion of the religious from the political.⁴⁸ God “is not content to be ‘God’ in the
religious sense,” to claim only inner devotion, but demands outer devotion as
well, not just in ritual but in the full conduct of life, not just from the individual
but from the people as a whole:
The striving to have the entirety of its life constructed out of its relation to the divine can be
actualized by a people in no other way than that, while it opens its political being and
doing to the influence of this relationship, it thus does not fundamentally mark the limits
of this influence in advance, but only in the course of realization experiences or rather en-
dures these limits again and again.…He will apportion to the one, for ever and ever chosen
by Him, his tasks, but naked power without a situationally related task he does not wish to
bestow. He makes known His will first of all as constitution—not constitution of cult and
custom only, also of economy and society—He will proclaim it again and again to the
changing generations, certainly but simply as reply to a question, institutionally through
priestly mouth, above all, however, in the freedom of His surging spirit, through every
one whom His spirit seizes. The separation of religion and politics which stretches through
history is here overcome [aufgehoben] in real paradox. (119, emphasis in original).⁴⁹
Buber’s polemic here is directed against both kings and scholars—especially
those who take the side of kings or who make it easier to do so. The warning
against marking the limits of divine influence “in advance,” along with the
claim that God’s will determines cult and custom as well as “economy and soci-
ety” [Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, the title of Weber’s magnum opus in sociolo-
gy], strongly suggest that Weberian political realism cannot be reconciled with
the faith of Israel. The position is radically illiberal, in that it excludes the pos-
 Buber thus has a low opinion of King Solomon. He sees a “syncretistic faithlessness” in the
man who, “as hospitable as a Roman emperor, allotted holy high-places to the melakhim of the
neighboring peoples.” Kingship of God, 118. Buber reads Solomon’s pious proclamation that
one’s “heart should be satisfied with YHVH” (I Kings 8:61) as a crafty retreat from the uncondi-
tional insistence on heart and soul and might (Deut. 6:5).
 The term aufheben, often translated “overcome” or “sublate,” is heavily freighted with He-
gelian philosophical ballast, but Buber here places the “sublation” historically prior to the sep-
aration of church and state characteristic of the liberal order.
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sibility of separate “spheres” for religion and for politics. The very idea of “reli-
gion” as a “sphere” unto itself is an impoverishment of divine rule.⁵⁰
The tendency towards direct theocracy expresses itself in two ways. First in
the community’s choice of a charismatic leader, whom it recognizes as tempora-
rily inhabited by the charis of divine spirit.⁵¹ This is the case of Moses, Joshua,
and the various shoftim in the Book of Judges. The second aspect of theocracy
occurs between the death of one charismatic leader and the rise of another
one.We might refer to this interregnum most appropriately as anarcho-theocracy.
There is literally no (human) ruler in Israel and there are no corresponding in-
stitutions. The separate tribes tend to their own business, confident that YHVH
still rules as King even when He declines to issue new orders. Internally, the peo-
ple feel themselves to be under an invisible government; externally, there ap-
pears to be no government at all.
To explain the movement between these two stages, Buber turns to Weber’s
analysis of charisma and its “routinization” (he also borrows from Weber the
concept of “hierocracy,” rule by priests or some other religious caste claiming
to speak for the divine, as a name for what is most commonly called “theocracy,”
in contrast to true, direct theocracy, which is the topic of Kingship of God).⁵² The
historical form of direct theocracy, according to Buber, is a charismatic leader-
ship in which the recipient of the temporary charis is recognized to hold a com-
mission to some limited and particular task (never to unlimited leadership). But
what is charis, exactly? According to Buber, “there is here no charisma at rest,
only a hovering one, no possession of spirit, only a ‘spiriting’, a coming and
going of the ruach; no assurance of power, only the streams of an authority
 Ibid.,119 (emphasis in original). In this sense, Buber sees the moment of the institution of the
monarchy not as a moment of increased “theocratization,” as Weber had argued in Ancient Ju-
daism, but in fact as a dramatic secularization of the theopolity. It is the moment in which the
fearsome terror of war causes the people to lose faith in the task for which they were elected.
Unlike Schmitt, who sees secularization as beginning in modernity with the seventeenth-century
transformation of theological concepts into political concepts, Buber sees it as taking place in
the ancient past, when the people of Israel first abandoned their true divine King for the comfort
of human rule. And unlike Schmitt, who adopts Weber’s view of rationalization/secularization
as an irreversible process, Buber sees it as potentially reversible at any time, if the people simply
heed the prophetic call to turn, to return.
 The continual use of the Greek term charis here, rather than a Hebrew term, may be another
indication of Weber’s influence. Charis has connotations of gratuitousness, of free gift, compa-
rable to the Hebrew Chesed.
 Buber acknowledges that Weber’s account of hierocracy in Economy and Society does not
“touch upon our problem,” but he appropriates the term anyway because it aids him in drawing
the contrast to theocracy. Kingship of God, 215 n.15.
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which presents itself and moves away.…Authority is bound to the temporary
proof of the charisma.”⁵³
Charisma is thus a fleeting, passing quality, even for the recognized charis-
matic, and it requires proof through deeds. But its very transience renders cha-
risma supreme: “The charis accordingly stands superior to every enchantment
[Zauber] as well as every law [Gesetz].”⁵⁴ Problems occur, however, with any ef-
fort “to exercise theopolitics even when it is a matter of letting the charis hold
sway beyond the actual charisma,”⁵⁵ or in Weberian terms, to base an enduring
institutional structure upon manifestations of charis. The most fundamental is
the question of succession. A dying charismatic leader leaves the community
with these options:
1) Waiting for a successor to have an epiphany and to demonstrate his or her
qualifications (allowing an interregnum, potentially endangering the cohe-
sion and continuity of the community);
2) Securing continuity by one of the following methods:
i. The charismatic leader himself names and designates a successor;
ii. Upon his death, the followers identify and acknowledge the qualified
candidate;
iii. The community recognizes the possibility of transmitting charisma
through blood ties or ritual anointing and coronation [Salbung und Krö-
nung] (a process that can lead to hierocracy).
Buber prefers the first option, waiting: “Certainly the faithful wait for the grace
as that alone which they want to follow, and the most faithful of all profess to do
it in order to have to follow no one.”⁵⁶ He also claims, however, that the Bible
itself favors the first option; according to Buber, the history of pre-state Israel
knows only one instance of the transfer of charisma to a successor, namely
the succession to Moses by Joshua.⁵⁷ That succession is unique, since Joshua
dies without renewing the process, without establishing a succession principle,
and without leaving any clues regarding the structure of permanent institutions.
The arrival at full anarcho-theocracy, however, and the open embrace of the
interregnum on the part of its supporters, sharpens what Buber calls the “para-




 In a remarkable literary-critical footnote on this passage, Buber actually suggests an emen-
dation of Numbers 27:18–21, the calling of Joshua, so as to eliminate all references to Eleazar the
priest, references which are “to be dismissed as hierocratizing revision.” Ibid., 215, n.21.
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dox of theocracy.” This paradox consists in the fact that “the highest commit-
ment according to its nature knows no compulsion,” that it applies in all its “ex-
istential depth” [existentielle Tiefe] on both individual and general levels. For the
individual, it is possible at any time to “either strive toward a complete commun-
ity out of free will [Gemeinschaft aus Freiwilligkeit], a divine kingdom, or, letting
himself be covered by the vocation thereto, can degenerate to an indolent or bru-
talized subordination.”⁵⁸ On a political level, the same principle confirms “the
rightful possessor of the commission, the ‘charismatic’ man,” in his authority,
yet also sanctions the misappropriated and abused authority of pretenders
and the empty license [leere Herrschaftslosigkeit] of those who indulge in
“crass licentiousness and enmity not merely to order [Ordnung] but to organiza-
tion [Gestaltung].”⁵⁹ Theocracy is thus “a strong bastion for the obedient, but
also at the same time can be a shelter to the self-seeking behind which he exalts
his lack of commitment as divine freedom..⁶⁰ This double-tiered double bind
produces an existence fraught with conflict:
The result of this is that the truth of the principle must be fought for, fought for religio-po-
litically. The venture of a radical theocracy must therefore lead to the bursting-forth of the
opposition latent in every people. Those, however, who in this fight represent the case for
divine rulership against that of ‘history’, experience therein the first shudder of eschatolo-
gy. The full, paradoxical character of the human attitude of faith is only begun in the sit-
uation of the ‘individual’ [Einzelnen] with all its depths; it is developed only in the real re-
lationship of this individual to a world which does not want to be God’s, and to a God who
does not want to compel the world to become His. The Sinai covenant is the first step visible
to us on the path through the dark ravine between actualization and contradiction. In Israel
it led from the divinely proud confidence of the early king-passages first of all to that first
form of resignation with which our Book of Judges ends. ⁶¹
However heightened and theologically-inflected this rhetoric may be, Buber in-
tends to remain within the realm of historical description. The “first shudder
of eschatology” occurs for the partisans of the kingship of God when they imag-
ine a society in which all are reconciled to divine rule and no longer seek to
usurp or undermine it; in other words, a sustainable anarcho-theocracy. More-
over, Buber believes that he is describing a general phenomenon of which the
 Ibid., 138.
 Ibid., 149. Note that while Scheimann’s translation has “anarchy” here, Buber actually uses
Herrschaftslosigkeit to describe this negative condition, whereas elsewhere he uses anarchische
to positively describe the characteristic psychological inclination to freedom of desert tribes. I
have therefore substituted “license” for “anarchy.”
 Kingship of God, 148
 Ibid., 139.
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story of Israel as presented in the Bible is only one instance. Recognition of the
paradox of theocracy leads to the breakout of conflict and opposition within
every people, and within every people the two sides are the same: they “contend
in the same name, and always without a clear issue [Ausgang] of the quarrel.”⁶²
What Buber here counterposes to divine rulership and calls “history,” he refers
to elsewhere as Realpolitik, and what he calls Realpolitik is identifiable once
again, still elsewhere, as political theology.⁶³
Schmitt saw the decision on the state of emergency as the act that irrevoca-
bly locates sovereignty.Whoever decides that this is the moment that the laws are
suspended reveals the ultimate dependence of law on his personal authority.
Schmitt analogizes the state of exception to the miracle in theology, conceived
as a radical interruption of the ordinary course of things. In Buber’s picture,
however, interruption occurs in the ordinary course of things itself. The injunc-
tion to wait reflects a very real dependence on God as the actual sovereign. The
Philistines are attacking, and God’s response—to empower a leader to organize
resistance or to allow the attack to proceed—will decide whether a state of emer-
gency really exists or not. The human desire to institute a monarchy for the pur-
poses of defence already reflects the decision, having been made by the people,
that a state of emergency in fact exists. They have mistaken the anarchy of inter-
regnum, which is theocracy, for the anarchy of emergency, which is chaos. The
people have usurped the sovereignty. Already in 1918, in “The Holy Way,”
which he dedicated to Gustav Landauer upon its publication a year later,
Buber called this moment “the true turning point of Jewish history.”⁶⁴
 Ibid., 148. The form and nature of this conflict, however, can vary. For example, Buber con-
trasts the “spiritual” polemic of the anti-monarchical judges and prophets against their fellow
Israelites with the “attitude of opposition, determined by religious commandment and urging
on to the most gruesome massacres,” assumed by the Kharijite sect of early Islam to the
whole body of their co-religionists. Ibid., 159. Buber otherwise finds that the Kharijites mirror
the anarcho-theocratic attitude found in Judges in almost every respect (except that “the Khar-
ijites want to prevent anyone from ruling upon whom the Spirit does not rest; by Gideon’s
mouth, however, the person on whom the Spirit rests says that he does not want to rule.”
Ibid.,160.”
 “History” is a term with many valences in Buber; here, in quotation marks to show that it is
being spoken by the opponents of anarcho-theocracy, it refers to the notion that the temporal
realm of human activity is governed by the law of force and necessity. See “What Is to Be
Done?” in Pointing the Way, and “The Question to the Single One” in Between Man and Man.
 Buber, “The Holy Way: AWord to the Jews and the Nations,” in On Judaism, ed. Nahum Glat-
zer (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), 117. This is a notable change from his earlier, more typ-
ically Zionist position that the turning point of Jewish history was the loss of the state.
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Thus the contemporary proponents of Realpolitik and political theology can
be considered analogous to those Israelites who misunderstand and abuse the
anarcho-theocracy. And they have a similar program: the establishment of an au-
thoritarian state. In times of peace, they may have little success, but in times of
military crisis, they can capitalize on the people’s fear and defeat the theopolit-
ical faction, the one that urges the continual, faithful waiting on YHVH. They de-
mand and are granted an enduring monarchy, with a standing army, like all the
other nations have. Buber sees the influence of these ancient Israelite political
theologians in everything from the redaction of the Book of Judges, wherein
what were originally two competing polemics, an anti-monarchical and a pro-
monarchical, become glued together in such a way that the book assumes a
pro-monarchical bias, to the inception of messianism in Israel, when the eventu-
al failure and loss of the monarchy give rise to the dream of its restoration:
Then for the first time does the people rebel against the situation which the primitive-pro-
phetic leaders tried, ever anew and ever alike in vain, to inflame with the theocratic will
toward constitution. The idea of monarchic unification is born and rises against the repre-
sentatives of the divine kingship. And the crisis between the two grows to one of the theo-
cratic impulse itself, to the crisis out of which there emerges the human king of Israel, the
follower of JHWH (12:14), as His ‘anointed’, meshiach JHWH, χριστòς κυριου.”⁶⁵
The shift to Greek at the end of this passage is significant: the first “messiah” is
none other than the human king of Israel, the institutional achievement of the
political theologians. He stands behind all the subsequent messiahs, including
“Christ the Lord.” Like Schmitt, Buber here sees “messiah” as a category that be-
longs to the authoritarian state; like Dostoevsky, he pits it against God.
Ultimately, for Buber, political theology is a form of idolatry. In Kingship of
God idolatry comes in two main forms. The first Buber calls Baalization: the ten-
dency to associate YHVH, the mobile leader-god of the tribe, with the baalim, the
stationary fertility gods of the land. In The Prophetic Faith (1950) Buber describes
the way in which Elijah combats this tendency by demonstrating once and for all
that YHVH is not only the God of the heavens but also of the earth, and that the
people do not need to placate any other powers to achieve agricultural success.
Far more insidious than Baalization, however, is the second idolatry, which
Buber calls Molechization. The people understand that the king is responsible
for the increase of the tribe’s numbers and for its political success, and that
the proper gratitude for this is the dedication of the first-born. YHVH, through
the dramatic story of the Akedah and through the institution of the semikha,
 Kingship of God, 162.
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both of which substitute an animal for a human sacrifice, indicates that he is
willing to substitute the intention to sacrifice oneself and one’s children for
the sacrifice itself. Some, however, precisely out of their zeal to serve their
King with the service they deem proper to him, make the mistake of going too
far: they pass their children through fire.
While Buber actually shares Schmitt’s worries about technicity and its at-
tendant draining of the vitality from human life, he does not locate this danger
in the increase of administration and the decrease of politics. He asserts rather
the precise opposite: that the share of qualitative “humanity” in life increases as
the share of “politics” decreases. “Politics,” as an independent sphere with its
own rules, is nothing but a rebellion against God and as such a denial of
human nature; “there is no political realm outside the theopolitical.” The crea-
tion of politics as a separate sphere can only occur as a result of a sophisticated
version of Molechization. Of course the people still pay lip service to God; they
say that the king is God’s anointed and that his will is God’s will. But when they
sacrifice their children to form his fifties and his hundreds, when they allow him
to set up altars to the gods of neighboring peoples, “the theocratic principle be-
gins to lose its comprehensive power and to be limited to the merely-religious in
order finally merely to provide the intangible shielding of autocracy, as in Egypt
and Babylon.”⁶⁶ In this sense, theopolitics declares political theology itself to be
idolatry; anarcho-theocracy declares human authority itself to be usurpation.
An interesting result of these differences is their effect on Schmitt’s criterion
of the political, the notorious friend/enemy distinction. It cannot be said that
Buber’s picture of the ancient Israelite theopolity, and the implications he
draws from it, are terribly pacific. In fact, they are radically tension-filled, far
more than we might expect from a thinker so heavily associated with the idea
of “dialogue.” Buber sees a division not merely within the ancient Israelite the-
opolity, between the faithful theo-politicians and the idolatrous political theolo-
gians, but a division that continues throughout the whole history of Judaism,
and in fact that breaks out within every people. But it would be impossible to
make this conflict the criterion of a dedicated, independent “political sphere.”
Instead, this division, which Buber calls “the true front,” divides every individual
against himself and every people against itself, and the struggle on this front,
which contra Schmitt and Weber can never become the defining principle of a
violent conflict between distinct parties, is the only true theopolitical fight:
So long as God contends against the idols there prevails for the people a clear demarcation:
one’s own and that which is alien stand in opposition to one another. It is a matter of with-
 Kingship of God, 91.
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standing the allurements of the alien and to keep one’s vows to one’s own. But where God
rises against the idolization of Himself the demarcation is clouded and complicated. No
longer do two camps stretch out opposite to one another: here JHWH, there Astarte!, but
on every little spot of ground the truth is mixed with the lie. The struggle of exclusiveness
is directed toward unmixing, and this is a hard, an awesome work.⁶⁷
Buber expressed this same sentiment three years earlier, in a eulogy for Landau-
er, when he wrote that “the true front runs through the heart of the soldier; the
true front runs through the heart of the revolutionary.” Here Buber, like Landauer
himself, is more anarchistic even than most anarchists, denying them the battle
against the State as an external force unless it begins with the battle against the
State in ourselves. He seeks to disarm that State of one of its greatest weapons:
the idolatrous language of religious legitimation, or political theology.
Conclusion: Is Theopolitics an Antipolitics?
Buber’s theopolitics was refined and elaborated during the course of the 1920s,
culminating in the publication of Kingship of God in 1932. This work was itself
originally intended to be merely the first installment in a trilogy on Das Kom-
mende, the Coming One of Israelite messianism, but the rise of the Nazis and
the flight to Palestine interrupted Buber’s work on this project, and parts of it
appeared instead in Buber’s separately-issued biblical works, including Moses,
The Prophetic Faith, and Two Types of Faith. The 1920s were bookended for
Buber by the murder of his friend Landauer on May 2, 1919 by reactionary Frei-
korps troops under contract from the SPD, and the publication of his aforemen-
tioned eulogy for his friend in 1929; in between, Buber taught at the Lehrhaus,
published I and Thou, and embarked upon the new translation of the Bible
with Rosenzweig. There is another figure on whom Buber reflects at the begin-
 Ibid., 112. More could be said about the role of violence in Buber’s picture, since he presents
military defense as a primary function of the ancient Israelite charismatic leader. Here, however,
I can only refer to Buber’s own mobilization of theopolitics in the service of a radical critique of
mainstream Zionism, and also note this Buber-inspired remark of Martin Luther King Jr. in op-
position to a conception of non-violence that, like Weber’s, would exclude those committed to it
even from strikes, boycotts, or other direct action: “I must confess that I am not afraid of the
word ‘tension.’ I have earnestly opposed violent tension, but there is a type of constructive non-
violent tension that is necessary for growth… Too long has our beloved Southland been bogged
down in a tragic effort to live in monologue rather than dialogue.” King, “Letter from Birming-
ham Jail,” in Why We Can’t Wait (New York: Signet Classic, 2000), 67–68. Buber is referred to
explicitly a few pages later.
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ning and the end of the next decade: Mahatma Gandhi. If Landauer’s anarchism
raised the question of the borders of the political for Buber, Gandhi’s work posed
it in its truly theopolitical form, as a puzzle:
So far as Gandhi acts politically, so far as he takes part in passing parliamentary resolu-
tions, he does not introduce religion into politics, but allies his religion with the politics
of others. He cannot wrestle uninterruptedly with the serpent; he must at time get along
with it because he is directed to work in the kingdom of the serpent that he set out to de-
stroy… The serpent is, indeed, not only powerful outside, but also within, in the souls of
those who long for political success… There is no legitimately messianic, no legitimately
messianically-intended, politics. But that does not imply that the political sphere may be
excluded from the hallowing of all things. The political ‘serpent’ is not essentially evil, it
is itself only misled; it, too, ultimately wants to be redeemed.⁶⁸
This reflection, with its image of politics as a serpent (redolent of Schmitt’s dis-
cussion of Leviathan), is echoed nine years later in Buber’s famous letter to Gan-
dhi: “You once said, Mahatma, that politics enmesh us nowadays as with ser-
pent’s coils from which there is no escape however hard one may try. You said
you desired, therefore, to wrestle with the serpent. Here is the serpent in the full-
ness of its power! Jews and Arabs…”⁶⁹ The Zionist project served as Buber’s
arena for the contemporary conflict between theopolitics and political theology;
Buber saw Gandhi react against the political-theological form of Zionism, and he
attempted to enlist him in the service of the theopolitical form.
The eulogy for Landauer relates an anecdote that can serve as a microcosm
for many of these points. “I was with [Landauer] and several other revolutionary
leaders in a hall of the Diet building in Munich”:
The discussion was conducted for the most part between me and a Spartacus leader, who
later became well known in the second communist revolutionary government in Munich
that replaced the first, socialist government of Landauer and his comrades. The man
walked with clanking spurs through the room; he had been a German officer in the war.
I declined to do what many apparently had expected of me—to talk of the moral problem;
but I set forth what I thought about the relation between end and means. I documented my
view from historical and contemporary experience. The Spartacus leader did not go into
that matter. He, too, sought to document his apology for the terror by examples. ‘Dzertshin-
sky,’ he said, ‘the head of the Cheka, could sign a hundred death sentences a day, but with
an entirely clean soul.’ ‘That is, in fact, just the worst of all,’ I answered. ‘This “clean” soul
you do not allow any splashes of blood to fall on! It is not a question of “souls” but of re-
 Buber, “Gandhi, Politics, and Us,” in Pointing the Way, 129, 137.
 Buber, “Letter to Gandhi,” in Pointing the Way, 145.
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sponsibility.’ My opponent regarded me with unperturbed superiority. Landauer, who sat
next to me, laid his hand on mine. His whole arm trembled.⁷⁰
The anecdote shows that Buber and his interlocutors distinguished between an
abstract “moral problem” and the consummate political question of “the rela-
tionship between end and means.” Weber, citing Trotsky approvingly, had de-
fined violence as the means that defines the state and thereby the political itself;
here, the Spartacist leader echoes this line.⁷¹ Buber, by contrast, seems to be ar-
guing something other than “what many apparently had expected” of him,
namely that purity of means are required to guarantee purity of soul. Rather,
he claims that a consonance of ends and means belongs, precisely, to the politics
of responsibility. He is unable to convince his opponent of this claim; the last line
indicates that the martyred Landauer at least shared his outlook, but it also links
it to Landauer’s fate.
The career of the Bavarian Revolution is defined by several stages: the pres-
idency of Eisner ends in electoral defeat and assassination, following which a
period of turbulence sees the establishment of not one but two “Bavarian Coun-
cil Republics,” the first of which is associated with Landauer and the anarchists,
and the second with the Communists. The latter had a habit of treating the for-
mer as though they were political children, insufficiently grounded in the recog-
nition of the necessity for violence and party leadership; they referred derisively
to the “Bavarian Coffeehouse Republic.”⁷² Typical of this type of criticism is the
claim that anarchists are too bohemian, which is to say that they mix up their
aesthetics with their politics; they are unable to see and practice the pure poli-
tics. This judgment is echoed by a number of historians; Landauer himself is
called “impractical” and “excessively romantic” even by proponents of revolu-
tionary change, and “saintly, unpolitical, and inept” by its opponents.⁷³ Like
 Martin Buber, “Recollection of a Death,” in Pointing the Way, ed. and trans. Maurice Fried-
man (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), 119.
 Buber does not identify this figure, but it is most likely Eugen Leviné (1883–1919), who
served in the German army in World War 1, joined the KPD (the Communist Party of Germany),
and is said to have ordered the shooting of hostages by the Red Guards towards the end of April
1919, when hostage-taking failed to prevent Friedrich Ebert from ordering the destruction of the
Second Council Republic and the reinstatement of Johannes Hoffmann as Minister-President of
Bavaria in May.
 Gabriel Kuhn, “Introduction” to Erich Mühsam, Liberating Society from the State and Other
Writings: A Political Reader (Oakland: PM Press, 2011), 20 n60.
 “Impractical romantic anarchism,” James Joll, The Second International, 1889– 1914 (New
York: Harper & Row, 1966), 64; “excessively romantic,” George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History
of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 363; “saintly,
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Weber, these historians, even when they are unsympathetic to communism, are
able to characterize the Communist revolutionaries as politically “realistic,” be-
cause the Communists recognize the necessity of the state and of state violence.
The anarchists, who deny this necessity, seem to come from an extra-political
world, defined as aesthetic or religious. Some have taken this critique to
heart, and taken up the epithet “antipolitical” as a badge of honor; a contempo-
rary edition of Landauer includes two volumes called Antipolitik.⁷⁴
What Buber’s theopolitics claims is that these historians are unwittingly a
party to the conflicts they attempt to objectively describe. In taking the side of
“realism,” in allowing politics its autonomy, they fall in with one of the oldest
forms of idol-worship, and take the part of Messiah against God. This is by no
means surprising, since the party of realism has almost always outnumbered
the theopolitical faithful. It is even possible to be committed to realism in a ro-
mantic way, exalting one’s own probity and willingness to make hard choices;
Goethe himself exalted Schwerer Dienste tägliche Bewahrung, “daily achievement
of difficult tasks,” and a young romantic could make a slogan from these words
as well as from any others of that poet.⁷⁵ One can do the same with Weber’s “Pol-
itics means slow, strong drilling through hard boards.”⁷⁶ What is necessary is to
define the exact nature of what is being praised and what condemned, and this
is what Buber and Schmitt are each attempting to do in their opposing ways.
Is theopolitics an antipolitics? Yes, if “politics” is an autonomous realm that
prescribes itself its own laws. No, if one recalls with Walzer that “antipolitics is a
kind of politics,” in this case one oriented towards the realization on earth of the
kingship of God in the form of a human community whose self-conception is that
of God’s subjects. In Buber’s view this community—which is always emerging
and never quite fully present in the world, though it could be—is called “Israel.”
It is, much like Augustine’s city of God, not to be confused with any group of
people that may call themselves by this name, and its work is always a theopo-
litical work. There is much more to be said about the role of this concept in Bub-
er’s understanding of biblical history, and his application of it to contemporary
unpolitical, and inept,” Amos Elon, The Pity of It All: A Portrait of the German-Jewish Epoch,
1743– 1933 (New York: Picador, 2002), 351.
 Gustav Landauer, Antipolitik. Ausgewählte Schriften, Band 3.1, ed. Siegbert Wolf. Hessen: AV
Verlag, 2010.
 As indeed Buber himself did, proclaiming that “no revelation is needed other than this”;
Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber’s Life and Work: The Early Years, 1878– 1923 (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1988), 20. The line occurs in the seventh stanza of Goethe’s “The Testa-
ment of the Ancient Persian Faith”, from the West-östlicher Diwan, where it is italicized.
 “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 369.
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Zionist politics. But for now, this is where the discussion of Buber’s relationship
to the borders of the political may come to a close.
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Ran HaCohen
Bubers schöpferischer Dialog mit einer
chassidischen Legende
Martin Bubers Werk zum Chassidismus spielte eine entscheidende Rolle in der
Gestaltung des Bildes dieser osteuropäischen religiösen Massenbewegung in der
westlichen Gesellschaft, jüdischwie nicht-jüdisch gleichermaßen. In einer großen
Zahl von Werken, die Buber seit dem ersten Jahrzehnt des 20. Jahrhunderts ver-
öffentlichte, und in welchen er sich immer weiter mit den stilistischen und
theoretischen Fragen auseinandersetzte, die die Bearbeitung der chassidischen
Stoffe benötigte,¹ „leistete Buber zweifellos einen entscheidenden Beitrag zum
Bekanntheitsgrad der chassidischen Bewegung im Westen,“ wie G. Scholem be-
zeugte;² „Die Werke hinterließen bei den Lesern einen starken Eindruck, da sie
ihnen ein bislang unbekanntes Gebiet erschlossen,“ schrieb Shmuel H. Berg-
mann.³ Bubers Werk zum Chassidismus war das Thema mehrerer Diskussionen
und Forschungen, deren Ansatz jedoch meistens philosophisch war.⁴ Im Fol-
genden soll anhand einer chassidischen Legende die Art und Weise der Buber-
schen Bearbeitung prototypisch illustriert werden; auch wenn der Ansatz und die
 Vgl. im Vorwort zu Martin Buber, Die Erzählung der Chassidim (Zürich: Manesse Verlag, 1949),
11 ff.
 Gerschom Scholem, „Peruscho schel Martin Buber la-chassidut“ [Hebr.], in idem, Dewarim be-
go (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1982), 361.
 Shmuel H. Bergmann im Eintrag „Buber,“ Encyclopaedia Hebraica [Hebr.] (Jerusalem: Ency-
clopaedia Publishing Company, 1959), Bd. 7: 681.
 GershomScholem, „Martin Buber’s Interpretation ofHasidism,“Commentary 32 (1961): 305– 16;
Rivkah Schatz-Uffenheimer, „Man’s Relation to God andWorld in Buber’s Rendering of theHasidic
Teaching,“ in Paul Arthur Schilpp andMaurice Friedman, eds., The Philosophy of Martin Buber (La
Salle: Open Court Publishers, 1967), 403–34; Steven D. Kepnes, „A Hermeneutic Approach to the
Buber-Scholem Controversy,“ Journal of Jewish Studies 38 (1987): 81–98; Maurice Friedman,
„Interpreting Hasidism: The Buber-Scholem Controversy,“ Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute,
Vol. 33 (1988), 449–67; Laurence J. Silberstein, „Modes of Discourse in Modern Judaism: The
Buber-Scholem Debate Reconsidered,“ Soundings 71 (1988): 657–81; Moshe Idel, „Martin Buber
and Gershom Scholem on Hasidism: A Critical Appraisal,“ in Ada Rapaport-Albert, ed., Hasidism
Reappraised (London: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilisation, 1996), 389–403; Martin Buber,
„Replies to My Critics,“ in Paul Arthur Schilpp and Maurice Friedman, eds., The Philosophy of
Martin Buber (La Salle: Open Court Publishers, 1967), 731–41; Jon D. Levenson, „The Hermene-
utical Defense of Buber’s Hasidism: A Critique and Counterstatement,“Modern Judaism 11 (1991):
299–320; Jerome Gellman, „Buber’s Blunder: Buber’s Replies to Scholem and Schatz-Uffen-
heimer“, Modern Judaism 20 (2000): 20–40.
Methodologie hier eher literarisch sind, ⁵ soll auch die ideelle Dimension des
Textes in den Vordergrund rücken.
* * *
Die erste Bubersche Bearbeitung unserer Legende findet sich in seinem 1928 er-
schienenen Band Die chassidischen Bücher mit etwa 30 kurzen Geschichten über
den wichtigen chassidischen Rabbi Jaakob Jizchak von Pžysha, den sogenannten
„Heiligen Juden“ oder „Jehudi“ (1765–1813).⁶ Der vollständige Text Bubers lautet
wie folgt:
Können und Wollen
Über Land wandernd traf der Jehudi einst auf einen umgestürzten Heuwagen. „Hilf mir doch
den Wagen aufzurichten!“ rief ihm der Besitzer zu. Er versuchte es, aber es ging nicht
vonstatten. „Ich kann nicht“, versicherte er endlich. Der Bauer sah ihn streng an. „Du
kannst“, sagte er, „aber du willst nicht.“
AmAbenddieses Tags sprach der Jehudi zu seinen Schülern: „Heute ist esmir gesagtworden.
Wir können den Namen Gottes aufrichten, aber wir wollen nicht.“
Gemäß westlichen Konventionen gelesen, handelt es sich hier um eine Anekdote
mit einer deutlichmoralischenDimension. Der Text weist eine Zweiteilung auf, die
sich auch in den beiden Absätzen widerspiegelt. Zunächst wird die Szene mit dem
Rabbi als Protagonisten und dem Bauern als Antagonisten aufgebaut; danach
folgt zum Abschluss die Moral, die der Rabbi seinen Schülern mit auf den Weg
gibt. Zeitlich werden die beiden Szenen durch einige Stunden („Am Abend dieses
Tages“) voneinander abgesetzt. Die Moral der Anekdote ist chassidisch-religiös
 Weitere literarische Einsichten bieten u.a. Dan Laor, „Agnon and Buber: the story of a fri-
endship or, the rise and fall of the ‘Corpus Hasidicum’“, in: PaulMendes-Flohr, ed., Martin Buber, a
Contemporary Perspective (Jerusalem/Syracuse: The Israel Academy of Sciences and the Huma-
nities/Syracuse University Press, 2002), 48–86; Baruch Kurzweil, „Gog u-Magog le-Martin Buber“
[Hebr.], in idem,Le-nokhach ha-mewukha ha-ruchanit schel dorenu (RamatGan: Bar IlanUniversity
Press, 1976), 69–76; Akiva Ernst Simon, „Martin Buber we-emunat jisra’el“ [Hebr.], Iyun 9 (1958):
13–50; Martina Urban, „Retelling Biblical Mythos through the Hasidic Tale: Buber’s ‘Saul and
David’ and the Question of Leadership“,Modern Judaism 24 (2004): 69–78; Shmuel Werses, „Ha-
chassidut be-asspaqlarja beletristit: ijjunim be-Gog u-Magog shel Martin Buber“ [Hebr.], in idem:
Mi-laschon el laschon (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1996), 168–207.
 Die chassidischen Bücher (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1928), 529. Unverändert wiederholt in
Hundert chassidische Geschichten (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1935), 21 und in Die Erzählungen der
Chassidim (Zürich: Manesse, 1949), 719,wie auch in der hebräischen Version des Letzteren, Or Ha-
Ganuz (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1946). Allerdings fehlt sie im Kapitel über den „Heiligen Juden“ im 1922
erschienenen Der groβe Maggid und seine Nachfolge (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1922), 164– 174;
vermutlich lernte sie Buber erst nach 1922 kennen.
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begründet – „den Namen Gottes aufrichten“ ist im kabbalistischen Kontext als
Bezeichnung für die Erlösung zu verstehen. Der Titel „Können undWollen“ deutet
jedoch bereits an, dass hier auch eine allgemeinere Lehre abzulesen ist, die Bubers
hauptsächlich nicht-chassidische, selbst nicht-jüdische Leserschaft ansprechen
soll.
Wie stehen aber die beiden Teile der Anekdote nun zueinander? Konkreter
gefragt: Wie lässt sich die moralische Botschaft im zweiten Teil aus dem ersten
Abschnitt ziehen? Bei näherer Betrachtung taucht hier ein Problem auf. Nehmen
wir zunächst tentativ an, dass der Rabbi eine statische Figur ist, deren Einstellung
im Laufe des Erzählten unverändert bleibt.Wollte er also tatsächlich den Wagen
aufrichten, konnte es aber nicht, so widerspräche die Anekdote ihrer eigenen
Moral; denn diese soll ja gerade zeigen, dass das Können demWollen folgt,was in
dieser Lesart nicht gegeben wäre. Dieser Interpretationsversuch scheitert also.
Eine alternative Hypothese wäre, dass der Rabbi von vornherein den Wagen nicht
aufrichten wollte, also nur so tat, als ob er es versuchte. Dieser Ansatz ist höchst
unwahrscheinlich, würde er doch den Rabbi als unehrliche Figur darstellen und
damit seiner Funktion als positivem Protagonisten entgegenstehen.
Der Leser ist daher gezwungen zu dem Schluss zu kommen, dass der Rabbi
keine statische sondern vielmehr eine dynamische Figur ist, die im Laufe der
Anekdote selbst etwas Neues erfährt, und sich infolgedessen wandelt. Dies ent-
spräche auch Bubers dialogischer Philosophie. DasWesen entsteht und formt sich
erst durch die Begegnung, durch den Dialog mit dem Anderen: „Der Mensch wird
am Du zum Ich.“⁷ Der modern-westliche Leser ahnt hier auch den romantischen
Ansatz: Gerade die Begegnungmit dem „ungebildeten“ und „naturnahen“ Bauern
verändert die Einstellung des buchgelehrten Rabbi.Um zu dieser Interpretation zu
gelangen, muss der Leser jedoch die elliptisch wirkende Handlung gewisserma-
ßen ergänzen. Er muss nämlich davon ausgehen, dass es letztendlich doch ge-
lungen ist, den Heuwagen aufzurichten, und dass damit das Können tatsächlich
dem Wollen gefolgt ist. Dies geht jedoch nicht direkt aus im Text hervor, sondern
muss vielmehr – gemäß den kulturabhängigen Erwartungen und Schemata –
ergänzt werden, die der Text beim modern-westlichen Leser aktiviert. Dement-
sprechend lässt sich auch die Beziehung zwischen Anekdote und Moral nach-
vollziehen: Erst durch den Vorwurf des Bauern wurde der Wille des Rabbi groß
genug, um das mutmaßlich erfolgte Aufrichten des Wagens zu ermöglichen. Das
Können folgt dem stärker gewordenenWillen. Diese Lehre überträgt der Rabbi nun
 Martin Buber, Ich und Du (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1936), 36.
Bubers schöpferischer Dialog mit einer chassidischen Legende 91
im zweiten Teil der Geschichte auf den Namen Gottes und die Erlösung, indem er
den Heuwagen allegorisch als den Namen Gottes auffasst.
* * *
Eine Weiterentwicklung erlebte diese Anekdote in Bubers 1940/41 auf Hebräisch
und 1949 auf Deutsch erschienenem chassidischen Roman Gog und Magog.⁸ Der
Erzähler im folgenden Auszug ist der „Heilige Jude“ selbst, eine Hauptfigur im
Roman. Die Anekdote steht diesmal in einer Rahmenerzählung: Die Chassidim
sitzen in Lublin um einen großen Tisch und jeder von ihnen muss eine Geschichte
erzählen. Jaakob Jizchak – der „Heilige Jude“ – erzählt sogar zwei:
„Meine zweite Geschichte“, sagte Jaakob Jizchak, „ist wohl noch kürzer und noch bündiger
als die erste. Sie heißt: ›Wie ich bei einem Bauern in die Lehre ging‹. Als ich nämlich,
nachdem ich Apta verlassen hatte, auf der Wanderschaft war, traf ich auf einen riesigen
Heuwagen, der umgestürzt war und quer über die Straße lag. Der Bauer, der daneben stand,
rief mir zu, ich möchte ihm den Wagen aufrichten helfen. Ich besah mir den: wohl, ich habe
kräftige Arme,und auch der Bauer schienwas zu vermögen, aber wie sollten zwei Männer die
ungeheure Last heben? ›Ich kann nicht‹, sagte ich. Da schob jener mich an. ›Du kannst‹, rief
er, ›aber du willst nicht‹. Das fuhr mir ins Herz. Bretter waren zur Hand, wir stemmten sie
unter den Wagen, hebelten mit all unsrer Kraft, das Gefährt schwankte, hob sich, stand,wir
luden das Heu wieder drauf, der Bauer strich den noch immer zitternden und keuchenden
Ochsen über die Flanken, sie zogen an. ›Laß mich eine Weile mit dir hinterher gehen‹, sagte
ich. ›Geh nur mit, Bruder‹, antwortete er. Wir gingen mitsammen. ›Ich möchte dich etwas
fragen‹, sagte ich. ›Frag nur, Bruder‹, antwortete er. ›Wie kam dir in den Sinn‹, fragte ich ihn,
›daß ich nicht will?‹ ›Das kam mir in den Sinn‹, antwortete er, ›weil du gesagt hattest, du
könntest nicht. Niemand weiß, ob er etwas kann, eh er’s versucht hat‹. ›Aber wie kam dir in
den Sinn‹, fragte ichweiter, ›daß ich kann?‹ ›Das‹, antwortete er, ›kammir nur so in den Sinn.‹
›Was heißt denn das, nur so?‹ fragte ich. ›Ach, Bruder‹, sagte er, ›was bist du für ein Presser!
Nun gut, es kam mir in den Sinn, weil man dich mir in den Weg geschickt hat.‹ ›Meinst du
etwa gar‹, fragte ich, ›deinWagen sei gestürzt, damit ich dir helfen könne?‹ ›Was denn sonst,
Bruder?‹ sagte er.“⁹
Auffällig in dieser Bearbeitung ist die Verdichtung der Darstellung mittels aus-
führlicher Beschreibung von Gefühlen, Tatsachen und des inneren Dialogs des
Rabbi – alles den Konventionen des modernen Romans entsprechend. Die
zweiteilige Struktur bleibt hier zwar erhalten, wurde aber modifiziert: Die Prot-
agonisten in der ersten Szene sind nachwievor der Bauer und der Rabbi, dieser
spricht allerdings in dieser Geschichte nicht zu seinem Schüler, sondern zu seinen
 Außer der hebräischen und deutschen Versionen, die Buber selbst verfasste,wurde der Roman
in viele Sprachen übersetzt, u.a. ins Englische (For the Sake of Heaven, 1945), Spanische, Nie-
derländische, Italienische, Tschechische, Ungarische, Polnische und Japanische.
 Martin Buber, Gog und Magog (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1949), 47 f.
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Freunden,mit denen er zusammen sitzt. DieserWechsel ist bezeichnend, da er den
dialogischen Charakter des Textes stärkt, der in dieser Bearbeitung des Stoffes
zentral ist. Die Hierarchie von Lehrer und Schülern wird durch die Gleichwer-
tigkeit der Freunde ersetzt. Der dialogische Charakter der Begegnung zwischen
Rabbi und Bauer wird wesentlich durch die ausführliche Konversation am Ende
der Szene verdichtet. Auch der sehr verbindliche Charakter des Gesprächs, der
durch das Duzen und durch die gegenseitige, sich viermal wiederholende Anrede
„Bruder“ betont wird, trägt zur Stärkung des dialogischen Charakters bei.
Die Geschichte, deren Handlung auf den ersten Blick unverändert bleibt, zeigt
bei näherer Betrachtung eine Anpassung an die bereits in der ersten Bearbeitung
vermuteten Erwartungen des modern-westlichen Lesers. Anders als in der zuvor
untersuchten Anekdote, wo gar nicht erst der Versuch unternommen wird, den
Wagen aufzurichten, kommt es in der zweiten Geschichte nach dem Vorwurf des
Bauern tatsächlich zum Versuch, und erwartungsgemäß gelingt es auch, den
Wagen wieder aufzurichten.
Was die Moral betrifft, so gibt es in dieser späteren Bearbeitung mehrere
Ebenen. Zunächst gibt es eine allgemein-menschliche Moral, die bereits im Titel
der ersten Version angedeutet wurde, diesmal aber eindringlicher in dem Satz
„Niemand weiß, ob er etwas kann, eh er’s versucht hat“ zum Ausdruck gebracht
wird. Darüber hinaus lässt sich auch eine mystische, neuromantische Dimension
der Moral aus dieser zweiten Episode herauslesen: „›Meinst du etwa gar‹, fragte
ich, ›dein Wagen sei gestürzt, damit ich dir helfen könne?‹ ›Was denn sonst,
Bruder?‹ sagte er.“ Sie erinnert etwa an die bekannte Aussage Bubers, alle Reisen
hätten eine heimliche Bestimmung, die der Reisende nicht ahnt. Zudem knüpft sie
an das bekannte Motiv der Mystik an, es gäbe keine Willkürlichkeit, da alles, was
auf der Welt passiere, einen –wenn auch verborgenen – Grund habe. Stärker noch
als in der ersten Bearbeitung, wird hier die „Weisheit“ der Figur des Bauern zu-
geschrieben.War es in der ersten Bearbeitung noch der Rabbi, der die Moral zog
und seinem Schüler mit auf denWeggab, so ist es hier der Bauer, der die Lehre aus
der Geschichte artikuliert. Dies spiegelt sich auch im Titel wider, die der Erzähler
der Geschichte selbst gibt, nämlich „Wie ich bei einem Bauern in die Lehre ging.“
Noch stärker wirkt der Titel, liest man diese Geschichte in ihrem Kontext; denn
diese Anekdote folgt unmittelbar auf eine andere mit der Überschrift „Wie ich bei
einem Schmied in die Lehre ging“:¹⁰ Beide Titel verweisen also auf die Beschei-
denheit des gelehrten Rabbi,wie auch auf seine demütige Bereitschaft von jedem,
auch von als einfach, ihm gesellschaftlich und intellektuell unterlegen geltenden
Personen, zu lernen. Damit ist hier ein bekanntes Motiv aufgegriffen, das sich in
 Ebd., 45.
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vielen literarischen Traditionen ausmachen lässt, nicht zuletzt im Talmud.¹¹ Die
chassidisch-religiöse Moral fehlt übrigens auch in dieser Bearbeitung nicht. Sie
wird aber erst ein paar Absätze später im Roman deutlich und kommt, ebenfalls
dialogisch gestaltet, in der auf die Geschichte folgenden Diskussion unter den
Freunden zum Ausdruck.¹²
Die Entwicklung zwischen den beiden Bearbeitungen Bubers – vom „Können
undWollen“ in Die chassidischen Bücher zu „Wie ich bei einem Bauer in die Lehre
ging“ in Gog und Magog – kann zusammenfassend als Anpassung an eine mo-
derne Leserschaft bezeichnet werden. Sie betrifft die „Lösung des Problems“ auf
der Handlungsebene, die in der ersten Bearbeitung erkennbar ist, indem der
gescheiterte Versuch vor dem Vorwurf durch einen gelungenen Versuch nach dem
Verwurf ersetzt wurde. Darüber hinaus wurde eine allgemein-menschliche Di-
mension der Moral hinzugefügt und das Dialogische stark erweitert. Protagonist
und Antagonist wurden durch gleichwertige Gesprächspartner – den Rabbi ei-
nerseits und seine Freunde andererseits – ersetzt,womit das Autoritätsgefälle, das
vor allem zwischen Rabbi und Bauer bestand, nivelliert wurde. Die eher elliptische
Anekdote in der ersten Bearbeitung wurde in der zweiten gemäß bekannter lite-
rarischer Schemata und unter Einfluss der dialogischen Philosophie Bubers er-
gänzt, erweitert und grundlegend angepasst.
* * *
Im Folgenden wollen wir die Vorlage zu Bubers Bearbeitungen, die chassidische
Quelle selbst, genauer in den Blick nehmen. Es handelt sich um das 1914 (nur
14 Jahre vor der ersten Bearbeitung Bubers) in Petrikau erschienene Sefer Sichot
Chajim von Chajim Me’ir Jechi’el von Moglince.¹³ Die folgende Übertragung aus
 Vgl z.B. Talmud Erubin 53b: „R. Jehošuá b. Hananja sagte: Lebtags besiegte mich niemand als
eine Frau, ein Knabe und ein Mädchen“ usw. (Lazarus Goldschmidt, Übers., Der Babylonische
Talmud, 3. Aufl. (Königstein i.T.: Jüdischer Verlag 1980), 2. Bd., 160.
 „Es sei“, erklärte Simon, „aber was hat deine zweite Geschichte mit Lublin zu tun?“
Der „Jude“warmit einem Schlage,wie er damals beim Anblick des Rabbi errötet war, leichenblaß
geworden. „Da redet ihr immerzu“, sagte er, ohne aufzusehen, leise, aber so, daß es stärker zu
hören war als ein lauter Ruf, „vom Exil der Schechina, da klagt ihr, daß sie in der Fremde um-
herirrt, erschöpft hinsinkt, am Boden liegt. Und das ist kein Gerede, es ist ganz wirklich so, ihr
könnt ihr auf der Landstraße der Welt begegnen. Aber was tut ihr,wenn ihr ihr begegnet? Streckt
ihr ihr die Hand entgegen? Helft ihr ihr vom Staub der Landstraße auf? Und wer sollte ihr auf-
helfen, wenn nicht die Männer von Lublin?“ Ebd., 49.
 Chajim Me’ir Jechi’el, Sefer Sichot Chajim (Perikau 1914), 9. Am Schluss Or Ha-Ganuz – der
hebräischen Ausgabe des Die Erzählungen der Chassidim – verzeichnete Buber die Quellen seiner
Bearbeitungen.
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dem Hebräischen bleibt dem Text möglichst wortwörtlich treu, die häufigen Ab-
kürzungen wurden allerdings aufgelöst.
E[in] M[al] wanderte der H[eilige] Jude, [sein] A[ndenken] z[um Leben] i[m] J[enseits], mit
seinen Schülern im Feld, und sie begegneten einem Unbeschnittenen, der einen Wagen Heu
führte. Und der Wagen war umgestürzt. Der Unbeschnittene rief zum H[eiligen] Juden und
seinen Schülern, [ihr] A[ndenken] z[um Leben] i[m] J[enseits], sie sollen ihm helfen, den
Wagen aufzurichten und das Heu zu laden.Und sie gingen, um ihm das Heu laden zu helfen,
konnten ihm mit ihrer Kraft aber nicht helfen. Der Unbeschnittene wurde auf sie zornig und
sagte ihnen in polnischer Sprache, „Mozesz ale nie chcesz“ [=„Du kannst es, willst aber
nicht,“ polnisch], d.h., er war auf sie zornig,weil die das Heu hätten heben können, es aber
nicht wollten. Darauf sagte der H[eilige] Jude zu seinen Schülern:
„Ihr hört,was der Unbeschnittene sagt: Er sagt uns, dass wir den [Buchstaben] ‘H’ im Namen
[Gottes] erheben können, dass wir es aber nicht wollen,“ s[o] w[eit seine] h[eiligen] W[orte].
Auffällig ist einmal die Mehrsprachigkeit, die in Bubers Bearbeitungen den lite-
rarischen Sprachkonventionen seiner Zeit vollständig zum Opfer fiel. Der Text ist
grundsätzlich Hebräisch, und zwar rabbinisches Hebräisch, mit geringer Beach-
tung der klassischen Grammatik, beinhaltet aber auch einen Satz auf Polnisch. Im
Hintergrund lässt sich auch noch das Jiddische hören, die Alltagssprache der
Chassidim, in welcher die Anekdote, sofern sie einer konkreten Wirklichkeit
entsprach, tatsächlich stattgefunden hat. Der jiddische Hintergrund ist unent-
behrlich zum Verstehen der Anekdote, denn sie beruht auf einem Wortspiel: „der
[Buchstabe] ‘H’ imNamenGottes“ [=JHVH, Jehova]–der hebräischenName dieses
Buchstaben ist Hey – ist eine Anspielung auf das Heu, jiddisch Hey, das die
Chassidim heben sollten. Die Übertragung der Moral von dem Heuwagen auf Gott
beruht also in der Vorlage nicht auf einer Allegorie, wie in Bubers Bearbeitung,
sondern auf der Klangähnlichkeit zweier verschiedener Wörter auf Hebräisch und
Jiddisch.
Auf der Handlungsebene geht es in der Vorlage um den gescheiterten Versuch
zu helfen, und zwar vor dem Vorwurf des Bauern, genau wie in Bubers erster
Bearbeitung. Damit ist die „Richtung“ von Bubers Bearbeitungen bestätigt: seine
zweite Bearbeitung ist von der Vorlage weiter entfernt als die erste. Ein weiterer
Unterschied zwischen der Vorlage und Bubers Bearbeitungen lässt sich in Hin-
blick auf die Akteure erkennen. In der Vorlage sind es „der Jude“ und seine
Schüler, die zusammen spazieren gehen; bei Buber wandert „der Jude“ allein.
Dieser Unterschied zwischen Vorlage und Bearbeitung ist bereits Bubers Schüler
und Freund, dem Philosophen und Pädagogen Ernst Simon (1899– 1988), auf-
gefallen.¹⁴ Simon wollte es als Betonung des Dialogischen verstehen: Die Ge-
 Simon, „Martin Buber ve’emunat yisra’el“ (s.o., Anm. 5), 34.
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genüberstellung von Rabbi und Bauer wirke stärker dialogisch als die einer
ganzen chassidischen Schulklasse und der Figur eines Bauern. Auch die Di-
mension des Wunders komme besser zur Geltung, wenn die Szene nur aus Bauer
und „dem Juden“ besteht, als wenn eine Gruppe von Schülern involviert ist; denn
das Aufrichten des Heuwagens – und damit die Macht des Willen – sei umso
bemerkenswerter, je weniger Personen daran beteiligen sind. Auf diese letztere
Aussage Simons wollen wir später noch zurückkommen.Vorerst ist zu bemerken,
dass diese Modifikation der involvierten Akteure Buber dazu veranlasst hat, die
Anekdote in zwei zeitlich (in den Bearbeitungen immer weiter voneinander) ge-
trennte Szenen zu unterteilen. Da die Schüler aus literarischen Überlegungen im
ersten Teil der Anekdote unpassend geworden waren, musste die zweite, spätere
Szene „am Abend dieses Tages“ fingiert werden, um Raum für die moralische
Schlussfolgerung zu schaffen, die nun nicht mehr, wie in der Vorlage, bereits an
Ort und Stelle, also beim Heuwagen im Feld, erfolgte.
Besonders auffällig ist für den „modernen“ Leser zweifelsohne die mehrmals
wiederholte Bezeichnung „Unbeschnittener“ für den von Buber einfach als Bauer
bezeichneten Antagonisten. Am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts, als Buber begann,
seine Bearbeitung chassidischer Texte zu veröffentlichen, gab es durchaus jüdi-
sche Bauern, sowohl in Europa wie auch in Palästina; Bubers Bauer wird aller-
dings weder explizit als Jude noch als Nicht-Jude beschrieben, seine Gruppen-
identität bleibt einfach dahingestellt, und ist im Text völlig irrelevant. Nicht so in
der chassidischen Vorlage. Hier wurde die Bezeichnung „Unbeschnittener“ –
hebr. ‛arel, eine eindeutig pejorative Bezeichnung mit Bezugnahme auf die Kör-
perlichkeit, deutlich pejorativer als gängige wie nochri, goj oder akum – nicht
weniger als vier Mal wiederholt. Außerdem geht aus dem Text hervor, dass der
„Unbeschnittene“ Polnisch spricht – eine weitere Bestätigung, in der Form des
telling, seines „Unbeschnittenseins“, was gleich darauf, als showing, durch seine
Aussage auf Polnisch noch verstärkt wird. Darüber hinaus wird der „Unbe-
schnittene“ als zornig dargestellt. Auch seine lakonischen Worte, die er an „den
Juden“ richtet,wirkenmisstrauisch und respektlos. Hier ist Bubers Anpassung am
radikalsten: Im Sinne der „deutsch-jüdischen Symbiose,“ oder eines egalitären
Humanismus im allgemeinen, wurde die feindliche Gegenüberstellung Jude-Un-
beschnittener durch einen verbindlichen Dialog zwischen dem Rabbi und dem
nicht explizit als Nicht-Jude bezeichneten Bauern ersetzt.
* * *
Was ist aber der Sinn der chassidischen Anekdote in ihrem ursprünglichen
Kontext? Warum wird das „Unbeschnittensein“ des Antagonisten so sehr betont?
Um dies besser zu verstehen – denn von unseren Erwartungen und Schemata als
Leser müssen wir uns gerade verabschieden – wollen wir jetzt den tatsächlichen
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Kontext der Vorlage heranziehen. Unmittelbar nach der bereits zitierten Vorlage
steht der folgende Text, der mit einer deutlichen Leseanweisung beginnt:¹⁵
Und eine Geschichte wie diese passierte a[uch] dem Sabba Kadischa aus Radoschitz, [sein] A
[ndenken] z[um Leben] i[m] J[enseits]. E[in] M[al] am Markttag ging der h[eilige] R[abbi], um
bei einem Unbeschnittenen einenWagen Holz zu kaufen.Und der Unbeschnittene wollte für
das Holz vier Gulden, und der h[eilige] R[abbi] wollte nicht mehr als drei Gulden ausgeben,
und als sich der h[eilige] R[abbi]mit ihmnicht einigen konnte, kehrte er ihmden Rücken,und
derUnbeschnittene rief ihm inpolnischer Sprache nach, „Poprawcie to kupicie“ [=„Verbesser,
dann kaufe“, polnisch], und der Radoschitzer verstand nicht, was er sagte, und fragte einen
Juden, der dabei war, „was schreit der Unbeschnittene, was habe ich ihm angetan?“, und
derjenige Jude legte ihm aus, dass der Unbeschnittene ihm sagt, „as er sol sech ferbesseren,
wet er kennen koifen“ [„Wenn er sich verbessert, wird er kaufen können“, jiddisch] und der
Sabba Kadische hat d[arüber] gesagt: „selbst der Unbeschnittene sieht ein, as ich badarf sech
zu ferbesseren [=“dass ich mich verbessern soll“, jiddisch]“, und sofort schloss er sich zu
Hause ein und untersuchte seine Taten.
Die beiden aufeinanderfolgenden Anekdoten weisen auffällige Ähnlichkeit in
Struktur, Handlung und Stil auf, die auch deren Verfasser bzw. Sammler nicht
entging. In beiden geht es um eine Begegnung zwischen einem Rabbi und einem
so genannten „Unbeschnittenen“, eine Bezeichnung, die hier sogar sechsmal
wiederholt wird. In beiden Texten ist der Nicht-Jude auf den Rabbi böse, spricht
einen kurzen Satz auf Polnisch, und verschwindet dann. Darauf zieht der Rabbi
eine chassidisch-religiöse Lehre mittels Dekontextualisierung der Worte seines
Antagonisten. Diese Dekontextualisierung ist nicht als Missverständnis zu deuten;
der Rabbi interpretiert die Worte des Nicht-Juden absichtlich außerhalb deren
ursprünglichen Kontextes, der für den Rabbi keine Relevanz hat.
Die Bedeutung der beiden Anekdoten versteht sich aus der kabbalistischen
Lehre der Funken.¹⁶ Nach der lurianischen Kabbala waren bei der Schöpfung der
Welt die göttlichen Funken in unreine Abgründe gefallen; es ist die Aufgabe der
Gerechten, diese Funken aus dem Abgrund zu retten und einzusammeln, um
dadurch die Erlösung der Welt zu beschleunigen. Um dieses Einsammeln der
Funken geht es auch in den Anekdoten: Der Rabbi sammelt die heiligen Funken
aus dem unreinen Abgrund. Je unreiner der Abgrund, desto größer ist auch das
Verdienst des Rabbi. Deshalb muss die „Unreinheit“ des Nicht-Juden möglichst
betont werden, und es muss gerade ein „Unbeschnittener“ sein – also weder Jude
noch einfach ein Nicht-Jude –wie die Texte so oft wiederholen. Der Bauer bzw. der
Marktverkäufer wird also als zorniger, frecher,ungebildeter und polnisch redender
 Jechi’el, Sefer Sichot Chajim [s.o. Anm. 13], 9 f.
 Siehe Gershom Scholem, Kabbalah (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974), 138 f.
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„Unbeschnittener“ beschrieben, um damit die Tiefe des Abgrundes und das
Verdienst des Rabbi hervorzuheben.
* * *
Diese aus der chassidischen Quelle selbst hervorgehende Interpretation ändert
den Sinn der Heuwagen-Legende entscheidend. Demzufolge geht es in der Vorlage
nämlich weder um „Können undWollen“ noch um „bei einem Bauern in die Lehre
gehen“. Vielmehr geht es um die Fähigkeit des Rabbi – mittels „schöpferischer“
Ausdeutung – die göttlichen Funken aus dem unreinen Abgrund einzusammeln.
Die beiden Figuren, Rabbi und Bauer, stehen nicht analog zueinander, sondern
sind gerade als Antipoden angelegt, als heiliger Rabbi und unreiner Unbe-
schnittener. Sie sind in der Legende nicht gleich-, sondern einander gegenüber-
gestellt, und diese Gegenüberstellung wird im Text möglichst zugespitzt. Nur der
Rabbi kann die heiligen Funken einsammeln und die moralischen Schlüsse zie-
hen, keinesfalls aber der Unbeschnittene,wie in Bubers zweiter Bearbeitung. Auch
von der Bescheidenheit und Lernbereitschaft des Rabbi kann in der ursprüngli-
chen Legende keine Rede sein. Hier entsteht die Größe des Rabbi vielmehr aus der
Geringschätzung des Nicht-Juden heraus. Es versteht sich nun, dass in dieser
Urfassung der Geschichte ein Dialog zwischen dem Rabbi und dem so genannten
Unbeschnittenen ausgeschlossen ist, da dieser dem Geist der ursprünglichen
Legende völlig widerspräche.
Eine Frage, die offen bleibt, ist, ob der Heuwagen in der chassidischen Vorlage
tatsächlich aufgerichtet wurde. Der Text äußert sich dazu nicht, man kann aber
annehmen, dass es dazu nicht gekommen ist, so wie auch in der zweiten Legende
das Holz nicht verkauft wurde. Auf jeden Fall ist diese Frage dem chassidischen
Text völlig fremd. Es geht dem Text wohl nicht um den Wagen, sondern um das
Heu; und auch nicht um das tatsächliche Heu, sondern um seine Umdeutung als
Buchstaben des Namen Gottes. Das Verhältnis zum so genannten Unbeschnitte-
nen ist keine Ich-Du-Beziehung, sondern eine Ich-Es-Beziehung. Er selbst, seine
Probleme und seine Äußerungen dienen lediglich dazu, das Verdienst des Rabbi
zu unterstreichen; darüber hinaus sind sie belanglos. Aufgrund der impliziten
Annahme des Lesers, dass der Wagen doch aufgerichtet wurde (s.o.), wird die
Macht der literarischen Konventionen und der Buberschen Bearbeitung sichtbar,
die sogar einen einfühlsamen und hochgebildeten Leser wie Ernst Simon irre-
zuführen vermochten.
* * *
Zusammenfassend kann man feststellen, dass Buber, wenn auch mittels sehr
geringer Modifikationen im Text, den ursprünglichen Charakter der chassidischen
Legende grundlegend verändert hat. In der ersten Bearbeitung genügte der Aus-
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tausch des „Unbeschnittenen“ durch die Figur des Bauern, um den Charakter des
Erzählten wesentlich zu ändern. In der zweiten Bearbeitung wurde die Umge-
staltung weitergeführt und zugespitzt, in eine Richtung allerdings, die bereits in
der ersten Bearbeitung erkennbar war. So wurde die chassidische Legende, deren
Lehre etwa folgender Maßen lautet: „Auch in den unreinsten Umgebungen,
nämlich bei einem zornigen Nicht-Juden,weiß der Rabbi einen heiligen Funken zu
finden,“ zu einer Anekdote mit universell-menschlicher Moral, mit dem Tenor:
„Wo ein Wille ist, da ist auch ein Weg,“ oder „Von jedem, auch von einem ein-
fachen Bauern, kann man etwas lernen.“
Kann man also Buber eine Verzerrung, ja sogar Verfälschung des Chassidis-
mus vorwerfen? Die Frage, inwiefern Bubers Darstellung des Chassidismus dem
wirklichen Chassidismus treu ist, war bekanntermaßen das Thema einer hitzigen
Diskussion zwischen Buber, seinen Anhängern und seinen Kritikern, mit Ger-
schom Scholem als dem Bekanntesten unter Letzteren.¹⁷ Gerade die hier behan-
delte Legende kann die beiden Positionen verdeutlichen. Einerseits, wie bereits
gesagt, ist Bubers Bearbeitung des chassidischen Stoffes alles andere als histo-
ristisch treu. Buber hat die Legende aus ihrem ursprünglichen Kontext heraus-
gerissen und ihr seine eigene, ihr aber fremde Moral zugeschrieben. In dieser
Hinsicht ist die historistische Kritik an Buber gerechtfertigt; man könnte fast von
einer Vergegnung – wie Buber eine verfehlte Begegnung zu bezeichnen pflegte –
sprechen, in welcher Buber den Quellen seine eigene Auffassung aufdrückte.
Andererseits weist gerade dieser re-interpretative Vorgang die größte Ähnlichkeit
mit dem chassidischen Text selbst auf, denn schließlich hat Buber den Text der
Legende genauso behandelt,wie deren Protagonist – der „Heilige Jude“ nämlich –
mit der Aussage des Nicht-Juden im Text umging. In dieser Hinsicht ist Bubers
Bearbeitung zwar nicht historistisch, jedoch dem Geist der Vorlage als lebendiger
Tradition treu geblieben, wie Buber selbst zu seiner Verteidigung sagte. Es ging
Buber nicht um eine historistische Wiedergabe seiner chassidischen Vorlage,
sondern um einen Dialog mit ihr als lebendigem Wesen, um eine Begegnung im
vollen Sinne, die etwas Neues schafft.
 Siehe oben, Anm. 4.
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Religio Today: The Concept of Religion in
Martin Buber’s Thought
The aim of my contribution is to bring out the originality and contemporary rele-
vance of Buber’s concept of religion. First, I shall try to show how original this
concept is compared with the meanings that have been given to the Latin term
religio in the history of thought and culture. This term has been adopted by var-
ious European languages: in present usage, the German word Religion, English
religion, French religion, Spanish religión, and Italian religione have the same
meaning the Latin term religio had. Therefore, probing the denotations attributed
to the original Latin term perforce entails pondering the phenomenon of religion
in present day Europe and in all the societies influenced by European culture –
from Western to Eastern countries. Second, I shall try to show how relevant Bub-
er’s concept of religion is for us, given the often unfortunate consequences reli-
gio, if characterized by violence and intolerance, has.
The following exposition is divided in three parts. In the first I shall focus on
the various meanings religio had in the Roman and Christian world, and note the
historical impact these conceptions of religio have had up to present-day society.
In the second part of the paper, I shall consider the meaning that Buber gives the
term “religion,” with particular reference to Ich und Du (1923). Specifically, I will
highlight his distinctive interpretation of religion as the only possible way out of
the existential crisis of contemporary man. In the third part, I shall try to clarify
briefly how through meditations on biblical and philosophical texts – which he
published in the forties and fifties of the previous century – he sought to illumi-
nate for his readers a means to re-appropriate religion.
The term religio:
Does it derive from relegere or religare?
In the Roman world it was Cicero (106–43 BCE) who provided an etymology of
the word religio when he distinguishes it from superstitio (superstition). In his
work De natura deorum he writes:
Accipimus […] deorum cupiditates, aegritudines, iracundias. […] Cultus autem deorum est
optimus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis ut eos semper
pura, integra, incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur. Non enim philosophi solum,
verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separaverunt. Nam qui totos dies
precabantur et immolabant ut sibi sui liberi superstites essent superstitiosi sunt appellati,
quod nomen patuit postea latius. Qui autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent dil-
igenter retractarent et tamquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi ex relegendo ut elegantes ex
eligendo tamquam a diligendo diligentes, ex intellegendo intellegentes; his enim in verbis
omnibus inest vis legendi eadem quae in religioso. Ita factum est in superstitioso et religio-
so alterum vitii nomen, alterum laudis.¹
We receive […] the desires, diseases and furies of the gods. […] But the cult of the gods is
excellent, absolutely pure and holy, and full of piety so that they are worshipped with both
an uncorrupted mind and voice. Not only the philosophers, but our ancestors too separated
superstition from religion. Those who offered prayers and sacrifices every day so that their
children might survive them are called superstitious, a word [whose meaning] was extend-
ed afterwards, while those who diligently reconsidered and seemed to be going over and
over again everything that concerned the cult of the gods, are called religious from relegen-
do (reread), just as they are called elegant from eligendo (elect) and diligent from diligendo
(favour), and intelligent from intellegendo (understand); all these verbs have the same force
as “re-read” in religious. In this way the superstitious and the religious acquired a name
that was either reprehensible or praiseworthy.
Cicero ascribes to the word religio a meaning that corresponds exactly to the con-
ception then current in ancient Rome regarding the proper attitude one was to
assume towards the gods: those who follow scrupulously the ceremonies and
practices established by tradition are deemed religious; those who love their
children more than their parents, and so are incessantly introducing new
forms of worship and prayer, almost as if they wanted to force the gods to protect
and defend their progeny, even after their death, are superstitious. Religio in the
Roman world is expressed through the link between past and present, and be-
tween the individual and the gods who dominate every particular aspect of
life: religio consisted of liturgical and sacred practices in pre-determined times
and places, either to be held in certain seasons of the year or on certain set oc-
casions, or, in the case of events that were surprising or unexpected, of practices
that could be introduced without breaking the rules that allow continuity be-
tween generations, however differently those rules might be applied.
In the Christian world it was the Church Father Lactantius (250–327) who in
disputing Cicero’s conception of religio, also dwelt on the term’s etymology. In
book four, “De vera sapientia et religione”, of his work Divinae Institutiones, Lac-
tantius, like Cicero, underlines the difference between religio and superstitio:
Quae cum ita se habeant, ut ostendimus, apparet nullam aliam spem vitae homini esse pro-
positam, nisi ut abjectis vanitatibus et errore miserabili, Deum cognoscat et Deo serviat,
 Cicero, De natura deorum, II, 70–72.
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nisi huic temporali renuntiet vitae, ac se rudimentis justitiae ad cultum verae religionis
instituat. Hac enim conditione gignimur, ut generanti nos Deo justa et debita obsequia
praebeamus; hunc solum noverimus, hunc sequamur. Hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti
Deo et religati sumus; unde ipsa religio nomen accepit, non ut Cicero interpretatus est,
a relegendo. […] Haec interpretatio quam inepta sit, ex re ipsa licet noscere. […] Si semel
facere, optimum est, quanto magis saepius? […] Quod argumentum etiam ex contrario
valet: si enim totos dies precari et immolare criminis est; ergo et semel. […] Nimirum religio
veri cultus est, superstitio falsi. Et omnino quid colas interest, non quemadmodum colas,
sed quid precere. […] Superstitiosi ergo qui multos ac falsos deos colunt. Nos autem religio-
si, qui uni et vero Deo supplicamus.²
Things being as we have shown, it is clear that human life is given no other hope than
knowing God and serving God, once vanities and wretched error have been abandoned, re-
nouncing this earthly life and dedicating oneself to the principles of justice governing the
practice of the true religion. In fact we were created [literally, generated], so that we might
offer the right and proper signs of submission to the God who has created [generated] us,
that we might know Him only and follow Him only. With this bond of piety we are subju-
gated and bound to God; religion received its name from this and not, as Cicero interpreted
it, from “re-read”. […] One can see from the thing itself how inappropriate this interpreta-
tion is. […] If doing something once only is excellent, how much more so can it be to do it
more often? […] This argument also holds ex contrario: if it is a crime to pray and sacrifice
every day, then it is to do so even once. […] Of course, religion is the cult of the truth, and
superstition the cult of the false. And only what you adore matters, not how you adore it,
but what you pray. […] So those who adore many false gods are superstitious, while we are
religious because we pray to the one true God.
Lactantius, we may note, does not understand Cicero’s thought regarding the op-
position of religio and superstitio: he simply identifies superstitio with an exces-
sive repetition of acts of worship rather than with an attitude of the soul regard-
ing those actions which involve a rupture between fathers and sons, the past and
the present, as mentioned above. Unlike Cicero, Lactantius does not regard con-
duct as fundamental to religio, but knowledge of the true God. The God that Lac-
tantius appeals to is the God who enters into relation with the individual, with-
draws him from the world, and ensures his salvation in eternal life. Religion
owes its name not to the heart and mind going back over what has already
been done, to relegere, but to being bound to a God who made himself known
to men by coming into the world, to religare. What is essential to religio are
truth as a state of things revealed to men, and the relation between man and
God: this relation isolates man from the world, obliges him to go back inside
himself, to find in his inner life the presence of a God who redeems him by suf-
fering on his behalf on the cross and rising again to eternal life. Religio means
 Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones, IV, 28.
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the bond between God and man: God will save him if he believes in Him and
follows His example.
In the history of European culture, these two contrasting meanings of the
term religio – one current in the ancient world, the other affirmed at the time
of the formation of Christian theology – have been interwoven and have given
rise to various manifestations. Accordingly, religio became further enriched
and took on new connotations. And this interweaving and enrichment took
place despite the Church’s conflict with paganism at the time of the decline of
the Roman Empire. In order to appreciate how religious practice and profession
of the truth of the kinship of man with God were equally celebrated and placed
in close connection as two sides of the believer’s life, one need but consider the
fact that in many places the Church took over the pre-existing cult of the divin-
ities worshipped, for instance, by the peoples residing on the borders of the Em-
pire that it had converted, transforming it according to its own theological teach-
ings. The intimate relation between religious practice and confession is also
attested to by the fact that conscientious adherence to ceremonial and liturgical
rules was conjoined in mediaeval Christian civilisation with the elaboration of
the doctrines concerning the revelation, and by the fact that the link between
man and God was not considered by Christianity in the modern age, particularly
by Protestantism, as independent of the actions performed in the world.
But the history of religio is also a history riven by wars and tragic conflicts –
a reality that raises until this very day unresolved problems, which are inherent
in religio conceived in terms of these two meanings. In fact, religio as the reiter-
ation of acts designed to praise the divinity or to pray for health and prosperity
for oneself and those close to one – one’s family, one’s community, one’s people
– might be considered as the precursor of religio as a form of life characterizing a
given group of human beings and setting them apart from other groups and in-
commensurable with them. And religio as the relation of man with a God who
redeems man contingent on belief in His revelation, beyond the use of reason
or attention towards human relations in this world, might be seen as the precur-
sor of religio as the unshakable affirmation of a transcendent truth and its at-
tendant criticism of a way of life inspired only by human experience. In the
first case, there is the risk of religious pluralism without any possibility of com-
munication between different religious communities, and the consequent engen-
dering of self-enclosure, of a conservative posture bound by rules and regula-
tions, wary of all that is new as posing a danger and menace. In the second
case there is the risk of dogmatism and intolerance towards those who do not
share the truth proclaimed by the religious authorities and institutions founded
on revelation.While in the first case the human being runs the risk of being en-
chained to the conditions of one’s birth, to the group he belongs to, and to col-
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lective custom, at the loss of individual freedom, in the second case the human
being runs the risk of being crushed by a truth that does not admit discussion
and differences. Truth in this latter case is imposed on everybody: only by recog-
nizing it, is redemption possible, and every other attitude towards God is judged
false. Religio, then, whether it derives from relegere or from religare, contains el-
ements that harbinger religious conflicts.
Of course, the path leading from Cicero and Lactantius to our era is a long one.
But the ideas of religio that they sustain are not wholly innocent of the evils that
religio produces in our age and our societies. On the other hand, contemporary phi-
losophy that does not appeal to religion – either because of its sceptical, naturalistic
or historicist tendencies, or because it has turned towards mysticism, in the wake of
Nietzsche and the late Heidegger – does not seem able to offer an alternative to re-
ligion for those who want to affirm humanism or defend the dignity of man.³
Religion in “Ich und Du”
Throughout the various stages of Buber’s work, the term “religion” has been in-
flected with distinctive meanings: it is never used in either the sense of a series
of practices connected with a divine cult, or in the sense of a relation between
man and a transcendent God, in the sense that crystallized in the early centuries
of the Christian era. In the lecture entitled Jüdische Religiosität, given in Prague
in 1913, later collected in Vom Geist des Judentums (1916), and then in Reden über
das Judentum (1923),⁴ Buber opposes Religiosität as a productive, creative force to
Religion as a series of forms, ceremonies and doctrines originally instantiated by
this force. While Religion in Judaism denotes a heritage handed down in a long
tradition, the father who teaches his children about the God in whom they
should believe, and inculcates obedience to ritual and liturgical precepts, Reli-
giosität means the individual’s choice and decision and the children setting
themselves free to find their own path to the Absolute. Thus, this early text by
Buber distinguishes religio in two different moments, one subjective or personal
in character, full of vitality, and the other objective and stable: the first moment
 On the nihilistic trend in contemporary philosophy, elucidated – among others – by Karl Löw-
ith, Leo Strauss, Emmanuel Levinas, and the necessity for contemporary thought to take up
again Kant’s program of the defence of human rights against empiricism on the one hand,
and metaphysical dreams on the other, see Irene Kajon, Contemporary Jewish Philosophy. An In-
troduction (London: Routledge, 2006).
 Martin Buber, Vom Geist des Judentums (Leipzig: Kurt Wolff, 1916); Reden über das Judentum
(Frankfurt a. M.: Rütten & Loening, 1923); 2. ed. (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1932).
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proves able to give new impulse to the second when this becomes only a sign
without a signification. This revitalization of the objective structure of religion
through a subjective moment is inspired by the dialectic between the “life”
and the “forms” propounded by Georg Simmel, one of Buber’s philosophy teach-
ers in Berlin in 1898–99.⁵ But it was only during World War One that Buber ela-
borated his idea of religion as the very reality of the relation (Beziehung) between
I, Thou – whether belonging to the world of nature, plant or animal, or human
being, or “spiritual entities,” that is, works that have come to be through the cre-
ative human spirit – and the eternal Thou (God). Religion is the very fact of this
relation, the lyrical-dramatic moment of human existence, the miraculous event
that indicates to man his humanity, the most precious moment of his life.
In her book Buber’s Way to “I and Thou”,⁶ Rivka Horwitz analyzes Buber’s
lectures “Religion als Gegenwart” that he delivered at the behest of Rosenzweig
at the “Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus” in Frankfurt from January to March 1922. She
also examines the correspondence between Buber and Rosenzweig regarding the
lecture. Horwitz’s study reveals that in May 1922 Buber gave the title of Ich und
Du to the text that emerged from these lessons. He had not yet given up, howev-
er, his original plan of writing a work in five volumes whose aim was to describe
Religion or, more precisely, Religiöses Leben, and explore how it takes shape and
the different forms it has in human existence. This plan came to naught. But Ich
und Du, which was ready for the press in December 1922, still contains the signs
of this broader project: the word Religion is precisely defined when its meaning
in the text is differentiated from that of ordinary usage, formed through the pre-
dominant directions of the history of European culture.
There are passages in Ich und Du in which the term “religion” appears in in-
verted commas. These passages do not present the author’s concept of religion so
much as that of some modern philosophers (Buber seems to be thinking partic-
ularly of Schleiermacher’s On Religion and Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling,
though he does not mention them) or the common way of considering religion.
We find, for example, an appeal to the “religiöse Situation” of man in the third
part of the book: here Buber discusses the “antinomy” and “paradox” of
 On Buber’s education, cf. Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber’s Life and Work, (New York: Dut-
ton, 1981), vol. 1: “The Early Years 1878– 1923.”Georg Simmel expounds his thought on the rela-
tion between the “life” and the “forms” in “Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur,” in Simmel,
Philosophische Kultur. Gesammelte Essais (Leipzig: A. Kroner, 1911), 245–277.
 Rivka Horwitz, Buber’s Way to “I and Thou”: An Historical Analysis and the First Publication of
Martin Buber’s Lectures “Religion als Gegenwart” (Heidelberg: Lothar Stiem, 1978). About Buber’s
path towards Ich und Du, cf. also Paul Mendes-Flohr, Von der Mystik zum Dialog. Martin Bubers
geistige Entwicklung bis hin zu “Ich und Du” (Königstein i.T.: Jüdischer Verlag, 1979).
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human existence that is both in time and in the eternal, in the finite and in the
infinite, in necessity and in freedom, and cannot escape these contrasting real-
ities, although one may try to reconcile them in thought.⁷ Or we find an appeal to
the “religiöser Mensch” when he recalls how religion is beyond the pure ethical
moment, in a sphere in which man is alone before God in silence and detached
from the world.⁸ In other passages, however, it is the author himself who offers
his meditation on Religion (this time without inverted commas) starting from the
very event to which the Religionen allude and whose deeper sense he is seeking.
In the final pages of Ich und Du Buber writes:
Das ewigeDukann seinemWesennachnicht zumEswerden;weil es seinemWesennachnicht in
Mass und Grenze, auch nicht in dasMass des Unermesslichen und die Grenze des Unbegrenzten
gesetzt werden kann. […] Und dochmachenwir das ewige Du immer wieder zumEs, zum Etwas,
machen Gott zum Ding – unserem Wesen nach. Nicht aus Willkür. […] Das ausgesagte Wissen
und das gesetzte tun der Religionen –woher kommen sie? […] Die Erklärung hat zwei Schichten.
Die äussere, psychische erkennen wir, wenn wir den Menschen für sich, von der Geschichte
abgelöst betrachten;die innere, faktische,dasUrphänomenderReligion,wennwir ihn sodann in
die Geschichte wiedereinstellen. Beide gehören zusammen.⁹
The eternal Thou cannot by its very nature become It; for by virtue of its nature it cannot be
established in measure and bounds, not even in the measure of the immeasurable, or the
bounds of boundless being. […] And yet in accordance with our nature we are continually mak-
ing the eternal Thou into It, into some thing – making God into a thing. Not indeed out of ar-
bitrary self-will. […] What is the origin of the expressed knowledge and ordered action of the
religions? […] The explanation has two layers. We understand the outer psychical layer when
we consider man in himself, separated from history, and the inner factual layer, the primal phe-
nomenon of religion, when we replace him in history. These two layers belong together.¹⁰
Religion is constituted by continuous alternation of the relation between man
and the eternal Thou and the human expression of that relation as an It: this lat-
ter It-expression necessarily grows out of the primal relation to the Eternal Thou,
although it is unfaithful to the essence of religion and to our religious life. Reli-
gion refers to the human being who is both an individual, whose soul is before
God, and a member of a community, which finds itself in a particular space and
time. Thus religion embraces within itself both the relation between the I and the
 Martin Buber, Ich und Du, in Buber, Werke (München-Heidelberg: Kösel Verlag, 1962), vol. 1:
142–43. Cf. Soeren Kierkegaard, Frygt og Baeven [Fear and Trembling], 1843.
 Martin Buber, Ich und Du, 151. Cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Ueber Religion. Reden an die Ge-
bildeten unter ihren Verächtern [On Religion. Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers], 1799.
 Martin Buber, Ich und Du, 154f.
 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1958), 112f.
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eternal Thou, and the I-Thou relation that takes place in the world and in history.
Buber writes, completing his thought on religion as an elementary, primitive,
spontaneous phenomenon of human life:
In Wahrheit […] kann die reine Beziehung zu raumzeitlicher Stetigkeit nur auferbaut werden,
indem sie sich an der ganzen Materie des Lebens verleiblicht. Sie kann nicht bewahrt, nur be-
währt, sie kann nur getan, nur in das Leben eingetanwerden. […] Die echte Bürgschaft der Dauer
besteht darin, dass die reine Beziehung erfüllt werden kann im Du-werden der Wesen, in ihrer
Erhebung zumDu, dass das heilige Grundwort sich in allen austönt. […] Und so besteht die echte
Bürgschaft der Raumstetigkeit darin, dass die Beziehungen der Menschen zu ihremwahren Du,
die Radien, die von all den Ichpunkten zur Mitte ausgehn, einen Kreis schaffen. Nicht die Pe-
ripherie, nicht die Gemeinschaft ist das erste, sondern die Radien, die Gemeinsamkeit der Be-
ziehung zur Mitte. Sie allein gewährleistet den echten Bestand der Gemeinde.¹¹
Actually […] pure relation can only be raised to constancy in space and time by being em-
bodied in the whole stuff of life. It cannot be preserved, but only proved true, only done,
only done up into life. […] The authentic assurance of constancy in space consists in the
fact that pure relation can be fulfilled in the growth and rise of beings into Thou, the
holy primary word makes itself heard in them all. […] Thus, too, the authentic assurance
of constancy in space consists in the fact that men’s relations with their true Thou, the ra-
dial lines that come from all the points of the I to the Centre, form a circle. It is not the pe-
riphery, the community, that comes first, but the radii, the common quality of relation with
the Centre. This alone guarantees the authentic existence of the community.¹²
In this way religio in Ich und Du appears as what really characterizes man: it is
not a special sphere of life, but indicates the highest moment of life, that which
allows all the other moments to take on meaning too. The I-Thou Beziehung (re-
lation) is manifest in religion: and this concerns both the I-Thou relations of
human beings with each other and with other vital finite beings, and the rela-
tions between the I’s and the eternal Thou – the former event not being separa-
ble from the latter. Objectivity – the world of It – presupposes the kingdom of
living, animated subjectivities because these alone are the knowing I’s, and
therefore give continuity to time and structure to space: what unites the subjec-
tivities is not the Logos, but what Buber defines as “love” (Liebe) – not “senti-
ment” (Gefühl), but “reality” (Wirklichkeit) – or as “spirit” (Geist). But “spirit”
as it allows the “between” (Zwischen) to be established is not a mediating ele-
ment that can be hypostatized or substantiated: “spirit” is effective only in its
unifying function of different beings; it is a force that is not an independent
being. Buber replaces the God or the All of Spinoza and his followers with a
God who does not deny human freedom: initially freedom is obtained in the re-
 Ich und Du, 156.
 I and Thou, 114f.
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lation with the eternal Thou, as knowledge and love of Him, and then it is also
manifest in free choice of individuals to pursue this relation. So human beings
become what they are only through religion.
Subsequent to Ich und Du, in Eclipse of God, published in 1952,¹³ Buber
would reflect anew on religion as that primary dimension of human existence,
which modern civilisation risks forgetting because it recognizes and gives impor-
tance only to the world of It: the religious dimension of existence needs to be
urgently rediscovered in its authentic and original form, still present beneath
the institutions created by religions, in society, in the world of economic rela-
tions, and in politics. This can be the only way to individual and collective re-
demption – to be found in both human resolve and divine grace. In his writings
about religio, Buber thus embarked on a radically new path compared with those
philosophers of religion who continued to follow the path forged in the history of
European philosophical and theological thought.
Accessing Religion: The meditation on the
biblical and philosophical texts in Buber’s
writings of the nineteen forties and fifties
But how, according to Buber, could there be a transition from a human condition
now almost incapable of entering into a relation with God as the eternal Thou
and with the other finite Thou’s, to a human condition in which this relation
will again take place in all aspects of life and in all its intensity? In some of
his writings published in the 1940s and 1950s he indicates two paths that
might allow man to become aware of religion as the realm of true, authentic
human existence. In Das Problem des Menschen¹⁴ he meditates on philosophy
– a philosophy, however, that is not separated from the philosopher’s subjectiv-
ity, that unifies the individual and the universal, and that bears in mind man’s
concrete, everyday existence, and the multiplicity of his rational and non-ration-
al experiences. In this book Buber identifies the foundations of this kind of phi-
losophy in Plato, Kant and Husserl. Pondering these philosophers’ anthropolog-
ical insights regarding the overarching question “What is Man?”, we are made
aware of man’s simultaneous social essence and infinity, in spite of his living
 Martin Buber, Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy (New
York: Harper & Row, 1952).
 Martin Buber, Das Problem des Menschen (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1947).
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in the world bounded by time and space: religion and a religious life, as under-
stood by Buber, could be renewed if we attune ourselves to the insights of these
philosophers who, in the history of philosophical thought, point out the anteri-
ority and superiority of ethical life – which allows human beings to arrive at the
Absolute – with respect to theoretical knowledge and science. In Zwei Glaubens-
weisen¹⁵ Buber appeals to the conception of faith informing both in the Old and
the New Testament as a way to understand what religion truly is: faith is chiefly
emuna (trust) for the Jewish people, that is to say it includes the elements of
God’s promises and commandments, the people’s love of God, and the relation-
ship between God and the people founded on a covenant; faith is above all pistis
(knowledge) for the Christian community which affirms the truth manifest in
Jesus Christ’s Incarnation, Passion and Resurrection; however, both the Jewish
people as the foundation or root, and the Christian community as the outgrowth
or tree, share an attitude which allows them to attain a genuine religious life.
Therefore, an attentive reading of their history, as narrated in Scripture, promises
to point to a way out of the solitude and egotism in which human beings find
themselves in contemporary society beholden, as it is, to secular philosophy
and culture.
It is possible that Buber’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy in Das Prob-
lem des Menschen was significantly influenced by Hans Jonas’s interpretation of
Husserlian phenomenology in his commemorative article on Husserl’s death.¹⁶
Shortly after Buber settled in Jerusalem in March 1938, Jonas delivered a com-
memorative address at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in which he charac-
terized Husserl’s phenomenological method as underlining the role of the Ego in
the constitution of being and as an agent of Reason’s self-responsibility. Reason
is, for Husserl, not an abstract faculty of producing ideas, but originates in the
human heart, belongs to every individual, and embraces in itself the various
ways of giving form to objects. Husserl, for Jonas, marks the consummation of
a philosophical tradition which begins with Parmenides and Plato and continues
with Descartes, Kant, Hegel; he is the most radical and rigorous thinker in this
tradition because of his obedience to the ethical imperative of uninterrupted self-
justification. Hence the originality and novelty of his teachings.
It is possible that Buber’s interpretation of Jewish and Christian faith draws
significantly on the conception of the dialectical relationship between Judaism
and Christianity – “the fire and the rays” – that Rosenzweig expounded in Der
 Martin Buber, Zwei Glaubensweisen (Zürich: Manesse, 1950).
 Hans Jonas, “Edmund Husserl and the Ontological Problem,” Moznaim, 1938, VII, pp. 581–
89 (Hebrew).
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Stern der Erlösung (1921).¹⁷ We know from Jonas himself that Buber was in close
contact with him from 1938 onwards;¹⁸ and Buber himself, in his biblical exege-
sis in Zwei Glaubensweisen, which takes up the main themes he had developed
together with Rosenzweig in their joint reflection on the translation of the He-
brew Bible into German,¹⁹ demonstrates an intimate knowledge of Rosenzweig’s
concept of the similarity-difference between Christianity and Judaism, presented
in his magnum opus.²⁰
Nevertheless, beyond Buber’s relation with other Jewish philosophers, what is
particularly important is to emphasize that regardless whether he appeals to philos-
ophy or to biblical faith as paths which can give new life to religion, he never sep-
arates affective life from thought: true philosophers and true believers are engaged
in reality with their total being. Religio itself involves receiving in love, feeling active-
ly, and thinking. But, all in all, for Buber access to religion does not depend so
much on the reading of books, however important and meaningful these can be.
Life is much more instructive than books.²¹ In order to reclaim religion as the
ground of true existence, we must make an effort to work, to speak, to be in
touch with other human beings in the name of the divine Thou, even if contempo-
rary social conditions, given the primacy of the I-It relations, renders this effort dif-
ficult. Only the event of the “between” (Zwischen) can preserve our humanity. In-
deed, for Buber homo religiosus coincides with homo tout court.
 Cf. Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung (1921), part 3. Rosenzweig writes in a letter of
January 4, 1922 to his wife Edith that he knows that Buber read the Stern, but was not as inter-
ested in the second part, dealing with the relationship between man and God, as one might ex-
pect. Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften (Haag/Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976–
84), vol. 1.2. From Rosenzweig’s letter to Eugen Rosenstock, letter dated August 28, 1924, ibid.,we
learn that Buber was interested in the third part.
 Cf. Hans Jonas, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt a. M.: Insel, 2003), 441–42.
 Cf. Martin Buber – Franz Rosenzweig, Die Schrift und ihre Verdeutschung (Berlin, 1936). Buber
refers to this book when in Zwei Glaubensweisen he deals with the key words (Motiv-Worte) in
the Bible, its ethical teachings, its representation of idolatry, and its concept of “spirit” (ruach).
 Like Rosenzweig in Der Stern der Erlösung, part 3, Buber regards the center of Christianity to be
the faith in Jesus Christ, which he deems essential to Christian evangelical mission,which implicitly
posits that space and time are unredeemed, if not conquered by eternity. Buber attributes this con-
ception of Christianity to Paul and promoting a species of Gnosticism. He further argues that the
relation between the Jewish concept of divine love and the Greek concept of Logos in John’s Gospel
prepares the way to the negation of God’s transcendence, the source of the neo-Gnosticism that af-
flicts the modern world. Cf. particularly, Zwei Glaubensweisen, preface, chapters 4, 13–16.
 Cf. Martin Buber, Autobiographische Fragmente, Anhang: III. Bücher und Menschen, inMartin
Buber, ed. Paul A. Schilpp and Maurice Friedman (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), 32–33.
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Karl-Josef Kuschel
Martin Buber und das Christentum
Er gilt als der Dialogiker schlechthin, praktisch und theoretisch. Das dialogische
Prinzip, so einer seiner Buch-Titel – es ist „sein“ Prinzip, mit seinem Namen un-
verwechselbar verbunden. Mehr als andere Denker des 20. Jahrhunderts hat er
„Dialog“ geübt und theoretisch durchdacht, er, der jüdische Gelehrte, der – bei
allen Anregungen von außen – aus nichts anderem denn aus den Quellen des
Judentums heraus denken und glauben wollte. Was verstand er unter „Dialog“?
Wie praktizierte er ihn in einerWelt, die für ihn, in Wien geboren, nun einmal vom
Christentum geprägt ist? Viele haben ein harmonisierendes Bild von Bubers Be-
ziehung zumChristentum imKopf. Man erinnert sich gerne an ein Buber-Wort über
Jesus, den er, Buber, stets als seinen „großen Bruder“ empfunden habe, ein Wort,
das umso schwerer zu wiegen scheint, als es 1950, nach der Shoa, geschrieben
steht und zwar in seinem zusammenfassenden Werk Zwei Glaubensweisen. Aber
Harmonie ist damit nicht gemeint.ÜberblicktmanBubers ganzeGeschichte, erlebt
man einenMann, der sich auch entschieden abzugrenzenversteht von christlichen
Bekenntnissen und deutsch-christlichen Zumutungen. Die Bekenntnisse betreffen
Glaubensdifferenzen zwischen Juden und Christen, die Zumutungen Zugriffe auf
die gesellschaftliche Stellung von Juden in der deutsch-christlichen Mehrheits-
gesellschaft. Von beidem muss die Rede sein. Das eine ist vom anderen nicht zu
trennen. Und wir müssen zuerst den Kämpfer Buber kennen lernen, der für eine
eigenständige und authentische jüdische Identität streitet, bevor wir den Dialo-
giker wahrnehmen können.¹
„Fremdandacht“:
Prägende frühe Erfahrungen mit Christen
Wie hat alles angefangen? Buberwird 1878 inWien geboren,wächst aber ab demAter
von 4 Jahren – die Eltern hatten sich getrennt – bei seinen Großeltern im galizischen
Lemberg auf. Heute heißt der Ort Lwiw und ist in der Ukraine gelegen. Ein provi-
dentielles Ereignis nicht nur in biographischer, sondern auch in geistiger Hinsicht.
Großvater Salomon Buber ist nicht nur ein erfolgreicher Kaufmann, sondern als
 Das hier in aller Knappheit behandelte Thema findet seine ausführliche Entfaltung bei: Karl-
Josef Kuschel, Martin Buber - seine Herausforderung an das Christentum, Gütersloh: Gütersloher
Verlagshaus 2015.
Privatgelehrter einer der wichtigsten Forscher und Sammler auf dem Gebiet der
chassidischen Tradition des osteuropäischen Judentums. Sein Enkel Martin wird
dieser Tradition wie kein anderer Anerkennung im Westen verschaffen.
Über Bubers Schulzeit in Lemberg wissen wir wenig. Umso kostbarer ein Do-
kument, das Buber 1960, fünf Jahre vor seinem Tod, selber preisgibt. Der damals 82-
Jährige legt „autobiographische Fragmente“ vor, darunter einen Text unter dem Titel
„Die Schule“. Ein bemerkenswertes Signal nach einem ereignisreichen Leben und
jahrzehntelangen Bemühungen um einen Dialogmit Christen. Der Altgewordene will
offenbar der Öffentlichkeit noch einmal signalisieren, wo er herkommt und welche
Erstbegegnung mit der christlichen Welt sein Leben geprägt hat.
Die Szene spielt im Kaiser-Franz-Joseph-Gymnasium zu Lemberg, das Buber in
den Jahren 1888 bis 1896 besucht. Die Unterrichtssprache ist Polnisch, sind doch
die Mitschüler zum größten Teil Polen katholischer Konfession. Juden sind nur als
kleine Minderheit präsent. Persönlich kommen die Schüler gut miteinander aus,
aber beide Gemeinschaften wissen – so Buber – „fast nichts voneinander.“
Vor 8 Uhr morgens mussten alle Schüler versammelt sein. Um 8 Uhr ertönte das Klingel-
zeichen; einer der Lehrer trat ein und bestieg das Katheder, über dem an der Wand sich ein
großes Kruzifix erhob. Im selben Augenblick standen alle Schüler in ihren Bänken auf. Der
Lehrer und die polnischen Schüler bekreuzigten sich, er sprach die Dreifaltigkeitsformel und
sie sprachen sie ihm nach, dann beteten sie laut mitsammen. Bis man sich wieder setzen
durfte, standen wir Juden unbeweglich da, die Augen gesenkt.
Ich habe schon angedeutet, dass es in unserer Schule keinen spürbaren Judenhass gab;
ich kann mich kaum an einen Lehrer erinnern, der nicht tolerant war oder doch als tolerant
geltenwollte. Aber auf michwirkte das pflichtmäßige tägliche Stehen im tönenden Raum der
Fremdandacht schlimmer, als ein Akt der Unduldsamkeit hätte wirken können. Gezwungene
Gäste; als Ding teilnehmen müssen an einem sakralen Vorgang, an dem kein Quentchen
meiner Person teilnehmen konnte und wollte; und dies acht Jahre lang Morgen um Morgen:
das hat sich der Lebenssubstanz des Knaben eingeprägt.
Es ist nie ein Versuch unternommen worden, einen von uns jüdischen Schülern zu be-
kehren; und doch wurzelt in den Erfahrungen jener Zeit mein Widerwille gegen alle Mission.
Nicht bloß etwa gegen die christliche Judenmission, sondern gegen alles Missionieren unter
Menschen,die einen eigenständigenGlaubenhaben.VergebenshatnochFranzRosenzweigmich
für den Gedanken einer jüdischen Mission unter Nichtjuden zu gewinnen gesucht.²
Eine kleine Szene zwar, aber sie ist von geradezu obsessiver Mächtigkeit. Hier sich
bekreuzigende katholisch-polnische Schüler; hier christliche Gebete mit der
Dreifaltigkeitsformel, laut gesprochen, und ein übermächtig-großes Kruzifix,
welches das Katheder des Lehrers ins geradezu Metaphysische steigert – und dort
 Martin Buber,Begegnung. Autobiographische Fragmente (Heidelberg:Verlag Lambert Schneider,
1978), 20 f.
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die jüdischen Schüler: stumm, unbeweglich, die Augen gesenkt. Szenisch-sym-
bolisch-körperlich kann Ausgrenzung kaum intensiver, kaum bitterer erfahren
werden. Es braucht in der Tat die direkte Diskriminierung nicht, keinen „spür-
baren Judenhass,“ keine „Akte der Unduldsamkeit“, um Erfahrungen mit der Welt
des Christlichen traumatisch werden zu lassen. Juden sind unter Christen „ge-
zwungene Gäste.“Die jüdischen Schülermüssen einem religiösenAkt beiwohnen,
ohne mit einem „Quentchen“ ihrer Person teilnehmen zu können. Denn ihre
Anwesenheit wird kalt ignoriert, als gäbe es sie nicht.
Acht Jahre lang erlebt Buber diese Szene, Morgen für Morgen, für die er das
Wort „Fremdandacht“ prägt. Eine bemerkenswerte Wortschöpfung. Sie bringt die
Entfremdungsgeschichte zwischen Juden und Christen „vor Gott“ plastisch ins
Bild. Bubers Verhältnis zum Komplex „Christentum“ als soziokultureller Größe ist
mit dieser Erfahrung ein für allemal vorgeprägt. Sie hat sich in die „Lebenssub-
stanz“ des Knaben ebenso eingeprägt wie der Widerwille „gegen die christliche
Judenmission,“ ja „gegen alles Missionieren unter Menschen“ überhaupt, „die
einen eigenständigen Glauben haben.“ Kein Zufall somit, dass der alt gewordene
Martin Buber diese Szene ganz bewusst noch einmal der bleibenden Erinnerung
überliefert. Und man versteht von daher auch das Zeugnis eines polnischen
Mitschülers von Buber aus den Lemberger Jahren besser, von Witold O., der 1962
auf die Zusendung der „Autobiographischen Fragmente“ Bubers in einem Brief
festhält: „Das Christentum, in dem ich so tief verwurzelt war, Dir war es verhasst.
Wie gut erinnere ich mich noch an Deinen Ausspruch: Schade um die schönen
Glockenklänge für diese christliche Religion!“³
„Jüdische Renaissance“:
Konsequenzen für das Bild vom Christentum
Für die Jahre vor dem ErstenWeltkrieg zeichnen sich zwei gegenläufige Bewegungen
in Bubers Entwicklung ab. Zum einen eignet er sich vor allem durch Universitäts-
studien in europäischen Zentren wie Wien, Leipzig, Zürich und Berlin ein breites
Wissen der europäisch-christlich geprägten Geistes- und Kulturgeschichte an, na-
mentlich in Philosophie, Geschichte, Psychologie und Kunstgeschichte. Den „auto-
biographischen Fragmenten“ zufolge haben auf Buber vor allem Immanuel Kants
„Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigenMetaphysik“ sowie FriedrichNietzsches „Also
sprach Zarathustra“ nachhaltigen Eindruck gemacht. Insbesondere die Nietzsche-
 Martin Buber, Briefwechsel aus sieben Jahrzehnten, hrsg. v. G. Schaeder (Heidelberg: Verlag
Lambert Schneider, 1975), III: 551.
Martin Buber und das Christentum 115
Lektüre „bemächtigt“ sich seiner derart, dass Buber sich entschließt, den „Zara-
thustra“ ins Polnische zu übersetzen, ein Plan, der über Anfänge nicht hinauskommt
und schließlich fallen gelassenwird. Bezeichnend auch:Unter dem Stichwort „Wien“
gibt es in den „Autobiographischen Fragmenten“ Fingerzeige vor allem auf das
„Burgtheater“: auf die Welt der hier zu findenden Dramen, des „‚richtig‘ gespro-
chenenMenschenworts“, „der Fiktion aus Fiktion.“All dies schlägt den jungenBuber
in seinen Bann.
Sichtbarer Ausdruck dieser frühen Auseinandersetzung mit der europäisch-
christlich geprägten Kultur ist Bubers 1904 an der Universität Wien in den Fächern
Philosophie und Kunstgeschichte abgelegte Promotion. Die eingereichte Dissertation
über zwei christliche Denker (Nikolaus von Kues und Jakob Böhme) trägt den Titel:
„Beiträge zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems.“Vor allem aber seine seit 1904
erfolgenden Studien zur Geschichte der Mystik zeigen, wie breit Buber in dieser Zeit
kultur- und religionsgeschichtlich orientiert ist. Das findet seinen besonderen Aus-
druck in zwei Publikationen. 1909 erscheint eine Sammlung mystischer Texte unter
dem Titel Ekstatische Konfessionen.Überraschend hat Buber hier nicht nur Zeugnisse
klassischer europäisch-christlicher Mystik vom 12. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert aufge-
nommen, sondern auch Texte aus der Welt Indiens, Chinas und des Orients. Mehr
noch: 1910 erscheint eine Sammlung von Reden und Gleichnissen des taoistischen
Klassikers Tschuang-Tse (ca. 370–ca. 300 v.Chr.). Buber präsentiert sie nicht aus dem
chinesischen Original, entnimmt sie vielmehr einer englischen Ausgabe. Seine als
Nachwort demBuchmitgegebene Abhandlung „Die Lehre vom Tao“ allerdings ist ein
Meilenstein deutschsprachiger Taoismus-Rezeption.⁴
Zum anderen setzt bei Buber gleichzeitig vor dem ersten Weltkrieg eine neue
Hinwendung zum Judentum ein. In der Zwischenzeit hatte der Wiener Publizist
Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) seine programmatische Schrift Der Judenstaat (1896)
erscheinen lassen und damit der Bewegung des Zionismus gewaltigen Auftrieb
gegeben. Buber schließt sich bereits als Student in Leipzig 1898/99 der Bewegung
des Zionismus an, ohne sich aber völlig mit dessen politischen Zielen zu identi-
fizieren. Angesichts vielfacher geistiger Auszehrung jüdischer Identität liegt sein
Schwerpunkt auf einer kulturellen Erneuerung. Die geistigen und ethischenWerte
des jüdischen Volkes gilt es zu revitalisieren. Zionismus als Bewegung zur Ge-
winnung einer jüdischen Identität ja, aber Kulturzionismus, das ist Bubers
Schwerpunkt von Anfang an. Dabei ist Buber nicht gegen die Schaffung einer
Heimstadt des jüdischen Volkes in Palästina, worauf dem politischen Zionismus
alles ankommt. Aber wenn schon soll dessen Ausstrahlung eine Renaissance des
 Martin Buber,Werke (Heidelberg/München:Verlag Lambert Schneider und Kösel-Verlag, 1962),
Bd. 1 (Schriften zur Philosophie), 1021– 1051.
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jüdischen Geistes in der Diaspora befördern. Kulturzionismus geht es um „Ge-
genwartsarbeit“: um die Stärkung des jüdischen Gemeinschaftsbewusstseins und
die Förderung einer eigenständigen kulturellen Identität in Deutschland.
Der Anschluss an die zionistische Bewegung kommt für Buber einer „Be-
freiung“ gleich, der Befreiung aus einem wurzellosen europäischen Intellektua-
lismus, der über alles reden kannund sich an nichts bindet. Buber selber spricht in
der Rückschau⁵ von einer „Wiederherstellung des Zusammenhangs,“ von einer
„erneuten Einwurzelung in die Gemeinschaft,“ von einer „rettenden Verbindung
mit einem Volkstum.“ Keiner bedürfe all dessen so sehr, „wie der vom geistigen
Suchen ergriffene, vom Intellekt in die Lüfte entführte Jüngling; unter den Jüng-
lingen dieser Art und dieses Schicksals aber keiner so sehr wie der jüdische.“⁶ In
der Tat ist insbesondere der Chassidismus eine der großen Entdeckungen Bubers
im Prozess kulturzionistischer Erneuerung: eine mystisch-charismatische Fröm-
migkeitsbewegung im osteuropäischen Judentum seit dem 18. Jahrhundert. Hier
glaubt er, die noch unverbrauchte geistige Kraft des Judentums gefunden zu ha-
ben. „Urjüdisches,“wie ermeinte, sei ihm in den Texten der chassidischenMeister
aufgegangen, Urjüdisches, das „im Dunkel des Exils zu neubewusster Äußerung
aufgeblüht“ sei: die „Gottesebenbildlichkeit desMenschen als Tat, alsWerden, als
Aufgabe gefasst.“ „Urjüdisches,“ das für Buber zugleich „Urmenschliches“ ist,
„der Gehalt menschlichster Religiosität“ schlechthin.⁷ 1906 beginnt Buber mit
einer ersten Publikation chassidischer Texte:Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman,
gefolgt 1908 von Die Legende des Baalschem.Und mit diesen Texten „im Rücken“
geht Buber nun auch in die Auseinandersetzungmit dem Komplex „Christentum.“
Sie haben sein Selbstbewusstsein als genuin jüdischerDenker in besondererWeise
gestärkt.
Erster Höhepunkt einer durch Buber nun programmatisch vollzogenen Jüdi-
schen Renaissance sind die drei in Prag 1909 und 1910 gehaltenen „Reden über das
Judentum.“⁸ Und wir registrieren: Die geistige Neubestimmung des Judentums ist
bei Buber zugleich eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Ursprüngen des Christentums.
Erstmals greifen wir in diesen Reden programmatische Äußerungen zum Ur-
christentum und zur Gestalt Jesu und zwar in scharfer Abgrenzung zu dem, was
Buber schon hier und künftig pauschal „das Christentum“ nennt. Er versteht
 Martin Buber, „Mein Weg zum Chassidismus“ (1917), in: Buber, Werke (Heidelberg /München:
Verlag Lambert Schneider und Kösel-Verlag, 1963), Bd. III (Schriften zumChassidismus), 959–973.
 Matin Buber, Werke III: 966.
 Buber, „Mein Weg zum Chassidismus“, 967 f.
 Martin Buber, „Drei Reden über das Judentum“, in: Martin Buber, Frühe jüdische Schriften
1900– 1922, hrsg., eingeleitet und kommentiert von Barbara Schäfer.Martin Buber Werkausgabe 3
(Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 2007), 219–256.
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darunter einen von jüdischen Wurzelboden abgelösten, unter den Bedingungen
der hellenistisch-römischen Kultur gewachsenen geschichtlichen Komplex. „Ur-
Christentum“ und die Gestalt Jesu aber werden von Buber jetzt und künftig aus-
schließlich von ihren jüdischen Voraussetzungen her verstanden. Ur-Christentum
müsse eigentlich „Ur-Judentum“ heißen, erklärt Buber in seiner dritten Prager
Rede, denn es habe „mit dem Judentum weit mehr als mit dem zu schaffen, was
man heute als Christentum“ bezeichne.⁹ Buber spitzt seine mittlerweile gewon-
nenen Einsichten in dieser Rede so zu:
Was an den Anfängen des Christentums nicht eklektisch, was daran schöpferisch war, das
war ganz und gar nichts anderes als Judentum. Es war jüdisches Land, in dem diese Geis-
tesrevolution entbrannte; eswaren uralte jüdische Lebensgemeinschaften, aus deren Schoße
sie erwacht war; es waren jüdische Männer, die sie ins Land trugen; die, zu denen sie
sprachen, waren – wie immer wieder verkündet wird – das jüdische Volk und kein anderes;
und was sie verkündeten, war nichts anderes als die Erneuerung der Religiosität der Tat im
Judentum. Erst im synkretistischen Christentum des Abendlandes ist der dem Okzidentalen
vertraute Glaube zur Hauptsache geworden; im Mittelpunkt des Urchristentums steht die Tat
[…] Und können wir nicht denen, die uns neuerdings eine ‚Fühlungnahme’ mit dem Chris-
tentum anempfehlen, antworten: Was am Christentum schöpferisch ist, ist nicht Christen-
tum, sondern Judentum,und damit brauchenwir nicht Fühlung zu nehmen, brauchen es nur
in uns zu erkennen und in Besitz zu nehmen, dennwir tragen es unverlierbar in uns;was aber
am Christentum nicht Judentum ist, das ist unschöpferisch, aus tausend Riten und Dogmen
gemischt, – und damit – das sagen wir als Juden und als Menschen – wollen wir nicht
Fühlung nehmen. Freilich dürfen wir dies nur antworten, wenn wir den abergläubischen
Schrecken, den wir vor der nazarenischen Bewegung hegen, überwinden und sie dahin
einstellen, wohin sie gehört: in die Geistesgeschichte des Judentums.¹⁰
„Abergläubischer Schrecken vor der nazarenischen Bewegung“! „Nicht Fühlung
nehmen“! Die Sprache ist kämpferisch. Der frühe Buber setzt sie gezielt ein, und
ihre psychologische Funktion ist offensichtlich.Vergessen wir nicht: Adressat der
Reden ist ein jüdisches Publikum im Prozess des Ringens um eine eigene Identität.
Wer wie Buber „Schrecken“ beschwört, weiß um die Angst von Minderheitskul-
turen in Mehrheitsgesellschaften. Wer „das Christentum“ zur „nazarenischen
Bewegung“ verkleinert, auf einen unschöpferischen, weil angeblich synkretisti-
schen Mix aus „tausend Riten und Dogmen“ reduziert und in seinen Ursprüngen
„in die Geistesgeschichte des Judentums“ verweist, der tut das, weil das Gegen-
über von geschichtlicher Übermächtigkeit ist.
 Ebd., 247.
 Ebd., 247, 248f.
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Bubers Bild von Jesus
Bubers Jesus-Bild muss vor dem Hintergrund dieser kulturgeschichtlich folgen-
reichen Entwicklung gesehen werden. Schon 1914 formuliert er Einsichten und
Überzeugungen¹¹, an denen er – bei allenWandlungen in Ton und Stil – der Sache
nach auch künftig festhalten wird:
(1) Das Urchristentum ist eine radikaljüdische Bewegung. Sie ist Buber
wichtig, nicht weil, sondern obwohl sie im Christentum mündete, in einem
Christentum, in dem „alle jüdischen Elemente nicht entfaltet, sondern entstellt“
worden seien.
(2) Zuunterscheiden ist zwischen Jesus als glaubendemMenschen, als Subjekt
seiner eigenen Religiosität, und Jesus als Objekt von Religiosität, als „Gegen-
stand“ des Glaubens. Jesu Religiosität ist für Buber tief geprägt vom Judentum
seiner Zeit, so wie die des Sokrates vom Griechentum und die des Buddha vom
Indertum. Insofern ist sie Juden tief vertraut. Die „Objektivierung“ Jesu als
Glaubensinhalt und -gegenstand dagegen bezeichnet Buber schon 1914 als für
Juden als „auf immer unüberwindlich fern und fremd“. Das lässt sich auf die
Formel bringen: Ernstnehmen der Botschaft Jesus ja, ein Bekenntnis zu ihm als
jüdischem Messias (griechisch: der Christus) oder Sohn Gottes – nein. Eine
Christologie, sei sie paulinischer oder johanneischer Provenienz, bleibt Buber ein
für allemal „fern und fremd.“
(3) Die unüberwindliche Ferne und Fremdheit wird von Buber in dieser Zeit
unmittelbar vor dem ersten Weltkrieg mit geradezu militärischen Bildern zum
Ausdruck gebracht: kein „Frieden“, kein „Waffenstillstand“. Ein scharfer Ant-
agonismus kommt herein zwischen „reinen und ganzen Juden“ sowie der „welt-
beherrschenden christlichen Kirche.“ Ein Antagonismus, der dadurch entsteht,
dass Buber der Kirche die „Usurpation jüdischen Urbesitzes“ vorwirft. Mit dem
neu gewonnenen Selbstbewusstsein jüdischer Gläubigkeit hält er dem den
„ewigen Anspruch“ des Judentums entgegen, „die wahre Ekklesia, die Gemeinde
Gottes zu sein.“
 Martin Buber, „Eine Feststellung“ (1914), in: Buber, Schriften zum Christentum, hrsg., einge-
leitet und kommentiert von Karl-Josef Kuschel. Martin Buber Werkausgabe 9 (Güterslohr: Gü-
terslohrer Verlaghaus, 2011), 76.
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Deutschtum und Judentum – vereinbar?
Der „Fall Kittel“
Dieses demonstrative Selbstbewusstsein hat mit dem ständig neu geforderten
Legitimationsnachweis jüdischer Denker angesichts einer christlichen Mehr-
heitskultur zu tun. Es ist ein „Schrei“ nach Anerkennung, der freilich vielfach „ins
Leere“ geht,weil er von der Gegenseite überhört oder nicht ernst genommenwird.
Jüdische Denker sind immer wieder neu gezwungen – so Christian Wiese in einer
bedeutenden Untersuchung aus dem Jahre 1999 zu Recht – „gegen Vereinnah-
mung, missionarische Intentionen und exklusive Wahrheitsansprüche“ ihr eige-
nes zu setzen.“¹²
Mehr noch: Juden in Deutschland sind immer wieder neu lauernden Fragen
ausgesetzt, ob sie sich als Judenwirklich demdeutschen Staat vollgültig zugehörig
fühlen. Müssen Juden ihr Judentum nicht ablegen und sich zum Christentum
bekehren, um gleichberechtigte deutsche Bürger zu sein? Buber muss noch gegen
Ende des ersten Weltkriegs zu solchen Fragen Stellung nehmen – 100 Jahre Ju-
denemanzipation in Deutschland zum Trotz.¹³ Solch ständig lauerndes Miss-
trauen, solche Bekehrungserwartung und solcher Loyalitätsdruck machen die
Stellung von Juden in Deutschland nach wie vor prekär.
Wie prekär, zeigt spätestens das Jahr 1933. In diesem Schicksalsjahr
Deutschlands wird Buber durch einen protestantischen Theologen der Universität
Tübingen in eine offene Auseinandersetzung gezogen.¹⁴ Der Hintergrund: Der
Tübinger evangelische Neutestamentler Gerhard Kittel (1888–1948), als Mitbe-
gründer und Herausgeber eines großen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagenwerks
(Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Bd. I 1933) eine anerkannte
Autorität in seinem Fach, tritt im Juni 1933mit einer Broschüre unter dem Titel „Die
Judenfrage“ an die Öffentlichkeit. Gerade als christlicher Theologe fühlt er sich
berufen, in einer Frage der aktuellen deutschen Politik, in der „eine besonders
große Unsicherheit und Hilflosigkeit“ herrsche, Klarheit zu schaffen und Vor-
schläge zu unterbreiten, was mit „dem Judentum“ zu geschehen habe. Ein maß-
loses Ansinnen im Ungeist politischer Verblendung. Immerhin hatten die Nazis
und ihre Helfershelfer in Deutschland nach der „Machtergreifung“ Adolf Hitlers
Ende Januar 1933 bereits gegen jüdischeMitbürger zuwüten begonnen. Am 1. April
1933 war es erstmals zum Boykott jüdischer Geschäfte gekommen: ein erster,
 Christian Wiese, Wissenschaft des Judentums und protestantische Theologie in wilhelmini-
schen Deutschland. Ein Schrei ins Leere? (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 363.
 Martin Buber, „Der Preis“ (1917), in: Buber, Schriften zum Christentum, 77–83.
 Martin Buber, „Offener Brief an Gerhard Kittel“, in: Buber, Schriften zum Christentum, 169– 174.
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gezielter Akt öffentlichen Terrors gegen Mitbürger jüdischer Herkunft. Am 7. April
war das „Gesetz zurWiederherstellungdes Berufsbeamtentums“ erlassenworden,
und mit diesem Paragraphenwerk, das den berühmt-berüchtigten „Arierpara-
graphen“ enthält (Juden sind vom aktiven Staatsdienst ausgeschlossen) hatte die
systematische rechtliche Diskriminierung für Juden in Deutschland begonnen.
Welche Art von „Klarheit“ will Gerhard Kittel schaffen, um klarzustellen, was mit
„dem“ Judentum zu geschehen habe?
Gleich zu Beginn seiner Einleitung zählt dieser „christliche“ Theologe in
kältester Bürokratenprosa vier Optionen auf, wie man mit „dem Judentum“ ver-
fahren könne:
1) Man kann die Juden auszurotten versuchen (Pogrome);
2) man kann den jüdischen Staat in Palästina oder anderswo wiederherstellen
und dort die Juden der Welt zu sammeln versuchen (Zionismus);
3) man kann das Judentum in den anderen Völkern aufgehen lassen (Assimi-
lation);
4) man kann entschlossen und bewusst die geschichtliche Gegebenheit einer
‚Fremdlingschaft‘ unter den Völkern wahren¹⁵,
Kittel argumentiert nun messerscharf und eiskalt für die vierte Option. Die ersten
beiden hält er für politisch aussichtslos, die dritte für selbstwidersprüchlich; sie
liefe auf eine Selbstaufgabe des Judentums hinaus. Die vierte Option dagegen hält
Kittel für sachgemäß,weil sie dem Status entspreche, den Gott dem jüdischen Volk
von jeher auferlegt habe. Das Judentum brauche als Religion (auf der Basis seines
Religionsgesetzes) einen Sonderstatus innerhalb der Völkerwelt, meint Kittel. Es
müsse sich abgrenzen und habe von daher notwendigerweise einen Fremdlings-
status. Rechtliche Gleichstellung im bürgerlichen Sinn könne von daher nicht in
Frage kommen. Judentum in der Völkerwelt könne es nur als „Gastjudentum“
geben, und dies angeblich nach dem Selbstverständnis des Judentums selber:
Dagegen hat das echte, fromme Judentum selbst zu allen Zeiten die klare Erkenntnis fest-
gehalten, welcher Fluch die Assimilation ist. Eines der Grundgesetze, dass die alttesta-
mentlichen Propheten nicht müde werden zu verkündigen, ist dieses: dass Vermischung mit
den anderen Völkern die schwerste Sünde für Israel sei. Das Alte Testament bestraft diese
Sünde mit Ausrottung. Dieser Kampf um die Reinheit Israels durchzieht das gesamte Alte
Testament von der Zeit desMose bis zur Zeit nach demExil. Der Bestand des Ghetto durch die
Jahrhunderte hin war ja nicht nur durch den Zwang von außen gewährleistet, sondern auch
durch den Willen von innen. Der fromme alte Ostjude verflucht noch heute seinen Sohn,
wenn dieser in die Assimilation und in das Konnubium mit der Nichtjüdin geht. Das echte
Judentum wusste zu allen Zeiten und weiß es auch heute noch: Volksvermischung und
 Gerhard Kittel, Die Judenfrage (Stuttgart,W. Kohlhammer, 1933), 13.
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Rassenvermischungheißt: sich selbst verlieren, heißt: Dekadenz.Assimilisation ist Sünde und
Übertretung eines von Gott in Volk und Völker gesetzten Willens.¹⁶
Undweil dies für Kittel das Verständnis des Judentums selber ist, kann es deutsche
Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens nicht geben. Der Jude, eben weil er Gast sei,
müsse auf „jeden maßgebenden Einfluss verzichten,“ und zwar „in den Dingen,
die deutsches Staats- und Volksleben, deutsche Kultur und deutsche Geistesbil-
dung“ beträfen.¹⁷ Das gelte auch für die deutsche Literatur. Kittel wörtlich:
„Ebenso muss gelten, dass der Angehörige des fremden Volkes in der deutschen
Literatur nichts zu suchen hat.“¹⁸
Vorgetragen war dies alles mit der Autorität eines christlichen Exegeten, der
das Judentum noch besser zu kennen meint als Juden selber. Das ist provozierend
genug. Für Buber aber musste es besonders provozierend erscheinen, dass Kittel
ausgerechnet ihn, Buber, mit anderen Vertretern des zeitgenössischen Judentums
als Bundesgenossen für sein Ansinnen glaubte beanspruchen zu können. Inner-
halb der Judenschaft selber seien ja Bemühungen im Gange, meint Kittel, „in dem
die Fremdlingschaft bejahenden Judentum eine lebendige Religion zu erwe-
cken.“¹⁹ Bemühungen also, eine „Verflachung des Liberalismus“ wie eine „Ver-
trocknung der Orthodoxie“ zu überwinden“. Und Kittel fügt hinzu: „Vielleicht ist
in Martin Buber den Juden noch einmal ein Führer auf solchem Wege geschenkt,
wenn er auch bisher stark mit dem zionistischen Ideal verbunden war. Seine
Lebensarbeit um eine Erweckung der Religion der Väter und sein Ringen um die
Seele seines Volkes kann und soll auch der Deutsche, und vollends der deutsche
Christ, in Ehrfurcht und Achtung grüßen.“²⁰
Kittel schickt Buber seine Schrift am 13. Juni 1933 zu.²¹ Buber antwortet mit
einem „Offenen Brief an Gerhard Kittel“²² und weist – im Ton auffallend sachlich
und unpolemisch – Kittels Argumentation souverän zurück. Er muss denn auch
angesichts der politischen Lage in Deutschland vorsichtiger sein als etwaGershom
Scholem (1897–1982), einem der großen Gelehrten des deutschsprachigen Ju-
dentums im 20. Jahrhundert, der schon 1923 nach Palästina eingewandert war und
Bahnbrechendes zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung der jüdischenMystik leisten
wird. In einem persönlichen Brief an Buber aus Jerusalem (24. August 1933) kann
 Ebd., 36 f.
 Ebd., 42.
 Ebd,, 44.
 Ebd., 66 f.
 Ebd., 67.
 Buber, Briefwechsel. II: 486f.
 Buber, „Offener Brief an Gerhard Kittel“.
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Scholem seinen Gefühlen von „Ekel“ und „Empörung“ freien Lauf lassen kann.
Kittels „Broschüre“ sei unter allen „schmachvollen Dokumenten eines beflissenen
Professorentums“ gewiss „eines des schmachvollsten“, schreibt Scholem: „Wel-
che Verlogenheit, welch zynisches Spiel mit Gott und Religion.“²³
„Die Welt ist unerlöst“:
Ablehnung der Messianität Jesu
Wir müssen stets die prekäre Situation von Juden in Deutschland in der ersten
Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts im Blick behalten, wenn wir Bubers Auseinander-
setzung mit „dem Christentum“ verstehen wollen. Biographisch ist dabei wichtig:
Solange es die politischen Verhältnisse zulassen, versucht Buber auch nach 1933
noch, seine Stellung als Lehrer und Forscher in Nazi – Deutschland zu behaup-
ten. 1938 muss auch er gehen. Er verlässt sein Haus in Heppenheim an der
Bergstraße, in dem er 22 Jahre gelebt hatte und siedelt mit der Familie nach Je-
rusalem über. Umgekehrt aber gilt mit Buber jetzt auch: Jüdische Gelehrte stellen
ganz neu mit eigenem argumentativen Gewicht „dem Christentum“ ihrerseits die
Legitimationsfrage – 2000 Jahre christlicher Dominanz hin oder her. Man mache
sich klar: IndemBuber Jesusganz für das Judentum reklamiert, entzieht er faktisch
dem christlichen Glauben die Legitimationsbasis, sich auf Jesus als den Christus
zu berufen. Kann man,wird später der evangelische Theologe Gerhard Ebeling in
selbstkritischer Auseinandersetzung mit Buber fragen, „den christlichen Glauben
radikaler in Frage stellen, als wenn man ihn im Namen Gottes um des Glaubens
willen unter Berufung auf Jesus in Frage stellt?“²⁴
Warum aber ist Buber in der Frage der Christologie, sprich: der Messianität
Jesu so entschieden negativ? Weil aus seiner jüdischen Sicht das Erscheinen des
Messias mit der Erlösung der Schöpfung zusammenfällt. Dies geht bereits aus
einer Stellungnahme Bubers vom November 1917 hervor. Ein christlicher Ge-
sprächspartner hatte behauptet, „nichts“ stünde doch im Weg, Jesus als den
Messias der Welt anzusehen, der „das geläuterte Judentum der aus ihrem Göt-
zendienst zu befreienden Welt gebracht“ habe. Buber hält dagegen:
Wer ‚die Welt‘, richtiger einen Teil der Menschheit vom Götzendienst befreit, heiße er nun
Jesus oder Buddha, Zarathustra oder Laotse, hat keinen Anspruch auf den Namen des
‚Messias der Welt‘; der käme nur dem zu, der die Welt erlöste. Läuterung der Religiosität,
Monotheisierung, Christianisierung, all das bedeutet nicht Erlösung der Menschheit. Erlö-
 Buber, Briefwechsel. II: 502.
 Gerhard Ebeling, Wort und Glaube (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967), III: 239.
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sung – das ist eine Verwandlung des ganzen Lebens von Grund aus, des Lebens aller Ein-
zelnen und aller Gemeinschaften. DieWelt ist unerlöst– fühlen Sie das nicht wie ich in jedem
Blutstropfen?²⁵
„Die Welt ist unerlöst, fühlen Sie das nicht in jedem Blutstropfen?“ Das Pathos ist
gewollt. Für einen Juden steht hier Entscheidendes auf dem Spiel. Und wie sehr
sich dieses Pathos durchhalten kann, zeigt ein Buber-Text, der knapp 30 Jahre
später entstand – nach der Schoah.²⁶ Ist sie nicht das grauenhafteste Zeichen für
die Unerlöstheit der Welt? Nichts widerlegt doch christlich-messianische An-
sprüche stärker als das,was Juden hier angetan wurde. In diesem kurzen Text aus
dem Jahr 1945 zum Gedenken an den Schweizer evangelischen Theologen Leon-
hard Ragaz (1868–1945) hat Buber in einer wahrlich klassischen Weise noch
einmal seinen Vorbehalt gegen jegliche Christologie angemeldet:
Aber ich glaube ebenso fest daran, dass wir Jesus nie als gekommenen Messias anerkennen
werden, weil dies dem innersten Sinn unserer messianischen Leidenschaft (…) widerspre-
chen würde. In das mächtige Seil unseres Messiasglaubens, das, an einen Fels im Sinai
geknüpft, sich bis zu einem noch unsichtbaren, aber in den Grund der Welt gerammten
Pflocke spannt, ist kein Knoten geschlagen. Für unseren Blickgeschieht Erlösung allezeit, für
ihn ist keine geschehen. Am Schandpfahl der Menschheit stehend, gegeißelt und gefoltert,
demonstrieren wir mit unserem blutigen Volksleib die Unerlöstheit der Welt.²⁷
Von Zwiesprache und Begegnungen:
„Ich und Du“ (1923)
Mit dem Jahr 1923 wird vieles bei Buber anders. In diesem Jahr publiziert er ein Buch,
das eine Schlüsselbedeutung in seinem Werk einnehmen wird: die Abhandlung zur
Philosophie desDialogs: „IchundDu“ (1923).WerkundWirkungdieser Schrift sind zu
komplex,umhier in Einzelheiten gehen zu können. Nur der Grundgedanke sei heraus
gestellt. Programmatisch beginnt das Buch mit den Sätzen:
Die Welt ist dem Menschen zwiefältig nach seiner zwiefältigen Haltung.
Die Haltung des Menschen ist zwiefältig nach der Zwiefalt der Grundworte, die er sprechen
kann.
Die Grundworte sind nicht Einzelworte, sondern Wortpaare.
Das eine Grundwort ist das Wortpaar Ich-Du.
Das andere Grundwort ist das Wortpaar Ich-Es; wobei, ohne Änderung des Grundwortes, für
 Buber, Briefwechsel. I: 513.
 Martin Buber, „Ragaz und ‚Israel’“, in: Buber, Schriften zum Christentum, 187–191.
 Ebd., 190.
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Es auch eins der Worte Er und Sie eintreten kann.
Somit ist auch das Ich des Menschen zwiefältig.
Denn das Ich des Grundwortes Ich-Du ist ein andres als das des Grundwortes Ich-Es.²⁸
Buber hat wie kaum ein anderer zuvor erkannt und in verdichteter Form zum
Ausdruck gebracht, dass Menschsein sich in den beiden Wortpaaren Ich-Du und
Ich-Es beschreiben lässt. Diese Struktur ist gewissermaßen „immer schon“ ge-
geben. Sie ist nicht etwas,was Menschen nachträglich machen oder setzen. Sie ist
in demMoment gegeben,woMenschen „Ich“ sagen, sich als „Ich“ erkennen. Denn
ein Ich setzt immer ein Du voraus, ein Du immer ein Ich. Zugleich ist das Ich immer
schon auf ein Es bezogen, „Es“ im Sinne von Sachen, Gegenständen, Objekten
wobei „Es“ auch ein Er oder ein Sie meinen kann. „Er“ und „Sie“ im Sinne eines
verobjektivierten personalen Gegenübers, das gerade kein Du ist.
Woraus folgt: Nicht das „Ich“ für sich genommen interessiert Buber. Ihn in-
teressiert das Mit-Sein, die Tatsache, dass das Ich stets nur Ich ist im Verhältnis zu
einem Gegenüber. Nicht das An-sich-Sein, die Beziehung interessiert ihn, die
Dynamik der Beziehung, die Wechselseitigkeit der Beziehung. Buber selber hat
hier stets das Kernanliegen seines gesamten Lebenswerkes gesehen. In einer
seiner „autobiographischen Fragmente“ heißt es:
Soll icheinemFragendenAuskunftgeben,welchesdenndas ingedanklicher Spracheaussagbare
Hauptergebnis meiner Erfahrungen und Betrachtungen sei, dann ist mir keine andere Erwide-
runggegeben, alsmich zu demFragendenundmich umfassendenWissen zu bekennen:Mensch
sein heißt, das gegenüber seiende Wesen sein. Die Einsicht in diesen schlichten Sachverhalt ist
im Gang meines Lebens gewachsen.Wohl sind allerhand andere Sätze gleichen Subjekts und
ähnlicher Konstruktion geäußert worden, und ich halte manche davon durchaus nicht für un-
richtig; mein Wissen geht nur eben dahin, dass es dies ist,worauf es ankommt. In dem Satze ist
der bestimmteArtikel voll betont. AlleWesen in derNatur sind ja in einMit-Anderen-Seingestellt,
und in jedem Lebendigem tritt dies als Wahrnahme des Andern und Handlung am Andern ins
Werk. Menscheneigentümlichkeit aber ist, dass einer je und je des Andern als dieses ihm ge-
genüber Bestehende inne werden kann, dem gegenüber er besteht.²⁹
„Wahrnahme“ des je Anderen aber geschieht durch Begegnungen. Und es gibt sie
in Bubers Werk, solche Momente der Begegnung, solche Augenblicke der Zwie-
sprache mit dem „Du“, die alles plötzlich verändern. In persönlichen Begeg-
nungen mit einem „Du“ ereignet sich für Buber Offenbarung. Nicht bloß am
„Sinai“, stets und immer sind in und durch Begegnungen „Offenbarungen“
möglich. Einer dieser Momente in Bubers Leben ist unauslöschlich mit dem Na-
 Martin Buber, „Ich und Du,“ in: Buber, Das dialogische Prinzip (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert
Schneider, 1962), 4. Aufl. 1979: 7.
 Buber, Begegnung, 83.
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men eines Freundes verbunden. Er heißt Florens Christian Rang (1864– 1924),war
einstmals evangelischer Pfarrer gewesen und arbeitet später als Jurist. Es ist
Pfingsten 1914. Eine international zusammengesetzte Gruppe engagierter Zeit-
kritiker und Reformer trifft sich in Potsdam („Forte-Kreis“), um, wie Buber sich
erinnert, im „unbestimmten Vorgefühl der Katastrophe einen Versuch zur Auf-
richtung einer übernationalen Autorität vorzubereiten.“³⁰ Im Verlauf der Aus-
sprache trägt Rang Bedenken vor. Bei der Zusammensetzung der Gruppe seien „zu
viele Juden genannt worden, so dass etliche Länder in ungehöriger Proportion
durch die Judenvertreten“ seien. Buber ist dieser Einwand nicht fremd, glaubt aber
doch, als „hartnäckiger Jude“ gegen diesen „Protest“ protestieren zu müssen:
Ich weiß nicht mehr, auf welchemWeg ich dabei auf Jesus zu sprechen kam und darauf, dass
wir Juden ihn von innen her auf eine Weise kennten, eben in den Antrieben und Regungen
seines Judenwesens, die den ihm untergebenen Völkern unzugänglich bleibe. ‚Auf eine
Weise, die Ihnen unzugänglich bleibt‘ – so sprach ich den früheren Pfarrer [Rang] unmit-
telbar an. Er stand auf, auch ich stand, wir sahen einander ins Herz der Augen. ‚Es ist ver-
sunken‘, sagte er, und wir gaben einander vor allen den Bruderkuss. Die Erörterung der Lage
zwischen Juden undChristen hatte sich in einenBund zwischendemChristen unddem Juden
verwandelt; in dieser Wandlung erfüllte sich die Dialogik. Die Meinungen waren versunken,
leibhaft geschah das Faktische.³¹
Eine autobiographische Schlüsselszene, die in ihrer Bedeutung derjenigen
gleichkommt, von der wir ausgegangen sind: der „Fremdandacht“ im Kaiser-
Franz-Josephs-Gymnasium zu Lemberg. Machen wir uns die „Wandlung“ bei
Buber klar. Damals waren Juden „gezwungene Gäste“ in einer christlich domi-
nierten Anstalt, jetzt sind Juden Partner in einer internationalen Koalition von
politisch-religiös Gleichgesinnten. Damals ein Dabeisein an einem „sakralen
Vorgang“ ohne ein „Quentchen“ der eigenen Person, jetzt der Blick in das „Herz
der Augen“, der „Bruderkuss“ mit einem Christen. Damals das Gefühl des Aus-
geschlossenseins und der Teilnahmslosigkeit auf Seiten der Juden, jetzt ein „Bund
zwischen dem Christen und dem Juden“. Damals das Absolvieren eines pflicht-
mäßigen Rituals, jetzt die Wandlung zur „Dialogik“. Damals die „Vergegnung“,
jetzt die „Begegnung“.
Eine zweite Szene dieser Art ist in den „Autobiographischen Fragmenten“
überliefert. Buber ist Anfang er 1920er Jahre eingeladen, in einer deutschen
Universitätsstadt einen theologischen Vortrag zu halten. Während seines Auf-
enthaltes ist er zu Gast bei einem „edlen alten Denker“ dieser Universität, einem
Philosophen. Man kommt ins Gespräch.Wie er, Buber, es fertig brächte, will sein
 Martin Buber, „Zweisprache,“ in: Das dialogische Prinzip, 145.
 Ebd., 146.
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Gastgeber wissen, so Mal um Mal „Gott“ zu sagen. Dieses Wort sei doch „so
missbraucht, so befleckt, so geschändet worden“ wie kein anderes. Wie viel
schuldloses Blut sei um dieses Wortes willen vergossen worden.Wie viel an Un-
gerechtigkeit begangen! Wenn er, der alte Mann, „Gott“ höre, komme ihm das
zuweilen wie eine Lästerung vor. Und Buber antwortet:
‚Ja‘, sagte ich etwa, ‚es ist das beladenste aller Menschenworte. Keines ist so besudelt, so
zerfetzt worden. Gerade deshalb darf ich darauf nicht verzichten. Die Geschlechter der
Menschen haben die Last ihres geängstigten Lebens auf diesesWort gewälzt und es zu Boden
gedrückt; es liegt imStaubund trägt ihrer aller Last. Die Geschlechter derMenschenmit ihren
Religionsparteiungen haben das Wort zerrissen; sie haben dafür getötet und sind dafür
gestorben; es trägt ihrer aller Fingerspur und ihrer aller Blut.Wo fände ich ein Wort, das ihm
gliche, um das Höchste zu bezeichnen! Nähme ich den reinsten, funkelndsten Begriff aus der
innersten Schatzkammer der Philosophen, ich könnte darin doch nur ein unverbindliches
Gedankenbild einfangen, nicht aber die Gegenwart dessen, den ich meine, dessen, den die
Geschlechter der Menschenmit ihrem ungeheuren Leben und Sterben verehrt und erniedrigt
haben. Ihn meine ich ja, ihn, den die höllengepeinigten, himmelstürmenden Geschlechter
der Menschen meinen. Gewiss, sie zeichnen Fratzen und schreiben ‚Gott‘ darunter; sie
morden einander und sagen, ‚im Namen Gottes‘. Aber wenn aller Wahn und Trug zerfällt,
wenn sie ihm ge-genüberstehn im einsamsten Dunkel und nicht mehr ‚Er, er‘ sagen, sondern
‚Du, Du‘ seufzen, ‚Du‘ schreien, sie alle das Eine, und wenn sie dann hinzufügen ‚Gott‘, ist es
nicht der wirkliche Gott, den sie alle anrufen, der Eine Lebendige, der Gott der Menschen-
kinder? Ist nicht er es, der sie hört? Der sie – erhört? Und ist nicht eben dadurch das Wort
‚Gott,‘ das Wort des Anrufs, das zum Namen gewordene Wort, in allen Menschensprachen
geweiht für alle Zeiten? Wir müssen die achten, die es verpönen, weil sie sich gegen das
Unrecht und den Unfug auflehnen, die sich so gern auf die Ermächtigung durch ‚Gott‘ be-
rufen; aber wir dürfen es nicht preisgeben. Wie gut lässt es sich verstehen, dass manche
vorschlagen, eine Zeit über von den ‚letzten Dingen‘ zu schweigen, damit die missbrauchten
Worte erlöst werden! Aber so sind sie nicht zu erlösen. Wir können das Wort ‚Gott‘ nicht
reinwaschen,undwir können es nicht ganzmachen; aberwir können es,befleckt und zerfetzt
wie es ist, vom Boden erheben und aufrichten über einer Stunde großer Sorge.‘ Es war sehr
hell geworden in der Stube. Das Licht floss nicht mehr, es war da. Der alte Mann stand auf,
kam auf mich zu, legte mir die Hand auf die Schulter und sprach: ‚Wir wollen uns du sagen.‘
Das Gespräch war vollendet. Dennwo zwei wahrhaft beisammen sind, sind sie es im Namen
Gottes. ³²
Dass Buber auch ein glänzender Erzähler ist, zeigt allein dieser Text. Souverän be-
herrscht er die narrative Dramaturgie, weiß Spannungsbögen zu setzen, Pointen
einzubauen. Man beachte die inszenierten Momente von Körperlichkeit und Räum-
lichkeit, die dem Text einen wirksamen Abschluss geben. Am Ende der Zwiesprache
ist das Zimmer „sehr hell geworden.“ Licht ist auf einmal „da,“ das uralte Symbol für
Klarheit und Vernunft. Der Partner erhebt sich, tritt auf Buber zu, berührt ihn durch
 Buber, Begegnung, 68–70.
Martin Buber und das Christentum 127
Auflegen seiner Hand auf die Schulter. Durch dialogischen Austausch ist jetzt eine
tiefe, persönliche Beziehung von Mensch zu Mensch entstanden. „Begegnung“ im
besten Sinn desWortes hat stattgefunden,der „Kairos“ einer Zwiesprache. Kein Zufall
somit, dass Buber dieses Ereignis mit einem „Bibelwort“ überhöhen und so ins
Grundsätzliche und Prinzipielle heben kann: „Denn wo zwei oder drei wahrhaft
beisammen sind, sind sie es im Namen Gottes.“ Buber hat damit ein Jesus-Wort (Mt
18,20) gezielt „theozentrisch“ und damit „gut jüdisch“ für seine Zwecke umge-
schrieben und damit am Ende des Textes dem so „beladenen“ Wort Gott doch eine
unverzichtbare Bedeutung wieder gegeben.
Was sind „echte Religionsgespräche“?
Wir halten fest: Mit diesen beiden autobiographischen Schlüsselszene hat Buber
eine der Geburtsstunden dessen beschrieben, was man in seinem Sinne Begeg-
nungen (statt Vergegnungen) nennen kann, besser: Zwiesprache von Person zu
Person.Das ist wohl zu unterscheiden vom Streit um Glaubensinhalte. Beides wird
künftig sein Verhältnis zu Christen als glaubenden Menschen bestimmen. Jetzt
kann Buber wie nie zuvor sagen:
Eine Zeit echter Religionsgespräche beginnt – nicht jener so benannten Scheingespräche,wo
keiner seinen Partner in Wirklichkeit schaute und anrief, sondern echter Zwiesprache, von
Gewissheit zu Gewissheit, aber auch von aufgeschlossner Person zu aufgeschlossner Person.
Dann erst wird sich die echte Gemeinschaft weisen, nicht die eines angeblich in allen Re-
ligionen aufgefundenen gleichen Glaubensinhalts, sondern die der Situation, der Bangnis
und der Erwartung.³³
Was also sind „echte Religionsgespräche“? Buber unterscheidet im selben Zu-
sammenhang „dreierlei Dialog“:³⁴ „den echten – gleichviel, geredeten oder ge-
schwiegenen -,wo jeder der Teilnehmer den oder die anderen in ihremDasein und
Sosein wirklich meint und sich ihnen in der Intention zuwendet, dass lebendige
Gegenseitigkeit sich zwischen ihm und ihnen stifte“; das ist das, was Buber die
„echte Zwiesprache“ von „aufgeschlossener Person zu aufgeschlossener Person“
nennt. Stichwort: „lebendige Gegenseitigkeit“. Dann den technischen Dialog, „der
lediglich von der Notdurft der sachlichen Verständigung eingegeben ist;“ und
schließlich den „dialogisch verkleideten Monolog“, das also, was Buber mit „so
benannten Scheingesprächen“ bezeichnet.
 Buber, „Zweisprache“, 149.
 Ebd., 166.
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Alle diese Dialogformen hat Buber erlebt. Einer dieser Dialoge ist von be-
sonderem Rang, nicht weil es hier um ein „echtes Religionsgespräch“ gegangen
wäre, sondern weil Buber selber nun einen Weg gefunden hat, als Jude das
Glaubensgeheimnis von Christen anzuerkennen. Wir steuern auf den entschei-
denden Punkt zu: Bubers Konzept einer Verhältnisbestimmung von Israel und
Kirche, Judentum und Christentum.
Wechselseitige Anerkennung der
„grundverschiedenen Gottesgeheimnisse“
Stuttgart: 14. Januar 1933.Nur wenige Tage vor der „Machtergreifung“Adolf Hitlers
kommt Buber im Lehrhaus der Stadt noch einmal mit einem christlichen Theo-
logen zu einem öffentlichen Gespräch zusammen. Es dürfte sich für lange Jahre
„um das letzte Religionsgespräch zwischen einem jüdischen und einem christli-
chen Gelehrten in Deutschland“ (P. von der Osten-Sacken) gehandelt haben. Der
christliche Partner heißt Karl Ludwig Schmidt (1891– 1956) und ist seit 1929 Pro-
fessor für Neues Testament an der evangelisch-theologischen Fakultät der Uni-
versität Bonn. Vorbereitet und thematisch abgesprochen wird das Stuttgarter
Gespräch durch brieflichen Austausch,³⁵ sowie einen Besuch Schmidts in Bubers
Haus in Heppenheim auf der Reise von Bonn nach Stuttgart.³⁶ Die „lange Un-
terhaltung“ in Bubers „Heim zu Heppenheim“ sei für ihn ein „ordentliches Stu-
dium“ gewesen, schreibt Schmidt am 28.1. 1933 an Buber, bei dem er „viel gelernt“
zu haben glaube.Und „im D-Zug, dann im Stuttgarter Hotel und schließlich bei der
öffentlichen Auseinandersetzung“ sei alles noch „viel intensiver“ geworden.
Das 1926 gegründete Stuttgarter Jüdische Lehrhaus ist Buber wohl vertraut. Er
hatte dessen Gründung unterstützt. Es ist das zweite „Lehrhaus“ dieser Art in
Deutschland nach dem 1920 von Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) gegründeten in
Frankfurt. Buber hatte darüber hinaus in den folgenden Jahren das Stuttgarter
Lehrhaus „zum Mittelpunkt des christlich-jüdischen Dialogs“ gemacht, nachdem
Versuche erfolglos geblieben waren, „eine Reihe interkonfessioneller Debatten im
Lehrhaus in Frankfurt zu veranstalten.“³⁷Vier solcher jüdisch-christlichen Gespräche
vor 1933 sind dokumentiert.³⁸ Nicht unerwähnt lassen will ich in diesem Zusam-
menhang,dass es seit Februar 2010 ein neues „Stuttgarter Lehrhaus“ gibt und zwar in
 Buber, Briefwechsel, II: 460 f.
 Ebd., 461 f.
 Michael Brenner, Jüdische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik (München: C. H. Beck, 2000), 108.
 Buber, Schriften zum Christentum, 369–371.
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Form einer „Stiftung für interreligiösen Dialog“. Entsprechend der veränderten Lage
in Deutschland sind bei diesem Projekt nun auch Muslime beteiligt.
Am 14. Januar 1933 findet Bubers letztes Stuttgarter Lehrhaus-Gespräch statt,
das mit Karl Ludwig Schmidt.³⁹ Ort: der Saal der Hochschule für Musik. Zeitge-
nössischen Berichten zufolge vor einem „großen Zuhörerkreis.“ Vom Veranstalter,
dem Vorstand des Jüdischen Lehrhauses, war Schmidt um einen „streng sachli-
chen,“ d.h. nicht polemischen oder apologetischen Beitrag gebeten worden, und
an diese Vorgabe hält er sich wörtlich: Sachlichkeit, verbunden mit Strenge. Denn
Schmidt bewegt sich mit seinen Ausführungen ganz im Rahmen traditioneller
christlicher Israel-Theologie: Enterbung und Ersetzung Israels durch die Kirche.
Bei allem Respekt vor der Person Bubers als Denker, Mensch und Jude,⁴⁰ bei aller
Bedeutung, die er Israel als „auserwähltem Volk Gottes“ für die Kirche zuspricht
und aller politischen Gegnerschaft zum Nationalsozialismus (Schmidt wird als
Nazi-Gegner noch 1933 von seinem Bonner Lehrstuhl vertrieben und geht in die
Schweiz), fühlt Schmidt sich als Christ von seinem Verständnis des Neuen Tes-
tamentes her gedrängt und verpflichtet, den „Anspruch“ der christlichen Kirche,
das neue, das „wahre“ Israel zu sein, unzweideutig zu vertreten. Schon in seinem
ersten Brief an Buber hatte Schmidt davon gesprochen, dass sein Beruf (als
Theologe) getragen sei „von dem Amt der Kirche Jesu Christi.“ Und dieses „Amt“
heißt für Schmidt: Auslegungder Schrift. Die ist nicht bloß für den professionellen
Exegeten, verpflichtend, sondern für den Christen und Theologen schlechthin,
„weil alle Theologie Exegese der Heiligen Schrift ist,“meint Schmidt, „wobei sich
Exegese und Dogmatik nur technisch unterscheiden“. Der christliche Theologe
tritt also Buber von Anfang als „Amtsperson“ gegenüber, die – unbeschadet aller
persönlichen Gefühle – in aller Sachlichkeit den „exklusiv kirchlichen Stand-
punkt“ vertreten zu müssen glaubt.
Und das sieht so aus: Zwar gäbe es „Gemeinsamkeit zwischen Juden und
Christen“ in der „gemeinsamen Bemühung um Israel.“ Eine Kirche, die nichts
wisse oder wissen wolle von Israel, sei eine „leere Hülse.“ Aber diese Gemein-
samkeit ist für Schmidt „nur eine vorläufige.“ Warum? „Die Kirche Jesu Christi
eifert fort und fort umdieses Judentum; ihreDuldsamkeit ist ein hoffendesWarten,
dass schließlich auch die Juden, ja gerade die Juden erkennen möchten, dass nur
die Kirche des Messias Jesus von Nazareth das von Gott berufene Gottesvolk
darstellt, dem die Juden einverleibt werden, wenn sie sich wirklich als Israel
verstehen.“ „Nur die Kirche“! Denn: „Kirche,“ davon ist Schmidt überzeugt, „gibt
 Karl Ludwig Schmidt und Martin Buber, „Kirche, Staat, Volk, Judentum. Zwiegespräch im
Jüdischen Lehrhaus in Stuttgart am 14. Januar 1933,“ in: Buber, Schriften zum Christentum, 145–
168.
 Vgl. Schmidts ersten Briefe vom 11./12. 1.1933 in Buber, Briefwechsel II: 460f
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es nur in exklusivem Sinn. Der Satz aus dem christlich – kirchlichen Altertum:
‚Extra ecclesiam nulla salus‘ ist nicht nur römisch-katholisch, sondern überhaupt
katholisch und auch evangelisch.“
Buber dagegen spricht zwar ebenfalls in aller Sachlichkeit von seinem Glauben
als Jude, aber gerade nicht als Träger eines Amtes. Er fühlt sich „nicht berufen,“„für
eine ‚Synagoge‘ zu sprechen.“ Er war und ist kein Rabbiner,wird es nie werden,was
ihm stets die Ablehnung durch Vertreter der jüdischen Orthodoxie eintrug.Und selbst
mit demWort „Judentum“ kann sich Buber nicht völlig identifizieren, denn er will als
glaubender Mensch über nichts anderes nachdenken und sprechen als über das
GeheimnisGottesmit „Israel.“Buber vertritt gerade keinen „Anspruch“des Juden oder
„der Synagoge“ an Christen oder die Kirche. Dabei kennt er die über Jahrhunderte
tradierte Position des christlichen Exklusivismus und Antijudaismus zur Genüge. Die
Kirche sehe Israel „als ein von Gott verworfenes Wesen“, und diese Verworfenheit
ergebe sich notwendigerweise aus dem „Anspruch der Kirche, das wahre Israel zu
sein“. Die „von Israel habendanach ihrenAnspruch eingebüßt,weil sie Jesusnicht als
den Messias erkannten.“
Zugleich aber denkt Buber jetzt nicht mehr daran, auf den christlichen Ex-
klusivismus mit einem jüdischen zu antworten. Wir erinnern uns an seine Äu-
ßerungen aus den Jahren vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Im Gegenteil: Bubers Antwort
ist jetzt ein neues, zukunftsweisendes Gesprächsangebot. Zunächst räumt er ein,
dass er als Jude „keine Möglichkeit“ habe, „gegen dieses Wissen der Kirche um
Israel etwas zu setzen“. Gemeint ist: den Anspruch der Kirche, das „wahre Israel“
zu sein, schlicht zu falsifizieren. Aber man kann als gläubiger Jude seinen eigenen
Anspruch dagegen setzen, daneben stellen. Denn „Israel“ ist für ihn „ein Ein-
maliges, Einziges, in keine Gattung Einzureihendes, nicht begrifflich Unterzu-
bringendes.“ Und von diesem „Israel“ wissen Juden und Christen „in grundver-
schiedener Weise,“ wie Buber meint. Von daher grenzt sich Buber einerseits von
einem exklusiven christlichen Standpunkt ab, andererseits aber ersetzt er gerade
nicht einen christlichen durch einen jüdischen Exklusivismus. Vielmehr vertritt
Buber erstmals in dieser Form eine Theologie derwechselseitigen Anerkennung der
grundverschiedenen Gottesgeheimnisse von Israel und Kirche:
Aber wir Israel wissen um Israel von innen her, im Dunkel des von innen her Wissens, im
Lichte des von innen her Wissens.Wir wissen um Israel anders. Wir wissen (hier kann ich
nicht einmalmehr ‚sehen‘ sagen, dennwirwissen es javon innenher,und auch nichtmit dem
,Auge desGeistes‘, sondern lebensmäßig), dasswir, diewir gegenGott tausendfach gesündigt
haben, die wir tausendfach von Gott abgefallen sind, die wir diese Jahrtausende hindurch
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diese Schickung Gottes über uns erfahren haben – die Strafe zu nennen zu leicht ist, es ist
etwas Größeres als Strafe –, wir wissen, dass wir doch nicht verworfen sind.⁴¹
Der ungekündigte Bund Gottes mit Israel
„Nicht verworfen“heißt positiv: Der BundGottesmit Israel bleibt gegeben. Das ist das
Entscheidende. Mag die Kirche Israel auch noch so sehr verworfen haben, mag Israel
selber sich gegen Gott „tausendfach“ versündigt haben, Gottes Berufung Israels als
sein Volk ist unwiderrufen. Was umgekehrt heißt: Es gibt in der Geschichte ein
bleibendes Nebeneinander von Kirche und Israel im Gegenüber zu Gott. Buber bringt
jetzt die theologische Schlüsselkategorie ins Spiel, mit der dieses bleibende Gegen-
über von Kirche und Israel beschrieben werden kann: wechselseitige Anerkennung
des jeweils eigenen „Gottesgeheimnisses.“ Das theologische Zentrum Bubers zum
Verhältnis Kirche – Israel ist jetzt und damit endgültig benannt:
Ich sagte schon: Das Juden und Christen Verbindende bei alledem ist ihr gemeinsames
Wissen um eine Einzigkeit, und von da aus können wir auch diesem in Tiefstem Trennenden
gegenübertreten; jedes echte Heiligtum kann das Geheimnis eines anderen echten Heilig-
tums anerkennen. Das Geheimnis des anderen ist innen in ihmund kann nicht von außen her
wahrgenommen werden. Kein Mensch außerhalb von Israel weiß um das Geheimnis Israels.
Und kein Mensch außerhalb der Christenheit weiß um das Geheimnis der Christenheit. Aber
nichtwissend können sie einander im Geheimnis anerkennen.Wie es möglich ist, dass es die
Geheimnisse nebeneinander gibt, das ist Gottes Geheimnis.Wie es möglich ist, dass es eine
Welt gibt als Haus, in dem diese Geheimnisse wohnen, ist Gottes Sache, denn die Welt ist ein
Haus Gottes. Nicht indemwir uns jeder um seine Glaubenswirklichkeit drücken, nicht indem
wir trotz der Verschiedenheit einMiteinander erschleichenwollen,wohl aber indemwir unter
Anerkennung der Grundverschiedenheit in rücksichtslosem Vertrauen einander mitteilen,
was wir wissen von der Einheit dieses Hauses, von dem wir hoffen, dass wir uns einst ohne
Scheidewände umgeben fühlen werden von seiner Einheit, dienen wir getrennt und doch
miteinander, bis wir einst vereint werden in dem einen gemeinsamen Dienst, bis wir alle
werden, wie es in dem jüdischen Gebet am Fest des Neuen Jahres heißt: ‚ein einziger Bund,
um Seinen Willen zu tun.‘⁴²
Die hier gewonnene Grundfigur der wechselseitigen Anerkennung des je ver-
schiedenen Gottesgeheimnisses wird somit für Buber gesteuert von einer theo-
logischen Axiomatik: Gottes Berufung Israels als sein Volk ist unwiderrufen; der
Bund Gottes mit Israel ist ungekündigt. Das hebt ein Schlüsseldokument noch
einmal heraus, das schon sprachlich-stilistisch zu den eindrücklichsten Zeug-
 Buber, „Kirche, Staat, Volk, Judentum,“ 159.
 Ebd.
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nissen Buberscher Prosa gehört: „Dom und Friedhof“ (1934), ein Text, den Buber
schon 1933 in das Gespräch mit Karl Ludwig Schmidt eingebracht hatte.
Ich lebe nicht fern von der Stadt Worms, an die mich auch eine Tradition meiner Ahnen
bindet; und ich fahre von Zeit zu Zeit hinüber.Wenn ich hinüber fahre, gehe ich immer zuerst
zum Dom. Das ist eine sichtbar gewordene Harmonie der Glieder, eine Ganzheit, in der kein
Teil aus der Vollkommenheit wankt. Ich umwandle schauend den Dom mit einer vollkom-
menen Freude.
Dann geh ich zum jüdischen Friedhof hinüber. Der besteht aus schiefen, zerspellten,
formlosen, richtungslosen Steinen. Ich stelle mich darein, blicke von diesem Friedhofsgewirr
zu der herrlichen Harmonie empor, und mir ist, als sähe ich von Israel zur Kirche auf. Da
unten hat man nicht ein Quentchen Gestalt; man hat nur die Steine und die Asche unter den
Steinen. Man hat die Asche, wenn sie sich auch noch so verflüchtigt hat. Man hat die
Leiblichkeit der Menschen, die dazu geworden sind. Man hat sie. Ich habe sie. Ich habe sie
nicht als Leiblichkeit im Raum dieses Planeten, aber als Leiblichkeit meiner eigenen Erin-
nerung bis in die Tiefe der Geschichte, bis an den Sinai hinein.
Ich habe da gestanden, war verbunden mit der Asche und quer durch sie mit den Urvätern.
Das ist Erinnerung an das Geschehenmit Gott, die allen Juden gegeben ist. Davon kannmich
die Vollkommenheit des christlichen Gottesraums nicht abbringen, nichts kann mich ab-
bringen von der Gotteszeit Israels.
Ich habe da gestanden und habe alles selber erfahren, mir ist all der Tod widerfahren: all die
Asche, die Zerspelltheit, all der lautlose Jammer ist mein; aber der Bund ist mir nicht auf-
gekündigt worden.
Ich liege am Boden, hingestürzt wie diese Steine. Aber gekündigt ist mir nicht.
Der Dom ist,wie er ist.Und der Friedhof ist,wie er ist. Aber gekündigt ist uns nicht worden.⁴³
Der Text ist sowohl in seiner narrativen Dramaturgie wie in seiner inhaltlichen
Substanz nicht nur ein Schlüsseltext Buberscher Schreib- undWortkunst, sondern
auch ein Schlüsseltext Buberscher Theologie und Spiritualität. Er ist kurz, aber
höchst kunstvoll gestaltet. Dabei darf die kontrastive Gegenüberstellung von
„Dom“ und „Friedhof“ nicht als „Kleinmachen“ oder als falsche Schwäche des
Judentums missverstanden werden. Im Gegenteil. Gerade weil Buber die jüdische
Seite mit dem Bild vom „Friedhofsgewirr“ so „bescheiden“ hält, kann er seine
dialektische Pointe umso wirkungsvoller ins Spiel bringen: Das,was menschlich-
geschichtlich gesehen klein, gering, ja „aschig“ aussieht, ist von Gott her groß.
Und das,was äußerlich so „vollkommen“ dasteht, muss sich vor Gott bescheiden.
Das am Ende des Textes dreimal wiederholte „mir nicht gekündigt“ bringt in
Selbstbescheidung und Selbstbewusstsein Israels bleibende Erwählung durch
Gott zum Ausdruck, aber auch die eigene Bindung an Israel.
„Mir“ nicht gekündigt: diese Personalisierung ist entscheidend. Der Bund
Gottes mit Israel ist auch für jeden Einzelnen verpflichtend. Er kann durch keine
 Buber, „Dom und Friedhof“, in: Buber, Schriften zum Christentum, 175.
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menschlichen Machenschaften gegen Israel einerseits und keine Versündigung
Israels gegenGott andererseits aufgehobenwerden. KeineMacht derWelt und kein
Missbrauch durch die Religionen vermögen Gottes Bindung an Israel zu annul-
lieren: das ist Bubers bleibende sachliche und persönliche Überzeugung, die auch
durch die Erfahrung der Schoah nicht erschüttert wird. Gekündigt werden könnte
der Gottes-Bund nur von Gott selbst.
Umgekehrt aber lebt für Buber auch die christliche Kirche Seite an Seite mit
Israel als eine in ihrer Andersheit gottgewollte Größe. Die Kirche hat ihr eigenes
unverwechselbares Gottesgeheimnis. Buber bringt dies auf die prägnante Formel,
mit der er nicht zufällig seinen Beitrag im Gespräch mit Karl Ludwig Schmidt
enden lässt: „Der Christ braucht nicht durchs Judentum, der Jude nicht durchs
Christentum zu gehen, um zu Gott zu kommen.“⁴⁴ Beide, Juden wie Christen,
wissen somit um ihr jeweiliges Gottesgeheimnis, ohne es miteinander teilen zu
können. Warum aber das so ist, warum es dieses Nebeneinander der „Geheim-
nisse“ gibt in der einen Welt als dem „Haus Gottes“: das zu wissen, bleibt Men-
schen entzogen. Den Grund kennt Gott allein. Eine Einsicht, die Juden und
Christen wechselseitig bescheiden machen könnte. Buber argumentiert auch hier
wieder theozentrisch und zieht daraus Konsequenzen für die Verpflichtung von
Juden und Christen auf Frieden und praktische Zusammenarbeit. Beide wissen
sich hineingehalten in das Geheimnis Gottes, jetzt noch mit einer „Scheidewand“
versehen, aber doch ausgestattet mit dem Wissen um die Einheit des Hauses
Gottes und mit der Hoffnung, dass sie einst vereint sein werden in dem einen
„gemeinsamen Dienst.“
Das alles hat mit einem schiedlich-friedlichen Nebeneinander von Juden und
Christen nichts zu tun. So wäre Buber gründlich missverstanden. Denn sein Text
lässt nicht Unverbindlichkeit, sondern Verpflichtung für Juden und Christen er-
kennen, um die jeweils erkannte Wahrheit Gottes noch zu ringen. Ausdrücklich
betont Buber, dass man sich als Jude oder Christ um seine je eigene „Glaubens-
wirklichkeit,“ d.h. um sein im Gewissen verpflichtendes Glaubenszeugnis, nicht
„drücken“ könne. Das je eigene Glaubenszeugnis wäre in „rückhaltlosem Ver-
trauen“ einander „mitzuteilen.“ Das ist das Gegenteil von schulterklopfendem
Einverstandenseinmit der Andersheit des je Anderen,was nur ein Alibi lieferte für
Passivität und Gleichgültigkeit. Verpflichtung auf Dialogizität verbindet sich bei
Buber vielmehr mit dem Festhalten an einer theologischen Axiomatik.
Was folgt daraus? Religionsgespräche haben für Buber nicht das Ziel, „gleiche
Glaubensinhalte“ zu identifizieren mit dem Ziel, die Differenzen zwischen den
Religionen zu überspielen oder zu bagatellisieren. Stattdessen stellt Buber seine
 Buber, „Kirche, Staat, Volk, Judentum,“ 168.
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Arbeit in den Dienst einer Wiederbelebung der „gemeinsamen Urwahrheit“, auf
die Juden und Christen gleichermaßen verwiesen sind: das Geheimnis Israels als
erwähltem Bundesvolk. Dieses Geheimnis aber hat man nicht ohne tiefe Ver-
trautheit mit der Ur-Kunde: der Hebräischen Bibel.
Bibelverdeutschung: Bubers Vermächtnis an
Juden und Christen
Gemeint ist das Projekt einer „Verdeutschung der Schrift“, an dem Buber 1925
zusammen mit Franz Rosenzweig zu arbeiten beginnt. Erst 1961 – vier Jahre vor
seinem Tod – kann er das Werk vollenden, nicht zuletzt deshalb,weil sein Partner
Rosenzweig 1929 imAlter von nur 42 Jahren gestorbenwar. Die gemeinsame Arbeit
war bis zum 53. Kapitel des Buches Jesaja vorgedrungen.Was war und ist der Sinn
dieses gewaltigen Unternehmens, das man ohne Übertreibung Bubers Ver-
mächtnis an Juden und Christen bezeichnen kann?
Bei einer Hausfeier 1961 in Jerusalem „zum Abschluss“ der Übertragungsar-
beit gibt Buber noch einmal einen Hinweis.⁴⁵ Die Verdeutschung der Hebräischen
Bibel hatte und hat einen doppelten Sinn. Zum einen sollte ein weitgehend as-
similiertes deutschsprachigen Judentum, das keine Kenntnisse der Ursprache
mehr besitzt, über das Deutsche an die ureigenen Quellen herangeführt werden.
Buber-Rosenzweig wählen bewusst eine Sprachform, die das hebräische Original
im Deutschen durchklingen lässt und so sprachlich-akustisch noch hörbar macht.
Zum zweiten sollte der deutschen Christenheit ihr manchmal latenter, manchmal
offener „Marcionitismus“ ausgetrieben werden, um sie resistenter zu machen
gegen die stets aufs Neue virulente Versuchung, das „Neue“ Testament unter
Abwertung oder gar Absehung vom „Alten“ Testamentes stark zu machen. In
seiner Ansprache bei der genannten Hausfeier zitiert Buber nicht zufällig einen
Brief Franz Rosenzweigs an ihn vom 29. Juli 1925, dem Jahr ihres Arbeitsbeginns:
Ist Ihnen eigentlich klar, dass heut der von den neuen Marcioniten theoretisch erstrebte
Zustand praktisch schon da ist? Unter Bibel versteht heut der Christ nur das Neue Testament,
etwa mit den Psalmen, von denen er dann noch meist meint sie gehörten nicht zum Alten
Testament. Also werden wir missionieren.⁴⁶
 Martin Buber, „Zum Abschluss,“ in: Buber, Werke (Heidelberg/München: Verlag Lambert
Schneider und Kösel-Verlag, 1964), Bd. 2 (Schriften zur Bibel), 1175–82.
 Buber, Briefwechsel, II: 232.
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Die Anspielung auf „neue Marcioniten“ bezieht sich auf eine Gestalt in der Ge-
schichte der frühen Kirche, auf den aus Kleinasien stammenden Schiffsreeder
Marcion (ca. 85– 160 n.Chr.). Dieser hatte die normativen Schriften des Judentums
(weil angeblich nur von einen zwar gerechten, aber auch unbarmherzig strafenden
Schöpfer- und Richtergott zeugend) verworfen und nur Teile des Neuen Testa-
mentes gelten lassen. Warum? Weil nur sie angeblich von einem lichten, guten,
liebenden Erlösergott zeugen. Damit hatte Marcion einen verhängnisvollen Dua-
lismus von Gesetz und Evangelium etabliert, schwerwiegender noch, damit hatte
er Schöpfung und Erlösung auseinander gerissen.
GegenMarcion, der nach einemBruchmit der römischen Gemeinde 144 n.Chr.
eine eigene, Jahrhunderte lang dann erfolg- und einflussreiche Kirche zu gründen
versteht, trifft die frühe Kirche eine Entscheidung von epochaler Wirkung: Ein für
allemal bleibt die Hebräische Bibel das Fundament zur Auslegung der Gottes-
botschaft Jesu und zum Verständnis des Bekenntnisses zu Jesus als dem Christus.
„Marcioniten“ aber gibt es immer wieder in der Geschichte der Kirche, alte und
neue. Gerade auch gegen sie ist das Projekt „Verdeutschung der Schrift“ gerichtet.
In einem weiteren von Buber zitierten Schreiben Rosenzweigs an einen Freund
vom Dezember 1925 steht es noch deutlicher:
Ich fürchtemanchmal, die Deutschenwerden diese allzu unchristliche Bibel nicht vertragen,
und es wird die Übersetzung der heut ja von den neuen Marcioniden angestrebten Aus-
treibung der Bibel aus der deutschen Kultur werden, wie Luthers die der Eroberung
Deutschlands durch die Bibel war. Aber auch auf ein solches Golus Bowel [babylonisches
Exil] könnte ja dann nach siebzig Jahren ein neuer Einzug folgen, und jedenfalls – das Ende
ist nicht unsere Sache, aber der Anfang und das Anfangen.⁴⁷
Buber kommentiert diese Briefstellen Rosenzweigs zum Abschluss seiner An-
sprache 1961 mit der überraschenden Präzisierung seine Ablehnung von „Missi-
on,“ von der wir zu Beginn so Entschiedenes im Zusammenhang mit der
„Fremdandacht“ im Gymnasium zu Lemberg gehört haben:
Es sieht mir nicht danach aus, als ob Die Schrift siebzig Jahre zu warten hätte. Aber ‚mis-
sionieren‘ – ja, auf jeden Fall! Ich bin sonst ein radikaler Gegner allesMissionierens und habe
auch Rosenzweig gründlich widersprochen,wenn er sich für eine jüdische Mission einsetzte.
Aber dieseMission da lasse ichmir gefallen, der es nicht um Judentumund Christentumgeht,
sondern um die gemeinsame Urwahrheit, von deren Wiederbelebung beider Zukunft ab-
hängt. Die Schrift ist amMissionieren.Und es gibt schon Zeichen dafür, dass ihr ein Gelingen
beschieden ist.⁴⁸
 Buber, „Zum Abschluss,“ 1182.
 Ebd.
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Die „gemeinsame Urwahrheit“ freilegen, darum geht es Buber. Sie ist eine Her-
ausforderung an beide: an Juden wie Christen.
Nur wenige sind ihm darin gefolgt, darunter ein christlicher Theologe, dessen
ich hier besonders gedenken will: der schwäbische Pfarrer und Schriftsteller Al-
brecht Goes (1908–2000). Schon 1934 hatte er sich als 26jähriger Pfarrer einmal
brieflich um Rat an Buber gewandt, nicht ahnend, dass ihm gut 20 Jahre später die
Aufgabe zufallen würde, in geschichtlich außerordentlicher Stunde eine große
Rede auf Buber zu halten: die Laudatio bei der Verleihung des Friedenspreises des
Deutschen Buchhandels an Buber 1953. Theologisch als Christ durch das Grauen
der Schoah sensibel geworden, hatte sich Goes dafür vor allem durch sein lite-
rarisches Werk nach 1945 „empfohlen.“ Insbesondere seine Erzählung „Begeg-
nung in Ungarn“ (1946) sowie „Unruhige Nacht“ (1950) sind hier zu nennen. Nach
der Paulskirchen-Rede werden noch wichtige Texte wie „Das Brandopfer“ (1954)
und „Das Löffelchen“ (1965) folgen. Das Verhältnis Buber – Goes ist mit erhel-
lenden Analysen und zahlreichen Dokumenten 2008 gründlich aufgearbeitet und
dargestellt worden durch den Tübinger evangelischen Theologen Helmut Zwan-
ger: „Albrecht Goes. Freund Martin Bubers und des Judentums. Eine Hommage“.
Für Goes war Bubers „theologisches Axiom“ vom „ungekündigten Bund“ Gottes
mit Israel lebensentscheidend geworden. Entsprechend hatte ihn der tief ver-
wurzelte Antijudaismus christlicher Theologie sowie das Versagen seiner Kirche
gegenüber dem Judentum im Dritten Reich mit Scham und Trauer erfüllt. Daran
hatte auch das nachmals viel zitierte „Stuttgarter Schuldbekenntnis“ vomOktober
1945 wenig geändert, da auch hier eine Benennung der Mitschuld von Kirche an
den Verbrechen gegen das jüdische Volk völlig fehlte.
Am 27. September 1953 wird Buber in der Frankfurter Paulskirche der Frie-
denspreis des deutschen Buchhandels verliehen. Eine geschichtlich bedeutsame
Stunde schon deshalb, weil Buber erst zum zweiten Mal nach seiner Vertreibung
aus Deutschland und seiner erzwungenen Übersiedlung von Heppenheim nach
Jerusalem (1938) wieder öffentlich in Deutschland redet. Seiner Dankesrede gibt
Buber den Titel gibt: Das echte Gespräch und die Möglichkeit des Friedens.“ Sein
Laudator Goes spricht über „Martin Buber, der Beistand“undgrenzt „Beistand“ ab
vom „Diktator“ einerseits und vom „Präzeptor“ andererseits. „Beistand“ sei einer,
der uns begleite, meint Goes, „durch die unendliche Dauer des Augenblicks“, der
uns die Augen öffne für die „unermessliche Gnade des Augenblicks.“⁴⁹ 1980 hält
Goes eine Rede zur Eröffnung einer Buber-Ausstellung in Heilbronn und bestimmt
mit Blick auf Buber noch einmal grundsätzlich das Verhältnis von Juden und
 Zit. nach Helmut Zwanger, Albrecht Goes. Freund Martin Bubers und des Judentums. Eine
Hommage (Tübingen: Klöper & Meyer, 2008), 63.
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Christen nach der Schoah: „Ich will nur sagen: man soll ihn (Buber), der sich
zuweilen einen ‚Erzjuden‘ genannt hat, nicht in einem christlichen Vorhof an-
siedeln wollen; dort wollte er nie sein. Ich denke einen ungelehrten, ernsthaften
Menschen, der Gesprächen in diesem Spannungsfeld zuhört, und dann einen Satz
wie diesen versucht: es scheine ihmwichtig, dass der Christ, indem er hier zuhört,
aufmerksamer auf sein Christsein achten lernt, und dass der Jude, indes er zuhört,
aufmerksam sich neu auf sein Jude-sein besinnt. Ihm, der so spricht, würde ich
sagen: ‚Sie haben Martin Buber an Ihrer Seite.‘“⁵⁰
„Zu Gott demütig werden“:
Bubers Grundhaltung zu den Religionen
„Nicht in einem christlichen Vorhof“. Buber entzieht sich solchen Vereinnah-
mungen,weil sein Denken Schablonen sprengt.Wir haben uns seinenWeg von der
Konfrontation zum Dialog klar gemacht. Sein Werk dient nicht der Selbstbestä-
tigung „des Judentums“ oder der Widerlegung „des Christentums,“ sondern ei-
nem Dritten: dem Nachdenken über das Geheimnis Gottes mit seinem Volk und den
Völkern, gegründet im Geheimnis Israels als dem Bundesvolk Abrahams. Für Buber
ist das eine Herausforderung an beide Seiten: an Juden wie Christen.
Und zur Illustration dieser Herausforderung gibt es keine eindrücklichere
Geschichte als die, die man in Bubers Buch Der Weg des Menschen nach der
chassidischen Lehre aus dem Jahr 1948 findet.⁵¹ Diese Geschichte spielt in einem
Gefängnis in St. Petersburg noch zur Zeit der Zarenherrschaft. Eingekerkert ist
Rabbi Schnëur Salman, der Rabbiner von Reussen. Er war bei der Regierung
verleumdet worden und sieht einem Verhör entgegen. Da kommt der Oberste der
Gendarmerie in seine Zelle, und es entspannt sich ein „christlich-jüdischer Dia-
log“ der besonderen Art, denn der Wächter erweist sich als ein „nachdenklicher
Mann.“ Er verwickelt den Gefangenen in ein Gespräch, denn beim Lesen der Bibel
ist ihm einWiderspruch aufgefallen. Jetztmöchte er den Rabbi „testen“: „Wie ist es
zu verstehen,“ fragt er den Gefangenen, „dass Gott der Allwissende zu Adam
spricht: ‚Wo bist du‘?“ Kann Gott etwas erfragenwollen,was er als „Allwissender“
eigentlich längst wissen müsste? Der Rabbi antwortet: „Glaubt Ihr daran, […] dass
die Schrift ewig ist und jede Zeit, jedes Geschlecht und jeder Mensch in ihr be-
schlossen sind?“ Als der Wächter die Frage bejaht, sagt der Rabbi: „Nunwohl, […]
in jeder Zeit ruft Gott jedenMenschen an: ‚Wo bist du in deinerWelt? So viele Jahre
 Zit. nach ebd., 92.
 Martin Buber, Werke III: 713–738.
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und Tage von den dir zugemessenen sind vergangen,wie weit bist du derweilen in
deiner Welt gekommen?‘ So etwa spricht Gott: ‚Sechsundvierzig Jahre hast du
gelebt, wo hältst du?‘“ Als der Oberste überraschend die Zahl seiner Lebensjahre
nennen hört, legt er dem Rabbi die Hand auf die Schulter und ruft: „Bravo!.“ Und
sein Herz „flattert.“⁵²
Warum erzählt Buber diese Geschichte? Und warum erzählt er sie so? Ihm
kommt es auf eine entscheidende Einsicht an. Die Frage des Obersten ist ja eine Art
Fangfrage, gestellt in der Position des angeblich Überlegenen. Sie ist im Grunde,
so Buber, „keine echte Frage, sondern nur eine Form der Kontroverse.“ Deshalb
zielt die Antwort des Rabbi auf etwas ganz Anderes. Sie zielt darauf, den Fra-
genden aus der Rolle des Überlegenen zu holen und ihn zum Betroffenen zu
machen. Zielt darauf, dass der Fragende sich selber als „Adam“ begreift, an den
Gott die entscheidende Frage richtet: „Wo bist du?“ Nicht der angebliche Wider-
spruch Gottes steht zur Debatte, sondern der Standort des Fragenden. „Wo bist du
in deiner Welt?“ Und wenn Gott so fragt, will er, meint Buber, „vom Menschen
nicht etwas erfahren,was er noch nicht weiß; er will imMenschen etwas bewirken,
was eben nur durch eine solche Frage bewirkt wird, vorausgesetzt, dass sie den
Menschen ins Herz trifft, dass der Mensch sich von ihr ins Herz treffen lässt.“⁵³
Die Pointe dieses Dialogs zwischen einem Juden und einem Christen läuft also
auf die exemplarische Erkenntnis heraus: Alles kommt darauf an, ob Menschen sich
in der Begegnung in Frage stellen, ob sie sichvon Gott nach ihremOrt befragen lassen.
Die Begegnung zwischen Juden und Christen hört dann auf, zur Wahrheitsrechtha-
berei zuwerden. Beide stellen sich unter die „FrageGottes,“, eine Frage,die, so Buber,
die Menschen „aufrühren“ will. Eine Frage, die ihnen ihren „Verstecksapparat zer-
schlagen“ und so zeigen will, wo der Mensch „hingeraten“ ist.⁵⁴ Das Zusammen-
kommen von Jude und Christ wäre dann ,wenn beide sich von Gott befragen ließen:
„Wo bist du?“, keine „Vergegnung“, sondern eine echte „Begegnung“.
Dass „Religionen“ in ihrer institutionalisierten Form Menschen den Weg zu
Gott verstellen können, davon war Buber in seinem Alter mehr denn je überzeugt.
Sein geistiges Vermächtnis im Blick auf die Religionen der Welt (auf alle Religio-
nen) hat er in einem kurzen Text niedergelegt, den er bescheiden „Fragmente über
Offenbarung“ nennt. Er erscheint in dem Sammelband „Nachlese“⁵⁵, dessen
Veröffentlichung Buber nicht mehr erlebt, da er am 13. Juni 1965 in Jerusalem
verstirbt. Fahnenkorrekturen kann er noch vornehmen. Der kurze, aber dicht
 Martin Buber, „Der Weg des Menschen nach der chassidschen Lehre,“ in Ebd., 715.
 Ebd., 716.
 Ebd., 717.
 Martin Buber, „Fragmente über Offenbarung,“ in: Buber, Nachlese (Heidelberg: Verlag Lam-
bert Schneider, 1966), 107– 112.
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geschriebene Text ist sein Vermächtnis am Ende eines langen Lebens. Und dieses
sein Vermächtnis ist auch heute noch herausfordernd genug:
Die geschichtlichen Religionen haben die Tendenz, Selbstzweck zu werden und sich gleichsam
an Gottes Stelle zu setzen, und in der Tat ist nichts so geeignet, dem Menschen das Angesicht
Gottes zu verdecken, wie eine Religion. Die Religionen müssen zu Gott und zu seinem Willen
demütig werden; jede muss erkennen, dass sie nur eine der Gestalten ist, in denen sich die
menschliche Verarbeitung der göttlichen Botschaft darstellt, – dass sie kein Monopol auf Gott
hat; jede muss darauf verzichten, das Haus Gottes auf Erden zu sein, und sich damit begnügen,
ein Haus der Menschen zu sein, die in der gleichen Absicht Gott zugewandt sind, ein Haus mit
Fenstern; jede muss ihre falsche exklusive Haltung aufgeben und die rechte annehmen. Und
noch etwas ist not: die Religionen müssen mit aller Kraft darauf horchen, was Gottes Wille für
diese Stunde ist, sie müssen von der Offenbarung aus die aktuellen Probleme zu bewältigen
suchen, die der Widerspruch zwischen dem Willen Gottes und der gegenwärtigen Wirklichkeit
derWelt ihnen stellt. Dannwerden sie,wie indergemeinsamenErwartungderErlösung, so inder
Sorge um die noch unerlöste Welt von heute verbunden sein.⁵⁶





For Buber, the attitude of dialogue creates the sphere of authentic existence.
“The individual is a fact of existence insofar as he steps into a living relationship
with other individuals.”¹ Buber’s idea, that the self is actually a social or inter-
personal self, seems to resonate with linguistic perspectives, according to
which dialogue is a more fundamental form of speech than monologue, and lan-
guage “lies on the borderline between oneself and the other.”² In the same vein,
it might be argued that culture – of which language is arguably the most signifi-
cant component – is located in the interstices between people. Indeed, even
without embracing Buber’s ideas as a vantage point, it seems safe to argue
that for anthropology, the discipline that studies human culture, the centrality
of dialogue is self-evident. Communicating with the other, making sense of
and giving voice to the other’s rich subjectivity, adopting “the native’s point of
view,” without “going native”³– all these are the sine qua non of ethnography.
Still, as elaborated below, the centrality of dialogue in anthropology, strongly
present in the ethnographic process (fieldwork), has often been much less visible
in the ethnographic outcome (text).
Dialogic anthropology contends, more explicitly, that the ethnographic en-
deavor is just a metonym of culture-making in general. According to Tedlock
and Mannheim,⁴ whose work provides the conceptual framework for this
essay, cultures are continuously produced, reproduced and revised in dialogues
among their members. Cultural events are the scenes where shared culture
emerges from interactions. Once culture is seen as arising from dialogical
ground, then ethnography itself is revealed as an emergent cultural (or intercul-
tural) phenomenon, produced, reproduced and revised in dialogues between
field-workers and natives. In what follows, I will keep the analytic distinction be-
 Martin Buber, The Way of Response Edited by N. N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1966),
113.
 M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, trans. by C. Emerson and M. Holquist (Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 1981), 293.
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
 Dennis Tedlock and Bruce Mannheim, eds., The Dialogic Emergence of Culture. (Urbana and
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995).
tween ethnography and culture. First, following Tedlock and Mannheim,⁵ I will
critically discuss the place allotted to dialogue in ethnographic works. Second,
resorting to my own fieldwork, I will highlight some intriguing aspects of the dia-
logic nature of culture as reflected in the vicissitudes of an Israeli shrine which I
studied in the 1980s.⁶
The predicament of dialogue in anthropology
According to dialogic anthropology, ethnography should acknowledge more ex-
plicitly the dialogic nature of its own production. This claim is in concert with
many other critical voices in current anthropology, propelled by “the crisis of
representation,”⁷ and augmented by the epistemological melancholia that
plagued the discipline in the postmodern era.⁸ Against the positivistic, self-as-
sured stance of classical anthropology, postmodern anthropology has been in-
formed by a social reality in which the boundaries between ethnographer and
informant were systematically eroded, and with it the authority of the ethno-
graphic text. In fact, some of the discontent uttered by dialogic anthropologists
gave also rise to the genre of experimental ethnographies⁹ that evolved as a re-
action to the unwarranted “ethnographic realism” of classical anthropology. Re-
cent ethnographies in this genre do seek to retain some of the dialogic exchange
between researcher and native, and with it some of the “noise” that is embedded
in the particular fieldwork context.
Insofar as fieldwork alone is concerned, the importance of dialogue was rec-
ognized in anthropology long time ago. To grasp the native’s point of view the
ethnographer had to immerse himself or herself in native subjectivity. Ideally,
this could generate an interpersonal ambiance conducive to the creation of I-
Thou relationship, in the Buberian sense. But the writing of ethnography in
 Ibid.
 See Yoram Bilu, The Saints’ Impresarios: Dreamers, Healers, and Holy Men in Israel’s Urban
Periphery (Haifa: Haifa University Press, 2005) [Hebrew]; idem., “Dreamers in Paradise: The Wor-
ship of Prophet Elijah in Beit She’an, Israel,” ARAM 20 (2008): 43–57.
 James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and the Politics of Eth-
nography (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1986); James Clifford, The Predicament of
Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); George E. Marcus and Michael J.
Fischer, Anthropology as a Cultural Critique (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
 Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1987).
 George E. Marcus and Dick Cushman, “Ethnographies as Texts.” Annual Review of Anthropol-
ogy 11 (1982): 25–69.
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mainstream anthropology has ordinarily constituted an ascendance to objectiv-
ity. The self-interpreting moves of the natives were not part of the ethnography
even though they were essential for its construction, and the beliefs and behav-
iors of the researcher were not inscribed in the same critical place as those by the
persons under study. Following the intellectual impact of Clifford Geertz and the
interpretive school in anthropology,¹⁰ the natives have been cast in the role of
producers of texts, while the interpretation of these texts was reserved for the
writers of ethnography. From a critical dialogical perspective, the objectified eth-
nographic text is often an authoritative monologue. It often adopts the voice of a
third person omniscient narrator that reduces the voices of the others into a few
understandable “native terms.” To take just one striking example, in Levi-
Strauss’ Tristes Tropiques,¹¹ the reigning classic among anthropological mem-
oirs, not a single Brazilian utters as much as one complete sentence, not even
with the aid of an interpreter.¹²
The issue of anonymity (“disguising” the natives’ identities), the deliberate
use of selective quoting in the service of lending support to the ethnographer’s
hypotheses, and the elimination of the first-person voice, and often the very per-
son, of the fieldworker – all these are examples of taking a “scientific distance”
from the natives and of flattening the dialogue with them in ethnographies. In
Buber’s terms the potential I–Thou relationship is thus reduced into I–It.
Under the spell of the crisis of representation, the once-romantic encounter
between researcher and native in ethnographic classics has been harshly criti-
cized, among other things, as emblematic of I–It relations (without using
these terms explicitly). I will illustrate this type of criticism by an example
from Clifford and Marcus’s Writing Culture,¹³ the paradigmatic volume of the
hyper-reflexive, postmodern anthropology of the 1980s and 1990s. In this volume
Renato Rosaldo compares a historical classic, Montaillou by Ladourie¹⁴ – himself
a historian with ethnographic sensibilities – with an ethnographic classic,
Evans-Pritchard’s work on the Nuer.¹⁵ Intriguingly, Rosaldo does not compare
the eminent anthropologist with the historian but rather with Inquisitor Jacque
 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures; Lawrence Rosen, Bargaining for Reality: The Construction of
Social Relations in a Muslim Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).
 Claude Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John Russell (New York: Atheneum, 1973).
 Dennis Tedlock, “Interpretation, Participation, and the Role of Narrative in Dialogic Anthro-
pology.” The Dialogic Emergence of Culture, D. Tedlock and B. Mannheim, eds. (Urbana and Chi-
cago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 264.
 Marcus and Cussman [see fn. 7].
 Le Roi Emmanuel Ladourie,Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village: 1294– 1324
(London: Scholar Press, 1978).
 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940).
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Fournieu, the chief interrogator of the heretic inhabitants of Montaillou. In both
cases, so the argument goes, the authors entirely ignore the critical context of
control and oppression originating in British colonialism and the church respec-
tively. Working under the auspices of this oppressive power (perhaps unwitting-
ly), the ethnographer’s dialogic encounter with the natives is reduced into mis-
guided I–It relationship. Such arguments – again without referring explicitly to
Buber – have been culminated in the generalized assertion that the making of
anthropology as a modern discipline could not be separated from the historical
advent of Western imperialism and colonialism.¹⁶ But even without resorting to
sweeping generalizations, it is safe to assume that even ethnographies attuned to
the dialogic nature of fieldwork usually ignore the asymmetric nature of the en-
counter and the complexities of power relationships that enshroud it. In a post-
colonial, self-doubting anthropology, no one can be immune of the blame of ob-
jectifying or reducing the natives. Ironically,Vincent Crapanzano, who in Writing
Culture¹⁷ did not spare his criticism for Clifford Geertz for under-representing the
natives in “Deep Play,”¹⁸ was unflatteringly compared by Dennis Tedlock with
conquistador Hernan Cortes. In Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan,¹⁹ Crapanzano
depicted his relationship with one native, Tuhami, in all its richness and com-
plexity; but at the same time he left another native, the translator, entirely trans-
parent, as did Cortes in his memoires of the conquest of Mexico.
The pessimistically radical notions of certain brands of postmodern, post-
colonial anthropology with its epistemological cultural relativism – amounting
to the immanent unknowablility of the Other – have been shunned by scientifi-
cally inclined anthropologists as self-failing and self-destructive. Ironically,
Buber might have joined this criticism, given his firm belief in the possibility
of finding paths to the heart of the other. But he would have certainly supported
the erosion of boundaries between ethnographer and native that has been grow-
ing in more recent ethnographies. Along with the dialogic turn in anthropology,
came the sensibility that the native as an object of analysis may become an an-
alyzing subject and a critical reader of the ethnography of which he or she have
been the protagonists. The dialogical reverberations of the ethnographic texts in
 Talal Asad, Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (New York: Humanities Books, 1973).
 Vincent Crapanzano, The Hamadsha: A Study in Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1973).
 Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” in idem, Interpretation of Cultures,
412–453.
 Vincent Crapanzano, Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1980).
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the lives and social worlds of people is a fascinating domain, which is beyond
the scope of this essay.²⁰
Dreams and the dialogic nature of culture:
fieldwork example
In 1979, an Israeli man of Moroccan background in his late 30s named Yaish
O’hana, a leader of a cleaning team in the Beit-She’an municipality, announced
that he had discovered the Gate of Paradise in the backyard of his house. The
announcement was informed by a Talmudic tradition which deemed Beit
She’an in the Jordan Valley as the privileged entrance (Babylonian Talmud, Eru-
vin 19 A). Still, coupling the enchanted Garden with a peripheral working-class
development town, and grounding it in an unassuming plebian house appeared
ambitious at best. Elijah the Prophet, the protagonist of Yaish’s visitational
dreams which precipitated the discovery, was declared the patron of the site. Ya-
ish’s dreams having inspired the new holy place, also ignited a chain reaction of
dreams in the local community. A vibrant community of dreamers (for which I
coined the term oneirocommunity);²¹ sprouted up around the Gate of Paradise,
with an intense, open-ended dream-based dialogue as its interactive matrix.
This dream discourse provided the dreamers with rich and engaging subjective
experiences associated with saint and site. The community enjoyed a charismat-
ic, though short-lived, period, in which men and women exchanged dreams and
other experiences in an enthusiastic and joyful atmosphere of solidarity and mu-
tual care. To illustrate the character of the dream culture that emerged around
the Gate of Paradise, Yaish’s initiatory dream sequence, and two other dream re-
ports of activists in the local community are presented in the appendix with
short exegeses. The four dreams were taken from a corpus of 150 dream reports
I collected in Beit She’an in the1980s.
Dreams might represent a challenge to Buberian theory. On the one hand,
psychologists have noted that dream-work is essentially based on encouraging
a dream dialogue between ego and the unconscious or between different
 See Yoram Bilu, Without Bounds: The Life and Death of Rabbi Ya’aqov Wazana (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 2000), 153– 167; Margaret B Blackman, ed., “The Afterlife of the
Life History.” Journal of Narrative and Life History 2 (1) (1992); and Caroline Brettel, When
They Read What We Write (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1993).
 See Yoram Bilu, “Oneirobiography and Oneirocommunity in Saint Worship in Israel: A Two-
Tier Model for Dream-Inspired Religious Revivals.” Dreaming 10/2 (2000): 85– 101.
Dialogic Anthropology 145
dream figures that represent distinct aspects of the psyche or constitute “sub-
personalities.”²² But for Buber dialogue is not intra-psychic but rather situated
in the realm of the inter-human. In modern psychology, dreams are conceptual-
ized not as they are experienced, i.e., intensely cinematic virtual reality, but as
subjective experiences and an endogenous creation of the person’s own psyche.
For example, if during therapy a person reports that he or she was pursued by a
tiger in a dream, a common psychodynamic interpretation would be that the
tiger symbolically stands for the dreamer’s aggressive side. Some therapists (fol-
lowing Jung’s Analytic Psychology or Perls’ Gestalt Psychology) may resort to ac-
tive imagery techniques, encouraging the dreamer to stop running away and face
the tiger asking literally or symbolically, “What do you want?” It is possible then
that the tiger might be transformed into something else, less frightening and
more accessible. In fact, the Senoi (or Semai), an aboriginal group in Malaysia,
have developed an elaborate system of dream confrontation, based on establish-
ing rapport with dream beings, which could arguably sublimate and “domesti-
cate” the dream plot and message.²³ Notwithstanding the controversy over the
authenticity of Senoy lucid dreaming,²⁴ its rationale is based on the transforma-
tive power of a genuine dialogue. As long as the tiger is frightening – as long as it
is “it,” it will continue to pursue us, until we take it into account as a Thou. But
does Buber really allow that genuine dialogue is possible intra-psychically? Does
it not contradict the basic assumption that I–Thou relation resides in the inter-
personal (inter-subjective) domain?
From an anthropological perspective, this challenge could be answered by
problematizing the very relevance of a psychodynamic language to Buberian
thinking about dreams. Let us consider the dreams in case. These dreams are
dialogical in two respects. First, designated in scholarly discourse visitational
dreams²⁵ because the dreamer is visited by otherworldly beings, the dreams
are epistemologically located on a cosmological rather than psychological
plane. The dreams constitute charismatic experiences, during which the dreamer
enters the sacred realm of the Garden of Eden and establishes a dialogue with a
transcendent power in the figure of Elijah the prophet. Moreover, Buber asserts
 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. and ed., James Strachey (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1954); Carl Gustav Jung, Dreams, trans. and ed., R. F. C. Hull (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
 K. R. Stewart, “Dream Theory in Malaya.” Complex 6 (1951): 21–33.
 G.William Domhoff, The Mystique of Dreams: A Search for Utopia Through Senoi Dream Theo-
ry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Stephen LaBerge, Exploring the World of Lucid
Dreaming (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990).
 Crapanzano, The Hamadsha.
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that the divine is a phenomenological constant in the world, manifested in a
multiplicity of signs. Yet people usually are not ready, open, or amenable to
these omens. “Each of us is encased in an armor whose task is to ward off
signs… and from generation to generation we perfect the defense apparatus.”²⁶
The dreamers of Beit She’an appear ready to encounter the holy; they engage
in a dialogue with the transcendent power that frequent their dreams; and
they do it directly, despite their plebeian background, without the mediation
of the religious authorities, and often against their will. I believe that Buber
would have nodded in approval over this kind of liaison with the divine,
based on the prophetic, inherently dialogic experience of visitational dreams.
Second, and more importantly perhaps, the community of dreamers under
discussion cultivated a dialogic genre which is ordinarily absent from modern
public life. Related to the fact that visitational dreams are epistemologically
grounded in a cosmological rather than psychological ground, they are also sit-
uated in a social milieu that allows for culturally enjoined frames of disclosure
and dream-telling. Unlike the modern psychological view of dreaming as em-
blematic of private, subjective, and largely ineffable experiences, here the
dreams unabashedly went public.What had started as a representation of expe-
rience, of the world, has become a cultural thing in the world. The dreams were
told and retold, mainly during visits to the shrines, whether on annual celebra-
tions (hillulot) or on other occasions. This resonates with Jung’s word: “In the
deepest sense, we all dream not out of ourselves but out of what lies between
us and the other.”²⁷ The gay and festive atmosphere that pervaded the dream-
telling settings, resonate with anthropologist Victor Turner’s notion of communi-
tas, and liminality. Turnerian anthropology is dialogic to the core. Generally
speaking, it might be argued that dialogue is typically liminal, involving betwixt
and between. It is also liminal in the sense that it produces a semi-private space
and time shared by interlocutors to the partial exclusion of the rest of the world.
More to the point, according to Turner, “the bonds of communitas are anti-struc-
tural in the sense that they are undifferentiated, equalitarian, direct, extant, non-
rational (but not irrational), existential, I–Thou (in Feuerbach’s and Buber’s
sense) relationships… Communitas is spontaneous, immediate, concrete – it is
not shaped by norms, it is not institutionalized, it is not abstract.”²⁸ In another
place Turner defines communitas as “a spontaneously generated relationship be-
tween leveled and equal total and individuated human beings, stripped of struc-
 Buber, The Way of Response, 119.
 Jung, Dreams, 173.
 Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 274.
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tural attributes…”²⁹ In yet another place it is “a direct, immediate, and total con-
frontation of human beings.”³⁰ While Turner’s conception of pilgrimage as the
event where “the other become a brother” is certainly idealized, it can still be
argued that the climate of saint worship and pilgrimage does foster a dialogic
exchange with the transformative quality of I–Thou.
In conclusion, I would like to dwell on three notions that are pertinent to the
essence of dialogic anthropology and that can be highlighted in the case under
study. First, dialogic anthropology is strongly associated with the notion of emer-
gence: the social and cultural world is not something independent from histor-
ical instances of native discourse but is made and remade precisely in such in-
stances. Buber viewed man as world-maker through dialogue. Dialogic
anthropology seeks to engage native speakers in their active “world-making”
role. In the case under study, the authority and legitimacy of Yaish’s revelation
was communally validated through the dream dialogue that ensued. Moreover,
the notions of site and saint were created anew with each dream and were ne-
gotiated and shaped in the course of the exchange between the dreamers.
Note that in the dream appendix, Yaish’s revelation was reproduced in the
dreams of the two other dreamers, Meir and Rachel. Each has created his or
her own version of Paradise based on his or her particular life experiences.
Second, dialogic anthropology is linked to the notion of performance: verbal
meaning is an emergent property of performance, conceived as a fully engaged
social event and constructed jointly through the actions of all the participants in
the event. Thus dialogic anthropology is about language, discourse, and dia-
logue as world making. Dialogue, like other social events, requires the tacit col-
lusion of all the participants who implicitly agree that they are interpreting
events within the same framework. These requirements were satisfied in the
Gate of Paradise, because visitational dreams functioned as “swing concepts,”³¹
bridging mental, intra-psychic processes and collective, interpersonal and inter-




 Waud H. Kracke, “Reflections on the Savage Self: Interpretation, Empathy, Anthropology,” in
The Making of Psychological Anthropology II, eds., M. M. Suarez-Orosco, G. Spindler, and L. Spin-
dler (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1994), 195–222.
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Following anthropologist Gananath Obeyesekere,³² a personal symbol is
viewed as located in between the private and the public, amalgamating individ-
ual experiences and cultural symbols. The emergence of the community of be-
lievers in Beit She’an, based on a rich dream-based dialogue, was made possible
because the visitational dreams were not idiosyncratically construed. Rather,
they stemmed from an established tradition of dreaming that relied on a widely
shared vocabulary of cultural symbols. The authority of visitational dreams, their
power to bind people to the shrine and to each other, and to constitute a mean-
ingful dialogue between them, was predicated on this shared vocabulary, in
which saint and site were the major cultural idioms. As the dream reports in
the appendix indicate, the dreamers employed the idioms of Elijah and Paradise
in their dreams to articulate and cope with a wide variety of individual experi-
ences.While offering this “therapeutic” function, which in itself was likely to en-
hance the attraction of the shrine for the dreamers, dreams of Elijah and para-
dise also served as corroborative evidence for the validity of Yaish’s revelation
underlying it and for engaging it on a truly dialogic level (the admixture of
the private and the public). In their dreams, Meir, Rachel and other dreamers re-
vived and relived Yaish’s revelation, discovering anew their own version of Para-
dise.
A Caveat
The notion of communitas is commonly viewed as an idealized articulation of
the spirit of saints’ pilgrimages since it has not been confirmed whenever put
to empirical test.³³ The sense of comradeship and solidarity in Beit She’an com-
munity of dreamers was not an exception. The Gate of Paradise did not last more
than two decades, despite the glamour of visitational dreams.Without going into
the reasons for its downfall, we should ask how realistic are Buber’s ideas re-
garding the establishment and, more challengingly, of the maintenance of I –
Though relationships in our world? Note that visitational dreams played a deci-
sive role in the exciting charismatic phase of the foundation of the shrine, but
 Gannanath Obeyesekere, Medusa’s Hair: An Essay on Personal Symbols and Religious Expe-
rience (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981); G. Obeyesekere, The Work of Culture,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).
 Yoram Bilu, “The Inner Limits of Communitas: A Covert Dimension of Pilgrimage Behavior.”
Ethos 16/3 (1988): 302–325; John Eade and Michael J. Sallnow, “Introduction.” Eade and Sal-
lnow, eds., Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage (London: Rout-
ledge,1991) pp. 1–29.
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their effects proved to be short-lived. To sustain the initial enthusiasm (which the
dreams reflected and further enhanced), to lengthen the “shelf life” of the shrine
by institutionalizing the charismatic phase of the revelation (again, evident in
the “dream epidemic” that swept the community), a critical set of prosaic pre-
conditions had to be fulfilled. A new shrine cannot make itself a name without
a basic infrastructure to properly absorb the visitors and an effective promotion
campaign to attract people to the new shrine. All this involves resources and po-
litical sophistication that dream dialogue alone cannot provide, even when it is
supposedly stemming from the noble ground of communitas and I – Though re-
lationships.
Appendix
1. Yaish: Announcement to the Public
I, O’hana Yaish who lives in Beit Shean, Neighborhood D, 210/2, have been priv-
ileged by the Lord to see wonders. In my first dream a tsaddiq revealed himself to
me and told me to dig in the yard behind my house. I started digging and sud-
denly a gate was disclosed to me. I entered through the gate, and marvelous
things were revealed to my eyes. I saw a pool with fresh water and a lot of plants
around it. I kept on going and saw a splendid, bountiful garden, and rabbis
walking around the garden, enjoying the brightness of the place. One of the rab-
bis turned to me and told me that I must take good care of the place because it is
holy. He also told me to inform anyone who would like to come to the place that
first he must cleanse himself.
I didn’t pay attention to the dream even though it came back every day on
that week. But then, on the second week, I was bothered again (by another
dream). I dreamed that I was standing between two cypress trees in the yard
of my house and I heard a voice calling to me in these words: Listen, listen, lis-
ten. Three times the voice was heard. I stood there trembling from head to toe,
and the voice continued, telling me that the place were I stood was holy and I
must maintain its holiness.
And again on the third week, on Sabbath eve, I went to the synagogue to
pray. After the prayer I came back home, did the kiddush, and sat down to
eat. After dinner I went out to the yard, and suddenly a gate was revealed to
me in the same place, and I saw light burning in the entrance. And again I
heard the same voice calling me in the same words: Listen, listen, listen. And
this time it was a reality, not a dream. And I was told that this was the gate of
Paradise. And I was asked to build an iron gate and to clean the place, and to
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put it in order. I was also asked to announce in all the synagogues and to inform
the public at large that those who would like to frequent the place must first cut
their fingernails and purify themselves and make repentance.
Then my wife had a dream in which I came to her and told her that we have
to prepare a seudah (festive meal) and call it after Elijah the Prophet.
Exegesis: The announcement, written down and promulgated to the inhabi-
tants of Beit She’an, describes the entire set of experiences, most of them dream
revelations, which led Ya’ish to locate the Gate of Paradise in his back yard. The
events described in the announcement took place over three weeks in the month
of Elul, during which Ya’ish gradually came to realize the identity of the holy site.
The opening dream, which recurred and troubled Ya’ish for a week, was visually
the most rich. The dreamer’s naivety—which probably enhanced his credibility—
was augmented by his stubborn refusal to engage the nocturnal message he re-
ceived. Furthermore, he failed to identify the tsaddiq who offered the revelation
and identified the site (Bilu & Abramovitch 1985)—even though typological and
traditional images of the Garden of Eden pervade the dream. The Announcement
hinted at the site’s identity by using expressions like “a wonderful garden” and
“I must maintain its holiness (cf. Genesis 2:15).” This emphasis on the dreamer’s
passivity, which presented him as an instrument that conveyed messages from
authoritative beings and voices, reinforced the claim to a revelation from an out-
side source. Nevertheless, the Announcement included some active descriptions
(“I started digging”; “I entered”; “I kept on going”), which underlined the per-
sonal and spontaneous nature of the inspiration and which foreshadow the ini-
tiative and activity involved in establishing the site—beginning with writing the
announcement.
After the first dream,Ya’ish did not again go through the Gate of Paradise. In
other words, the dream was, for him, a miraculous initiation dream, a one-time
event. Instead, he received oral messages that highlighted the site’s holiness,
until it was finally identified. These messages, each with a ceremonial opening,
echoed classic biblical revelations, beginning with Jacob’s dream (which also
centered on a wondrous gate— “the gate of heaven,” Gen. 28:17), through
Moses at the burning bush, to Samuel’s initiation dream at Shilo. The link to
these two latter events can be seen in the phonetic similarity between the He-
brew word for “listen,” tishma, and God’s address to these prophets by their
names, “Moshe, Moshe” (Ex. 3:4) and “Shmuel, Shmuel” (I Sam. 3:10). The link
to the episode of the burning bush can also be seen in the similarity of the in-
junctions: “the place where I stood is a holy place,” the voices told Ya’ish;
like the admonition to Moses in Exodus 3:5: “the place where you stand is
holy ground.”
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The revelatory sequence reached its apex at the end of the third week, when
the identity of the place was conveyed to Ya’ish directly. The fact that this peak
experience took place in waking reality granted it additional authority. Note the
timing of the revelation—a Sabbath eve at the end of Elul, the month of peni-
tence that leads to the High Holidays. This, together with the activities that pre-
ceded the revelation—evening prayer in the synagogue, the Kiddush ritual, and
Sabbath meal—converged to produce an apposite backdrop for the revelation.
The revelation occurred at an intersection of sacred time, sacred space, and ap-
propriate ritual activity (Eliade 1959).
2. Meir’s Dream
I am walking near Kittan (a local textile factory) juncture, on the old road to Beit-
She’an. There was some sort of hut, and I saw someone there, looking like a re-
ligious kibbutz member, with kova tembel on his head (a typical Israeli hat, one
of the Israel’s national symbols in its first years). He was sitting there, and I saw
myself as if I were going to work (in Kittan). He says to me: “Shalom Meir, how
are you?” and I reply: “Shalom, what are you doing here?” And he points at this
house (Yaish’s), toward the wadi, indicating that they are working there with
compressors, digging some sort of a stream. I ask him why, and he says to
me: “Look, the stream as it exists today, the rain always blocks it. The passage
they dig, it’s in the direction of this (Yaish’s) house.” And I ask him: “What hap-
pened?” And he says: “Look, here it always overflows; that is, it disrupts the traf-
fic and all this. So we would like to dig a stream here.” And he shows me how
they work.
Suddenly I meet another person, and he also asks me how I am. And the
place is full of trees; really, trees all over, and people are coming out of the
place, old-timers, like Yemenite Jews. And a young man was standing there,
like I told you before, a kibbutz member with kova tembel. And I ask him:
“Who are these people?” And he replies: “This is an old moshav ( a semi-coop-
erative village), and in the morning every one is going on his work.” And I see
them, one with a basket, another with a bicycle, etc. I asked him: Can I see
this?” And he says: “Sure.” I entered that place and, instead of seeing some
sort of a moshav, I saw something like his (Yaish’s) house.
And I see something like a hospital, a Sick-Fund clinic, girls with white
gowns, all this. And I see a man sitting there, with three bottles of wine near
him, and inside the bottles there are mirtles. I ask him: “Tell me, are these mir-
tles? I would like to ask you a question.” And this is what I asked him: “Why
doesn’t every plant succeed?” He replied: “Look, this is a secret I can’t divulge.”
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And I see the people, like sick people, sitting there, as in a Sick-fund clinic. And
he tells them to take some arak from the bottles, as if they threw away (the pills)
…As if they took some pills or something, and now they don’t take these pills
anymore. And he gives them some arak to drink, this is their medicine. And I
ask them: “Well, how do you feel?” And they say: “All the pain that we had –
with the stuff he has given us, it’s O. K., it’s passes away.”
And I go on and I see a third man, and I ask him: “What do you plant here?”
And he says, “Look mister, here, near the entrance to Beit-She’an, we already
planted something one year ago, but the inhabitants spoiled what we had plant-
ed. Then I say: “You should blame no one. You informed us neither by letters nor
through the Ministry of Religion or the local municipality.” Then he says: “You’ll
receive a letter and then you’ll know.” That’s what he said to me.
Exegesis: In contrast with Ya’ish’s dreams, which take place in a contextual
vacuum, Meir’s dream involved places and characters from Beit She’an and its
environs—the Kitan junction (the location of the factory where Meir worked), a
man from a religious kibbutz (of which there are several just south of Beit
She’an (, an old Yemenite moshav, a clinic, and of course Ya’ish’s home, where
the dreamer was headed. The diversion of the creek towards the house signaled
the identity of the site—Genesis 2:10 states that “a river went out of Eden to water
the garden.” The creek supplied the water for the sapling to grow, the sapling
symbolizing the shrine. In the prosaic municipal context in which the dreamer
lived, the new road, meant to enable easy, unobstructed access by car to the
holy site, signified a wish that word of the site spread and that it become
more popular. The excavation work itself may have signified laying the founda-
tions and the development of infrastructure for construction on the site, and per-
haps also unearthing the opening (in the dream, the “crossing”), the heart of the
site. (Meir was in fact a vocal supporter of a proposal to conduct archaeological
excavations at the site.) The figures he met indicated that, for Meir, the way to
the Gate of Paradise, which ended in a development town inhabited mostly by
North African Jews, began in a religious (Ashkenazi) kibbutz and went through
an old Yemenite moshav. This is more than a hint of the expansiveness of Meir’s
vision, which addressed the shrine’s social significance (an element completely
lacking in Ya’ish’s revelation dreams). Indeed, in his subsequent dreams, the
Gate of Paradise took on the character of an all-Israeli shrine, which drew
large crowds that included familiar Israeli figures of the 1980s such as Prime
Minister Menachem Begin, President Yitzhak Navon, and Israel’s Sephardi
Chief Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef.
The identification of the site’s vicinity as a tree-lined moshav may have de-
rived from the appearance of Ya’ish’s street, which was lined by one-story houses
surrounded by trees and shrubs. At the same time, it could refer to the tradition-
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al pastoral image of the Garden of Eden and its residents (in which case “old”
may refer to tsaddiqim). The dream transition from Ya’ish’s home to the adjacent
medical clinic probably derives from the functional similarity between the two
institutions, which were competing centers of healing, but it also derived from
the physical proximity between them in waking reality. Beyond the presentation
of the shrine as a place of healing, the conjunction between the two made it pos-
sible to display the superiority of the traditional over the modern system: the
araq and myrtle replaced the pills as the preferred medicine.
The optimism that the dream projected was accompanied by apprehension
and uncertainty about the realization of the vision, summed up in the key ques-
tion, “why doesn’t every planting succeed?” The question’s importance was pre-
figured in its formal prelude: “‘I want to ask a question.’ This is what I asked,” as
it was in the mystery surrounding the reply. The answer came from a third per-
son, who appeared in the dream soon before its end. He said that the sapling—
the holy site—had already been planted a year before at the entrance to Beit
She’an (Ya’ish lived close to the town’s western entrance), but that the inhabi-
tants “ruined it” (were not worthy?). Meir’s attempts to validate the revelation,
which in the real world led him to take upon himself to apply to well-known rab-
bis and to suggest archaeological excavations at the site, are expressed here in
his longing for a concrete sign that the sapling had taken root. The references
to the town council and the Ministry of Religion as “addressees” in the matter
suggest these institutions’ reluctance to recognize the shrine in the absence of
corroboration other than the dreams. The promise, at the end of a dream, that
a letter would arrive probably referred to the Announcement to the Public that
Ya’ish disseminated throughout Beit She’an; indeed, Meir’s dream may well
have catalyzed it.
From the perspective of the dream as a whole, it looks as if the three figures
that guided Meir along his way to the shrine all represent the site’s patron, Elijah
the Prophet. In Jewish folklore, Elijah often appears incognito, in the guise of a
variety of characters. This can explain his manifestation as a religious kibbutznik
in a cloth cap. The fact that the first two figures greeted the dreamer is of great
significance in this context, because encounters with Elijah in which he greets
those who encounter him on the road are considered to be of greater value
than those in which there is no verbal interaction with him.
In conclusion, clearly Meir’s vision placed Ya’ish’s revelation experience cen-
trally on the plane of community and the collective. It imbued the revelation with
meaning deriving from its local context in Beit She’an. The dream displayed the
huge importance Meir ascribed to the site as a center of healing and renewal, as
well as his intense hope to play a central role in its development and promotion.
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3. Rachel’s Dream
I dreamed that I go to Yaish’s house and I stand before the gate there. I knock on
the door and a tiny old man with a hat comes out. I ask him: ‘Where is Yaish?’ He
says: ‘Yaish isn’t here, I replace him, I take care of the house.What do you want?’
I say: ‘I came because I don’t feel well, I have problems with my pregnancy, give
me some arak from the place.’ Then he asks me: ‘Did you take a (ritual) bath?’
And I know that only tomorrow I should take the bath (indicating the regaining
of purity after the menstrual period). I say: ‘No, only tomorrow I go.’ He says: No!
I don’t agree, no one will enter this place without taking the ritual bath.’ I say to
him: ‘But Yaish, whenever I ask him, says that I don’t have to take the bath if I
am clean.’ He says, waving his hand: ‘No, you are not allowed to enter! and Yaish
should know that from this day on no woman would enter this place without tak-
ing the ritual bath first.’ I said O. K. He didn’t let me in. He stood with me at the
entrance. Then he says: ‘Wait here, I’ll bring you something.’ He gave me a glass
of arak and an orange, and I went home.
And my mother – I lost her when I was 14. And then I see her waiting for me
at home. She says: ‘Where have you been? How come you’ve disappeared. I have
been waiting for you for so long.’ I told her: ‘Mother, we have a place,what shall I
say, in that house every wish is granted. She said: ‘Come on, take me there, to
that place. I took her there. And I saw her standing, holding a baby and feeding
him with milk.
Exegesis: The dream is divided into two separate but thematically related
parts. As in most of her dream visits to the site, here too Rachel arrived as a sup-
plicant, with an actual life problem, related to her pregnancy. She met the gate-
keeper of the site, apparently a representation of Elijah, and asked him for a rem-
edy, some araq from the place. The tsaddiq’s refusal to let her in because she had
not immersed herself may have indicated a sense of guilt concerning her level of
religious observance. Following her marriage Rachel moved away from religion,
but after a while she repented and adopted a more religious lifestyle, to her hus-
band’s chagrin. The emergence of the Gate of Paradise in her neighborhood, and
Ya’ish’s explicit demand that she become fully observant, reinforced her existing
tendency towards religiosity, and served as a major source of support for her in
her contention with her husband. In the end, her husband accepted the religious
lifestyle that Rachel instituted in their home. It may be that the episode in the
dream had to do with this increased observance. The story also contained a re-
proach to Ya’ish for not enforcing more strictly the demand that female visitors
be ritually pure. The bitter pill of being refused entry was ameliorated by the fact
that Rachel became a mediator between the tsaddiq and Ya’ish. Her status and
close relationship with the tsaddiq is indicated by the araq and orange she re-
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ceives—another expression of oral nourishment, and an assurance that her dif-
ficult pregnancy, the reason for her visit to the site, would end well. (This may
reflect the popular belief that a pregnant woman should be given everything
she craves—see Bab. Talmud Yoma 72a.)
The second part of the dream was brief but striking, because Rachel met her
late mother. Her mother’s words, “Where did you vanish, my sweet? I’ve been
waiting for you for so long,” seem to be manifestly a projection of Rachel’s
sense of loss—her mother left her when she was young and needed her most.
The dynamic connection between this reunification with her mother and the
Gate of Paradise became concrete when the two of them visited the site together.
The moving conclusion displayed an explicit oral wish. The baby may have rep-
resented the dreamer returning to her mother’s bosom (and milk), thus receiving
compensation for her painful loss. Or maybe it was an infant her mother never
saw in life—the baby born to Rachel, healthy and whole, after her visit to the site.
Either way, it is clear that, for Rachel, the shrine was a kind of protective mother
surrogate.
The dream’s two parts have clear parallels. In both, the dreamer faces paren-
tal figures—the tsaddiq, a classic father figure, and her mother. In both, these
figures appear as nurturers and nourishers and, in both, the sustenance that
the figures grant is directed at the baby’s health, before or after his birth.
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Andreas Kraft
Jüdische Identität im Liminalen und
das dialogische Prinzip bei Martin Buber
Einleitung
Wir leben in Zeiten, in denen die Frage nach den Möglichkeiten und Formen von
Dialog von besonderer sozialer Dringlichkeit zu sein scheint. Der vorliegende
Beitrag möchte versuchen, durchaus kritisch die Frage zu stellen ob und wie
Bubers Modell des Dialogs hier nutzbar gemacht werden kann. Der kritische Blick
wird dabei über einen vermeintlichen Umweg erreicht: In einem ersten Schritt
möchte ich den Einfluss aufzeigen, den Martin Buber auf die Theorien des Eth-
nologen Victor Turner hatte. Mit den Einsichten Victor Turners in die Funktion von
Passageriten möchte ich dann – in einem zweiten Schritt – zur Person und Werk
Martin Bubers zurückkehren und ein Problem thematisieren, dass sich dort ergibt,
wo geglaubt wird, dass Gesellschaft durch die Verwirklichung einer durch Dialog
getragenen Gemeinschaft abgelöst werden kann.
Die Communitas im Werk Victor Turners
Das Leben und die biologische Entwicklung führen das Individuum durch ver-
schiedene Phasen des Wandels, die auf sozialer Ebene einen Wechsel der Grup-
penzugehörigkeit nach sich ziehen. Geburt, der Eintritt in das Erwachsenenleben,
Heirat und Tod sind Phasen, in denen ein Individuum von einer Gruppenzuge-
hörigkeit zu einer anderen wechseln muss, ohne dass dieser Prozess die stabilen
statischen Gruppengrenzen auflösen darf. Der Anthropologe Van Gennep er-
kannte in seinem berühmten Buch „Les rites de passage“¹ in den sogenannten
Übergangsriten ein Verfahren, das jene stabilitätsgefährdende Dynamik, die im
Wechsel liegt, so kanalisiert, dass die soziale Ordnung nicht in Frage gestellt wird.
Am Beispiel der räumlichen Übergänge arbeitet er ein dreistufiges Model der
Übergangsriten heraus: nach einer Trennungsphase, in der das Individuum sich
vom eigenen Territorium löst, tritt es in einer sakralen Schwellenphase in einen
Bereich der Undefiniertheit und Neutralität ein, der dann zugunsten einer An-
 Zitiert nach Arnold van Gennep, Übergangsriten. (Les rites de passage). Aus dem Französi-
schen von Klaus Schomburg und Sylvia M. Schomburg-Scherff (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1999).
gliederungsphase an ein neues Territoriumwieder verlassen wird. „Jeder, der sich
von der einen Sphäre in die andere begibt, befindet sich eine Zeitlang sowohl
räumlich als auch magisch-religiös in einer besonderen Situation: er schwebt
zwischen zwei Welten. Diese Situation bezeichne ich als Schwellenphase.“² Tur-
ner knüpft direkt an van Gennep und dessen Untersuchungen zum Übergangritus
an undwidmet sich besonders dermittleren Phase, also jene des Übergangs, die er
als liminal bezeichnet.
Die Initianden unterliegen in dieser liminalen Phase einem „Nivellierungs“-
Prozess, an dessen Ende sie nur noch mit „Zeichen ihres liminalen Nicht-Status“
markiert sind.³ Sie verlieren den Namen, sie werden anonymisiert bezüglich der
Kleidung oder auch des Geschlechts und fallen damit aus dem hierarchisch ge-
gliederten System politischer, rechtlicher und wirtschaftlicher Positionen heraus.
Damit besitzt das Schwellenwesen „keinen Status, kein Eigentum, keine Insi-
gnien, keine weltliche Kleidung, also keinerlei Dinge (…), die auf einen Rang, eine
Rolle oder Position im Verwandtschaftsystem verweisen.“⁴ In jener Phase der
Loslösung aus den Verbindlichkeiten der normalen Realität wird der Initiand in
magische und künstlerische Verfahren eingewiesen, die ihm Elemente einer
Ordnung an die Hand geben, mit denen er in spielerischer Weise neue Kombi-
nationen erproben kann, ohne dass dies zu einer Gefahr für die außerrituelle
Gesellschaft werden könnte. „Mit anderen Worten, in der Liminalität ‚spielen‘ die
Menschen mit den Elementen des Vertrauten und verfremden sie. Und aus den
unvorhergesehenen Kombinationen vertrauter Elemente entsteht Neues.“⁵
Für jenen Bereich, in dem Strukturelemente der nicht-liminalen Sphäre einer
spielerischen Neukombination unterworfen werden, führt Turner den Begriff
Antistruktur ein. Brian Sutton-Smith hat das dahinterstehende Konzept über-
nommen, doch dafür einen anderen Begriff, den des „protostrukturellen Sys-
tems“, vorgeschlagen. Die Liminalität ist als protostrukturelles System hier
„gleichsamdas Samenbeet kultureller Kreativität.“⁶ In der Liminalität werden nun
Erfahrungen von Gemeinschaft gemacht, die auf die umliegende soziale Struktur
innovativ wirken können.
 Van Gennep, Übergangsriten, 29.
 Victor Turner; „Das Liminale und das Liminoide in Spiel, ‘Fluß’ und Ritual. Ein Essay zur
vergleichenden Symbologie,“ in: ders.;Vom Ritual zum Theater. Der Ernst des menschlichen Spiels
(Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 1989), 38.
 Victor Turner, Das Ritual. Struktur und Anti-Struktur (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1989), 95.
 Turner; „Das Liminale“, 40.
 Ibid., 41.
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Neben dem Liminalen führt Turner einen weiteren Begriff ein: die Commu-
nitas. Sie ist in der liminalen Sphäre die genuine Form der zwischenmenschlichen
Begegnung.
Den Begriff leitet er von Martin Bubers Terminus der Gemeinschaft ab, den er
als Sozialwissenschaftler nicht voll anerkennen mag, aber auf den er als „einen
begabten einheimischen Informanten“⁷ zurückgreift. Buber selbst bezieht sich auf
Ferdinand Tönnies, von dem die Dichotomie von Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft
stammt,⁸ aber auch auf Max Weber und dessen Unterscheidung von Verge-
meinschaftung und Vergesellschaftung: Als Vergemeinschaftung bezeichnet
Weber jene soziale Beziehung, die auf „subjektiv gefühlter (affektueller oder tra-
ditioneller) Zusammengehörigkeit der Beteiligten beruht“.⁹ „Vergemeinschaftung
kann auf jeder Art von affektueller oder emotionaler oder aber traditioneller
Grundlage beruhen: eine pneumatische Brüdergemeinde, eine erotische Bezie-
hung, ein Pietätsverhältnis, eine ‚nationale‘ Gemeinschaft, eine kameradschaft-
lich zusammenhaltende Truppe.“¹⁰ Demgegenüber beruht die Vergesellschaftung
„auf rational (wert- oder zweckrational) motivierten Interessenausgleich oder
ebenso motivierter Interessenverbindung.“¹¹
Buber stellt nun fest, daß Webers These, die Gemeinschaft würde über das
Band der geteilten Emotionen sich bilden, nicht genüge¹² und führt das Beispiel
eine Gruppe von Menschen an, die aufgrund einer leidenschaftlichen Unzufrie-
denheit gegenüber den Zuständen sich in einem revolutionären „Verein“ zu-
sammenschließen: „Es kann sein, daß eine Gemeinschaft aus ihm (dem Verein;
A. K.) wird, aber dadurch, daß er die Gefühle der zusammengeschlossenen Per-
sonen zusammengelegt hat, dadurch ist zwischen diesen Personen Gemeinschaft
noch lange nicht entstanden.“¹³ Buber sieht in der Gemeinschaft eben nicht nur
einen „Gefühlsverband“ sondern eine „Lebensverband.“¹⁴ Ein solcher Lebens-
verband beruht nicht auf einem Zusammenschluss aufgrund partieller Gemein-
 Turner, Ritual, 124.
 Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1979).




 Martin Buber; „Wie kann Gemeinschaft werden?“. In: ders., Pfade in Utopia. Über Gemeinschaft
und deren Verwirklichung. 3. Auflage (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1985), 281f .; siehe auch den
Aufsatz gleichen Titels: Martin Buber; „Wie kann Gemeinschaft werden?,“ in ders. Der Jude und sein
Judentum. Gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden. 2. durchges. Aufl. (Köln: J. Melzer, 1993), 352.
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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samkeiten, wie Emotionen oder – im Falle der Gesellschaft – Interessen, sondern
hier schließen sich Menschen in ihrer Ganzheit zusammen zu einer Gruppe, die
mit der „ganzen Existenz bejaht, bewährt, gelebt“ wird.¹⁵
Die Gesellschaft ist dagegen für Buber ein mechanischer Typ des Zusam-
menlebens, eine „geordnete Getrenntheit, äußerlich zusammengehalten durch
Zwang, Vertrag, Konvention, öffentliche Meinung“¹⁶, die sich aus der ursprüng-
lichen Form des organischen Zusammenlebens, der Gemeinschaft entwickelt hat.
Die Gemeinschaft ist Ausdruck und Ausbildung des Ursprünglichen, die Totalität des Men-
schen vertretenden, naturhaft einheitlichen, bildungsgetragenen Willens, die Gesellschaft
des differenzierten, vom abgelösten Denken erzeugten, aus der Totalität gebrochenen, vor-
teilssüchtigen.¹⁷
Während somit bei Max Weber Vergemeinschaftung und Vergesellschaftung als
zwei mögliche Formen der sozialen Gruppenbildung mehr oder minder wertfrei
nebeneinander stehen, hebt Buber auf eine deutliche Wertung und Hierarchi-
sierung ab: die Gemeinschaft ist hier eine ‚natürliche‘, dem Menschen eigentlich
angemessenste Form des Zusammenlebens, die von denen in der modernen, in-
dustriellen Gesellschaft herrschenden Bedingungen massiv bedroht wird.
Auf diese Vorstellung der Gemeinschaft als genuin menschliche Begegnung,
die nur jenseits der Überformungen durch die Gesellschaft möglich ist, greift
Turner zurück, wenn er mit dem Begriff der Communitas die Erfahrung des Kol-
lektivs im Liminalen beschreibt: Communitas tritt nur dort auf, „wo Sozialstruktur
nicht ist.“¹⁸ Es ergeben sich somit zwei Modelle von Sozialbeziehungen:
Das erste Modell stellt Gesellschaft als strukturiertes, differenziertes und oft hierarchisch
gegliedertes System politischer, rechtlicher und wirtschaftlicher Positionen mit vielen Arten
der Bewertung dar, die die Menschen im Sinne eines ‚mehr‘ oder ‚weniger‘ trennen. Das
zweite Modell, das in der Schwellenphase deutlich erkennbar wird, ist das der Gesellschaft
als unstrukturierte oder rudimentär strukturierte und relativ undifferenzierte Gemeinschaft,
Communitas, oder auch als Gemeinschaft Gleicher, die sich gemeinsam der allgemeinen
Autorität der rituellen Ältesten unterwerfen.¹⁹
 Ibid., 353.
 Martin Buber; „Gemeinschaft“. In: ders., Pfade in Utopia. Über Gemeinschaft und deren Ver-
wirklichung. 3, erheblich erweiterte Neuausgabe (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1985), 264.
 Ibid., 263.
 Turner, Ritual, 124. Zur Communitas siehe auch Victor Turner; „Variationds on a Theme of
Liminality,“ in: ders., Blazing the Trail. Way Marks in the Exploration of Symbols, ed., Edith Turner
(Tucson & London: University of Arizona Press, 1992), 58–61.
 Turner, Ritual, 96.
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In der Communitas erleben sich die Individuen in einer Einheit, die alle Menschen
jenseits der Hierarchien vereint. Zentral für die Begegnung der Individuen in der
Communitas ist, so Turner, der Dialog im Sinne Bubers: im Liminalen entsteht im
Dialog ein wahres Ich-Du Verhältnis des „Zwischenmenschlichen“²⁰, bei dem sich
zwei Individuen als ganze und konkrete Menschen begegnen. „Nur wenn ich mit
einem Anderen wesentlich zu tun bekomme, so also, daß er gar nicht mehr ein
Phänomen meines Ich, dafür aber mein Du ist, nur dann erfahre ich die Wirklichkeit
des Mit-einem-redens – in der unverbrüchlichen Echtheit der Gegenseitigkeit“.²¹
Das dialogische Prinzip, das darauf abzielt, im Gegenüber einwesenhaftes Du zu
erfahren, ist also der Versuch, eine Kommunikation jenseits der sozialen Überfor-
mungen, der politischen Zwänge, der Ideologien und Dogmen zu ermöglichen. In
diesemDialog soll derMensch für einenAugenblick aus der Gesellschaft sich befreien
und in eine Gemeinschaft eintreten. In dieser Begegnung entsteht ein „wesenhaftes
Wir“²², das im Zentrum der Communitaserfahrung steht.
Als ein Bereich des von strukturellen Zwängen befreiten menschlichen Zu-
sammenlebens ist die Communitas für Turner auch ein Ort, an dem besonders
Utopien der Gesellschaft sich entwickeln können, die auf das Zusammenleben der
Individuen abzielen. Die Communitas entwickelt hier ein regeneratives Potential,
das auf die Gesellschaft wirkt und diese auf jene idealen Grundlagen menschli-
chen Zusammenlebens immer wieder zurückverweist, die in der Strukturierung
gesellschaftlichen Lebens verlorengehen. „Keine Gesellschaft kann ohne diese
Dialektik auskommen.“²³
Martin Buber mit Victor Turner gelesen
Ich möchte mich mit dem Konzept von Communitas als Form der dialogischen
Begegnung von Menschen jenseits einer Überformung durch soziale und politi-
sche Strukturen und Hierarchien nun Bubers Leben und Werk zuwenden. Die
Frage nach Identität und Gemeinschaft ist eines der zentralen Themen mit denen
sich Buber ein Leben lang beschäftigt hat.Von Interesse ist nun,wie bei dem oben
skizzierten Verständnis von Gemeinschaft, das alle äußeren sozial-hierarchischen
Eigenschaften hinter sich lassen will, Identität überhaupt möglich ist. Um Bubers
Antwort auf diese Frage zu zeigen, muss ich kurz zurück in seine vor-dialogische
 Ibid., 132.
 Martin Buber, Das Dialogische Prinzip. 8. Aufl. (Gerlingen: Lambert Schneider, 1997), 216, von
Turner zitiert in Ritual, 133.
 Turner, „Das Liminale“, 72.
 Turner, Ritual, 126.
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Zeit gehen, hier besonders auf die Prager Reden, die 1909 und 1910 entstanden
sind und die eine große Wirkung auf das postassimilatorische Judentum hatten.
Buber formuliert hier programmatisch eine notwendige Besinnung auf das
Urjudentum. Damit meint er aber nicht einfach ein Wiederaufgreifen alter Tra-
ditionen, sondern vielmehr ein Besinnen auf ein „unterirdisches Judentum,“²⁴ das
über all die Jahrhunderte des Exils und der damit verbundenen Entfremdung der
Juden von ihren Quellenweiter einen Traditionsfaden aufrechterhielt, an denman
nun anknüpfen soll. Dabei sind die Blutsbande von entscheidender Bedeutung,
denn diese gewährleisten, dass jeder einzelne Jude, und sei er noch so sehr von
den Bedingungen der Exilheimat in seiner jüdischen Identität überformt, wieder
mit seiner Existenz an diese Tradition anknüpfen kann. Zugleichmacht Buber aber
auch deutlich, dass er jegliche Religionsgesetze und Riten, die sonst die Tradition
ausmachen unddamit identitätsstabilisierend sind, zurückweist: für Buber hat die
Rabbinische Tradition vielmehr ebenso entfremdend von denwahren Quellen des
Judentums gewirkt, wie die Assimilation.
Bubers kritisches Verhältnis zur rabbinischen Tradition läßt sich besonders
dann klar fassen, wenn man Tradition als „Sonderfall von Kommunikation“ ver-
steht, „bei der Nachrichten nicht wechselseitig und horizontal, ausgetauscht,
sondern vertikal entlang einer Generationslinie weitergegeben werden.“²⁵ Ent-
scheidend bei diesemBegriff von Tradition als Kommunikation sind die Strategien
und interpretativen Verfahren, die notwendig sind, um die zu kommunizierende
Information über die Zeit und Generationen hinweg gesichert transportieren zu
können. Bubers gespannte Haltung gegenüber der jüdischen Tradition kann nun
hier als eine Kritik an den Autoritäten verstandenwerden, die eben jene Sicherung
des Traditionsstroms durch Kanonisierung und Auslegung übernehmen.
Bubers Traditions-Kritik setzt genau an dem Übergang von Prophetie zum
Rabbinertum an: Hier konstatiert Buber einen Konflikt zwischen Religion und
Religiosität²⁶, der nicht nur im Judentum zu beobachten ist: die Religiosität, die als
Gefühl, als Verlangen und Willen ein „wahrhaft Zeugendes“ ist, droht zur Reli-
gion, d.h. eine Sammlung von statischen Regeln und Bräuchen zu petrifizieren
und dadurch das Lebendige im Glauben zu ersticken.Wenn Buber bezüglich der
jüdischen Religion behauptet, sie sei ein „offizielles Scheinjudentum“ bei dem es
um die „Knechtungder Religiosität“ gehe, so gehören diese scharfenWorte „in die
 Martin Buber, „Jüdische Religiosität,“ in: ders., Der Jude und sein Judentum. Gesammelte
Aufsätze und Reden. 2. durchges. Aufl. (Gerlingen: Lambert Schneider, 1993), 69.
 Aleida Assmann, Zeit und Tradition. Kulturelle Strategien der Dauer (Köln, Weimar: Böhlau,
1999), 64.
 Siehe hierzu besonders in Bubers Aufsatz „Jüdische Religiosität,“ in: ders., Der Jude und sein
Judentum. Gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden, 64 f.
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Sturm- und Drang-Phase des jugendlichen Revolutionärs,“²⁷ wie Dafna Mach
richtig erkennt. Auch wenn er später diese Dichotomie nicht mehr so radikal
formuliert, so bleibt doch die These eines problematischen Verhältnisses von
Glauben und Glaubensregel bestimmend für Bubers weiteres Denken. Seine Re-
ligionskritik, in der sich seine „völlig mangelnde Beziehung zum Kult“²⁸ aus-
drückt, ist hier deutlich als Traditionskritik erkennbar.
Als Beispielmöchte ich hier nun kurz auf den Text „Jüdisch Leben,“ einenDialog
verweisen, den Buber 1918 verfaßte: in einem Gespräch versucht ein als „Führer“
bezeichneter Lehrer einem „Knaben“ zu erschließen, was es bedeutet, jüdisch zu
leben. Der „Führer“ bestimmt nun das, was „jüdisch leben“ ist im Vergleich zum
„deutsch leben“: „deutsch leben, das heißt nichts anderes, als wahrhaft und voll-
kommen in deutscher Gemeinschaft, in Gemeinschaft mit den Deutschen aller Zeiten
und mit den Deutschen über den Zeiten leben, mit den Menschen, Toten, Lebenden
und Ungeborenen, und durch sie mit der ewigen Idee.“²⁹
Jüdisch Leben ist nun genauso durch das Zusammenleben in jüdischer Ge-
meinschaft bestimmt, die nun aber im eigenen Seelenleben wiedergefunden
werden muss: es geht für den Juden darum, die Stimme im Blut wiederzufinden,
denn so kann in Gemeinschaft mit den Juden der Vergangenheit und Zukunft
leben. Der Talmud als eben jener Text, der gerade für die Sicherung des jüdischen
Lebens durch die Traditionsvermittlung über die Jahrhunderte hinweg verant-
wortlich war, findet hier in diesem Buberschen Modell nicht einmal Erwähnung.
Der Lehrer ist hier keine Autorität, die die Gesetzte vermittelt, sondern nur ein
Helfer, der dem Einzelnen auf seinem individuellenWeg Hilfestellung leistet. Dass
dies den Einzelnen oft jenseits der klaren Gesetze auch in eine Orientierungslo-
sigkeit entlässt, haben Anhänger Bubers kritisiert:
Aber vom Lehrer erwartenwir, daß er Anweisungen dafür gibt,wie wir denWeg gehen sollen.
(…) Buber zeigt uns das Ziel, er zeigt uns in seinen dialogischen Schriften die großen Ge-
fahren der Entpersönlichung unseres Lebens und des Verschwindens des echten Gesprächs,
und doch vermissen wir oft die führende Hand.³⁰
 Dafna Mach, „Erneuerung des Judentums,“ in: Werner Licharz, Heinz Schmidt (Hg.), Martin
Buber. Internationales Symposium zum 20. Todestag. Bd. 1. Dialogik und Dialektik. Arnoldshainer
Texte; Bd. 57 (Frankfurt a.M.: Haag und Herschen Verlag, 1989), 187.
 Mach, „Erneuerung,“ 194.
 Martin Buber, „Jüdisch Leben,“ in: ders., Der Jude und sein Judentum. Gesammelte Aufsätze
und Reden. 2. durchges. Aufl. (Gerlingen: Lambert Schneider, 1993), 679.
 Hugo Bergmann, „Martin Buber und die Mystik,“ in: Paul Arthur Schilpp u. Maurice Friedman
(Hg.), Martin Buber (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), 271 f.
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Bubers Entgegnung auf diesen Vorwurf macht deutlich, wie wichtig ihm die
Selbstbestimmtheit des Einzelnen auf seinem Weg zum Judentum ist:
Freunde und Gegner halten mir vor, daß ich weder einen überlieferten Zusammenhang von
Gesetzen und Vorschriften als absolut gültig anerkenne, noch aber auch ein eigenes System
der Ethik zu bieten habe. In der Tat, das Manko besteht: und es ist mit der Ganzheit meiner
Erkenntnis so eng verbunden, daß eine Ausfüllung undenkbar ist.Wenn ich eine versuche,
würde ich damit den Kern meiner Anschauung verletzen.
‚Vom Lehrer‘ sagte ein Freund, ‚erwarten wir, daß er Anweisungen dafür gibt, wie wir den
Weg gehen sollen.‘ Ich trete eben dieser Erwartung entgegen. Die Richtung soll man vom Lehrer
empfangen, nicht aber die Weise, in der man dieser Richtung zustreben soll: dies muß jeder
selber entdecken und erwerben, jeder die seine, in einer Arbeit, die das beste Vermögen einer
Seele anfordert, ihmaber auch einenSchatz schenkenwird,der für einDasein hinreicht. Soll ihm
diesesgroßeWerkabgenommenwerden?Odermute ich etwademEinzelnen zuviel zu?Wiedenn
als durch solche Zumutung können wir erfahren, wieviel der Einzelne vermag?³¹
An dieser Stelle wird deutlich, wie sehr Bubers Rückbesinnung auf jüdische
Wurzeln zugleich die Selbstbestimmtheit des Individuums in der Moderne zu
verteidigen sucht. Für Buber ist der Glaube an die Freiheit des Individuums nicht
ohne Weiteres mit der Autorität jener Dritten zu vereinbaren, die über Jahrhun-
derte hinweg versuchten, die ursprüngliche religiöse Erfahrung durch verschie-
denste Abschottungen und Einfassungen institutionell zu schützen.
Gerade in dieser Zurückweisung der Autorität der Tradition lag wohl eine Stärke
des Buberschen Verständnisses von jüdischer Identität: mit diesem Judentum, das
den Ritus und das jüdische Gesetzt marginalisierte, konnten sich eben jene bürger-
lichen,post-assimilatorischenStudenten,die denKontaktmit dem Judentumverloren
hatten, wieder identifizieren. In seiner Halacha-Kritik ist Buber eben auch ein typi-
scher Vertreter des emanzipierten Bürgertums und als solcher konnte er in seinen
Texten ein neues, annehmbares Identifikationsangebot machen. Michael Weinrich
sieht in Bubers Schriften ein Ringen um eine Erneuerung des Judentums, das den
Arbeiten Schleiermachers zum Christentum nicht unähnlich ist: bei beiden geht es
darum, den Glauben an die Moderne und das veränderte Selbstverständnis des In-
dividuums anzupassen: „die rückhaltlose Betonung der individuellen Freiheit und
die damit begründete Souveränität gegenüber allen Traditionen“³² macht eine Neu-
bestimmung der Religion nötig. Zugleich ist dies auch bei Buber ein Versuch, das
 Martin Buber; „Antwort,“ in: Paul Arthur Schilpp u. Maurice Friedman (Hg.), Martin Buber,
615.
 Michael Weinrich; „Zwischen den Welten. Martin Buber – eine deutsch-jüdische Symbiose?“
in:Werner Licharz (Hg.),Martin Bubers Erbe für unsere Zeit. Bd. 1: Ein Textbuch anläßlich des 20.
Todestages Martin Bubers. Einführungs- und Begleitband zum internationalen Buber-Symposium
1985. Arnoldshainer Texte, Bd. 31 (Frankfurt a. M. : Haag und Herschen Verlag, 1985), 113.
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Judentum und dessen zeitlose Substanz zu retten, ohne dabei sich weder der Ge-
schichtlichkeit mit ihrem ewigen Wandel noch der Tradition als das vermeintlich
Unflexible und Unzeitgemäße auszuliefern. Ähnlich wie Overbeck und Kierkegaard,
die durch eine existentielle Neudeutung jenes vermeintlich von seinen Quellen ab-
geschnittene Christentum revitalisieren wollten, setzt Buber also genaugenommen
auf Existenz statt Tradition.³³
An dieser Frage nach jüdischer Identität, die Buber formuliert, möchte ich nun
ein Problem skizzieren, das sich dann eventuell ergibt, wenn Identität aus dem
dialogischen Verständnis von Gemeinschaft heraus entwickelt werden soll. Bei
Buber ist die jüdische Identitätszuordnung weitgehend von Ritus und Gesetz
befreit. Ein Mangel an verbindlichen Glaubensregeln führt bei einer anarchistisch
zu nennenden Religiosität leicht zu einem „Mangel an Identifikation.“³⁴ Dies er-
klärt warum bald von Bubers Schülern in der Kibbuz-Bewegung in moderater
Form ein Brauchtumwieder eingeführt wurde. Buber selbst vertraute ganz auf eine
genuin jüdische Gemeinschafts-Erfahrung, die alle einte, doch diese Erfahrung
scheint es nicht im ‚luftleeren Raum‘ jenseits von normativen Setzungen zu geben.
Es bedarf wohl gewisser Gerüste von Ritus und Gesetz, um eine gemeinsame Er-
fahrung, die identitätsstiftend sein kann, zu ermöglichen: ohne solche Gerüste
wird es damit auch für manchen problematisch, sich noch als Jude zu bestimmen
und zu erleben. In letzter Konsequenz kann man darum auch die Religiosität, die
Buber sein Leben lang verfolgte, als eine beschreiben, die letztendlich zwischen
den Religionen beweglich bleibt: dies machte unter anderem seine „Lehre“ so
problematisch für das Judentum. Der biographische Buber befand sich sein Leben
lang in einer Wanderschaft zwischen den Religionen und Kulturen, die dazu
führte, daß er in keiner ganz zu Hause war, so Michael Weinrich.³⁵ Eben diese
Existenz zwischen den Kulturen findet sich in seinem Denken wieder und ist
maßgeblich für die traditionsablehnende Haltung mitverantwortlich.
Das Problem, das ich hier in Bubers antitraditionalistischem Denken zwi-
schen Gemeinschaftserfahrung und religiöser Identitätsbildung skizziert habe,
tritt auch dort auf, wo es um säkulare Identitätsbildung, etwa eine politische
Identität geht. Eine Gemeinschaft, die im Moment der dialogischen Begegnung
sich konstituiert, streift einen Großteil jener Strukturen ab, die gerade für die
Identitätsbildung verantwortlich sind. Diese Vorstellung jüdischer Identität, die
 Assmann, Zeit und Tradition, 145 ff.
 Pnina Navé-Levinson, „Martin Buber und das jüdische Selbstverständnis,“ In: Symposium 1:
223.
 Weinrich, Zwischen den Welten, 118. Er spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einer „Öko-
menizität,“ und er verheimlicht nicht, dass er aus einer deutschen Post-Holocaust Position ar-
gumentiert. Für ihn als Theologe ist und bleibt Buber eine ökomenische Brücke.
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Buber in seinem Werk formuliert und die er lebte, möchte ich nun als liminal
bezeichnen. Es ist eine Identität, die mit dem Begriff der „heiligen Unsicherheit“
beschrieben werden kann. Weinrich³⁶ berichtet von einem Gespräch zwischen
Ernst Simon und Buber, in dem deutlichwird, dass Buber in Gesetz und Ritus eben
nicht das Vertrauen findet, wie Simon. Er schreibt:
Ein anderes Mal erzählte ich ihm von meiner persönlichen Erfahrung mit der jüdischen
Lebensform. Bei aller objektivenGefahr ihrer Versteinerungundder nicht selten auftretenden
Gefahr von Zwangsneurosen sei sie mir doch zu einer täglichen Gelegenheit geworden, Gott
zu dienen, auf die ich mein Vertrauen setze. ‚Genau dieses Vertrauen fehlt mir‘, war Bubers
Antwort.³⁷
Weinrich führt einweiteres Zitat Bubers an: „ich besitze keine Sicherunggegen die
Notwendigkeit, in Furcht und Zittern zu leben; ich habe nichts als die Gewißheit,
daß wir an der Offenbarung teilhaben.“³⁸ Maurice Friedman hat den „schmalen
Grat,“³⁹ auf dem sich Buber in seinemSchaffen undmit seiner Existenz bewegt, als
eines der zentralen Aspekte seines Denkens bestimmt. Jener schmale Grat ist „eine
Metapher für die menschliche Existenz selbst: eine Existenz, in der man mit un-
sicheren Schritt geht, stets in der Gefahr, in die Abgründe zur Rechten oder zur
Linken zu fallen.“⁴⁰ Dieser Existenz ist eine Unsicherheit eigen, die zu einer
heiligen wird, wenn man sich selbst dem Drängen verweigert, durch verbindliche
Regeln und Normen aus der Angst zu stehlen, die sich angesichts einer Realität
einstellt, auf die es keine einfachen Antworten gibt und in der vielleicht sogar Gott
verschwunden zu sein scheint:
The defensive man becomes literally rigid with fear. He sets between himself and the world
a rigid religious dogma, a rigid system of philosophy, a rigid political belief and commit-
ment to a group, and a rigid wall of personal values and habits. The open man, on the
other hand, accepts his fear and relaxes to it. He substitutes the realism of despair, if
need be, for the tension of hysteria. He meets every new situation with quiet and sureness
out of the depths of his being, yet he meets it with the fear and trembling of one who has no
ready-made answer to life.⁴¹
 Weinrich, Zwischen den Welten.
 Simon nach Weinrich, 109.
 Buber nach Weinrich, 110.
 Hierzu besonders Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber. The Life of Dialogue (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1956), 3– 11. Aber auch die Biographie Maurice Friedman, Begegnung
auf dem schmalen Grat. Martin Buber – ein Leben (Münster: Agenda Verlag, 1999).
 Ibid., 74.
 Friedman, Life as Dialogue, 136.
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Dies Leben in einer heiligen Unsicherheit ist als eine liminale Existenz be-
schreibbar, in der alles flüssig gehalten wird jenseits von vermeintlich rigid-fi-
xierten Ordnungssystemen wie religiösen Dogmen, philosophischen Systemen
oder persönlichen Werten und Gewohnheiten.
Resümee
Das dialogische Prinzip, das darauf abzielt, im Gegenüber ein wesenhaftes Du zu
erfahren, ist der Versuch, eine Kommunikation jenseits der sozialen Überfor-
mungen, der politischen Zwänge, der Ideologien und Dogmen zu ermöglichen. In
diesem Dialog soll der Mensch für einen Augenblick aus der Gesellschaft sich
befreien und in eine Gemeinschaft eintreten.
Der Glaube, man könne Gesellschaft ganz durch Gemeinschaft ersetzen, ist
wohl eine unrealistische Utopie so wie m.E. auch die Vorstellung einer als liminal
zu bezeichnenden kollektiven jüdischen Identität. Für den Einzelnen, wie für
Buber selbst, scheint dieser Weg einer liminalen Identität gangbar, doch wenn
man die Kritik der Anhänger Bubers in Betracht zieht erscheint es fraglich, ob ein
Kollektiv sich in seiner Identität zur Gänze über einen dialogischen Moment der
Gemeinschaft auf Dauer stabilisieren kann. Die Gesellschaft mit all ihren nega-
tiven Seiten, die Buber und andere erkannten, scheint uns eben auch ein Korsett
zu sein, das unser Leben – trotz der Gefahr von Entfremdung und Entmenschli-
chung – stabilisiert.
Dies bedeutet aber nicht, das wir akzeptieren müssen, dass der Dialog im
Sinne Bubers und die mit ihm sich einstellende Gemeinschaft von Menschen, nur
von zeit zu zeit sich quasi zufällig in unserer Gesellschaft als etwas ereignet, dass
uns an dasWesen desMenschen ermahnt. Den Schluss, denman aus den Arbeiten
Victor Turners vielleicht ziehen kann, ist, dass man – anstelle der utopischen
Umwandlung von Gesellschaft in Gemeinschaft – besser in der Gesellschaft gezielt
Orte und Momente der gemeinschaftlichen Begegnung einrichtet, also liminale
Sphären, in denen, jenseits von politischen Kalkül und sozialem Zweckdenken,
ein Dialog etwa zwischen verfeindeten Parteien möglich ist. Manch einen Psy-
chologen wird eine solche Idee nicht überraschen: in therapeutischen Zusam-
menhängen ist es längst ein Allgemeinplatz, dass der, der im Dialog mit dem
Patienten etwas bewegen will, für den Moment des Dialogs eine besondere ge-
sicherte Sphäre schaffen muss.
Turners Arbeiten haben zudem gezeigt, dass diese liminalen Sphären, in
denen die allgemein geltende soziale Ordnung aufgelöst wird, auch Räume der
Kreativität sein können. In ihnen können Individuen mit den Elementen und
Zeichen, die aus den gesellschaftlich geltenden sozialen Strukturen freigesetzt
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sind, in experimenteller Weise neue Modelle ausprobieren. Im protostrukturellen
System der liminalen Sphäre, in denen die Menschen sich im Dialog im Sinne
Bubers begegnen, kann so eine Gesellschaft unter gesicherten Bedingungen mit
besseren Alternativen des Zusammenlebens experimentieren. Diese liminalen
Orte eines Dialogs sind dann in der Lage, innovative Impulse zu erzeugen, die auf
die Gesellschaft zurückwirken und so derenWandel vorantreiben können. Dies ist
wohl eine Möglichkeit, wie Bubers Modell des Dialogs auch im 21. Jahrhundert
vielleicht helfen kann, soziale Krisen zu bewältigen.
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Henry Abramovitch
The Influence of Martin Buber’s
Philosophy of Dialogue on Psychotherapy:
His Lasting Contribution
“I am most I when I am you.”
Paul Celan.
Introduction
I would like to begin this chapter with a cognitive exercise of what Carl Gustav
Jung calls an active imagination:
Imagine you are going to your doctor. You have a secret: You were sexually abused as a
child. You are afraid that that strange feeling in your body is cancer. It is the anniversary
of your father’s death and you are afraid that you, too, will now die. You are anxious, un-
certain whether to speak. Now imagine that the doctor hears the question you did not ask
and helps you speak about what you have told no one ever before. This healer of bodies
and souls listens and makes you feel understood, calmed and reassured…that you are
no longer alone with this secret.
This imaginative exercise illustrates what Buber calls “healing through meeting”.
Martin Buber had a lifelong concern with mental health and healing and his
lasting impact on psychotherapy continues “unto this very day.”¹ He did three se-
mesters of psychiatric training under some of the foremost figures of his time,Wil-
helm Wundt in Germany and Eugen Bleuler in Zurich, who was Jung’s teacher and
colleague. He maintained important dialogues with many major figures including
Freud whom he invited to contribute to a series he was editing. He wanted to
write a devastating critique of classical psychoanalysis which he felt was a perverse-
ly I-It infected enterprise, based on the inaccessibility of the analyst which blocked
any real encounter. The psychoanalyst’s use of transference interpretations and the
“scientific” desire to investigate the unconscious prevented meeting the person who
is suffering. Lou Andreas-Salome persuaded Buber from publishing it. One wonders
 For overview of Buber’s contribution to psychotherapy, see Judith Buber Agassi, Martin Buber
on Psychology and Psychotherapy: Essays, Letters and Dialogues (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Uni-
versity Press, 1999).
if his style would have mirrored the prosaic I-It style of contemporary case reports
rather than the poetry of the actual therapeutic moment.
He had a long and ambivalent relationship with Carl Jung, and his wife, the
analyst Emma Jung who heard Buber speak on various occasions. In 1923, Buber
spoke to the Jung Club, Zurich on the topic, “On psychologizing the world” and
again at the Eranos Conference in 1934 on the theme of “to heal the ‘between.”
One of Buber’s most powerful lines is, “A soul is never sick alone, but there is
always a betweenness also, a situation between it and another existing human
being.”² Likewise, genuine healing in this view can never come from self-help
books. Just as one cannot mourn alone, so one cannot heal the primary world
by oneself. Buber, like Freud, corresponded with Emma Jung. Later, Jung and
Buber had a very public and nasty quarrel on the nature of God and religion
in the public press. But that controversy aside, Buber and Jung share much
more in common than Buber and Freud, or Buber and the Freudians.³ Similar
to Buber, Jung affirmed the possibility of dialogical meeting between therapist
and patient, and accordingly considered how the analyst could be influenced
by the therapeutic encounter as well as the patient. In his notion of the temenos,
the Self, the mandala, dream work, Jung recognized the spiritual aspect of psy-
chotherapeutic work. For Freud, religion was a childish illusion; for Jung and
Buber, Freud was spiritually repressed.
One of the most fruitful connections Buber had was with Carl Rodgers, the
founder of Client-Centered Psychotherapy. Buber and Rodger, in 1957, had a pub-
lic encounter, now truthfully re-transcribed with commentary on both transcrip-
tion/communication dynamics and content/process. This unique night of dia-
logue directly influenced both of their work. “[I]n his famous postscript to I
and Thou written only months after his dialogue with Rogers, Buber wrote:
“But again the specific ‘healing’ relation would come to an end the moment
the patient thought of, and succeeded in, practicing ‘inclusion’ and experiencing
the events from the doctor’s pole as well.”⁴ The Buber-Rogers dialogue also
played a crucial role on the impact on Rogers’s thinking as he himself described
 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1958)142.
 See Barbara Stevens, “The Martin Buber-Carl Jung Disputations: Protecting the Sacred in the
Battle for the Boundaries of Analytical Psychology.” Journal of Analytical Psychology 46 (2001):
455–91; Arie Sborowtz, “Beziehung und Bestimmung. Die Lehren von Martin Buber und C. G.
Jung in ihrem Vehaltnäs zueinaner,” Psyche Bd. 11 (1955): 9 ff.; Hans Trueb, Han. Heilung aus
der Begegnung: eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Psychologie C. G. Jungs, ed., Ernst Michel and
Arie Sborowitz; Vorwort, Martin Buber (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1952).
 Rob Anderson and Kenneth N. Cissna, The Martin Buber-Carl Rodgers Dialogue: A New Tran-
script with Commentary (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997), 39; Buber, I and Thou, 133.
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seventeen years later: “This recognition of the significance of what Buber terms
the I-Thou relationship is the reason why, in client-centered therapy, there has
come to be a greater use of the self of the therapist, of the therapist’s feeling,
greater stress on genuineness, but all of this without imposing the views, values,
or interpretations of the therapist on the client.”⁵
The genuineness of the exchange between Buber and Rogers was manifest in
that it transcended any preconceptions, as revealed in the following famous ex-
tract of that exchange:
Buber: …But you cannot change a given situation. There is something objec-
tively real that confronts you. Not only he confronts you, the person,
but just the situation. You cannot change it.
Rodgers: Well now, now I’m wondering uh who is Martin Buber, you or me, be-
cause what I feel –
Buber: Heh, heh, heh. [audience joins laughter]
Rodgers: Because
Buber: I’m, I’m not, I’m not, eh, so to say “Martin Buber”…
Rodgers: In that sense, I’m not “Carl Rodgers” [Buber: I’m not – either [Laugh-
ter].⁶
Buber maintained a long correspondence and friendship with the existential psy-
chiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, who is considered a founding figure in the develop-
ment of humanistic and transpersonal psychotherapy. Buber, also, had a pro-
found influence on Hans Trueb, who he wooed away from Jung (who
apparently never forgave Trueb to whom he had sent his wife for treatment).
Trueb became a close friend of Buber from the middle 1920s onwards and
under Buber’s influence he increasingly detached himself from Jung and devel-
oped the psychotherapeutic method of “psychosynthesis,” a term later popular-
ized by Roberto Assigioli. His last work, Healing through Meeting, published post-
humously in 1952 included a preface, by Buber.⁷ Buber’s approach to
psychotherapy is most succinctly summed up in that phrase, Healing through
Meeting. In his preface, Buber writes:
…[T]he psychotherapist, whose task is to be the watcher and healer of sick souls, again and
again confronts the naked abyss of man, man’s abysmal liability…The psychotherapist
 Carl Rogers, “Remarks on the future of client-centered therapy,” in Innovations in Client-Cen-
tered Therapy, ed. D. A. Wexler and L. N. Rice (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 11.
 Anderson and Cissna, The Martin Buber-Carl Rodgers Dialogue, 4.
 Nahum Glatzer and Paul Mendes-Flohr, The Letters of Martin Buber: A Life of Dialogue (New
York: Schocken Books,1991) , 688–9.
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meets the situation…as a mere person equipped only with the tradition of science and the
theory of his school. It is understandable enough that he strives to objectivize the abyss that
approaches him and to convert the raging ‘nothing-else-than-process’ into a thing that can,
in some degree, be handled…The abyss does not call to his confidently functioning security
of action, but to the abyss, that is to the self of the doctor, that selfhood that is hidden
under the structures erected through training and practice, that is itself encompassed by
chaos, itself familiar with demons, but is graced with the humble power of wrestling
and overcoming, and is thus ready to wrestle and overcome ever anew; Through his hearing
of this call there erupts in the most exposed of the intellectual professions the crisis of its
paradox. The psychotherapist, just when and because he is a doctor, will return from the
crisis to his habitual method, but as a changed person in a changed situation. He returns
to it as one to whom the necessity of genuine personal meetings in the abyss of human ex-
istence between the one in need of help and the helper has been revealed. He returns to a
modified method in which, on the basis of the experiences gained in such meetings, the
unexpected, which contradicts the prevailing theories and demands his ever-renewed per-
sonal involvement, also finds its place.⁸
Buber’s notion of Healing through Meeting has been discovered and rediscovered
by each generation of therapists in turn. Buber anticipates the groundbreaking
work of Harold F. Searles, “The patient as therapist to his analyst”;⁹ the
“now” moment described by Daniel Stern;¹⁰ and the work of Owen Renik.¹¹
His idea dovetails with Jung’s idea of the uniqueness of every genuine therapeu-
tic encounter, when this patient has come to this therapist, to this wounded heal-
er, to heal in the analyst who can then heal the “between” and allow a deeper
healing to take place for both. Michael Balint, the Hungarian psychoanalyst
who fled to England taught GPs to do psychotherapy in ten minutes, and crystal-
lized his approach in the maxim, “The doctor is his best pill.” He also developed
a method, today, called “Balint groups” in which physicians discuss their most
difficult cases in an atmosphere of dialogue, relation and I-Thou.¹² All of these
and more are spiritual disciples of Martin Buber.
In 1957, Buber traveled from Jerusalem to Washinton, D. C. to deliver the
Fourth William Allison White Lectures at the Washington School of Psychiatry.
These talks were published in the journal Psychiatry founded by Harry Stack Sul-
 Buber-Agassi, Martin Buber on Psychology and Psychotherapy, 17–19.
 Harold F. Searles, “The patient as therapist to his analyst” in Tactics and Techniques in Psy-
choanalytic Therapy, ed., P. L. Giovacchini. (New York: Jason Aronson, 1975), 95–151.
 Daniel Stern, The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life (New York: Norton,
2003).
 Owen Renik, “Subjectivity and unconsciousness,” Journal of Analytical Psychology, 45 (2000):
3–20.
 For more on Balint, the man and his ideas, see Harold Stewart, Michael Balint: Object Rela-
tions, Pure and Applied (London: Routledge, 2003).
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livan and collected into the volume The Knowledge of Man: A Philosophy of the
Interhuman.¹³ This lovely volume consists of seven essays and an inaccurate ver-
sion of the Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl R. Rogers. The essays are
entitled: “Distance and Relation”; “Elements of the Interhuman”; “What is Com-
mon to All”; “The Word that is Spoken”; “Guilt and Guilt Feelings” and “Man
and his Image-Work.” The most influential pieces are the one of ‘Distance and
Relation’ and ‘Guilt Guilt Feelings’ which will be discussed below. Maurice Fried-
man’s seminal The Healing Dialogue in Psychotherapy¹⁴ argues that Buber’s influ-
ence can be seen in virtually every school of psychotherapy: Freudian, Jungian,
Interpersonal, Object-Relations, Self-Psychology, Existential therapy, Gestalt and
especially Family therapy. One school of family therapy, Contextual Family Ther-
apy, is explicitly based on Buber’s ideas. The founders of Contextual therapy,
Ivan Boszormenyani-Nagy and Barbara Krasner clearly place their ideas as deriv-
ing from Buber’s:
Buber first formulated the principles of therapy on the level of caring and just human re-
lationships […]. He made a decisive distinction between healing through efforts at integrity
in relationship and technical, often implicitly dehumanizing attempts at symptom change.
In all likelihood, he contributed more to building the foundations of accountable human
relating than any other thinker of our time. He sensitively defined the profound human is-
sues of relationship and interpersonal suffering and witnessed to the proposition that, in
the spirit of a responsible I-Thou dialogue, the self can gain merited reward. History will
probably recognize Buber as a giant of twentieth century thought…for us, his passion for
realized justice in the human order has direct and immediate implications for a world in
danger of abandoning its children.¹⁵
Even more recent exciting, new developments within contemporary psychoanal-
ysis such as Relational Psychoanalysis; Intersubjective Psychoanalysis and Dia-
logical Psychotherapy are very Buberian, even if it seems at times that the rec-
ognition of Buber remains in their collective unconscious. Buber’s ideas have
been applied to work in many diverse settings and populations such as prisons
and prisoners,¹⁶ patients and doctors,¹⁷ social work and pastoral counseling,¹⁸
 Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man: A Philosophy of the Interhuman, ed. and introd. by
Maurice Friedman (New York: NY, Harper Torchbooks, 1965).
 Maurice Friedman, The Healing Dialogue in Psychotherapy (London and New York: Jason Ar-
onson, 1985).
 Ivan Boszormenyi and Barbara Krasner, Between Give and Take: A Clinical Guide to Contex-
tual Therapy (New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1986), 28.
 E. T. and H. H. Mason, “Buber Behind Bars,” Journal of the Canadian Psychiatric Association
13, (1968): 67–74.
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therapeutic communities,¹⁹ dream work,²⁰ ecological psychotherapy²¹ and much
more besides. His clear influence can also be seen in the works of Alfred Adler,²²
Otto Rank,²³ Donald W.Winnicott,²⁴ R. D. Laing²⁵ and Leslie Farber.²⁶ It was Bub-
er’s insight that dialogue and authentic encounter are at the heart of psychother-
apy rather than insight and interpretation.
The main texts touching on psychotherapy are first and foremost Buber’s
outstanding and innovative collection of autobiographical fragments,Meetings.²⁷
In the first story, he tells of how he understood from a playmate that his mother,
who abandoned him at age three for a career in the theatre, would never return.
Based on that formative experience, he coined a new word, Vegegnung, a mis-
meeting or mis-encounter ‘to designate the failure of a real meeting between
men’. When he saw his mother again for the first time in thirty years, he looked
into her beautiful blue eyes and saw once more the word, Vegegnung. He ends
the story with a confession that is both simple and true, “I suspect that all
that I have learned about genuine meeting in the course of my life had its origin
 Henry Abramovitch and Eliezer Schwartz, “The Three Stages of Medical Dialogue,” Theoret-
ical Medicine 17, (1996): 175–87.
 Robert L. Katz, “Martin Buber and Psychotherapy,” Hebrew Union College Annual 46, (1976):
413–31.
 Tamar Kron, “The “We” in Martin Buber’s Dialogical Philosophy and its Implication for
Group Therapy and the Therapeutic Community,” International Journal of Therapeutic Commun-
ities 11, (1990): 13–20.; Tamar Kron and Rafi Yungman “Intimacy and Distance in Staff Group
Relationship,” International Journal of Therapeutic Communities 5, (1984): 99– 109.
 Tamar Kron, “The Dialogical Dimension of Therapists’ Dreams about their Patients,” Israel
Journal of Psychiatry and Related Subjects 28, (1991): 1–12.
 J. Willi, Ecological Psychotherapy (Seattle, WA: Hogrefer & Huber, 1999).
 M. J. Skellin, “A Comparative Study of Adler and Buber: From Cooperation to Contact.” Jour-
nal of Individual Psychology 56 (2000): 2–19.
 Friedman, The Healing Dialogue in Psychotherapy.
 Ernst Ticho, “Donald Winnicott, Martin Buber and the Theory of Interpersonal Relation-
ships.” Psychiatry 37, (1974): 240–253; Charles Brice, “Pathological Models of Interhuman Relat-
ing and Therapeutic Dialogue between Buber’s Existential Relation Theory and Object Relations
Theory,” Psychiatry 37, (1984): 109– 123.
 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness.
(London: Penguin Books, 1965); R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience, and the Bird of Paradise
(London: Penguin, 1967); R. D. Laing, The Self and Others (London: Tavistock, 1971).
 Leslie Farber, The Ways of the Will: Essays Towards a Psychology and Psychopathology of Will
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
 For an insightful discussion of these stories, see Steven Kepnes, The Text as Thou: Martin
Buber’s Dialogue of Hermaneutics and Narrative Theology (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1992).
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in that hour on the balcony.”²⁸ In another story, “Languages”, he writes how via
private, imaginative play (he was a precocious only child), he anticipated the key
issue in the cross cultural encounter: “I devised for myself two-language conver-
sations between a German and a Frenchman, later between a Hebrew and an an-
cient Roman and came ever again, half in play and yet at times with beating
heart to feel the tension between what was heard by the one and what was
heard by the other, from his thinking in another language.”²⁹ The important con-
temporary initiative to train interpreters as “culture brokers” derives no less from
this insight as from clinical anthropology.
One of the defining aspects of psychotherapy (and ethnography) is that it in-
volves intense personal interaction, followed by long periods of reflection on
what has taken place. In the model that I developed with my medical colleague,
Professor Eliezer Schwartz, medical and psychotherapeutic dialogue must move
from an initial I-Thou to a subsequent I-It and back to a renewed I-Thou but one
containing within the fruit and pit of the I-It wisdom.³⁰ Personal encounters go
wrong when the self-reflection occurs at the expense of real meeting. In the frag-
ment, “The Horse”, Buber describes just such a mistimed moment:
When I was eleven years of age, spending the summer on my grandparent’s estate, I used,
as often as I could do it unobserved, to steal into the stable and gently stroke the neck of my
darling, a broad dapple-gray horse. It was not a casual delight but a great, certainly friend-
ly, but also deeply stirring happening. If I am to explain it now…I must say that what I ex-
perienced was the Other, the immense otherness of the Other…But once – I did not know
what came over the child, at any rate it was childlike enough – it struck me about the strok-
ing, what fun it gave me, and suddenly I became conscious of my hand. The game went on
as before, but something had changed, it was no longer the same thing. And the next day,
after giving him a rich feed, when I stroked my friend’s head he did not raise his head. A
few years later, when I thought back to the incident, I no longer supposed that the animal
had noticed my defection. But at the time I considered myself judged.³¹
Buber’s well known collection of Hasidic stories also touches on many therapeu-
tic issues. Buber implicitly showed how stories were vehicles for healing and this
approach is itself the basis of narrative therapy of both Milton Erickson³² and Mi-
 Martin Buber, Meetings edited and with an introduction and bibliography by Maurice Fried-
man (LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1973), 19.
 Buber, Meeting, 21.
 Abramovitch and Schwartz, “Stages of Dialogue,” 175–187.
 Buber, Meeting, 26–7.
 Sidney Rosen, My Voice Will Go With You: The Teaching Tales of Milton H. Erickson (New
York: Norton, 1982).
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chael White.³³ Even Freud, himself, confessed to using Hasidic stories in his
treatments. Jung, for his part, describes a case in which a young woman came
to him but who turned out to be the daughter of a famous Rebbe. Jung felt
that his path lay in reconnecting with this tradition. The story of Reb Zusya, com-
ing to heaven and being asked not why he was not Moses but why he was not
Zusya, is a succinct statement of the moral imperative for individuation. Rabbi
Nachman’s story of the Prince who thought he was a turkey, in particular, re-
flects key dilemmas in the therapeutic task. In this story, a wandering “therapist”
comes to cure a “psychotic prince” who believes himself to be a turkey and lives,
naked, underneath the royal tables, pecking at scraps. Rather than challenge this
delusion, the healer strips and descends under the table and likewise pecks at
fallen scraps. After a long while, the prince asks the healer what he is doing
to which the healer replies that he is a turkey. The surprised prince replies
that he, too, is a turkey and they continue their foraging. Finally, the healer
tells the prince, “You can still be a turkey and wear pants.” The prince expresses
shock but does agree to wear pants and then a shirt and so gradually returns to
the tables of King and human society. This story metaphorically describes as-
pects of the therapeutic task: the need to enter into the inner world of psychotic
patients in order to bring them back from their private, inaccessible world; how
the therapist must give up his persona in order to be effective “under the table”,
in the realm of the unconscious; or indeed that much of the master-therapists
actions when seen from the outside appear crazy.
Here I would like to give a personal example.³⁴ Awoman came to me for psy-
chological counseling, sent by her former teacher following the death of her only
daughter in a traffic accident. When the woman arrived, it turned out that this
was only the last in a series of catastrophes. She had been born in Berlin but
the family fled to Prague, losing all. She managed to escape to Palestine just be-
fore the war. Her mother and younger brother, left behind, were murdered at
Auschwitz. Her beloved, remaining brother was killed in an industrial accident
on his kibbutz. Her first husband died a lingering and excruciating death from
motor neuron disease. In hard times, she sought financial help from her father
and was brutally rejected by him, after being told that she was not his biological
child, but the love child of his wife’s adulterous union. Her second husband di-
vorced her and returned to his country of origin. Then, her daughter, who she
loved, her only one, was killed in a meaningless accident, a truck crushing
 Michael White, Maps of Narrative Practice (New York: Norton, 2007).
 For a fuller discussion of this case, see Henry Abramovitch, “Temenos Regained: Reflections
on the Absence of the Analyst,” Journal of Analytical Psychology, 47 (2002): 583–97.
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her as she wheeled around on her Vespa to recover her scarf that had blown off.
The police made sure to tell her, it was her daughter’s fault. Therapists are often
able to deal calmly with horrendous stories we hear because we have heard
worse. Here was a case in which I had not heard worse, someone who had
lost her entire family time after time. I felt that she had come to me and I
must accept her. Gradually a bond of trust was formed between us. I mourned
with her the death of her daughter and the long list of losses that preceded it.
Our dialogue was to be interrupted when I was set to leave on a three and a
half month sabbatical. When I informed her long in advance, she said that all
our work was now being destroyed, that I would never come back.
At that time, in my analyst group, the Bitter Lemon, I heard of the case in
which both analyst and patient agreed that when the analyst was away, that
the patient could come and sit in the empty office. I thought, “Yes. How can I
suggest this bizarre idea?” Synchronistically, at the next session, she asked,
“Who will look after your plants when you are away?” I asked her if she wanted
to water them and she happily agreed. When I left I gave her keys to my office
and she came regularly to water my plants and sit quietly as if in church, meet-
ing my absent presence and perhaps the Eternal Thou. Had I heard of another
therapist handing over the keys of his office to a patient in his absence, I
would have considered the therapist “crazy”. Yet, this unusual arrangement sus-
tained our dialogue. It helped ease her anguish of our time apart. One further
note which sadly puts Berlin in a bad light. As a result of our work, she decided
to return to Prague and Berlin and revisit her homes. In Prague, she was received
warmly; in Berlin, the frightened occupant slammed the door in her face: I-Thou
versus I-It.
Buber also received young people in his home at set times, for something
akin to a therapy session. In “A Conversion”, he wrote something of the essence
of the psychotherapeutic enterprise whose task is to hear the question, which is
not asked:
What happened was no more than that one forenoon, after a morning of “religious” enthu-
siasm, I had a visit from an unknown young man, without being there in spirit. I certainly
did not fail to let the meeting be friendly, I did not treat him any more remissly than all his
contemporaries who were in the habit of seeking me out about this time of day as an oracle
that is ready to listen to reason. I conversed attentively and openly with him –only I omitted
to guess the questions which he did not put. Later, not long after, I learned from one of his
friends – he himself was no longer alive – the essential content of these questions; I
learned that he had come to me not casually, but borne by destiny, not for a chat but
for a decision. He had come to me; he had come in this hour.³⁵
 Buber, Meetings, 45f.
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Buber clearly seems to indicate that the young man had come to him concerning
a decision to commit suicide. Research has shown that this is indeed a common
situation in which individuals who are about to commit suicide see doctors,
teachers, friends and family who fail to hear the unasked question. In one dra-
matic, suicide prevention commercial shown on Israeli television, a young man
goes through his entire day, ringing a large bell no one hears. Nevertheless, bi-
ographers have revealed that the man’s decision was not suicide, but concerned
whether he should return to the front in WWI. In the end, the man did rejoin his
unit and was killed shortly afterwards. This fact, however, does not reduce Bub-
er’s collusion in the death. In Buber’s own mind, the encounter became a Vergeg-
nung, “the failure of a real meeting between men.”
This story illuminates the heart of psychotherapy as essentially an I-Thou
process, in which a unique individual comes to a unique therapist ‘not casually,
but borne by destiny’. Buber understood that encounters such as he had with
young men seeking him out at a fixed time of day could be and in many
cases, were therapeutic. Buber did not exactly treat him as an “It” but not
fully as a “Thou”. In I and Thou, Buber dichotomizes, “To man the world is two-
fold, in accordance with his twofold attitude…the I of man is also twofold. For
the I of the primary word I-Thou is a different I from that of the primary word
I-It.”³⁶ In practice, there are probably gradations in the degree of I-Thou-ness
(or indeed I-It-ness), just as psychotherapists learn from their failures, not
from their successes. Buber then goes on to ask a most daring paradoxical ques-
tion: “What do we expect when we are in despair and yet go to a man?” and to
which he gives an even more profound answer, “Surely a presence by means of
which we are told that nevertheless there is meaning.” Note Buber does not say
words by which we are told that nevertheless there is meaning. Words will not
work and certainly not be believed. But “presence” is an existential stance
that conveys all, in a silence worthy of Buber’s fellow Viennese, Ludwig Wittgen-
stein. Or as the great Jewish-American master of the spiritual in abstract expres-
sion, Mark Rothko said, “Silence is so precise.”
Buber never founded a school of psychotherapy and it is likely he would
deny he engaged in psychotherapy at all. But Carl Rodgers for his part took
on many aspects of this attitude and developed it into what became known as
the client-center approach in which the presence was one of unconditional pos-
itive regard, the attitude of a loving mother to a beloved child. In his essay, “Dis-
tance and Relation”, Buber argues, “Man wishes to be confirmed in his being by
man, and wishes to have a presence in the being of the other. The human person
 Buber, I and Thou, 3.
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needs conformation because man as man needs it.” He concludes the essay, “It
is from one man to another that the heavenly bread of self-being is passed.”³⁷
Buber’s story also raises the issue of guilt and specifically guilt in the thera-
pist. In one of his lectures to Sullivan’s institute, he made a fundamental distinc-
tion between actual guilt as opposed to guilty feelings. Reacting against to the
psychoanalytic tendency to absolve patients of all their guilty feelings, Buber
felt that such healers were making a serious moral error. Guilty feelings, the neu-
rotic guilt of childish thoughts truly needed cleansing, but actual guilt required
illumination. In one Jewish tradition, Cain the first murderer calls out not “ My
punishment is too great” but “My sin is too great to be borne!” ³⁸ (The ambiguity
in the original Hebrew revolves around the double meaning of “avoni,” which
means both punishment for sin, and sin itself). In the latter version, Cain’s cry
is one of deep and painful insight. As another sibling noted upon the death of
her brother when asked “Were you close?” responded, “Yes, but I did not
know it.” Only now, under God’s questioning and punishing, does he come to
realize the enormity of his deed. In the Qur’an, he realizes the impact of his
act when he sees a raven burying his brother:
Then God sent a raven, which scratched the ground
in order to show him how to hide the nakedness of his brother.
“Alas, the woe” said he, “that I could not be even like the raven and hide the nakedness of
my brother,”
[…] Whosoever kills a human being…
it shall be like killing all humanity;
And whosoever saves a life,
Saves the entire human race.³⁹
This moment of realization is what Martin Buber called, the “illumination of
guilt”, the necessary first stage in coming to terms with real guilt. Cain’s punish-
ment of never being able to rest in peace forces him to continue delving into his
guilt. This second of Buber’s stage is persevering in the knowledge of the guilt,
leading to sincere regret is reflected in a Midrash describing how Cain wandered
the world everywhere rejected, till finally he slapped himself on the head and
returned to the presence of his Lord. For Buber, however, “returning”, as repent-
ance is called in the Hebrew tradition, is not enough. Buber emphasized a third
stage in which the guilty party must enact a “tikkun” or “repair” of the guilt, at
 Buber, Knowledge of Man, 16.
 Genesis 4:13.
 Qur’an, Sura 5:31–2; translation by Ahmed Ali, The Holy Qur’an (Elmhurst, NY,: Tahrike Tar-
sile Qur’an, 2005)
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the place in which the human order was injured. Robert Jay Lifton developed
Buber’s ideas into a more clinical form. He distinguished “static guilt “(a dead-
ening immobilization of the self), which can be either self-lacerating (“…self con-
demnation in which unchanging imagery of unmitigated evil prevents actual
“knowledge” of guilt and results instead in what resembles a continuous killing
of self”) or “numbed guilt” in which guilt is avoided by “freezing” of the self and
a numbing of experience in general; as opposed to “animating” guilt which is
energizing and transformative toward a goal of renewal and change.⁴⁰
Can a killer, like Cain, ever achieve such a tikkun? Is not a dead brother ‘like
water spilled on the ground that can never be gathered up again’?⁴¹ A thief can
restore his loot; a slanderer may make a tearful, public apology.What can a mur-
derer do? Buber, nevertheless, suggested that ‘the wounds of the order-of-being
can be healed in infinitely many other places than those at which they were in-
flicted’. This goal of tikkun as a prime goal of therapy has been one of Buber’s
most poignant contributions to the fundamental project of psychotherapy and
the human condition of healing.
Critique
The strength of Buber’s emphasis on the eternal presence of genuine dialogue is
also its weakness. The lack of technique may allow therapy to flounder. At the ex-
treme, the emphasis on presence, confirmation, imaging the real, I-Thou, deny or
work against, the very idea that psychotherapists require rigorous training with
its necessary dose of I-It. The encounter, the very healing through meeting, is sus-
ceptible to misuse and exploitation by a narcissistic therapist who justifies his
abuse in terms of his own truth which is imposed on the patient in a form of psychic
rape. In a similar manner, Buber was naively unaware of the impact of psychothera-
pist’s own projections onto the patient and lacked any idea of how to deal with such
a situation. Many of great theoreticians of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, Sig-
mund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, Melanie Klein, Michael Fordham, Jacques Lacan,
Erich Neumann and James Hillman seem much more interested in theory than in
people. Inadvertently, they established a tradition in which religious devotion to
one’s school of thought and mentor became paramount. At times, it appeared
that true encounters with patients were sacrificed at the altar of theory. Buber,
like most great theoreticians failed to live up to the high demands of his theory,
 Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 139.
 II Samuel 14:14.
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as the oral tradition of Buber-meysehs clearly illustrates. He was, however, a wound-
ed-healer who explored the depths of his own wound and helped solve for us all
what he could not solve for himself alone.
Buber once said that he had no new doctrine to teach but compared his ef-
forts to taking someone to the window and pointing outside, or pointing to what
was forgotten. In an era of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), evidence based
medicine, time-limited psychotherapy, and managed care, Buber’s message is
more timely than ever. We must all follow him again and again to the window
and look outside to the magic we once knew, but have forgotten.
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Alan J. Flashman
Almost Buber: Martin Buber’s Complex
Influence on Family Therapy
In 1923 when Martin Buber’s Ich und Du¹ first appeared, Freud’s psychoanalytic
thinking had just entered its final phase of restructuring.While many if not all of
Freud’s cases involved complex and troubled family relations, no one at the time
entertained the notion that these relations could be altered directly in a thera-
peutic fashion. Freud himself had pronounced, “Families, I don’t know what
to do with them.”
It took another three or four decades and another world war before mental
health professionals began to approach Freud’s ironic and frustrated question–
“what to do with families?” – in a systematic and practical manner. Buber’s dia-
logical thinking has passed in and out of the Family Therapy movement. I will
demonstrate here first the central theoretical place that Buber’s thought could
occupy in formulating the core of family therapy. Second, I will outline impor-
tant crossroads at which the emergent theory of family therapy stood face to
face with Buber’s approach. Third, I will offer some reflections on how the man-
ner in which Buber did and did not influence family therapy sheds light both on
family therapy and on Buber’s thought.
Differentiation and Dialogue
One of the founders of the Family Therapy Movement in the United States was a
psychiatrist named Murray Bowen who worked at Georgetown University in
Washington, DC. Bowen was nearly unique in suggesting to family therapists
that they engage in therapy with their own families, as he himself did and report-
ed². Over four decades Bowen elaborated a theory for family therapy which has
become quite central in North American family therapy, partially due to the
sheer mass of Bowen’s many trainees now in practice³ . Bowen defined his cen-
 Martin Buber, Ich und Du (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1983 [1923]), and Martin Buber, I
and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970).
 Murray Bowen, Family Theory in Clinical Practice (New York: Jason Aronson, 1978).
 Peter Titelman, ed., The Therapist’s Own Family (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1987). See Alan
Flashman, “Review” of 101 More Interventions in Family Therapy by Thorana Nelson and Terry
Trepperin (New York: Haworth, 1998), Society and Welfare 20(2000): 4 (Hebrew).
tral theoretical concept as “differentiation of the self in the [family] system.”
Using an analogy from the biological science of embryology (since well before
Freud, psychology has been both enriched and sometimes muddled by the im-
portation of concepts from the physical sciences), Bowen tried to define a
scale of the health not of individuals but of the quality of their relationships.
Bowen used the term “differentiation” in two ways. First and more readily appre-
ciated, he suggested that higher level differentiation is characterized by the abil-
ity to separate thinking from emotion and engage each of these spheres of
human experience more or less independently. In the more central and enigmat-
ic way, Bowen tried to delineate the ability of each individual to maintain his
own “self” integrity while also maintaining significant emotional ties with
other similarly differentiated individuals in the family. It is to this second level
that I now turn.
Bowen attempted to operationalize his concept of differentiation by describ-
ing three elements of praxis by which a level of differentiation could be deter-
mined. The first two elements of this praxis achieved clear conceptual definition
in his work; the third element of praxis is clearly described in his work but left
without conceptual clarity.
The first two elements of praxis are “I-position” and “triangles.” Bowen sug-
gested that in families with a higher level of differentiation, individual com-
mence communication with each other speaking each from an “I-position.”
Here we have an analogy imported from classical ballet. “First position, second
position,” and here “I-Position.” Bowen meant that each individual begins to
communicate by expressing in a relatively full and authentic manner his own ex-
periential world, his needs and desires. These are expressed in an atmosphere of
openness to a similar expression from the side of his partner in communication.
In low differentiation, individuals limit the fullness of expression of themselves
or of their partner. Rather, an individual may attempt to placate his partner by
expressing only what the partner finds easy to hear. Alternatively, the individual
may force his wishes upon his partner, without willingness to entertain the dif-
ference in experience or desires coming from his partner.
A somewhat stylized illustration may help concretize this point. Take for ex-
ample a fourteen year old girl and her mother. The girl wants to stay out until
4:00 AM on a Saturday night, while mother agrees only to 2:00. The girl’s “I-po-
sition” amounts to her explanation that she needs to stay later in order to gain
acceptance with the “cool” girls in her crowd, something she has been working
on for a year and something her mother does not oppose in principle. The moth-
er’s “I-position” amounts to her expression of her personal trouble in tolerating
her anxieties regarding her daughter’s safety as the night deepens. Each takes
responsibility for her own experience and desires, and each takes an interest
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and listens to the world of the other. A conversation has begun. At a lower level
of differentiation, the girl may relinquish her social needs in order to placate her
mother, or force her will without listening. Or the mother may swallow her anxi-
eties without honestly talking with her daughter about her difficulties, or force
her will without listening to the girl’s social situation. There has been no
place for two “I-positions” to commence genuine communication.
Bowen’s second concept, one he shares with most family theorists, is that of
triangles. Two people enlist a third rather than engage in dyadic communication.
In our example, perhaps the mother would say, “Your father will need the emer-
gency room for the chest pains you will cause him after 2:00.” Or the girl might
say, “And my father agrees with me that you are too anxious.” Differentiation is
lower when dyads communicate through a third. Differentiation is higher when
dyads maintain their communication directly. Since families and systems are not
solely dyadic, this would involve the robust existence of communication in all
three dyads of a central triangle, but one at a time. In other words, in higher
level differentiation the girl and her mother, after completing their dyadic com-
munication,will continue each in a separate dyad with father. This should not be
seen too concretely. Often the three may be talking all together, but within this
logistical framework there is room for each dyad to communicate directly.
Here the reader may be puzzled. If two individuals begin communication
from “I-positions” and refrain from triangulation, what exactly do they do
next? This question brings us to the third part of Bowen’s praxis, which he dem-
onstrated but failed to conceptualize. In my teaching for the past twenty years, I
have been referring to this praxis as “mutual creation”. I am now pleased to
adopt Daniel Stern’s recent coinage, “co-creation.”⁴
To continue with our example, the girl suggests that she call her mother
every hour. Mother says that her anxieties become unbearable after twenty mi-
nutes. The girl says she cannot embarrass herself by calling her mother so fre-
quently. But she suggests that she could feign a call to a fictitious 17 year old
cousin who is at an even “cooler” party, and when she speaks this fictive cousin’s
name into her phone after dialing her mother, the mother will know from this
code that she is alive and well. Mother wants time to consider this proposal.
“Co-creation” here has meant that both girl and mother have grown a bit via
their face to face honest communication, and their relationship has grown as
well. Such “co-creation” constitutes the essential moments of growth in families.
 Daniel Stern, The Present Moment (New York: Norton, 2004).
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The following scheme (a metaphoric importation from enzymatic activity in
biochemistry) will illustrate this co-creative process, especially if the reader will
imagine the two arrows becoming complete from left to right simultaneously:
It is interesting to note how this “co-creation” is implicit in Bowen’s praxis but
did not reach conceptualization. Bowen reported in 1967 in a Family Research
Conference how he created a “tempest in a teapot” within the family in which
he was raised – he himself was more than 50 years of age at the time – in
order to make room for “I-positions” without triangles. He then describes in won-
derful emotional depth the new conversations that took place. For example, he
found a new closeness with his father and was able to “talk about the full range
of important subjects without avoidance or defensiveness, and we developed a
far better relationship than we had ever had. This experience brought a new
awareness that I simply did not know what constitutes a really solid person-
to-person relationship. …I believe that I had done something to change my
relationship with my father, which in turn changed his relationship to all he con-
tacted”⁵. These are the sorts of relational innovations that I refer to as “co-crea-
tions.” I believe that Bowen practitioners would recognize these unconceptual-
ized experiences as central to Bowen’s practice.
I wish to add a personal note here.When I first began to teach Bowen’s theo-
ry in a systematic way, I needed to conceptualize the co-creation in his practice
in order to explain differentiation fully to my students. At that time I became
aware that this “co-creation” was uncannily familiar to me, but not from the fam-
ily therapy literature. I then browsed my shelves and rediscovered Buber’s I and
Thou. Since then, I have always taught selections from Buber’s work together
 Murray Bowen, Family Theory, 517.
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with Bowen’s. For twenty-five years my students have learned with me that fam-
ilies with higher levels of differentiation are families that create moments of “I-
Thou” relating, within which people grow and change face to face. I would add
here that I have consistently been impressed that the sometimes strident, tech-
nical or gaming tone of family therapy students becomes softer, more rounded,
more humane, after working through and assimilating Buber’s concept of dia-
logue.
The following artistic illustration has often helped students to visualize the
I-Thou and I-It moments. The two pictures show two positions of the kinetic
sculpture Multiform by the French-Israeli sculptor Jonathan Darmon.⁶ I-Thou in-
volves a direct second person address, I-It a third-person relationship. These
plastic figures often help students of family therapy to imagine real turning to
and from direct meetings.
Three Near Misses
Buber then would seem to have exercised a significant influence on family ther-
apy theory and practice. Three pieces of historical contact between Buber and
the emerging field of family therapy indeed point to Buber’s seminal role.
The first historical fact was Buber’s delivery of the William Alanson White
Memorial Lectures Washington School of Psychiatry in 1956. The Washington
School was famous for developing the “interpersonal school of psychiatry”
whose foremost proponent and founder was Harry Stack Sullivan. The following
account of Buber’s acceptance of the invitation is instructive:
The most remarkable event at that time was the visit of Martin Buber, who in 1957 delivered
the fourth William Alanson White Memorial Lectures and also gave a series of evening sem-
 Jonathan Darmon, Multiform (1995), photographs by Alan Flashman.
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inars to especially interested faculty members… I was delegated to call upon him. It was an
experience I shall never forget. It made me somewhat uneasy to be calling a “holy man” (as
I thought of Martin Buber) on the telephone, but I did. I was to meet him in an apartment
house with a large private foyer or waiting room, where I waited for an uneasy five or ten
minutes. Buber was a short man, no taller than I was, with extraordinarily alive brown eyes
and a white Santa Claus beard. He greeted me without any social smile whatsoever. He
merely looked at me very intensely, and my uneasiness dropped away completely. I think
I have rarely felt so much at ease, so much myself. Still without any social smile, he
said, “Come over here in the light where I can see you better.” And so I did, without any
self-consciousness. One of the first things he said was: “When one is 80 years old, one
has to choose carefully which places one will go to. There isn’t SO much time left. I
want to come to the Washington School of Psychiatry because I think it is one of the
few places which keep the questions open.” I recall that he elaborated on this, indicating
he meant that there was a spirit of inquiry, not dogmatism, at the School. I have never for-
gotten the phrase “keep the questions open” and I think the School has never been paid a
greater compliment.⁷
What is most significant for this discussion is the fact that many of the graduates
of the interpersonal school, both at the Washington School and at the William
Alanson White Institute in New York City were responsible for the development
of group and family therapies in the 1950s, at first together, as interpersonal
practices, and later as separate disciplines. Many of these founders of family
therapy would have been avidly following the White Lectures, and the innovative
journal Psychiatry published by the Washington School, in which three of Bub-
er’s papers were published. The three, “Distance and Relation,” “Guilt and Guilt
Feelings,” and “Elements of the Interhuman,” were soon collected by the omni-
present Maurice Friedman into a popular volume, The Knowledge of Man.⁸ Prom-
inent among those founders of family therapy who would have been exposed to
Buber’s work was Don Jackson,who studied with Sullivan before becoming a col-
laborator with Gregory Bateson in developing cybernetic systems theory.
The second historical fact involves Gregory Bateson himself. Bateson, an an-
thropologist, biologist and innovative cybernetic thinker was the undisputed
high priest of family systems theory in the United States from the 1950s to his
death in 1987. Bateson collected his essays on cybernetics into his challenging
Steps to an Ecology of Mind in 1972. This work makes reference to Buber’s I-
Thou relationship as one that could evolve between an individual and his com-
munity or ecosphere.⁹
 Margaret Rioch, “Fifty Years at the Washington School of Psychiatry”, Psychiatry 49 (1986):11
from http://www.wspdc.org/Rioch_history.pdf
 Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man, ed. Maurice Friedman (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).
 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), 446.
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Bateson makes a cameo appearance in the third historical fact. By 1982 fam-
ily therapy was more than two decades into its development, and had separated
from group therapy with the creation of its flagship journal Family Process, cre-
ated by Don Jackson together with Donald Bloch and Jay Haley. Time was ripe for
a transparent discourse over the essence of this now middle-aged field, and the
March, 1982 issue of Family Process published what was to become famous as
the “great epistemological debate.” Two of the four major papers in this debate
make reference to Buber, and here full quotations are in order.
Bradford Keeney and Douglas Sprenkle’s lead paper, “Ecosystem epistemol-
ogy: critical implications for the aesthetics and pragmatics of family therapy”
saw Buber as the Nestor defining two main approaches:
It might be argued that therapists can be differentiated on the basis of their commitment to
aesthetics or pragmatics. Those who exclusively practice (and teach and evaluate) particu-
lar sets of skills and techniques as the royal road to therapeutic change would then be char-
acterized as pragmatics “technicians.” Such therapists occasionally imply that therapy is
analogous to fixing a car or repairing a broken chair, and sometimes suggest that any
focus on “the personal life of the therapist” is a distraction. They may even harshly criticize
training contexts that spend time on the “personal growth” of the therapist. For techni-
cians, their work is a craft involving useful skill- a representation of an “I-it” operation:
“I will cure it.”
On the other hand, art, rooted more in aesthetics than pragmatics, is an “I-Thou” op-
eration in which training and practice of therapy focuses on one’s own character building.
The skill is secondary and incidental to growth of self, as opposed to the technician’s focus
on acquisition of tolls and skill, with the self remaining the same. Paraphrasing Bateson,
art can be ecologically defined as the problem of judging the ecological implications of
a course of action as it becomes incorporated and assimilated into the total context.
Thus, for an artist, the ecological implications of a course of action that arise from the prac-
tice of a skill have importance only in terms of its ecological function in the larger contexts
of which the action is a part- its effects on one’s character and social context, as well as
planet. “We” are affirmed through our relations of “I-Thou.”¹⁰
Lawrence Allman’s paper, “The aesthetic preference: overcoming the pragmatic
error,” gave Buber a different and even greater weight:
Aesthetic meanings come to us as therapists through our own intuitively sensed processes
within the dialectic of what Martin Buber called the “I-Thou” relationship. Gregory Bateson
was fond of the expression ‘It Takes Two to Know One,’ which embodies his fundamental
belief that only through a lovingly playful sense of connectedness with others can we come
to know ourselves as part of the aesthetic unity of the collective mind system.With the in-
 Bradford Keeney and Douglas Sprenkle, “Ecosystemic Epistemology: Critical Implications for
the Aesthetics and Pragmatics of Family Therapy,” Family Process 21(1982):1–20.
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creasing trend in family therapy to view family systems as “things” determined solely by
structures and in need of mechanistic realignment, we are in danger of removing ourselves
as therapists from our families and subsequently removing ourselves from ourselves.¹¹
Looking back on these two papers, we can note that they take two different ap-
proaches to Buber. Keeney and Sprenkle suggest that proper family therapy may
involve “I-Thou” relationships (“aesthetics”) or “I-It” relationships – the more
“pragmatic” practical manipulation of activities. Allman, however, saw Buber
as essential to family therapy generally in order to preserve a humane and re-
spectful practice. The two papers share one decisive and surprising detail.
While both quote Buber’s “I-Thou” concept, neither cite I and Thou (nor any
other work of Buber’s for that matter) in their references. It would seem that
at least in the United States Buber’s thought had become ultra-condensed into
iconic “I-Thou” and “I-It.” Since these icons appear uprooted from their original
literary context and not replanted into some explanatory matrix of meaning, for
example the matrix of differentiation that I put forth above, it is doubtful wheth-
er readers of Family Process or family theoreticians could do very much with
these terms.
Co-creational Reflections
That is what I propose to attempt now: to do something with Buberian concepts
and family therapy theory. By reflecting upon a certain tension between the two,
I hope to use each to shed further light on the other. Let me begin with Buber.
One of Walter Kaufmann’s chief criticisms of Ich und Du was that he saw Buber’s
thinking as too dichotomous. Kaufmann expressed this in the Prologue¹² to his
translation of Ich und Du and later expanded the criticism to a central character-
ization of Buber among the “dichotomizing” thinkers whose works and lives
were investigated in his monumental Discovery of Mind.¹³ Kaufmann seems to
have taken quite literally the emotional, poetic, metaphorical statements in Ich
und Du that suggest that I-Thou moments are absolute and complete, and that
anything short of the ultimate meeting is doomed to the unredeemed experienc-
 Lawrence Allman, “The Aesthetic Preference: Overcoming the Pragmatic Error,” Family Proc-
ess 21 (1982): 43–56.
 Walter Kaufman, “I and Thou: A Prologue”, in Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1970).
 Walter Kaufman, Discovering the Mind, Vol. 2. (New Brunswick (USA): Transaction Publish-
ers, 1993).
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ing and using of the I-It. I suggest here that while this objection is plausible, it is
unnecessary, ungenerous, and unproductive. There are statements in Buber’s
later writings¹⁴ that suggest that Buber understood very well that there could
and must exist a grey area, a range within which I-Thou moments could be
more or less complete. What is more important, I think, is the fact that one
loses nothing from the precision or power of Ich und Du by seeing this range
of relative completeness as present, even if Buber did little to emphasize it.
Thinkers who make enormous efforts to see something in a new light are not nec-
essarily best defined by what they saw only dimly. I think of this range of rela-
tivity as just beyond Buber’s reach, but as the next point on the vector he de-
scribes. I am proposing to add the next point as part of a continuation of
Buber’s conceptual path, with gratitude.
I would then add one further additional point on this vector. Once we have a
relative range of completeness of I-Thou moments, we are able to pass this range
through time and create a developmental spectrum for the growth of I-Thou mo-
ments. I would propose that such growth in the sphere of I-Thou could provide a
way of conceptualizing the emotional growth within relationships, of the rela-
tionships themselves. In a relationship that is growing, I-Thou moments that
take place become increasingly full and complete.
I see such developments as crucial to family growth. If we return to our ado-
lescent girl and her mother, the moment of “co-creation” we imagined above
could be seen as one point upon a vector in which daughter and mother increase
the fullness of the I-Thou moments between them, as they each bring a relatively
more complete I (“I-position”) to their confrontation. In the clinical setting, this
often finds expression in my urging family members to say to each other one
more thing that they have never taken the risk to say. Not every last thing –
only a black and white I-Thou model would require this – but something
more, that makes this meeting relatively more complete. Clinically, a significant
I-Thou moment is one of growth, co-creation, in which this moment has ach-
ieved fuller presence of the two parties than previous moments.
At this point I import a notion from Gregory Bateson in order to expand the
picture. Bateson, in his challenging Mind and Nature was concerned with cyber-
netic processes, and noted (after Mittelstaedt) that there are two “sorts of meth-
ods for perfecting an adaptive act”¹⁵. Bateson gave the example of regulating the
temperature in a room by two different processes, one like calibration, which re-
sponds to the results of a change we have tried to make, and the other called
 Martin Buber, Knowledge, 75, 85.
 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1979), 211.
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“feedback” which denotes the intention that informs our actions. Bateson point-
ed out that calibration, by including results of all previous attempts, may be seen
as a higher level of logical type. Bateson’s singular contribution here was to re-
alize that these different sorts of activities do not only oscillate, but inform each
other. He proposed the accompanying scheme to demonstrate his point. At the
lowest level, the thermostat will turn the heating element on or off depending
upon the reading of the thermostat (i.e., “oscillating temperatures”). However,
the thermostat itself was set (i.e., “biased”) by the householder according to
how he has felt the temperature (hence, a calibration). The bias itself is the result
of the thermostat on the householder’s skin (i.e., “too cold or too hot”), which is
set by experiences of the householder with cold and heat, (“personal thresh-
old”), etc. Bateson even suggested an evolutionary advantage to alternation be-
tween two processes, to protect each process from moving two levels of logical
type at a time.
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This would seem like pretty heady stuff from the depths of the Eswelt. However,
Buber left us in Ich und Du the enigmatic picture of oscillation between the I-
Thou and the I-It modes of relating, without indicating the manner in which
this oscillation between the two poles affects the poles themselves. If we take
the flat line of oscillation between the two poles and pull it up accordion-like
through time, and through the range of increasing completeness of the I-Thou mo-
ments, we could place the seemingly flat oscillation into a developmental spiral,
which borrowing from Bateson, would look like this:
In order to make fuller sense of this scheme, I will introduce one more set of con-
cepts, which I find crucial in the teaching of just this point. The very same Daniel
Stern of “co-creation” composed a highly influential work summarizing two dec-
ades of research in infant development called The Interpersonal World of the In-
fant¹⁶. There Stern proposed two major stages in the way the infant makes use of
the “I” of the mother. During most of the first year, the mother serves as a “reg-
ulating selfobject”. In this term Stern defined more precisely one developmental
 Daniel Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
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aspect of the “selfobject” earlier elaborated by Heinz Kohut¹⁷. Kohut’s “selfob-
ject” means quite simply the way one person makes use of the presence of the
other in order to maintain the coherence of his own self. Stern’s regulating self-
object mother was used by the infant to maintain (and nurture) his own self, by
getting fed, comforted, or stimulated. At this stage the baby has relatively little
interest in the mother as a subject, what it is like for her to comfort him. He
just makes use of what he needs. Towards the end of the first year and through
the second year, Stern suggested that now mother becomes an “intersubjective
selfobject”. By this he meant that mother contributes the fact of her own subjec-
tivity to the baby’s ability to emerge as a subject himself. The baby now prefers to
see through mother’s eyes rather than solely to make use of her ministrations.
Mother allows the baby to participate in appreciating her own subjectivity,
and this allows the baby to appreciate and create his or her own subjectivity.
The “self” or “subject” is created through meetings with other subjects.
Buber first entered my teaching of family theory at the juncture between dif-
ferentiation and the inter-subjective, and it is exactly that juncture that I wish to
employ in order to describe the schema traced above. Families with “low differ-
entiation” are not failures who don’t perform “co-creations” as expected. They
are rather busy doing something else that comes first. Families of low differen-
tiation are busy with protective and regulating functions that come first¹⁸. These
regulations inform the Eswelt in which people use each other to protect the in-
tegrity of their family unit. However, caught only in regulating and protecting,
they find it impossible to grow. Growth of individuals takes place through inter-
subjective moments of “co-creation” in which each individual grows, the rela-
tionship grows, and the family grows. As family members emerge from regula-
tion and become less frightened, they take the risk of a relatively more
complete meeting viz. the “I-Thou” intersubjective moment. As change is creat-
ed, there is an enormous need to re-equilibrate and re-regulate the growing fam-
ily. During this period relationships return to regulation, in order to protect the
new growth. This would appear like a new I-It period, although a higher level of
differentiation than the previous level. Once safely regulated, and perhaps devel-
opmentally challenged by changes inside or outside the family, family members
 Heinz Kohut, The Anaylsis of the Self (New York: International Universities Press, 1971), and
Heinz Kohut, The Restoration of the Self (New York: International Universities Press, 1977).
 See Robert Kegan and Lisa Lahey, How the Way We Talk Can Change the Way We Work (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass 2001).
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will seek another “I-Thou” intersubjective co-creation¹⁹. The next “I-Thou” would
be one that now allows for a deeper and more complete meeting and a co-cre-
ation of relatively more complete dimensions. The family will then enter a regu-
latory phase to readapt to this now higher level of differentiation.
We would now be in a position to expand Bateson’s speculation about the
evolutionary necessity of oscillation between processes of different logical
type. I would add to Buber’s “wholeness” of the I-Thou the notion of a rise in
level of generalization of the relationship. The I-Thou includes all I-It relations
and in addition adds a new dimension to each “I.” Therefore it could be concep-
tualized as at a higher level of logical type. The new dimensions of each “I” need
protection from further change until they can be re-regulated into the matrix of
other relationships, or perhaps allow other “I-Thou” meetings with other signifi-
cant others. This post-creation re-regulating includes the new co-creation as well
as all the other processes of relations and reality, and is thus of higher logical
type. Once the regulation is adequate, a new, still higher logical type co-creation
will be possible, and so on. One could say with Bateson that if the I-Thou crea-
tions outstripped the ability for regulating and incorporating changes, the
changes would be either too unstable or too frighteningly distant from context,
and the result would be a total inhibition of the co-creative process.
In this way, family therapy practice would always be challenged to create a
regulation that enables growth towards an intersubjective I-Thou meeting of co-
creation and increasing differentiation. However, often families would need to be
helped to complete a re-regulation from the previous co-creation before they can
risk the next I-Thou. In family theory, the regulating was referred to as “first-
order change” while the co-creations were called “second-order change.”²⁰
These I-Thou moments are moments neither of luxury nor of superfluity.
They are moments deeply necessary for relationships to be able to grow, and
thus for all the individuals in the family to be able to grow. A family in which
the risk of the inter-subjective is too unsafe is a family which suffers from its in-
ability to be safe enough to take the risks of growth. This family therapist would
need to spend no little effort helping families to become safely regulated, as a
means to the ends of meeting the challenge of co-creations. Family therapy prac-
tice would need to alternate between the practice of regulation and the practice
of the intersubjective, between one I-It” and the next possible “I-Thou.” As the
 Alan Flashman, “Adolescents and Families,” Therapeutic Communication with Adolescents
(Hebrew) eds., Alan Flashman and Hanna Avnet (Jerusalem: Israel Ministry of Welfare, 2007),
143– 178.
 Lynn Hoffman, Foundations of Family Therapy (New York: Basic Books, 1981).
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level of differentiation increases, Buber’s principle of dialogue could be seen as
anything but incidental to such a process.
Obstacles to a Buberian Family Therapy
In this final section I offer some thoughts regarding the difficulty with which
family therapy today appreciates Buber’s fundamental relevance to its theory
and practice. I see the main obstacles in four realms: the needs of clients, the
experience of the therapist, the relinquishment of control, and the tendency to
dichotomize.
Families who begin therapy with a lower level of differentiation require a
great deal of attention to safe regulation. The intersubjective moments may
seem so distant and threatening as to escape the notice of the therapist, especial-
ly where many emergency protecting maneuvers are required. I find that family
therapists in the public sector, especially in areas of child protection or high con-
flict (i.e., low differentiation) divorce, find the Buberian formulations irrelevant
or annoying. I would put it this way: It is hard enough laboring in the Eswelt,
without being reminded about what is beyond it.
The second obstacle involves the experience of the family therapist. The no-
tion of creating moments of I-Thou in therapy is easier to conceptualize than to
practice. When two family members become ready for an intersubjective co-cre-
ation, many therapists feel that their presence in the therapy room is an intru-
sion. The therapist may feel the need to leave the family alone. Indeed, some
therapists, including myself, will on occasion leave a therapy room so as not
to distract from co-creation. However, there is a second aspect to this intimacy
that is emerging in family therapy. I find that some therapists experience an
overwhelming personal loneliness in the presence of family members’ creating
I-Thou moments. The intimacy of the clients engenders on the part of the thera-
pist a desire for such co-creation for herself or himself. If such moments are too
few and far between for the therapist personally, he or she may find it too diffi-
cult to bear their emergence between family members.
Family therapy has deep roots in the theory and practice of social control.
Much of the social motivation and financial support for family therapy in the
United States came from the post-World War Two failure to control two main so-
cial problems, mental illness and delinquency. The American theory was that the
problem belonged to the family, and the goal was to create a fully definable op-
erational goal of eradicating deviance by effecting family change. Buber’s I-Thou
cannot be operationalized, defined or controlled. It is nothing if it is not a theory
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of liberation, perhaps co-liberation. Family therapy that seeks to control behav-
ior will always be uncomfortable with its own relegation to the Eswelt.
In turning to the tendency to dichotomization I hope to suggest some con-
structive response to all these obstacles. The fact that Buber’s Ich und Du was
relegated to the dichotomizers by Kaufmann is instructive. Kaufmann’s magiste-
rial overview of the Discovery of Mind ²¹ saw Germany’s great thinkers divided be-
tween those who were limited in their own self understanding and therefore
caught in defining how the world should be according to dichotomous categories
(Kant was the first example) and those whose self-understanding allowed them
to appreciate the world as it is, without dichotomous categories (Goethe especial-
ly). It is perfectly obvious that we have here a dichotomizing war against those
who dichotomize. I bring this example to demonstrate how difficult it can be to
apprehend and consider two different processes without falling into overly di-
chotomizing errors. In family therapy as well, there has been a tendency to
see Buberian thinking as one part of a dichotomy. We saw this is Keeney and
Spenkle’s paper, dividing pragmatists from aestheticians. Mona deKoven Fish-
bane has written a fine survey of the Buberians in family therapy, especially
Ivan Boroszormenyi- Nagy and James Framo.²² It is all too easy to split Buber be-
tween the Eswelt types and the Ich-Du heroes, something Buber recognizes as a
likely error already in Ich und Du.²³ This split creates a formidable obstacle to in-
corporating Buber’s full message into family therapy as a whole. The “Buberi-
ans” claim priority of the intersubjective, which is only part of the whole picture,
leaving the “pragmatists” who are often struggling with regulatory functions to
defend themselves “against” Buber(ians) rather than appreciate what they have
to learn from Buber.
So I propose a different discourse in family therapy itself that I would sketch
by the now familiar scheme:
 Walter Kaufmann, The Discovery of the Mind, Vols 1,2,3, (New Brunswick: Transaction Pub-
lishers, 1991– 1993).
 Mona DeKoven Fishbane, “I, Thou, and We: A Dialogical Approach to Couples Therapy”,
Journal of Marital and Family Therapy 24 (1998):41–58.
 Martin Buber, Ich und Du, 78–9, and Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans.Walter Kaufmann 114.
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In words, I think that an honest discussion between “Buberians” and “non-Bu-
berians” would have much in common with moves from regulation to intersub-
jectivity in an ascending level of differentiation that would enrich the entire
field. I think that Family Therapy as a discipline by necessity meets both I-It
and I-Thou moments and that it might be better to define the discipline as learn-
ing how the different moments can be understood and enlisted in enhancing one
another. Perhaps Buber would have called this “keeping the questions open.”
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Aleida Assmann
Dialogic Memory
Memory is double edged. It can both serve as medium for reconciliation, peace
making and coexistence on the one hand and for rekindling conflicts by refuel-
ing hatred and revenge on the other.Whether it moves in one or the other direc-
tion is, of course, a matter of the social and political framework within which it
operates. If we are interested in the positive potential of memory for mutual un-
derstanding and peace building, we therefore need to understand better the
frameworks that determine the benign or malign quality of memory. This essay
argues that memory has a transformative power that can help to improve hither-
to divisive social and political relationships. In order to know more about the
cultural frameworks of memories, I will look at external and internal factors
that change memory and finally inspect more closely the shift from old to new
policies of remembering which draw on the dialogic quality of memory in situa-
tions of political and social change.
From the modernist frame to the memory frame
The idea that memory has transformative power is a rather new one and was de-
veloped only during the last thirty years or so. This shift in our thinking became
manifest in a new term that has surfaced in German discourse in the 1990s and
has since become part and parcel of the trite stock of official and public rhetoric,
namely: Erinnerungskultur (memory culture). We have developed the great hope
that memory can be conducive to changing human minds, hearts and habits and
even whole societies and states in the process of overcoming a traumatic history
of violence. Many people assume today that traumatic violence can be overcome
by negotiating mutual strategies of memory and visions of the past. All over the
world, the transformative power of memory is invoked to diffuse the pernicious
fuel of violence. It is implemented after periods of autocratic and genocidal vio-
lence (the Holocaust, Latin American dictatorships, South African Apartheid, the
Balkan War) as well as in response to the lasting impact of older genocides and
crimes against humanity (such as European colonialism and slavery).
But is this assumption really true? What has made us so optimistic? What is
our hope grounded on, or are we driven by an illusion? Let me start with a schol-
ar who does not share this view. Historian Christian Meier has expressed his dis-
sent in his book on “Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erin-
nerns”, in which he argues for forgetting rather than remembering as a
transformative power that leads to overcoming a pernicious past and to opening
a new page of history.¹
Meier argues as a historian, drawing attention to the policy of forgetting as
an age-old strategy for containing the explosive force of conflictive memories.
His examples are not only distant in time such as the Greek polis after the Pele-
ponnesian War, or the peace treaty of Münster-Osnabrück 1648 after another civil
war which contains the formula: “perpetua oblivio et amnestia.”² This policy
which goes hand in hand with a blanket amnesty in order to end mutual hatred
and to achieve a new social integration of formerly opposed parties is not a thing
of the past. Even after 1945 it was widely used as a political resource. It is true
that the International Court at Nuremberg had of course dispensed transitional
justice by indicting major Nazi functionaries for the newly defined “crime
against humanity.” This, however, was an act of purging rather than remember-
ing the past. In postwar Germany, the public sphere and that of official diploma-
cy remained largely shaped by what was called “a pact of silence.”³ The term
comes from Hermann Lübbe who in 1983 made the point that maintaining si-
lence was a necessary pragmatic strategy adopted in postwar Germany (and sup-
ported by the allies) to facilitate the economic and political reconstruction of the
state and the integration of society. Forgetting, or the pact of silence, also be-
came a strategy of European politics during the period of the Cold War in
which much had to be forgotten in order to consolidate the new Western military
alliance against that of the Communist block.⁴ As an example, let me refer to a
speech that Winston Churchill gave in Zürich in 1946 in which he demanded an
end to “the process of reckoning,” declaring:
We must all turn our backs upon the horrors of the past. We must look to the future. We
cannot afford to drag forward across the years that are to come the hatreds and revenges
 Christian Meier, Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns. Vom öffen-
tlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit (the obligation to forget and the necessity of re-
membering) (München: Beck. 2010).
 The peace treaty (Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis of 24th October 1648) contains the fol-
lowing article: “Both sides grant each other a perpetual forgetting and amnesty [perpetua obliv-
ion et amnestia] concerning every aggressive act committed in any place in any way by both par-
ties here and there since the beginning of the war.” Arno Buschmann, Kaiser und Reich.
Verfassungsgeschichte des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation vom Beginn des 12. Jahr-
hunderts bis zum Jahre 1806 in Dokumenten (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgsellschaft, 1994), 17.
 The term was employed in 1983 in a retrospective description by Hermann Lübbe (“kollektives
Beschweigen”). See Aleida Assmann, Ute Frevert, Geschichtsvergessenheit, Geschichtsversessen-
heit. Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,
1999), 76–78.
 Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2005).
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that have sprung from the injuries of the past. If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery,
and indeed from final doom, there must be an act of faith in the European family and an act
of oblivion against all the crimes and follies of the past.⁵
Within the cultural framework of the 1940s to 1960s, forgetting was considered
as a means to dissolve the divisive negative emotions of the past. As resentment
and hatred are supported, continued and refueled through memory, it was as-
sumed that forgetting rather than remembering could help to overcome a violent
past and open up a new future.
There are, however, two contrary ways of looking at forgetting: it can be seen
as a positive resource for leaving a troubled past behind and creating the poten-
tial for a new future, or it can be considered as a form of suppression and con-
tinuation of violence. Whether it is remembering or forgetting that is credited
with a transformative power depends on larger cultural frameworks and values
that change over time. Moving from forgetting to remembering implied what I
would like to call the shift from a modernist to a moralist perspective. The mod-
ernist spirit of innovation and orientation towards the future is based on a pos-
itive notion of temporal ruptures that contain the possibility of leaving the past
behind. The moralistic or therapeutic perspective, on the other hand, prescribes
a reengagement with a traumatic past in order to work through and overcome it.
During the last three decades, the general modernist trust in the automatic re-
generative power of the future that had been a central value of modernism
shared by European countries in both East and West has been eroded. In its
stead, a new concern with the abiding impact of violent pasts has entered our
thinking, feeling and acting not only in Europe but in many other parts of the
world as well. This is what I mean when I speak of a shift of attitude from the
“modernist frame” to the “memory frame.”
External and internal factors of change
There are various external and internal factors that can promote the transforma-
tive power of memory. Let me start with some external factors. Personal memory
remains restricted, constrained and devalued if it is deliberately cut off from his-
torical sources. The closing or opening of historical archives is therefore an im-
portant transformative factor. If sources are made publicly accessible and are
 Randolph S. Churchill, ed., The Sinews of Peace. Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill
(London: Cassell: 1948), 200. (I wish to thank Marco Duranti for drawing my attention to this
speech.)
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recognized in a public discourse, this can have a profound effect on a national
memory. After the end of the Cold War, for instance, the opening of Eastern Euro-
pean archives changed considerably the prevailing national maps of memory. As
the scope and complexity of Holocaust memory expanded, it challenged some of
the firmly established positive national self-images. New documents about Vichy
and the history of anti-Semitism in East Germany put an end to the self-image of
France or the German Democratic Republic as pure resisters; after the scandal
around Waldheim and the book about Jedwabne, Austria and Poland were no
longer able to claim an exclusive status of victim, and even the seemingly neu-
tral Swiss was confronted with its own ‘sites of memory’ in the form of their
banks and borders. As new evidence documenting collaboration or indifference
towards this crime against humanity ushered in heated debates, the clear and
simple structure of dominant national narratives had to become more complex
and inclusive. As long as archives remain closed, political power exerts control
over memory and the national self-image.
Another external factor is the impact of media. Books or films – if they are
able to inspire empathy and are well timed – can stimulate public debates and
change the social climate of discussion. An example for a powerful media inter-
vention into German memory was the American television series Holocaust,
which was televised in Germany in 1979. It is now generally agreed that this ser-
ies managed to do what public Holocaust education had hitherto not been able
to do: to tap the emotions of a wide range of the population and to open up the
blocked channels of empathy for Jewish victims. While many critics denigrated
the quality of the series as a trivial product of American mass culture, historians
such as Saul Friedlander and sociologists like Nathan Sznaider and Daniel Levy
have emphasized the transformative power of this tele event. I once talked to a
person who told me that his parents had forbidden him to watch the series,
which, of course, made his interest in this topic all the more ardent.
This brings me to a third factor that is of paramount importance for the
transformation of memory.With this factor we are moving from external to inter-
nal influences. Memory exists not only in the shape of eternal media, archives
and monuments, but also as embodied memory that is communicated between
three to four generations living together and interacting in a synchronic relation-
ship. According to sociologists who have investigated this field, each generation
is shaped by its decisive lifetime experiences, which influence its thinking and
feeling. Values, affections, loyalties and a specific weight of the past colors
their consciousness, their mind set and emotions. This generational memory is
not only transmitted from generation to generation but also periodically chal-
lenged, questioned and refuted by the younger. In this way, generational mem-
ories are exposed to continuous conflict and contestation within the society.
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The intergenerational dynamics is a central factor in changing the course of
memory. A common and even normative pattern in Western cultures is the revolt
of sons and daughters against the hegemony of their parents. The young protes-
tors are allowed and expected to deviate from and break with prevailing tradi-
tions and values. In Germany, this generational tension, which is built into the
dynamics of Western Culture, was reinforced by the 68-generation’s desire to
break with their parents continuous and silent loyalties with the Nazi period.
In their revolt, they enacted a violent cultural break in which they cut themselves
off from the contaminated legacy of the past. The sociologist Rainer Mario Lep-
sius has coined the term ‘externalization’ which can be applied to this desire to
break away and start anew. Twenty years later, when the 68ers had become
themselves fathers and mothers, they changed this attitude considerably towards
what Lepsius would call ‘internalization’. It took the form of reconnecting with
the family and working through the national past in a more empathetic and
self-critical way, reflecting on their own place in the generational chain.
The generational change can be of great importance for the introduction of a
new perspective in national memory. One example is the famous speech of West
German president Richard von Weizsäcker in 1985 in which he taught the Ger-
mans to think of May 8, 1945 no longer in terms of defeat and occupation but
rather in terms of liberation. He gave this speech at a moment when the number
was dwindling of those who belonged to the generation that had actually expe-
rienced a defeat by being captured and sent into shorter or longer terms of im-
prisonment. The younger generations, on the other hand, had grown up in a de-
mocracy that had become an integral part of Western Europe in which the spirit
of liberation had spilled across national borders.
The crucial importance of generations as carriers of memory can also be
seen in the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War. In Spain there was indeed a
“pact of silence,” or forgetfulness, which, however, did not come about immedi-
ately at the end of the civil war (1936–39), but was postponed for almost four
decades until Franco’s dictatorship ended with his death in 1975. The pact of si-
lence in 1977 was intended to underpin the transition (transición) from autocracy
to democracy. This transition has been characterized as “the birth of democracy
out of the spirit of dictatorship”19 All political crimes prior to 1977 were granted
an amnesty by the unwritten law of silence. The option of forgetting was in ac-
cord at the time with a widespread consensus in society. Nearly forty years after
the end of the civil war, the Spanish were prepared to let the problems of the past
be past, so as not to endanger their fragile democracy.20 It was the second gen-
eration after the Civil war that bypassed issues related to guilt or mourning in the
interests of consolidating a common future. Starting in the mid 1990s and culmi-
nating in the years after the turn of the century, the layers of silence enshrouding
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the violent past became increasingly porous; Republican counter-memory began
rediscovering the hidden past through an exhumation project, skeleton by skel-
eton. This new memory impulse originated in the third generation, which went
looking for the bodies of their lost grandparents and found them distributed
throughout the country.What their parents had chosen not to do – to act on be-
half of the first generation of victims – the grandchildren took up as their spe-
cific generational project of identifying Franco’s dead, working as self-declared
advocates of historical memory with the help of archaeologists, anthropologists
and geneticists. The pact of silence, which the second generation had endorsed,
enabled a transition to democracy, but it did not dissolve the traumatic legacy of
violence. Instead, it consolidated a deep division within society, materially pre-
served in the earth and in family memories.
In 2007, nearly seventy years after the end of the civil war and three decades
after the second generation’s pact of silence, another shift in the Spanish policy
of forgetting occurred. Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero, himself the grandson
of a Republican grandfather who was murdered and whose body disappeared,
rescinded the amnesty law after thirty years which amounts to the time span
of a generation. He passed the “Law of Historical Remembrance” (Ley de Memo-
ria Histórica) in parliament, which condemned the fascist dictatorship for the
first time, assuring its victims of recognition and restitution. Zapatero not only
conceded here to the internal pressure of Republican family memories, he was
also responding to changes in the general political climate of remembrance
which favored recalling the crimes of states and dictatorships even after such
an extended period of time. In a landscape saturated with Franquist symbols,
the hidden and hitherto neglected sites where the victims were unceremoniously
disposed have become the most significant lieux de mémoire for Republicans.27
The need for recognition which is felt by family members and their descendants
encompasses the rehabilitation and propitiation of the dead. Within the time
span of communicative memory, it is obviously the task of the third generation
to mourn and to bury the dead, performing this last ritual duty of commemora-
tion for their grandparents. The act of recovering and laying to rest the hidden
and forgotten dead refers us to an important transformative power or memory
that is rooted in the cultural dimension of religion and ritual.
From monologic to dialogic memory policies
From these personal and private acts of ritual remembrance let me come back to
the public and political context and discuss in more detail the paradigmatic shift
from forgetting to remembering in terms of new memory policies that we have
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seen emerging. Before addressing these new policies, let me first say a few words
about the old one, which – alas – is still thriving and continues to be in active
use. Edward Said characterized this traditional memory policy succinctly
when he wrote: “Memory and its representations touch very significantly upon
questions of identity, of nationalism, of power and authority.”⁶ In this context
of power and politics, he added, the past has always been “something to be
used, misused and exploited.”⁷ Such transformation of history into memory is
based on two important dimensions: political myths and national lieux de mé-
moire. Said defined myth in this context as the “power of narrative history to mo-
bilize people around a common goal.”⁸ He argued that in a world of decreasing
efficacy of religious, familial, and dynastic bonds […] people now look to this re-
fashioned memory, especially in its collective forms, to give themselves a coher-
ent identity, a national narrative, a place in the world.”⁹
Lieux de mémoire are more diverse than political myths; it is their function to
provide the nation with a sense of its distinct identity, rooting it in symbolic time
and space, emotionally charged common references and shared cultural practi-
ces. Pierre Nora’s concept is today also undergoing changes that reflect a shift
from monologic to more complex memory constructs. Nora’s inventory of com-
mon historical and cultural references reflected a strong French cult of the na-
tional. In the meantime, his concept has been widely imitated but also trans-
formed with each new context in which it was applied. In addition to many
national variations,¹⁰ new transnational models are currently being explored
and tested, such as Heinz Duchardt’s European lieux de mémoire or Robert Tra-
ba’s and Hans Henning Hahn’s impressive collaboration project on German and
Polish memory sites.¹¹ The new projects are often less normative and self-affirm-
ing and more self-reflexive and critical, including also traumatic and contested
sites. Nora’s holistic and homogeneous notion of the nation has also been ex-
changed for a new emphasis on different social milieus and ethnic experiences.
This open and inclusive approach is of special significance at a time when nation





 Denmark 1991/92; Netherlands 1993; Italy 1987/88; Austria 2000, Germany 2001, and Luxem-
burg 2007. Georg Kreis, “Pierre Nora besser verstehen – und kritisieren,” in Historie. Jahrbuch des
Zentrums für Historische Forschung. Forschung Berlin der Polinischen Akademie der Wissenschaf-
ten. Nr. 2 (2008/2009):103– 117.
 Hans Henning Hahn, Robert Traba, Deutsch-Polnische Erinnerungsorte (Paderborn: Schö-
ningh 2011).
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states are undergoing a structural change and reconfiguring their memories to
make room for the experience of migrant minorities. The lasting success of
Nora’s concept seems to lie in its great flexibility and adaptability. Its updated
versions are doing much more justice to the diversity of social and regional
groups and counter-memories, pointing even to gaps of oblivion –what is chosen
not to be remembered.
As Said emphasized, there is a direct connection between historical memory
and nation building. The power of such a memory lies not in an event but in the
effective narrative rendering of the event,which aims at creating a distinct profile
and positive self-image “as part of trying to gain independence. To become a na-
tion in the formal sense of the word, a people must make itself into something
more than a collection of tribes, or political organizations.”¹² Said wrote this
from the point of view of the Palestinians and their “inability to produce a con-
vincing narrative story with a beginning, middle and end”¹³ and who as a con-
sequence, according to him, have remained “scattered and politically ineffective
victims of Zionism.”¹⁴
In the old framework, national memories were mainly constructed around
heroic actions and heroic suffering. They are highly selective and composed in
such a way that they are identity-enhancing and self-celebrating. National mem-
ories are self-serving and therein closely aligned with political myths, which
Peter Sloterdijk has appropriately termed modes of “self-hypnosis.” With respect
to traumatic events, these myths provide effective protection shields against
those events that a nation prefers to forget. When facing negative events in
the past, there are only three dignified roles for the national collective to assume:
that of the victor who has overcome the evil, that of the resistor who has heroi-
cally fought the evil and that of the victim who has passively suffered the evil.
Everything else lies outside the scope of these memory perspectives and is con-
veniently forgotten.
The new memory policy that I am dealing with in this paper differs from the
old one not in abolishing national memory but in rethinking and reconfiguring it
along different lines. The new memory policy has undergone a shift from a
monologic to a more dialogic structure. It no longer evolves exclusively around
a heroic self-image but also acknowledges historical violence, suffering and trau-
ma within a new framework of moral and historical accountability. It was the cu-





ground for a profound cultural change in sensibility, which in many places of the
world also triggered new approaches to dealing with other historic traumas.
Against this background of a new transnational awareness of the suffering of vic-
tims, forgetting was no longer considered as an acceptable policy for overcoming
atrocities of the past. Remembering became a universal ethical and political
claim when dealing with the dictatorships in South America, the South-African
regime of apartheid, colonial history or the crime of slavery. In most of these
cases, references and metaphorical allusions were made to the newly established
memory icon of the Holocaust. In all of these cases, remembering rather than
forgetting is chosen for its transformative power and implemented as a therapeu-
tic tool to cleanse, to purge, to heal, to reconcile in the process of transforming a
state or reintegrating a society.
Reconciliation is often proverbially connected to the two verbs ‘forgive and
forget’. In these new cases, however, this is no longer the case. In the new policy,
forgiving is no longer connected to forgetting but to remembering. Remembering
here means recognition of the victims’ memories. It is more and more agreed that
without a clear facing and working through the atrocities of the past from the
point of view of those who suffered, the process of social and political transfor-
mation cannot begin. This transformative power of memory plays a crucial role
in the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) that were invented in South
America when countries such as Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil transi-
tioned from military dictatorships to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. In
this process, it was the ethical concept of human rights that supported the de-
mands to investigate a hidden past and restore it to social memory. By enforcing
the moral human rights paradigm, new political and extremely influential con-
cepts were coined such as ‘human rights violations’ and ‘state terrorism’. This led
to the establishment of investigative commissions, which became the antecedent
of later Truth commissions. The aim of TRCs is first and foremost a pragmatic
one: they are designed as instruments for “mastering” (rather than memorializ-
ing) the past.¹⁵ They emphasize the transformative value of truth and stress the
importance of acts of remembrance. “‘Remember, so as not to repeat’ (emerged)
as a message and as a cultural imperative.”¹⁶ The new human rights framework
 See Pierre Hazan, “Das neue Mantra der Gerechtigkeit,” in:Überblick. Deutsche Zeitschrift für
Entwicklungspolitik. The edition of May 2007 is dedicated to the problem of re-establishing jus-
tice after armed conflicts.
 Elizabeth Jelin, “Memories of State Violence: The Past in the Present”, Gladstein Lecture, de-
livered at the Human Rights Institute, University of Connecticut March 28, 2006, p. 5; see also
Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis: University of Minneso-
ta Press, 2003).
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replaced the older frameworks within which power struggles had been construct-
ed in terms of ideologies, class struggles, national revolutions or other political
antagonisms. By resorting to the universal value of bodily integrity and human
rights, the new terminology depoliticized the conflict and led to the elaboration
of memory policies.¹⁷ In the new framework of a human rights agenda and a new
memory culture, other forms of state violence could be addressed such as racial
and gender discrimination, repression and the rights of indigenous people.When
decades and sometimes centuries after a traumatic past justice in the full sense
is no longer possible, memory was discovered as an important symbolic resource
to retrospectively acknowledge these crimes against humanity.What the transna-
tional movement of abolition was for the nineteenth century, the new transna-
tional concept of victimhood is for the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury. The important change is, however, that now the victims speak for
themselves and claim their memories in a globalized public arena. The dissem-
ination of their voices and their public visibility and audibility has created a new
“world ethos” that makes it increasingly difficult for state authorities to continue
a repressive policy of forgetting and silence.
We have learned in the meantime that a new beginning can no longer be
forged on a tabula rasa. The road from authoritarian to civil societies leads
through the needle’s ear of facing, remembering and coming to terms with a bur-
dened past. This insight pushed the shift from the modernist frame to the mem-
ory frame that occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century. It was ac-
companied with a return of the old memory policy, but it also brought with it
a shift from monologic to dialogic memory constructs. Dialogic memory tran-
scends the old policy by integrating two or more perspectives on a common leg-
acy of traumatic violence. Two countries engage in a dialogic memory if they face
a shared history of mutual violence by mutually acknowledging their own guilt
and empathy with the suffering they have inflicted on others.
It is true that what I call ‘dialogic memory’ is not yet backed up by a consoli-
dated consensus but is still most conspicuous in its absence. It has, for instance,
become especially manifest in the relations between Russia and Eastern Europe-
an nations. While Russian memory is today centered around the great patriotic
war and Stalin is celebrated as the national hero, the nations that broke away
from Soviet power maintain a strikingly different memory of Stalin that has to
do with deportations, forced labor and mass-killings. The triumphalist memory
of Russia and the traumatic memory of Eastern European nations clash at the
internal borders of Europe and fuel continuous irritations and conflicts. “With
 Jelin, “Memories of State Violence”, 6.
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respect to its memories,” writes Janusz Reiter, previous Polish ambassador in
Germany: “the European Union remains a split continent. After its extension,
the line that separated the European Union from other countries now runs
right through it.” It must be emphasized, however, that the European Union cre-
ates a challenge to the solipsistic constructions of national memory and provides
an ideal framework for mutual observations, interactions and thus for dialogic
remembering. As we all know, the European Union is itself the consequence
of a traumatic legacy of an entangled history of unprecedented violence. If it
is to develop further from an economic and political network to a community
of shared values, the entangled histories will have to be transformed into shar-
able memories. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Bu-
chenwald, the former prisoner of the concentration camp and late writer Jorge
Semprún said: One of the most effective possibilities to forge a common future
for the European Union is “to share our past, our remembrance, our hitherto div-
ided memories”. And he added that the Eastern extension of the European Union
can only work “once we will be able to share our memories, including those of
the countries of the other Europe, the Europe that was caught up in Soviet totali-
tarianism.”¹⁸
There are dark incidents that are well known to historians and emphatically
commemorated by the traumatized country but utterly forgotten by the nation
that was immediately responsible for the suffering. While in the mean time the
Germans have learned a lot about the Holocaust, younger generations today
know next to nothing about the legacy of the Second World War and the atroc-
ities committed by Germans against, for instance, their Polish and Russian
neighbors. The Warsaw uprising, a seminal event commemorated in Poland, is
unknown to Germans because it is fully eclipsed by the Warsaw ghetto uprising.
Germans have rightly reclaimed the area bombing of Dresden for their national
memory, but they have totally forgotten a key event of Russian memory, namely
the Leningrad Blockade (1941–44) by the German Wehrmacht, through which
700,000 Russians were starved to death.¹⁹ This event has never entered German
national memory due to a lack of interest, empathy and external pressure.
 Jorge Semprún, “Nobody will be able any more to say: this is how it was!,” in: Die Zeit,
14. April 2005 (Trans. A. A.).
 To quote from a recent historical account: “The siege of Leningrad was “an integral part of
the unprecedented German war of extermination against the civilian population of the Soviet
Union. […] Considering the number of victims and the permanence of the terror, it was the great-
est catastrophe that hit a city during the Second World War. The city was cut off from the outside
world for almost 900 days from September 7th to 27th January 1944”. Jörg Ganzenmüller, Das
belagerte Leningrad 1941– 1944. Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern (Pa-
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Within the new memory frame, there are promising beginnings between
teachers and historians of neighboring countries working on shared textbooks
and mutual perceptions. Dialogic memory has a special relevance for Europe;
it could produce a new type of nation state that is not exclusively grounded in
pride but also accepts its dark legacies, thus ending a destructive history of vio-
lence by including the victims of this violence into one’s own memory. Only such
an inclusive memory,which is based on the moral standard of accountability and
human rights, can credibly back up the protection of human rights in the present
and support the values of a civil society in the future.
Dialogic memory, of course, can be extended also to other regions of the
world. My last example is the conflict between Israeli and Palestinians. National
memory does not only crystallize in narratives, but also around places. Sites of
antagonistic and violent history are always over-determined and become contest-
ed spaces for which new narratives have yet to be created. Said had suggested
that the Palestinians fell short in the process of national integration through
mythmaking which deprived them of mobilizing symbols and rendered them
helpless victims of Zionism. How could memory in this case unfold its transfor-
mative power? The Israeli writer Amos Oz has no hope whatsoever in such a
power. He once remarked: “If I had a say in the peace talks—no matter where,
in Wye, Oslo or where ever—I would instruct the sound technicians to turn off
the microphones as soon as one of the negotiating parties starts talking about
the past. They are paid for finding solutions for the present and the future”.²⁰
Oz obviously argues from the point of view of the modernist frame which neatly
separates the future from the past. In a conversation at Konstanz, Avishai Mar-
galit made a similar point to me on a more pragmatic level. He summed up the
problem in the formula: “No introduction of memory before the consolidation of
political structures!”²¹ Obviously both Oz and Margalit have little regard for the
transformative power of memory. There is, however, an Israeli NGO which is built
on exactly this hope in the transformative power of memory. It is called Zachrot,
which is the female form of the Hebrew “Zachor,” meaning Remember! This im-
perative is a central obligation in the Hebrew Bible and the key to Jewish tradi-
tion and identity. The female analogy of this emphatic word was created as the
derborn: Schoeningh, 2005), 20. See also Peter Jahn, “27 Millionen”, in: Die Zeit, Nr. 25 vom
14. Juni 2007.
 Amos Oz, “Israelis und Araber: Der Heilungsprozeß”, in:Trialog der Kulturen im Zeitalter der
Globalisierung, Sinclair-Haus Gespräche, 11.Gespräch 5.–8. December 1998, Herbert Quandt-Stif-
tung, Bad Homburg v.d.Höhe, 82–89, 83.
 Conversation with Avishai Margalit in the Inselhotel, Konstanz in November 2006, where he
gave the opening lecture at a conference on “Civil Wars”.
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name of a group of Israelis who take remembering out of a religious context and
place it in a political context. Their goal is to construct a more inclusive memory
on the basis of a dialogic remembering that includes into Israeli memory of the
Holocaust the Palestinian memory of the Nakba, a term for the traumatic expul-
sion from their homes during the war of independence in 1948. In contrast to Oz
and Margalit, the group that calls itself Zachot considers this dialogic and inclu-
sive memory an important basis for a civil society and a common future with Pal-
estinians. This is how they summarize their position on the internet:
Zochrot works to make the history of the Nakba accessible to the Israeli public so as to en-
gage Jews and Palestinians in an open recounting of our painful common history.We hope
that by bringing the Nakba into Hebrew, the language spoken by the Jewish majority in Is-
rael, we can make a qualitative change in the political discourse of this region. Acknowl-
edging the past is the first step in taking responsibility for its consequences. This must in-
clude equal rights for all the peoples of this land, including the right of Palestinians to
return to their homes.²²
Conclusion
Memories, to sum up, are dynamic and thus transformed over time.What is being
remembered of the past is largely dependent on the cultural frames, moral sen-
sibilities and demands of the present. In retrospect, we can identify a shift from
the modernist frame to the memory frame, which occurred in the late twentieth
century. During the Cold War, the memory of the Second World War was very dif-
ferent from what it is today; the Holocaust has moved from the periphery to the
center of West European memory only during the last two decades, but also other
historic traumas went through shorter or longer periods of latency before they
became the object of remembering and commemoration. While the old heroic
and monologic memory policy continues to be in use, it is now also challenged
in a new transnational if not global arena where they coexist in a web of mutual
reactions, observations, imitations, competitions and other forms of interaction.
During the last decades, the theory and use of memory have acquired a new
meaning when it became obvious that memory can be both a force for refueling
hatred and violence and thus maintaining and hardening divisions, as well as a
therapy for integration. Depending on the use and quality of memory, the former
fronts of violent conflict can be preserved or overcome. Although history has oc-
curred and is irreversible, our knowledge and evaluation of the events can be
 http://www.nakbainhebrew.org/index.php?lang=english (March 20, 2007).
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transformed in hindsight, if we reassess it in the light of retrospective knowledge
and values.
Remembering trauma evolves between the extremes of keeping the wound
open (or “preservation of the past”) and looking for closure (or “mastering the
past”). But we should not forget that remembering takes place simultaneously
on the separate but interrelated levels of individuals, families, society and the
state. Its transformative power works in different ways on the psychological,
moral, political and – last but not least – on the religious level when it comes
to the proper burying as a prerequisite for the memory of the dead. It is precisely
this cultural and religious duty of laying the dead to rest that is so shockingly
disrupted after periods of excessive violence. In the case of millions of Jewish
victims, there are no graves because their bodies were gassed, burnt and dis-
solved into air. For this reason this wound cannot be closed. At other places
the victims were “disappeared” or shot and hid in anonymous mass graves.
Some of these, relating to the Spanish civil war, are being reopened only now
after seventy-five years.²³ While the politicians and the society have still not
found a consensus for introducing these victims into a shared or sharable mem-
ory, it is up to individual family members to recover their dead and to perform
these last acts of reverence.
Let me close with a final question. In an essay with the title “Nightmares or
Daydreams?” Konrad Jarausch looks back at sixty-five years of European memo-
ry. He sees a strong preponderance of negative memories, what he misses are
positive values: “The impressive catalogue of human rights included in the docu-
ment has therefore derived its significance more from a general realization of
past evils that needed to be avoided than from a specific delineation of common
values that would bind the community together in the present. This failure is re-
grettable, because it tends to lock thinking about Europe into a negative mode.
Europe has become a kind of insurance policy against the repetition of prior
problems rather than a positive goal, based upon a shared vision for the fu-
ture.”²⁴
In his assessment of European memories, Jarausch uses two categorical dis-
tinctions. The first is the neat divide between past and future that resonates with
the modernist frame of thinking. As I tried to show, this simple binary has been
 Paul Ingendaay, “Der Bürgerkrieg ist immer noch nicht vorbei.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung, Nr. 276, November 25th 2008, p. 40.
 Konrad H. Jarausch, “Nightmares or Daydreams? A Postscript on the Europeanisation of
Memories”, in: A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politcs of Remembrance, hg. von
Malgorzata Pakier und Bo Strath, (Oxford und New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 309–320;
314 (trans. A. A.).
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replaced in the memory frame by a more complex interaction: in order to move
forward, we have to make a detour via the past. The second distinction is the op-
position between negative lessons and positive values. As I hope to have shown,
this neat distinction does not work in the case of recent European history where
the positive values of human rights, recognition of suffering, respect for the other
and historical accountability were distilled from negative lessons. Since the Eu-
ropeans gained these values in the course of their history, remembering this his-
tory including its errors, violence and immeasurable crimes, is their way to adopt
and ascertain these values. This new form of remembering deviates strikingly
from the old (and I would even say: default) monologic mode that focuses exclu-
sively on national heroism and national suffering by embracing also one’s own
guilt and the suffering of the others. It is this twist that transforms a negative his-
tory into a positive memory built on values that open up a new common future. I
would like to claim that the specific European heritage lies in this civil transfor-
mation of its own violent history into transnational orientations and new con-
necting bonds. I follow Adam Michnik who has succinctly defined this European
heritage: “The European Union emerged out of the negation of totalitarian dic-
tatorships which were full of atrocities and barbarism. The European values
are humanism and tolerance, equal dignity for all citizens, freedom of the indi-
vidual, solidarity with the weak and political pluralism. It is this testimony and
value system that Europe can bring to the world”.²⁵
For my generation the unexpectedly long peaceful phase in Europe comes as
an unexpected and – especially from the point of view of Germans – an utterly
undeserved gift. I am deeply grateful to the Europeans for transforming the
nightmare of their history into a vision which they now have the potential to
make real. The history they look back on is a particularly heavy burden and a
great challenge to commemoration. This is true, above all, of the trauma of
the Holocaust, which has created a national, European and trans-European
memory. As appreciation of the value of human dignity was won from the
most extreme destruction of that human dignity, the positive significance of
this value remains linked to its negative genesis.²⁶ The same applies to war
and post-war traumas, for the joint remembrance of a violent history is the
most effective way of overcoming the conditions that made it possible in the
first place. Historical violence has driven the nations of Europe apart, dialogic
 Adam Michnik, “A European Russia or a Russian Europe”, Baltic Worlds, IV:1 März 2011 (Sö-
dertörn University, Stockholm), 4–6, 6.
 Cf. Hans Joas, “Gewalt und Menschenwürde. Wie aus Erfahrungen Rechte werden,” in idem,
Die Sakaralität der Person. Eine neue genealogie der Menschenrechte (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag,
2011).
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forms of remembering can – in spite of lingering tensions and invisible barriers –
bring them closer together. The shared house of Europe gains in stability in pro-
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